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A b s t r a c t
This study examines the Singapore government’s Suzhou Industrial Park 
project between 1992 and 1999. It argues that the Singapore governments’ 
strategies can be explained as those of a ‘transnational entrepreneurial state’ 
participating in the global game of industrial production. As an interventionist 
government, it sought to realize financial profits in China to supplement 
economic growth in Singapore. The project involved two strategies designed 
to enhance the project’s competitive advantages. Firstly, it introduced the 
competitive strategy to supply high quality secondary factors of production— 
such as industrial infrastructure and bureaucratic administration—to industrial 
transnational corporations seeking to locate in China. Secondly, it utilized the 
collaborative strategy to encourage complementary collaboration with the 
China government and several industrial transnational corporations. During the 
Construction Phase (1992-1994), both strategies were successfully 
implemented, enhancing the competitiveness of the Suzhou Industrial Park. 
During the Take-Off Phase (1994-1996), many industrial transnational 
corporations had responded positively to these competitive advantages and 
chose to locate their operations at the Suzhou Industrial Park. During the 
Adjustment Phase (1997-1998), the Suzhou Industrial Park lost 
competitiveness because of external factors such as the impact of the Asian 
Finaucial Crisis and also because of intense competition from other industrial 
estates in China. In the Disengagement Phase (1999), the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state chose to withdraw from the project for 
economic and political reasons. This study concludes that the Singapore 
government differed from the archetypal interventionist state because of 
endogenous and exogenous factors. It became a transnational entrepreneurial 
state because by its resources and motivations, aud its own assessment of its 
economic and political conditions. This study also found that the outcome of 
its strategies were not just dependent on how they were implemented but also 
on the actions of other agents, including collaborators and competitors, and the 
influence of the external environment.
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Chapter One
C h a pt e r  O ne  
State Str ateg ies  in  th e  G l o b a l  E c o n o m y
1.1 R e s e a r c h  P r o b l e m
I n t r o d u c t io n
This study explores a central issue within the sociology of development: the 
role of the state as an agent of economic growth. More specifically, this study 
is interested in the effectiveness of state intervention to stimulate economic 
growth (Henderson and Appelbaum 1992: 3). Such intervention can be 
understood as development strategies, which can be defined as sets of 
government policies that shape a country’s relationship to the global economy 
and that affect the domestic allocation of resources among industries and 
major social groups (Gereffi 1990: 23). The experiences of the 
‘Developmental States’ of Asia have demonstrated that intervention— 
especially state fostering of indigenous enterprises—has made particular local 
industries highly competitive in a global context, and subsequently brought 
about rapid industrialization and subsequently economic growth (Woo- 
Cumings 1999: 2). However, state intervention can take many other forms. For 
example, a government could encourage local enterprises to invest overseas 
through offering attractive subsidies, hoping that profits earned abroad might 
supplement the domestic economy (Kojima 1978). Other states have 
intervened in their economies to create competitive conditions that would 
attract foreign direct investment as their main strategy for growth1 (Lall 1996: 
49). Yet, regardless of the forms, the objectives of all development strategies 
are necessarily geared towards achieving competitiveness in the global 
economy. This usually takes the form of a state’s defensive measures against 
rapid economic globalization or offensive measures to take advantage of new 
opportunities, or a combination of both (Gereffi 1990, and Henderson and 
Appelbaum 1992).
However, although state interventionist development strategies are 
globally oriented, most of the actual interventions are local. Against this
1
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backdrop, the Singapore government’s development strategy from the 
beginning of the 1990s differs from the model significantly. Its 
‘regionalization’ programme was designed to intervene in the regional Asia- 
Pacific rather than local economy to generate profits that would supplement its 
own domestic economy (see Wong and Ng 1997). In other words, the 
Singapore government’s development strategy for encouraging or maintaining 
economic growth for Singapore was geographically situated within other 
countries, such as China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. What were 
the conditions and motivations for the Singapore government to opt for this 
particular strategy? How was this strategy ultimately executed, and what were 
the outcomes of the regionalization programme? From a theoretical 
perspective, what does the case of the Singapore government’s regionalization 
programme contribute to the existing sociological models of state 
intervention?
In order to address these questions, this study proposes that the concept 
of the ‘transnational entrepreneurial state’ can be utilized to explain the 
actions, interactions and transactions of the Singapore government in the 
regional economy. This is because its profit-seeking motivations resembled the 
strategies of one type of interventionist state: the ‘entrepreneurial state.’ 
(Eisinger 1988, and Yu 1997) In addition, as implied, the Singapore 
government was transnational rather than local in orientation. This study will 
focus on the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) project 
between 1992 and 1999. Although the strategies involved several different 
thrusts, the Suzhou project provided an the exemplary case because it was the 
largest, most expensive and most politically significant sub-programme within 
the Singapore government’s regionalization programme . Indeed, many leaders 
of the Singapore government described the Suzhou Industrial Park as the 
country’s ‘flagship’ project.
T h e  S u z h o u  In d u s t r ia l  P a r k : A  B r ie f  S k e t c h
The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park—henceforth referred to
as the Suzhou Industrial Park—project was one of several industrial parks
2
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within the Singapore government’s wider ‘regionalization’ programme. This 
programme was designed to generate financial surpluses, creating an external 
income that would supplement Singapore’s economy. Within the 
‘regionalization’ programme was the ‘regional industrial parks’ project, which 
involved the building and management of Singapore-developed industrial 
estates in the Asia Pacific region. These estates would have advantages over 
others in the region because of their high quality industrial infrastructure and 
bureaucratic administration. The Singapore government initially projected that 
it could earn an income from the profits earned through ‘selling’ or ‘leasing’ 
industrial units to industrial transnational corporations that sought to expand 
manufacturing operations in the Asia Pacific region. In all these projects, the 
Singapore government would initially broker an agreement with the local 
government, before assigning a Singapore government-linked company or 
state-owned enterprise to complete the project. However, the Suzhou Industrial 
Park project was significantly different from the others because it was 
originally planned as the largest, most expensive and most politically 
significant project. Furthermore, unlike the other seven Singaporean regional 
industrial parks in the Asia-Pacific region, the Singapore government’s role in 
the Suzhou Industrial Park did not just involve brokering the deal, it included 
direct control over infrastructure development and bureaucratic administration. 
Furthermore, for this project, it initiated top-level govemment-to-govemment 
collaboration between the Singapore and China governments, and also a 
transfer of several Singapore social and political institutions to the local area.
In China, the Suzhou Industrial Park project was listed as one of over 
400 Special Economic Development Zones. It was located to the east of 
Suzhou city, which is 90 kilometres west of Shanghai in Jiangsu Province. 
However, between 1992 and 1999, this Park—along with the other Singapore- 
developed estate in Wuxi (see Chapter Four)— also differed from others in 
China because it was not developed, managed and marketed by any Chinese 
agency or organization. Instead, it was run by the China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park Development (CSSD) Private Limited, a foreign-Sino joint-
3
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venture company, where the Singapore government was effectively the 
majority shareholder3. Competing against other such zones in China for 
foreign investment, the Singapore government’s intention was to construct 
competitive advantages for the Suzhou Industrial Park project. These were the 
provision of high quality industrial infrastructure and a ‘Singaporean operating 
system’4 for the Park’s administration in China. At the same time, the 
Singapore government intentionally sought to encourage the China 
government and industrial transnational corporations to collaborate in the 
project by co-investing various forms of capital. For example, the China 
government contributed political capital by demonstrating its support for this 
project, while industrial transnational corporations invested social capital by 
providing positive referrals to other potential investors. To initially encourage 
such collaboration, the Singapore government had to convince its partners that 
the project would be mutually beneficial. The China government could benefit 
from economic and urban development, employment creation, technology 
transfer and foreign currency earnings. Transnational corporations could 
benefit from the low land and labour costs, but still enjoy high quality 
infrastructure and administration (see Table 1.1).
Ta b le  1.1: Th e  S yste m  o f  Co llab o ra tio n  a t  th e  S u zh o u  In d u str ia l  P a r k
Singapore China Government Transnational
Government Corporations
Input • Invests financial • Invests political • Invests positive
capital and support referrals
expertise
Returns • External Income • Urban • Low cost
• Strategic development production
International • Employment • Entry to the China
Relations • Technology market (limited)
transfer • Profits
In 1992, the China and Singapore government signed a joint agreement to 
promote the project. After two years of planning, in the ‘masterplan’ unveiled 
in 1994, the Suzhou Industrial Park was designed to cover 70 square 
kilometres by 2014, and would have cost an estimated US$30 million to
4
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develop {Singapore Straits Times 15 Sep 1994). The Park projected over 
US$20 billion in fixed capital investments, creating over 360,000 jobs for 
Suzhou. The venture began with a five-year project to develop the first eight 
square kilometres known as ‘Phase One.’ Between 1994 and 1997, the Suzhou 
Industrial Park was one of the most effective locations in China for attracting 
foreign investments {Singapore Straits Times 3 May 1997). Tenancy of the 
completed industrial land parcels was high and the fixed investment 
commitments were close to their forecasted targets; investment growth at the 
Park averaged slightly over 20 percent for the period (see Table 1.2).
Ta b le  1.2: N umber o f  C o m pan ies  a n d  F ix e d  In v e stm e n ts  C o m m itm en ts  in  
Th e  S u zh o u  In d u strial  Pa r k  (1994-1999).
Year Number of 
Companies
Fixed Investment
Commitments
(cumulative)(l)
Investment 
Growth 
rate (%)
Source
1994 14 US$0.87 billion - ST 15 Sep 1994
1995 56 US$1.88 billion 50 BT 6 Dec 1995
1996 69 US$2 billion 6 ST 5 May 1996
1997 82 US$3 billion 30 ST 3 May 1997
1998 92 US$4.3 billion 32 ST 8 Jul 1998
1999 132 US$6.4 billion 30 M T 1 Oct 99
2000 155 US$7 billion 8 Xinhua 12 May 2000
Note: (1) Includes further/additional investments by existing tenants.
Despite these positive growth figures, by the end of 1997, the Singapore 
government admitted that the Suzhou Industrial Park was ‘not doing well.’ It 
cited reasons such as the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis and ‘unfair’ 
competition from a rival industrial estate (the Suzhou New District) as the 
main reasons {Singapore Straits Times 29 Dec 1997). In June 1999, because 
the project was losing money and not expected to achieve its future targets of 
profitability5, the Singapore government announced that it was going to 
disengage formally from the project by selling its majority ownership of the 
CSSD to a consortium representing the China government {Singapore Straits 
Times 29 June 1999). As the most ambitious of the Singapore government’s 
regional industrial parks projects, it had originally hoped that the Suzhou
5
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Industrial Park’s competitive edge—its high quality industrial infrastructure 
and bureaucratic administration—would allow it to generate profits that would 
in turn supplement Singapore’s economy. However, despite its initial success, 
the Suzhou project could not sustain its competitive edge for a variety of 
reasons.
This study intends to analyze this project from within the perspective 
of interventionist state theories. Although the project could be approached 
from a variety of alternative viewpoints—for example, the project could be 
situated within the China government’s ongoing economic reforms or the 
global expansion of industrial transnational corporations—this study takes as 
its starting point the Singapore government’s evolution into a ‘transnational 
entrepreneurial state’ with its regionalization programme. This marks the first 
time a particular national government has transcended its national boundaries 
as a profit-seeking investor to take advantage of emerging opportunities in the 
‘global game of industrial production.’
1.2 Gl o b a l  Ga m e  o f  I n d u s t r ia l  P r o d u c t io n
The global game of industrial production could be defined as the
processes emanating from the demand and supply of factors of (industrial) 
production by various social agents or players6. The game is heavily influenced 
by the ‘global manufacturing system’ whereby industrial transnational 
corporations intentionally disperse production across the world for a variety of 
reasons (Gereffi 1992: 86). Demand is generated when certain players— 
particularly industrial producers— source and utilize factors of industrial 
production. Other players, usually those that have access to these factors of 
production, participate in the game as suppliers. Thus as suppliers, states (or 
governments) could theoretically offer access to the factors of production they 
control as a strategy to encourage industrial transnational corporations to 
locate. The framework further distinguishes between primary and secondary 
factors of production; the former usually refers to land, labour, raw materials, 
and capital. However, equally important are secondary factors. This includes 
any element in the industrial production process, including semi-finished
6
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(intermediate) products and services—such as fiscal incentives, financial 
inducements, tariffs, availability of infrastructure, and political stability—that 
supplement the industrial production processes (Dobson 1997: 7). In the global 
game of industrial production, the demand for factors of production are mostly 
generated by industrial transnational corporations whose motivation to 
generate profits for their shareholders is not geographically constrained; rather 
their search for profitability extends beyond national boundaries (Howells and 
Wood 1993: 13).
Suppliers can be any player that controls access to factors of industrial 
production. Some suppliers may be governments or states, as they control 
access to certain factors of production; alternatively, groups such as local 
labour unions and enterprises that have access to raw materials may also 
participate in the game by negotiating directly with industrial transnational 
corporations. These players have their own motivations for supplying these 
factors. Some states (or governments) might hope to achieve ‘developmental 
effects’—defined as forming local economic linkages, generating employment, 
earning foreign currency, and technology or managerial transfer (Sklair 1994: 
168-9)—from the operational location of industrial transnational corporations 
for their societies7. Others look to such location as a means to extract wealth 
for themselves8. One important dynamic is the ‘price’ of these factors of 
production, which is not arbitrary but is socially constructed. This price is 
generally determined by the level of demand from certain players and its 
supply from others. Thus, the price may change in response to changing 
demand and/or supply. As in all economic transactions, there is imperfect 
availability of information, and there could also be externalities that might 
distort the demand and/or supply of any of the factors (Henderson 1989: 37). 
However, another issue is the ‘quality’ of the factors, described as the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of these factors. This is because poor factors of 
production only lead to poor products. As suggested earlier, every location has 
different factor endowments (Henderson 1989: 9). Certain areas may have
7
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better human resource endowments, whereas other areas may be conducive for 
the extraction of key raw materials (Hayter 1997: 42).
The global game of industrial production emerges from players acting, 
interacting and transacting with each other, with their relationships usually 
influenced by the price of the factors. While this game has existed for several 
decades, since the 1980s under situations of rapid economic globalization, 
these dynamics are intensified. Rapid economic globalization refers to the 
intensification of transnational processes, particularly the movement of capital 
across borders (see Dunning 1998, Dicken 1998, and Held et al. 1999). While 
explaining why there is rapid economic globalization is beyond the scope of 
this study, the most important aspect about it was that intensification 
empirically took place during the 1980s (Oman 2000: 4). As the next section 
will show, this intensification of transnational economic activity was not just 
the result of increased transnationalization of industrial producers, but also 
because greater numbers of players—particularly national governments—that 
have chosen to participate in the game on the supply side.
T h e  D e m a n d  S id e
In the global game of industrial production, demand for factors of
production is mostly generated by industrial transnational corporations, 
especially expansionist corporations. This section briefly outlines the 
motivations, resources and strategies of ideal-typical industrial transnational 
corporations. It might be over-simplistic and probably even a truism to state 
that industrial transnational corporations are motivated by capitalism. In its 
broadest sense, capitalism refers to the creation of financial surpluses, usually 
through profits from investments. However, for industrial transnational 
corporations, the ‘type’ of capitalism is ‘global,’ where their sphere of 
operations transcends national boundaries9. All capitalist enterprises strive to 
expand as a strategy to increase profits. For industrial transnational 
corporations, expansion would involve extending their manufacturing or 
services activities over various locations. However, expansion is also strategic 
in the sense that it might involve entering into mergers and acquisitions as a
8
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means of strengthening competitiveness in a particular market (Michalet 1996: 
14). Put in another way:
‘The global firm and conglomerate is a design for survival under the 
competitive conditions of the new era. Its ability to scan the globe for 
investment possibilities makes possible a rational assignment of 
resources and ruthless pursuit of the exact combination of local 
policies, labour conditions, transport considerations, and so forth for 
any commodity or part.’ (Ross and Trachte 1990: 66)
However, even though nearly all industrial transnational corporations are 
driven by capitalistic motivations, their resultant strategies tend to vary widely. 
Part of the reason for this variation can be explained by the resources these 
industrial transnational corporations control. At one end of the spectrum, there 
are ‘massive’ industrial transnational corporations; all the largest ten 
corporations—as defined by Fortune magazine in its Global 500 index—have 
annual turnovers of over US$100 billion for the year 199910. At the other end, 
there are smaller industrial enterprises that strategically have a just a few 
production units distributed across several regions. The difference in resources 
would influence how each industrial transnational corporation proceeds with 
its business strategy. For example, large transnational corporations might have 
greater negotiating and bargaining power over suppliers of factors of 
production. Also, ‘giants’ might be better able to divide and distribute their 
operations horizontally and vertically in different locations across the world to 
take advantage of the most cost-effective and efficient factors. On the other 
hand, smaller transnational corporations might be more inclined to enter into 
joint-ventures and licensing deals in order to carve out their own niche in the 
global game of industrial production. This shows that although industrial 
transnational corporations have a uniform profit-seeking motive, their actual 
strategies can vary.
Acquiring the most efficient factors of production thus becomes an 
extremely important process to capitalist industrial transnational corporations. 
Poor factors of production only lead to poor products (Henderson 1989: 9, and 
Hayter 1997: 42-7). At one level, industrial transnational corporations focus on
9
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economic factor costs such as the cost of labour, materials, and land rents. Yet, 
equally important to them are political and social costs, which are those that 
arise from the availability (or the lack) of political and social stability of the 
location. These uncertainties or risks ultimately translate into real economic 
costs, as they might incur financial losses or weaken profitability. Thus, 
industrial transnational corporations will usually choose locations that have the 
lowest overall transaction costs (Dobson 1997: 9). At the same time, the 
location of industrial transnational corporations is not necessarily permanent. 
As the global economy is dynamic and constantly in flux, industrial 
transnational corporations might also switch and re-switch their resources and 
operations to maintain or enhance their profits (Dicken 1998: 177).
To summarize, expansionist industrial transnational corporations’ 
locational strategies are directly related to how they acquire and utilize factors 
of production. From a sociological perspective, this implies that industrial 
transnational corporations necessarily have to interact and transact with other 
agents or players such as governments, local labour and other groups within 
the global game of industrial production.
T h e  S u p p l y  S id e
When industrial transnational corporations source for factors of
production, this generates a ‘demand’ which other players to hope to ‘supply.’ 
The suppliers fall into two broad categories: those that supply directly and 
others that supply indirectly. For example, in the case of the global game of 
industrial production, direct suppliers includes the local workforce, which 
might negotiate for itself the ‘price’ at which it will exchange its labour with 
the industrial transnational corporations, or local enterprises that might control 
raw materials. Indirect suppliers might include national governments that 
might negotiate with industrial transnational corporations on behalf of local 
labour or local enterprises. In all these cases, players are motivated to supply— 
directly or indirectly—factors of production to industrial transnational 
corporations for their own benefit. In other words, they participate in the game 
to ‘win.’ Some might seek direct financial profit from the exchange, whereas
10
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others might seek other benefits. Certain governments or states are interested 
in industrial production (or more generally, industrialization), as a means of 
restructuring the economy, creating employment, earning foreign currency, and 
improving technology (see Stallings 1990). However, governments differ in 
how this industrialization could be achieved in their societies. In this light, this 
study is particularly interested in development strategies that involve the 
location of industrial transnational corporations within their borders11.
In the global game of industrial production, the reality is that there are
many players on both the demand and the supply sides. It is not unexpected to
see inter-group (for example, between industrial transnational corporations and
governments) and intra-group (between different industrial transnational
corporations) competition, collaboration or even exclusion. It is common for
players in the demand side to bargain and negotiate with several suppliers in
order to get the best value or price for the desired factors (Howells and Wood
1993: 44). Suppliers might negotiate with competing players from the demand
side for the best terms and conditions for itself. Also there might be
competition between industrial transnational corporations to maximize profits
through dominating market share, while suppliers might compete among each
other to ‘sell’ their factors of production, as evidenced by governments that
manipulate strategic industrial policies towards this end (see Chang 1998).
After the 1980s, suppliers of factors of production were also perpetrators and
victims of rapid economic globalization. For example, the ‘20th century gold
rush’ was as much caused by governments that were opening up their once
protectionist national borders to transnational capital, as much as it was caused
1 2by expansionist industrial transnational corporations (Tongzon 1998: 3). In 
this sense, more governments have turned to participation in the global game 
of industrial production as part of their economic development strategy. This 
aspect will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two.
Thus, the global game of industrial production arises from the actions, 
interactions and transactions of agents or players over the demand and supply 
of factors of production. As this study will demonstrate, some players—
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including the China government—participated in the game hoping to stimulate 
local economic growth, while others—such as the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state—hoped to benefit financially through encouraging the 
location of industrial transnational corporations.
1.3 Th e  Tr a n s n a  t io n a l  E n t r e p r e n e u r ia l  S ta  t e
This study argues that the Singapore government, based on its
strategies for the Suzhou Industrial Park project between 1992 and 1999, could 
be understood as a ‘transnational entrepreneurial state’. From a sociological 
perspective, the state is conceptualized as an organization incorporating 
specific groups in society which includes the government—referring to 
individuals that control political power—as well as the arms of the state, 
including the ministries, bureaucracies, state agencies and armed forces13. This 
implies that some individuals within the state, such as government ministers, 
may be elected (although not always the case). Other individuals are, in a strict 
sense, employees of the state. Thus, the state should not be understood as 
being a homogenous group, particularly in terms of its motivations. Not only 
could there be different and competing interests between various individuals 
within the state, even within the government there may be differences. 
Furthermore, various individuals in the arms of the state may have their own 
set of self-interests, which may possibly conflict with other groups. Therefore, 
the Singapore government should not be understood as being synonymous 
with the transnational entrepreneurial state. Instead, it is just one group within 
the state, albeit a dominant and powerful one, for specific reasons that will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
This study makes two key assumptions. The first is that all states will 
be motivated to achieve or maintain positive national economic growth. The 
reasons behind this motivation could range from the economic nationalism of 
the state to the personal gain by governmental leaders (see Woo-Cumings 
1999). In this sense, all states therefore have plans and visions of what the 
optimal economic performance ought to be, and how to achieve it. Such plans 
could be broadly described as ‘development strategies,’ which refer to how
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governments seek to achieve national economic goals or targets (Gereffi 1990, 
Henderson 1998, Kieley 1998 and Casey 1998). For some governments, the 
goal may be the maintenance of existing positive economic conditions; others 
may be ‘dissatisfied’ with current conditions and may attempt to improve 
them14. As will be discussed in the next section, how states actually achieve 
this is less obvious and subject to variation because of their different resources, 
motivations and strategies. The second assumption is that—in the present 
era—states necessarily consider that positive economic performance of the 
national economy is directly related to the country’s relative economic 
competitiveness in the global economy. Therefore the transnational 
entrepreneurial state is a specific state-form that executes a particular 
economic strategy that is influenced by its entrepreneurial motivations and 
resources.
S t a t e  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h ip
The Singapore government has actively participated in the global game
of industrial production since 1965 when the country became politically
independent (see Chapter Four). Between 1965 and 1990, the government had
successfully manipulated or managed the Singapore economy to take
advantage of a particular niche in the global game of industrial production as
an archetypal ‘supply’ side player to industrial producers. Singapore’s niche
was initially its low-cost location for the manufacturing operations of
industrial transnational corporations (Mirza 1986, Lim et al. 1988, and Peebles
and Wilson 1996). This provided the platform for consistent economic growth
over fifteen years. However, by the late 1980s, this niche was being seriously
eroded by the changes in the global game of industrial production. A key
change was the entrance of new players who sought to supply the same factors
of production at lower costs to industrial transnational corporations (see
Krause 1987). At the beginning of the 1990s, in response to the changing
environment, the Singapore government intentionally evolved into a
transnational entrepreneurial state in an attempt to improve the nation’s
economic performance.
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Entrepreneurship refers to the ability (and effectiveness) of agents to 
discover and exploit hitherto unnoticed opportunities (Kirzner 1973: 33)15.
The definition of ‘opportunities’ covers both being able to identify new fields 
to exploit as well as new means to exploit old fields. The main motivation for 
entrepreneurs is to create wealth and profit (Schumpeter 1962 [1939]: 83). 
Effective entrepreneurs should demonstrate their alertness in reading, 
understanding and then devising strategies to take advantage of market data 
(Yu 1997: 50). Another aspect of entrepreneurship is the relatively higher 
degree of risk involved. Compared with regular business ventures, 
entrepreneurial ventures carry higher risk but simultaneously offer higher 
returns if successful. In this sense, entrepreneurs are the few who go where 
eagles dare to tread. Yet, once the path is broken and proven successful, others 
will catch onto the idea and then copy successful techniques or processes. This 
ultimately spurs entrepreneurs to constantly strive to maintain their innovative 
edge (see Zafirovski 1999, and Glancey and McQuaid 2000).
In the literature on entrepreneurship, the focus has usually been on 
private enterprises or individual entrepreneurs rather than on state 
entrepreneurship (see Yu 1997). However, there have been several cases where 
state agencies and governments have been described as demonstrating 
‘entrepreneurial’ characteristics. For example, various states within the USA 
have shown entrepreneurial motivations because of the need to raise revenues 
through entrepreneurial activities due to a lack of federal or national funding in 
certain spheres and declining local revenues16 (see Eisinger 1988). Also, the 
strategies of several state-linked agencies in certain cities in the USA have also 
been found to be entrepreneurial in character (see Logan and Molotch 1987). 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the three so-called developmental 
states of Asia have displayed entrepreneurial characteristics, such as 
demonstrating entrepreneurial vision to identify ‘winners’ and devise strategies 
to enhance national economic competitiveness (Yu 1997, and Chang 1999). 
However, these developmental states of Asia could not be described as being 
truly entrepreneurial as their main motivations were ‘developmental.’ The
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difference is that developmental states are motivated to achieve developmental 
effects such as employment creation, technology transfer and enterprise 
efficiency as opposed entrepreneurial states that are predominantly motivated 
by profit seeking or wealth creation. Such an entrepreneurial state might re­
invest these profits in developmental projects, but this is not a necessary
1 7condition . With this distinction, there have been several specific 
governments that have shifted from developmental to entrepreneurial 
motivations; for instance, it was quite clear that the Japanese government after 
1970 was selectively subsidizing certain domestic conglomerates to invest 
abroad for the sole purposes of generating national surpluses (see Kojima 
1978). Other governments have different sets of strategies, because of 
variations in their available resources and the different conditions of the 
internal and external environment, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
While endogenous factors—such as the motivations, resources and 
strategies of entrepreneurs—are important in predicting the outcome of their 
activities, exogenous factors are equally salient. Two such important 
exogenous factors are the existence of competition (competitors) and the 
dynamic market. An entrepreneur’s effectiveness depends on being ahead of 
its competitors in all three spheres (opportunity identification, devising of 
plans, and investing of resources). A key objective of entrepreneurship is its 
aim of capturing and dominating a particular market niche. If competitors can 
replicate the product or service offered by the protagonist, it would mean that 
its niche or competitive edge has been lost, in turn leading to a loss in demand. 
Therefore, an effective entrepreneurial agent should have a unique product (or 
service) that competitors cannot duplicate. Secondly, the nature of the market 
is another important factor. The market—in this sense the demand for any 
product or service—is never static; instead it is highly dynamic and constantly 
in a state of flux because of many factors, including the level of technology, 
global economic conditions, and even personal tastes of consumers (see 
Zafirovski 1999, and Glancey and McQuaid 2000). For the entrepreneur to
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maintain its competitive edge, it has to constantly be able to identify 
opportunities and devise new strategies to keep ahead.
To summarize, both endogenous and exogenous factors influence the 
outcome of any entrepreneurial venture. Thus, effective entrepreneurial 
states—like private individual entrepreneurs— should demonstrate the ability 
to (1) identify new economic opportunities, (2) devise efficient strategies, (3) 
effectively invest its inherent resources, and (4) constantly monitor the market 
to stay ahead of the competition in order to maintain its niche. Thus, from 
within this entrepreneurial perspective, the Singapore government—if it were 
an effective entrepreneurial agent—would need to identify a profitable niche, 
and devise strategies to take advantage of it. However, the nature of 
entrepreneurial activity is a dynamic process. Effective entrepreneurship does 
not just entail devising and executing strategies to capture this niche once; 
instead, it involves the constant maintenance of this competitive niche. Any 
erosion of this niche—for example, the supply of similar products or services 
by competitors, or major changes in the demand—would negatively affect the 
profitability of the venture. Thus, successful entrepreneurial actors have to 
ensure that they maintain their competitive edge over time.
1.4 R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t io n
This study argues that the Singapore government could be understood
as a transnational entrepreneurial state, which identified that its niche at the 
beginning of the 1990s was the supply of secondary factors of production, such 
as high quality industrial infrastructure and administration, in the Asia Pacific 
region, which already had competitive low cost primary factors18. In order to 
capture this niche, the Singapore government sought to introduce competitive 
advantages at its various regional industrial parks, as well as to encourage the 
collaboration of key players, such as the local governments and industrial 
transnational corporations. However, the Suzhou Industrial Park stood out 
from all the other regional industrial parks, as it was by far the largest, most 
expensive, and politically significant to the Singapore government. The 
Suzhou project also involved top-level govemment-to-govemment
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collaboration, as well as a formalized transfer of institutions, known as the 
‘software transfer.’ Furthermore, unlike the other estates, the Singapore 
government itself became actively involved in the planning, negotiations and 
management of the Suzhou project. Under these conditions, the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project was therefore an exemplary case that could explain the 
actions, interactions and transactions of the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state.
This study will show that in the Suzhou project, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state’s main actions were its competitive and 
collaborative strategies. The former aimed to give the Suzhou Industrial Park 
competitive advantages over its competitors. To the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state, it believed that the Suzhou Industrial Park’s edge was its 
provision of high-quality industrial infrastructure and bureaucratic 
administration (the ‘Singaporean operating system’). Despite China’s highly 
competitive primary factors of production, its relatively poor quality of its 
secondary factors of production incurred risks or uncertainty costs for potential 
investors. If the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s competitive 
strategies could supply these secondary factors at the Suzhou Industrial Park, it 
would give the project a competitive edge over rival estates, and would 
encourage industrial transnational corporations to locate in the Park. Thus, if 
successful, the competitive strategies would generate a profitable income for 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state in China. For the 
collaborative strategies, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
hoped to further enhance the competitiveness of the Suzhou project by 
encouraging key players—such as the China government and industrial 
transnational corporations—to co-invest essential resources and inputs, such as 
political and social capital. To encourage this collaboration, the Singapore 
government’s strategies were designed to increase ‘embeddededness19’ with 
these players. As will be elaborated in the next chapter, embeddededness can 
be achieved through various mechanisms. Economic mechanisms were used to 
create economic and financial incentives to demonstrate complementarity and
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mutual benefit with the resources, motivations and strategies of the other 
players. Political mechanisms were used to govern the project, and social 
mechanisms were used to develop the other players’ confidence in the project. 
Therefore, if  successful, the collaborative strategies should establish 
complementarity, effectively govern the collaboration and enhance the 
collaborators’ level of trust and confidence in the project. Having established 
the project’s competitiveness, an entrepreneurial agent would have to monitor 
the actions of competitors to protect its own niche. It ought to continue to 
maintain embeddedness with its collaborators throughout the project. In 
addition, it would to monitor the external environment for changes to the 
market.
This study therefore intends to analyze and explain the Singapore 
government’s strategies by utilizing the concepts of the ‘transnational 
entrepreneurial state’ and the ‘global game of industrial production.’ The focus 
of the study centers on explaining why and how the Singapore government 
evolved into a transnational entrepreneurial state, and then how it proceeded to 
participate in the global game of industrial production through its actions, 
interactions and transactions with other key agents. As suggested in the 
previous sections, also important are variables such as the motivations, 
resources and strategies of other players, as well as the structure of the global 
game of industrial production. Furthermore, the study accepts that the global 
game of industrial production is not static but in a state of constant flux. The 
game might also affect the resources, motivations and strategies of other 
players including the collaborators and competitors.
Thus, this study aims to explain why and how the Singapore 
government, as a transnational entrepreneurial state, participated in the global 
game of industrial production through its Suzhou Industrial Park project. More 
specifically, the study focuses on explaining how the transnational 
entrepreneurial state acted, interacted and transacted with other key players in 
the game, including the China government, industrial transnational 
corporations and local authorities, in the course of the project between 1992,
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which was the year the Suzhou Industrial Park project officially began, and 
1999, the year the Singapore government officially announced its 
disengagement from the project. The study will be organized chronologically, 
beginning by identifying the resources, motivations and pre-existing conditions 
that led the Singapore government to consciously become a transnational 
entrepreneurial state at the beginning of the 1990s. The study will proceed by 
describing how the Singapore government, as a transnational entrepreneurial 
state, utilized its strategies to construct competitive advantages for the project
90between 1992 and 1994, in what this study will call the project’s 
‘Construction Phase.’ Here, the focus of the study will be on how the 
Singapore government utilized the competitive and collaborative strategies in a 
period where there was ‘China fever,’ a commonly used description of the 
huge influx of foreign direct investment into the China’s many special 
economic zones21. The study will follow with an analysis of the second period 
between 1994 and 1996, ‘the Take-Off Phase,’ where it examines the reasons 
behind the early competitive advantages of the project by analysing the 
responses of its collaborators and clients. For the third period between 1997 
and 1998, ‘the Adjustment Phase,’ the study analyzes how the Singapore 
government utilized its strategies to cope with the Suzhou Industrial Park’s 
diminishing competitiveness, caused by strong competition from other 
industrial estates in China and changes in the external environment with 
particular reference to the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. The study 
proceeds to explain the Singapore government’s actions during the fourth 
period, the ‘Disengagement Phase,’ beginning in 1999. It describes how and 
why the Singapore government utilized its strategies when it had to withdraw 
from the Suzhou project.
S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  S t u d y
The structure of this study is as follows: the next chapter theoretically
situates the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s competitive and
collaborative strategies within the literature on state interventionist
development strategies. Chapter Three is devoted to developing a research
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methodology to gather the necessary data to study the Suzhou Industrial Park 
project. Chapter Four examines the Singapore and China governments’ role in 
the global game of industrial production before 1990. The focus of this chapter 
is to explain why the Singapore government opted for transnational 
entrepreneurial development strategies in the late 1980s, and how this 
converged with the development strategies of the China government. Chapter 
five examines how the competitive and collaborative strategies were utilized 
during the ‘construction phase’ between 1990 and 1994. Chapter six analyzes 
how the strategies were utilized during the ‘take-off phase between 1994 and 
1996 to further enhance the project’s uniqueness and deepen the collaborative 
relationships. Chapter seven examines how the strategies were utilized during 
the ‘adjustment’ phase (1997-1999) to deal with changes to the external 
environment, particularly the impact of the Asian financial crisis and the 
increased competition from other industrial estates in China. Chapter eight 
explains how the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state utilized the 
strategies during the ‘disengagement’ phase (in 1999) when it had to withdraw 
from the project. Chapter nine reflects upon the intended and unintended 
consequences of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategies 
through analyzing the state’s relationships with ‘Singaporean’ enterprises in 
the project. This chapter also compares the Suzhou project with the other 
regional industrial parks projects. Chapter ten concludes by drawing together 
the main findings from the research, developing the concept of the 
transnational entrepreneurial state within the global game of industrial 
production, and contributing to the theories on the role of states as agents of 
economic growth, not just in the national but global economy.
N o t e s
1 On the other hand, there were cases of state intervention that negatively affected the 
economy, leading to economic stagnation or decline, state corruption, rent seeking and foreign 
exploitation (Evans 1995: 57-9).
2 This study argues that the Suzhou Industrial Park project is an exemplary rather than critical 
case, as will be fully discussed in Chapter Three. However, it can briefly be stated that an
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exemplary case represents one situation that is outstanding in several regards, even though it 
shares several similarities and origins with other situations. Critical cases are often regarded as 
essentially unique, and stand alone for other situations (see Yin 1994).
3 The Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park was jointly developed by a Singapore government 
linked corporations (Sembawang Corporation) and the local Wuxi Municipal Development 
Authority. As o f 1999, these were the only two o f the Special Economic Development Zones 
that had any foreign ownership or control.
4 As the later chapters will show, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state has 
intentionally utilized terms from information technology in the Suzhou Industrial Park project. 
Here ‘operating system’ (OS) alludes to various computer operating systems such as IBM, 
Macintosh, and Linux. Other prominent IT terms that have been used by the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state are the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ transfer (see Chapter 
Five).
5 See Singapore Straits Times ‘Suzhou park loss could hit (S)$151m,’ 15 Sep 1999.
6 The concept o f the ‘game’ derives from Stopford and Strange, who argued that the 
competition for world market shares by states and firms constitutes a game, and consequently 
‘...the structural changes in international political economy and the global economy [by the end 
of the 1980s] has altered the nature of the game by affecting the actions and responses among 
firms and states.’ (1991: 4, emphasis mine)
7 Conversely, there could be serious negative effects from the location o f industrial 
transnational corporations, including exploitation o f workers, environmental degradation and 
the formation o f a ‘dependent’ relationship with the host enterprise (as argued from the neo­
colonial perspective) (see Kiely 1998).
8 Such governments have been described as ‘predatory states’ (see Evans 1995: 12, and 43-7).
9 Gereffi writes: ‘In transnational production systems that characterize global capitalism, 
economic activity is not only international in scope; it is global in organization, where 
internationalisation refers simply to the geographical spread o f economic activities across 
national boundaries, globalization implies a degree o f functional integration between 
internationally dispersed activities.’ (1994: 215, emphases in original)
10 For example, the ‘largest’ company for 1999 was General Motors, with revenues of  
US$176,558 million, and the tenth largest company was Itochu, which had revenues of  
US$109,069 million (Fortune 17 April 2000).
11 In Chapter Two, this study situates these ‘TNC-oriented’ development strategies within the 
broader range o f FDI-led strategies in greater detail.
12 This mood o f ‘economic liberalism’ did not just spring from local governments, but was also 
influenced by the interests o f various powerful and resource-rich global players, including the 
United States government (and Treasury), the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, 
large transnational corporations and financial corporations. See Wade (1998 and 2000) and 
Sklair (2001) for somewhat different accounts o f those behind this ‘neo-liberal’ economic 
ideology.
13 See Johnson (1982), Henderson and Appelbaum (1992), and Evans (1995) for the logic of  
disaggregating the state.
14 As implicit in the discussion, all states attempt to manage their economies; whether their 
management is actually effective is less certain and much more variable, as will be explained 
later in the chapter.
15 Also see Kirzner (1979), Yu (1997), Zafirovski (1999), and Glancey and McQuaid (2000) 
for details o f the many definitions o f the concept o f entrepreneurship. However, the definition 
adopted for this study is particularly focused on explaining entrepreneurship from a 
sociological perspective.
16 Recently, certain local provincial governments in China have also demonstrated 
‘entrepreneurial characteristics’ for the same purposes (see Duckett 1998).
17 When governmental leaders extract these profits for their personal use, Evans has described 
them as a predatory state (1995: 12).
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18 As the later chapters will argue, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state did not 
choose to encourage the outward investment o f domestic enterprises (in the manner o f the 
Japanese government after 1970) because o f the internal structure o f Singapore’s economy.
19 The concept o f embeddedness is derived from Evans’ concept o f ‘embedded autonomy,’ 
(1995) which was used to explain the developmental state model. See Chapter Two of this 
study for a detailed discussion and operationalization o f this concept.
20 Although the year 1992 was chosen as a starting point, the research will extend back to 
1990, which was the time that the Singapore government announced its ‘Regionalization’ 
strategy and began its fact-finding missions to situate a major industrial park in the region. The 
Memorandum O f Understanding to develop the park in Suzhou was signed in 1993, and the 
Park was officially opened on 15 Sep 1994.
21 For example, see ‘China Fever,’ The Economist, 1 March 1997.
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C h a pt e r  Two 
C o lla b o r a t io n  a n d  C o m pe t it iv e n e ss
This study argues that the Singapore government’s regionalization programme 
can be understood as a transnational entrepreneurial state participating in the 
global game of industrial production. Theoretically, these strategies can be 
situated within the literature on state intervention in the economy and 
development strategies (henceforth known as interventionist development 
strategies). As suggested in the previous chapter, the Singapore government’s 
regionalization programme shared similarities to the interventionist 
development strategies model as it was geared towards achieving global 
competitiveness through active state intervention. However, they differed from 
the existing model as these strategies were transnationally rather than locally 
oriented in addition to being primarily motivated by profit generation. This 
study therefore argues that the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
adopted two central strategies of the interventionist development strategies 
model, the collaborative and competitive strategies, but applied them in 
different ways particularly for the Suzhou Industrial Park project.
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s collaborative 
strategy utilized embedding strategies to encourage and deepen the 
collaboration with targeted players, while the competitive strategy was 
designed to enhance the project’s competitive edge within the Chinese 
economy. The latter involved supplying high quality secondary factors of 
production—which included industrial infrastructure and bureaucratic 
administration—that would give the Suzhou Industrial Park competitive 
advantages vis-a-vis other industrial regions competing for the location of 
industrial transnational corporations. This chapter therefore focuses on an in- 
depth discussion of the collaborative and competitive strategies, drawn from 
the existing theories of interventionist development strategies.
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2.1 COLLABORATION: LESSONS FROM THE DEVELOPMENTAL STA TE
Within the theories of interventionist development strategies, the
state’s utilization of the collaborative strategy was aimed at encouraging the
collaboration of certain key players in national economic projects. This form
of collaboration is best exemplified in the case of the ‘developmental state’
(see for example Johnson 1999, and Woo-Cumings 1999). The developmental
state model emerged as an alternative explanation to the rapid East Asian
Growth after the Second World War, explaining the rapid industrial
transformation and economic growth of Japan between 1950 and 1970, South
Korea between 1960 and 1980 and Taiwan since 1970. Previously, these
countries growth was explained by either the ‘neo-liberal’ or ‘culturalist’
theories1. However, the developmental state model argued that rapid economic
growth was neither due to ‘free market’ principles nor the cultural work ethic
of the population; instead the state’s purposive intervention in its economy was
a critical factor. More specifically, the state’s interventionist strategies
involved enhancing the economy’s competitiveness through collaboration with
private enterprises. The following section will outline why these historically
specific governments chose this option.
I n t e r v e n t io n is t  S t a t e s
Developmental states can be understood as one of several ‘types’ of
‘plan-rational’ states that actively seek to ‘intervene’ in their national
economies (Henderson and Appelbaum 1992: 18-9). In the recent past, such
state intervention is designed to pursue ‘industrialization’ as a developmental
strategy:
‘Industrialization is a process by which not only the manufacturing 
sector comes to account for a large share of GDP and employment, 
but also the industrial structure is transformed to include the 
production of goods and services requiring higher technological 
capabilities, more sophisticated worker skills and greater managerial 
competence.’ (Chudnovsky 1996: 269)
In other words, governments usually view industrialization as a strategic 
means to increase economic activity in the country. Enterprises would be
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stimulated—through inter-enterprise competition—to maximize their use of 
technologies. However, because of the pervasiveness of global enterprises in
tlithe 20 century—with their ‘organisational capabilities’ based on a core 
technology—their institutionalisation of research and development effectively 
erected entry barriers around their proprietary technology family2. This 
effectively meant that in the modem era, the world was divided between the 
industrially-developed and the undeveloped societies, on the basis of the 
societies either having industrially efficient or industrially deficient enterprises 
respectively. However, it was argued that a process of Tate industrialization’ 
could re-address this situation (see Gerschenkron 1962). Gerschenkron’s Tate 
industrialization’ theory was a process that predicted that the more backward 
the society (measured in terms of productivity level), the better placed it was— 
under certain circumstances—to leam from developed industrial countries and 
potentially ‘leapfrog’ up the technological ladder (Amsden 1992: 56).
Although the Tate industrialization’ theory has not been empirically proven, it 
has seen many states—particularly ‘plan-rational’ states—take it upon 
themselves to create the environment conducive enough to attempt such a 
‘leapfrogging’ through intervention in the economy.
Before this section discusses how the developmental state could 
intervene in the economy, it is worth explaining why such governments would 
be motivated to prioritize development. An important factor was the pro- 
developmental motivations of a specific group within the state. This group— 
the ‘developmental elite’—was made up of government leaders and senior 
state bureaucrats3. They prioritized economic growth above all other social and 
political agendas (Johnson 1982). As they held key positions within the state, 
they harnessed their collective economic, political and social resources in 
society to dominate the various arms of the state—including the ministries, 
bureaucracies and state agencies—into executing various strategies that would 
promote economic development (Woo-Cumings 1999: 3). The developmental 
elite’s motivation could be explained by several factors: firstly members of 
this elite had a political ideology of ‘economic nationalism,’ which stressed
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that national survival depended heavily on economic growth (Woo-Cumings 
1999: 4). Secondly, the elite was motivated to prioritize growth because its 
own political legitimacy and survival within the country depended on 
‘delivering the fruits of development’ to the voting population (Castells 1992: 
34-5). It has also been proposed that exogenous forces also were pressuring 
these governments to achieve rapid economic growth (Weiss 1998: 23). For 
instance, there was some evidence that the United States government wished 
to see Japan, South Korea and Taiwan become ‘prosperous’ so that these 
countries could serve as a bulwark against communism (more specifically the 
People’s Republic of China and North Korea governments) as well as 
consumer markets for American products4. This saw the U.S. government not 
only militarily protect these states, but also support them financially (Pempel 
1999a: 153-4).
Although most states and governments subscribe to economic growth 
as a priority, actually realizing this has proven more difficult. One factor that 
contributed to the success of the developmental states of Asia was their control 
of key economic and political resources in their respective countries. 
Economically, the three developmental states of Asia had the financial support 
of the United States government5. Politically, the developmental state had 
control over various arms of the state, such as ministries, bureaucracies and 
agencies to execute the developmental plan. This included state agencies such 
as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan, the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) in South Korea, and the Industrial Planning 
Bureau (IPB) in Taiwan6. These agencies were important because senior 
bureaucrats— ‘techno-bureaucratic elite’—contributed the necessary expertise 
in the fields of economics, industrial development and law, assisting in the 
economic and industrial transformation or restructuring (Evans 1995: 12). This 
term was first utilized to describe Latin American state bureaucrats who 
utilized their resources to increase their own personal wealth (see Duvall and 
Freeman 1983). The key difference was that the Asian techno-bureaucratic 
elite shared the pro-developmentalist motivations with the governmental elites,
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and collaborated on the developmental project. There were two explanations 
for the bureaucrats’ loyalty to the state programme: the first is purely 
rationalistic, where state bureaucrats were very well financially rewarded for 
demonstrating loyalty (Evans 1995: 32). The second is more ‘cultural’ in the 
sense that (Asian) bureaucrats had a moral and traditional obligation to remain 
loyal to the state regimes (see Johnson 1982).
With these resources and pro-developmentalist motivations, the 
developmental state had the capacity to intervene in its national economy. The 
objective of intervention was to correct the existing market failure—which 
was causing the industrial inefficiency of enterprises in society—and to 
improve the economy’s global competitiveness. Identification of the failures 
and devising solutions to improve competitiveness are therefore important 
tasks for the state. This implies that effective developmental states need to 
have entrepreneurial vision, which can be defined as the ability to correctly 
identify the national economy’s relative weaknesses and devise solutions to 
promote competitiveness (see Yu 1997, and Chang 1999). For example, in the 
1950s the Japanese developmental state chose to concentrate resources on 
electronics and light manufacturing (Johnson 1982, and Okimoto 1989). The 
South Korean developmental state initially focused on steel production, and 
later shifted its attention towards manufacturing (Amsden 1989, Evans 1995, 
and Kim 1997). The Taiwanese developmental state geared its development 
strategy towards manufacturing (Wade 1990, Fields 1995, and McBeath 1998). 
Thus, the developmental states had to identify niches within the global 
economy, after which the state would have to devise strategies to exploit these
n
niches .
States cannot achieve economic growth by themselves; enterprises—
regardless of whether they are state-owned, private or semi-private—
8 * • necessarily have to be the engine of growth . It is through the efficiency and
positive economic performance of these enterprises that the economy would
expand and develop, in turn bringing about ‘developmental effects’ such as
employment, income distribution and wealth creation. However, private
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enterprises—more so than state-owned or government-linked enterprises— 
might not necessarily be motivated towards these ends:
‘The private sector may not initiate industrialization because it is 
shortsighted or operations with imperfect information. Or it may 
simply be undercapitalised and hence unable to take sort-term losses 
due to the underdevelopment and inefficiency of capital markets. Or 
future profits may not compensate for current losses (in the absence 
of incremental productivity and quality improvements), or investing 
in manufacturing may be less profitable than, say, speculating in 
land or importing foreign products, in which cases subsidies to 
manufacturing are justified if such activity has spillovers, 
externalities or complementarities.’ (Amsden 1992: 59)
As implied, for these enterprises to be productive and efficient enough to bring 
about national economic growth, states have to know when, how and how 
much to intervene, usually with financial subsidies. Thus, at a theoretical level, 
the socialist state would attempt to correct ‘market failures’ by gaining total 
control over key enterprises in the country, itself determining factor prices, 
production output levels and prices. At the other extreme, (ideal-typical) 
laissez faire states are assumed not to intervene in the economy, effectively 
allowing the ‘market’ to determine the most optimal levels of production and 
prices. In between these two theoretical extremes is a range of state-types. The 
Welfare State would manage the economy through intervention only to 
maintain optimal market forces, to regulate ‘fair competition’ between 
enterprises, and to ensure that essential ‘public goods’ are still supplied (see 
Block 1994). Then there are interventionist plan-rational states that attempt to 
restructure the market by assisting enterprises in one form of another 
(Henderson and Appelbaum 1992: 12). The Facilitative State is a plan-rational 
state type that offers subsidies and financial assistance to certain enterprises 
that might not be market efficient. This form of state intervention involves 
getting the prices ‘wrong,’ essentially skewing the market to re-favour private 
enterprises especially when they have to compete against other (often foreign) 
enterprises (Amsden 1992: 60). With these financial injections, these 
enterprises could acquire the necessary ‘technology’ to industrialize efficiently, 
and in turn spur economic activity in the country9. However, the Facilitative
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State often lacks the ability to discipline supported enterprises, where 
discipline refers to the state’s ability to enforce performance targets, leading to 
a situation o f ‘rent seeking’ (Amsden 1989: 32). Thus, it is argued that 
Developmental States not only gave out subsidies to enterprises but through a 
process known as ‘complementary collaboration,’ these subsidies became 
closely tied to performance criteria (Evans 1995: 13).
C o m p l e m e n t a r y  C o l l a b o r a t io n
Collaboration is defined as an activity where two or more separate
actors work together in pursuit of a particular goal, entering into a web of 
economic, legal, political and social interactions, transactions and 
relationships10 (see Child and Faulkner 1998). Collaboration would cover a 
broad range of possibilities, including joint ventures where details of the 
collaboration are formalized by legal agreements, strategic alliances with 
informal sharing of resources between collaborators, and verbal agreements to 
collaborate11. Collaboration is different from competition where parties work 
against each other in pursuit of their goals. Actors choose to collaborate when 
they do not have resources to achieve goals on their own, when they want to 
share risks, or when the returns may be higher than if they proceeded on their 
own. The developmental state opted for collaboration with private (and semi­
private) enterprises. One reason was because the developmental state, unlike 
the ideal-typical socialist state, lacked the economic or political resources to 
‘nationalize’ or transfer ownership of enterprises to the state. However, 
developmental states may have also intentionally chosen collaboration over 
nationalization because they believed that enterprises would be more 
economically efficient and productive if managed by the private sector 
(Johnson 1982: 32). If the state and companies pooled their resources and 
abilities under a system of ‘complementary collaboration,’ both sides could 
benefit:
‘Complementarity is the conventional way of conceptualizing 
mutually supportive relations between public and private actors. It 
suggests a clear division of labour, based on the contrasting 
properties of public and private institutions. (...) Putting two kinds
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of inputs together results in greater output than either public or 
private sectors could deliver on their own.’ (Evans 1996: 1120)
It is important to note that the motivations of both sides were different. The 
state was interested in achieving national economic growth while enterprises in 
the private sector were primarily concerned about profitability and efficiency. 
Yet, it was possible that these interests could be complementary and mutually 
beneficial. For instance, a firm’s profitability could lead to economic growth in 
the country. However, the developmental elite realized that it could not take 
for granted that companies would automatically agree to collaborate, as some 
enterprises might not be interested in participating in national economic 
projects because of reasons including the projects were not financially 
promising, these projects were not its ‘core competence,’ and there were prior 
poor relationships between specific enterprises and the state (see Chiu, Ho and 
Lui 1997). To encourage the enterprises to collaborate, the developmental state 
utilized ‘embedding’ strategies (Evans 1995: 50). Furthermore, if the 
collaboration was already underway, embedding could further enhance the 
collaborative relationship. This would translate into greater lubrication of 
transactions and interactions between partners.
In the case of the developmental states of Asia, complementary 
collaboration with private (and semi-private) enterprises was the adopted 
engine of growth. The economies of these states were stagnant or in decline 
because these enterprises were unable to function at optimal or efficient levels. 
For example, in the 1950s, private Japanese enterprises were economically 
weak due to the effects of World War Two (Johnson 1982, Okimoto 1989 and 
Tsuru 1993). Similarly in the 1960s, the South Korean enterprises emerged 
from the scars of a civil war and a predatory government (Amsden 1989, and 
Kim 1997). In Taiwan, the economy consisted of many small family based 
enterprises whose efficiency was negatively affected by the fierce local 
competition and technological backwardness as well as geopolitical threats 
from a hostile People’s Republic of China government12. All three countries 
faced a situation of high labour surplus, weak economic growth and poor
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industrial structure where most enterprises—private (or semi-private)—were 
technologically backward, capital-scarce and often producing below optimal 
levels. Furthermore, in all three countries, there was fierce inter-enterprise 
competition to seek rents from the state (Fields 1995). Under these conditions, 
the developmental state—as a purposive and interventionist plan rational 
state—chose collaboration as a strategy by subsidizing selected private and 
semi-private enterprises. The aim was to make them more efficient and 
competitive within the global economy, with the hope that this would in turn 
bring about national economic growth. The following section discusses how 
collaboration was achieved in the case of the developmental states of Asia, 
particularly through the utilization of embedding mechanisms that had a dual 
function of encouraging closeness as well as enforcing discipline13.
2.2  E m b e d d in g  M e c h a n is m s
In the developmental state model, embeddedness allowed a
government to effectively control and guide companies in the private or semi­
private sector towards participating in national economic projects without 
having to ‘own’ or nationalize them:
‘Embeddedness implies a concrete set of connections that link the 
state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with 
whom the state shares a joint project of [economic] transformation.’
(Evans 1995: 59)
Thus, effective embedding infers that collaborative partners are very close. 
Closeness has economic, political and social functions. Economically, 
closeness reduces transaction costs between partners, allowing for transactions 
and information flows to be faster and more accurate. Politically, closeness 
allows for greater governance and monitoring. Socially, closeness also implies 
familiarity, trust and confidence among partners. Conversely, autonomy is 
defined as one party’s degree of insulation from another14. Autonomy or 
insulation allows parties to ignore the actions, interactions and transactions of 
others. In order to achieve national economic growth, it was argued that on the 
one hand, the developmental state had to increase the embeddedness between
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itself and targeted private enterprises, while it had to maintain autonomy from 
interest groups that were seeking to capture the government15 (Evans 1995: 
14).
From a theoretical perspective, increasing embeddedness and reducing 
autonomy was important in encouraging collaboration or enhancing on-going 
collaboration. Thus, the more embedded the plan-rational state was to 
collaborating enterprises, the greater was its ability to direct and discipline the 
other’s actions. More specifically, interventionist states would seek to direct 
collaborating enterprises into profitable niches within the global economy. 
Also, an effective interventionist state would be able to discipline or exact 
performance standards from collaborating enterprises. The highest degree 
embeddedness between state and enterprises was the socialist state, since the 
former owned and controlled the latter. However, effective developmental 
states could achieve a high degree of embeddedness without owning 
enterprises. This was achieved through the use of specific economic, political 
and social mechanisms, as will be discussed in the following section. These 
three mechanisms parallel the concepts of ‘markets, hierarchy and networks,’ 
or ‘price, authority and trust16.’
E c o n o m ic  M e c h a n is m s
Economic, market or price mechanisms are financial incentives to
encourage other actors to respond positively. The basic assumption is that 
actors and groups react to market or price signals, and collaborate because it is 
economically rational. In the case of the Asian developmental states, the most 
commonly used economic mechanisms for embedding included financial 
subsidies, injections and loans to encourage selected or targeted companies to 
collaborate (Woo-Cumings 1999). Other economic mechanisms included the 
state’s protection of ‘infant’ companies against foreign competitors. In Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, at the onset of the collaboration, as companies were 
technologically backward, they chose to accept the incentives offered by the 
state since they would economically benefit (see Fields 1995, Kim 1997, 
Rodrik 1995 and Evans 1995). There were also instances where the
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developmental state offered large subsidies to enterprises willing to enter so- 
called ‘uncompetitive’ sectors because they were nationally important. Most of 
these companies either could not afford the economies of scale or viewed them 
as extremely risky ventures. In South Korea, this was exactly how the 
developmental state encouraged state-owned companies to go against 
‘traditional economic logic’ and enter the steel sector (see Amsden 1989, and 
Rodrik 1995 and Kim 1997). In Taiwan, the state’s later economic 
incentives—including the establishment of science parks, offering of large 
financial subsidies and tax relief—encouraged many small and medium sized 
enterprises to engage in Research and Development activities (see Rodrik 1995 
and Wang 1997). Private firms had not engaged in R&D because it was 
extremely capital and knowledge intensive which was too costly; furthermore, 
these firms could not match the capabilities of larger transnational 
corporations in the late 1970s, and thus always lagged behind. Yet, as these 
were nationally important activities, the state was willing to provide the 
capital. Since the capital was available, several enterprises eventually did 
collaborate in the project, which in turn paved the way for Taiwan to later 
become highly competitive in the semiconductor sector in the global economy 
in the 1980s (see Fields 1995, and Evans 1995).
Effective developmental states utilized economic mechanisms on 
targeted players—such as enterprises in the private and semi-private sector—to 
demonstrate that collaboration would be economically or financially 
complementary and mutually beneficial. However, by agreeing to collaborate, 
these targeted enterprises came under the discipline of the state, and had to 
accept the directives and performance standards set by the state (Amsden 
1989: 146). Private enterprises that valued their corporate autonomy more than 
economic benefits would decline to collaborate. As a further resort, the 
developmental state often utilized other mechanisms to embed itself more 
effectively onto the private sector. To achieve this, non-economic measures 
were also simultaneously utilized. Therefore, the economic mechanisms were 
purposively utilized to achieve complementarity and mutual benefit.
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P o l it ic a l  M e c h a n is m s
The political, hierarchy or authority mechanism is the use of legal and
political power to affect inter-group relationships. This refers to both the
creation of formal and legal institutions, as well as the use of political threats
and coercive power. Institutions are, in the broadest form, ‘...the rules of the
game, some formal others informal’ (North 1990: 1). The main role of
institutions is governance or control. Formal institutions between two actors
may take the form of contractual and legal agreements. These agreements
detail obligations, resource inputs and the distribution of the returns in a form
of a set of legally binding contracts (see Williamson 1986: 101-130). Informal
institutions include simple verbal agreements such as the ‘gentleman’s
handshake.’ As such, both formal and informal institutions might result in
systemic patterns of shared expectations being formed for the purposes of
governance. In the developmental states of Asia, the governments utilized
political mechanisms such as the constitutional and legislative instruments to
govern or control the private sector. For example, in South Korea and Taiwan,
it was mandatory by law for all registered businesses to join an official
business or commercial association. Through these associations, the state
could govern and control businesses by using the threat of heavy fines or
withdrawal of the business license to enforce compliance (see McBeath 1998,
Fields 1995 and Kim 1997). Furthermore, after the collaborative project had
begun, developmental states utilized political mechanisms to govern or
monitor their targeted enterprises. Thus, political mechanisms were said to
perform a disciplinary function in ensuring that partners carried through their
obligations (Amsden 1989: 149). Psychologically, the existence of political
mechanisms—regardless of whether they are actually utilized—could act a
form of assurance to collaborators, in that they have recourse to compensation
or punishment should there be a breach in the collaborative contract
(Williamson 1996: 32). However, political mechanisms often created friction
between partners, often leading to distrust and hostility especially from the
weaker partner17. In such coerced collaborations—where there was a political
or economic imbalance between collaborators—the weaker partner often only
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collaborated because it was either forced to or had no other economic choice. 
If the circumstances improved for the weaker partner, it could contemplate 
withdrawal.
S o c ia l  M e c h a n is m s
Social mechanisms consist of four elements: familiarity, reciprocity,
1 o
credibility and trust between parties . When these four elements are present 
between collaborators, they potentially lower transaction costs and increase 
confidence. A lack of confidence in one’s partner could incur high costs that 
arise from having to learn the rules (or institutions), finding the way around, 
looking for background information and monitoring (Williamson 1986: 114- 
5). These are translated into real costs when time, effort or money are incurred. 
Familiarity—developed through repeated and regular dealings with a close and 
trusted partner or through the availability of accurate information—could 
reduce these transaction and monitoring costs as well as diminish uncertainty 
(Schneider and Maxfield 1997: 13). Reciprocity refers to partners keeping 
obligations. Levels of reciprocity are considered high if both parties fulfil 
performance promises19. Credibility refers to the basis that one partner would 
act upon the other’s reputation (Schneider and Maxfield 1997: 10). With the 
existence of credibility and reciprocity, trust between actors would emerge20.
In the developmental state model, trust is operationalized to refer to a 
calculated and contingent phenomenon where actors on each side expect those 
on the other not to betray them (Schneider and Maxfield 1997: 13). In 
collaborative relationships, trust could be used by one party to encourage the 
other to jointly undertake a high risk venture; with high levels of trust, there 
would be less anxiety and greater confidence on the part of the invited party in 
committing to the venture. Trust by no means guarantees the success of the 
venture. It could however speed up the invited party’s decision-making 
process, encourage it to commit greater amounts of resources to the venture, 
and other similar confidence-demonstrating actions. At the same time, trust 
could lead parties to become over-complacent and lower their guard regarding 
basic business decision-making processes. To recapitulate, when social
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mechanisms—developing familiarity, reciprocity, credibility and trust—are 
effectively utilized, intergroup relationship between partners improve, in turn 
leading to an increase in the levels of confidence in each other. With such 
confidence, the likelihood of parties to engage in collaboration is increased. In 
cases of on-going collaboration, confidence has the function of further 
lubricating the relationships, leading to a reduction of transaction costs and an 
increase in efficiency. In the case of the Japanese developmental state, 
familiarity, reciprocity and trust between individuals in the government and the 
private sector were important factors that enhanced collaboration in the 
deliberation councils on Japanese industrial policy (see Johnson 1982, and 
Okimoto 1989). Social mechanisms do not always need to be based on 
personal contacts. Players may also place their trust indirectly in systems such 
as laws and offices (see Luhmann 1979), or social institutions such as in 
kinship networks or cultural practices such as guanxi21 (see Hamilton 1997). In 
this sense, prior social ties as in the case of Japan were not always required as 
social embedding could be cultivated and developed by either or both partners. 
Social mechanisms are therefore utilized to develop confidence and trust in 
collaborative relationships. In a similar manner, the developmental state could 
also use the economic and political mechanisms to maintain autonomy from 
groups attempting to ‘capture’ the state. Economically, the Taiwanese 
developmental state negotiated a ‘fair’ wage for local labour in order to 
maintain industrial harmony (see Wade 1990). Although not explicitly detailed 
in the studies, it could be argued that social mechanisms such as trust were 
developed between the state and labour when the benefits of economic growth 
and development were re-distributed to the population. With emerging trust in 
the developmental state, the population legitimized the government’s rule and 
policies.
To summarize, developmental states attempted to encourage targeted 
private and semi-private enterprises to collaborate in nationally important 
economic projects. To achieve this, the state utilized economic, political and 
social mechanisms to reduce the degree of autonomy and increase the degree
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of embeddedness between itself and the targeted enterprises. Economic 
mechanisms were utilized to convince potential partners that collaboration 
would be beneficial. Political mechanisms were mainly used to govern or 
monitor the collaboration, and social mechanisms were utilized to build 
confidence and trust in the project. In this sense, the motivations, resources 
and strategies of the private or semi-private enterprises were as important as 
the effectiveness of the state’s embedding mechanisms in understanding 
whether collaboration would proceed.
T h e  E x t e r n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t
One factor that could affect collaboration between players is the
external environment. The external environment—the economic, political and 
social conditions of the game—plays an important role in shaping the various 
players’ motivations, resources and strategies. Firstly, the resources, 
motivations and strategies of players in the game are shaped by the 
environment. Secondly, changes in the external environment could affect the 
resources, motivations and strategies of players involved in the game. Any 
changes to the resources, motivations and strategies of players could in turn 
affect the collaborative relationship, both positively and negatively.
In the cases of the developmental states, the external environment was 
an important factor that affected the collaborative relationship between the 
state and enterprises. For example, the role of the United States’ foreign policy 
during the post World War Two period was crucial in the emergence of the 
developmental states of Asia. As the United States wanted to ensure that 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan did not fall into the communist-Soviet sphere 
of influence, it allowed these frontier capitalist economies to export to the 
United States and even turned a blind eye to their highly protectionist import 
policies (Kim 1997, and Pempel 1999a). Thus, the theory argued that the 
external environment was critical in shaping and influencing the resources, 
motivations and strategies of the developmentalist government, which in turn 
affected the other players as well. Changes in the external environment were 
also shown to affect collaboration, as seen in the case of the South Korean
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developmental state. The government chose to end its collaboration with 
domestic companies in the footwear and textiles industry in the mid-1970s as a 
result of changes in the global economy. The state viewed that on the one 
hand, it would be nationally uncompetitive to continue subsidizing the low 
value-added footwear industry because South Korea could no longer compete 
with regions such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines. On the 
other hand, the developmental state identified a niche in the global market for 
electronic products. Thus, the government chose to collaborate with firms in 
the electronics and other high-technology sectors, effectively reallocating a 
large portion of its financial subsidies away from footwear producers towards
O ')electronics producers (see McNamara 1998). However, in the 1980s, large 
Korean electronics conglomerates withdrew from collaboration with the state, 
mainly because these companies had grown so large—mainly through earnings 
gained from exporting to the global economy—that they no longer required the 
financial support of the state. Thus, the South Korean government was 
described as having devolved from a ‘comprehensive’ to a ‘limited’ 
developmental state after 198023 (Kim 1997: 11-12). Thus, the collaboration is 
not only based on the internal dynamics between collaborating partners. 
Equally important is the influence of the external environment. When the 
external environment changes, it might cause one party to change its interests 
or motivations. Furthermore, changes in the external environment might also 
lead to a change in the parties’ resources. A change in the motivations and 
resources might then lead to them altering their strategy.
To recapitulate, this study argues that the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state utilized embedding mechanisms—resembling those 
utilized by the archetypal developmental states—with various players such as 
industrial transnational corporations (including Singaporean industrial 
enterprises), and the China government, with the intention of improving the 
competitiveness of the Suzhou Industrial Park project. The effectiveness of the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s embedding strategies do not 
just depend on its utilization of economic, political and social mechanisms but
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also on the motivations, resources and strategies of the other collaborators, as 
well as the influence of the external environment.
2.3 C o m p e t it iv e n e s s : L e s s o n s  f r o m  TN C -l e d  D e v e l o p m e n t
Theories of interventionist development strategies explain how and
why a particular government formulates and executes strategies to encourage 
or maintain the country’s economic competitiveness (see Stallings 1990, 
Gereffi 1994, and Chang 1998). As suggested earlier, there are many different 
forms of interventionist states, each with their own strategies. This study is 
interested in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) oriented interventionist 
strategies, and more specifically transnational corporation-led development.
T N C -l e d  D e v e l o p m e n t : S t a t e  M o t iv a t io n s
As discussed in the opening chapter, players in the global game of
industrial production can be divided into two groups: those that generate a 
demand for factors of production, and others that attempt to supply these 
factors. Certain governments may be motivated to participate in the game for 
developmental reasons. In the majority of the cases, the objective for these 
governments is to achieve industrialization. However, in the contemporary era, 
developing countries face different obstacles to those faced by the first wave of 
industrial nations. Instead, developing countries usually attempt to achieve 
Tate’ industrialization24, where ‘shortcuts’ to industrialization need to be 
taken, ostensibly by the state (see Amsden 1989 and 1992). Some of the 
shortcuts include ‘import substitution’ industrialization (ISI), ‘export-oriented’ 
industrialization (EOI), and FDI-oriented industrialization25. Furthermore, 
each form of industrialization can have many variations and sub-forms, as the 
following section will discuss.
Some governments intentionally choose to participate in the global 
game of industrial production in order to attract Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). FDI is distinct from foreign ‘portfolio investment.’ FDI entails control 
of an overseas project whereas portfolio investment does not. Portfolio 
investments are also characterized by their short-term nature, whereas FDI is
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usually long-term (see Stallings 1990, Wade 1998, and Okposin 1999). FDI 
can be realized by governments in various forms, including joint-ventures, 
mergers and acquisitions, original equipment manufacturing (OEM), and the 
physical location of industrial transnational corporations within the country 
(Lall 1996). Any of these forms can potentially stimulate local developmental 
effects such as employment creation, technology and managerial transfer, and 
capital injections26 (see Stallings 1990 and Lall 1996). The government’s 
choice of strategies and the type of FDI encouraged depends on its resources 
and motivations as well as the economic and political conditions at the time. 
Governments may turn to FDI in situations where the domestic economy 
lacked efficient indigenous enterprises or the availability of capital in society 
in order to stimulate industrialization. However, there could be situations 
where there might be inefficient but politically powerful domestic enterprises; 
in such cases, the state could not afford to marginalize these enterprises. 
Therefore, the government might instead broker joint-ventures with foreign 
enterprises as a strategy to gain access to capital. Also, certain governments 
might broker deals for local enterprises to undertake OEM in exchange for 
capital injections (see Sklair 1993). With injections of capital, the local 
enterprise might become more efficient and seek to expand, which in turn may 
lead to ‘developmental effects’ in the local economy. Another variant of FDI- 
oriented industrialization is transnational corporation (TNC)-led 
industrialization. In this case, the state relies on transnational corporations 
rather than local industrial enterprises as the ‘engines of growth’ in their 
economies. When a TNC establishes new or greenfield operations in the 
country, it could stimulate developmental effects, such as creating employment 
opportunities, investing capital, technology and expertise, and foreign currency 
earnings through taxation (see UNCTAD 1993). In the recent past, 
governments that have chosen TNC-led development usually find that their 
domestic enterprises were not globally competitive because they were 
technologically deficient, or operationally inefficient (see Chang 1998). There 
might also be a situation where there was a total absence of any private local 
industrial enterprises27. In such cases, the foreign enterprise could be the
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source of economic activity. Having discussed why certain governments might 
have turned to TNC-led industrialization, the following section discusses how 
these governments have encouraged such location.
C o m p e t it iv e  A d v a n t a g e
Transnational corporations generally base their decisions to locate
operations on their business strategy, costs, and risks (Hayter 1997, and
Legewie 1999). This combination ultimately would lead these enterprises to
locate at the most competitive sites for each particular operation.
Understanding this principle, governments could therefore use ‘comparative
and competitive advantages’ as incentives to attract investments28.
Comparative advantage refers to inherent or ‘natural’ attributes of a group or
location, whereas competitive advantage refers to created or manipulated
attributes (Hayter 1997). Comparative advantages often refer to primary
factors of production—such as land, raw materials, and even the population,
which may be utilized as labour—and also to secondary factors of production,
including government policies, infrastructure, communications, and
administration. Competitive advantage, at least for this study, refers to
strategically manipulated ‘comparative advantages.’ In this sense, if the land
has been prepared, raw materials already extracted and labour enhanced
through national training programmes, these factors would be considered
competitive rather than comparative advantages. Singapore’s comparative
advantages as a location for industrial operations include its geographic
proximity to major Asian markets such as Southeast Asia, Japan and China,
and its natural deep harbour. On the other hand, its competitive advantages,
such as labour, materials and land rent costs, have been shaped by many
factors and agents. Yet, what is most important for this study is the notion that
the competitive advantages of any location must be viewed in relation to
attributes of other locations. It follows that the quality and costs of any
advantages are ‘determined’ not by itself, but vis-a-vis advantages in other
regions (Hayter 1997: 32). Furthermore, these advantages are not unitary but
remain relatively dynamic, as advantages can be manipulated, enhanced or
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have value added by governments (that have the resources) through a variety 
of means.
When various governments offer their comparative and competitive 
advantages to industrial transnational corporations, this inevitably leads to
• • • • 2Q •inter-governmental competition for foreign capital . However, it could also be 
argued that there could be intra-govemmental competition for investments, 
where sub-national, regional and local governments and authorities might 
compete against one another to ensure that the investments specifically come 
to their regions. As sub-national governments could also manage or alter their 
own ‘competitive advantage,’ a slightly different set of dynamics might apply 
to intra-govemmental competition because of the resources, motivations and 
strategies of the players. For instance, one widely accepted practice is the 
offering of financial grants to targeted industrial transnational corporations as a 
direct incentive to encourage them to locate within the country, as opposed to 
locating in another country (see Chang 1998). The local government would 
argue that such grants would be economically ‘worthwhile,’ as the location of 
the industrial transnational corporation might spur local economic activity.
However, why should prospective industrial transnational corporations 
tmst the promises—such as gaining access to primary or secondary factors of 
production—of any government? To transnational corporations, the reputation 
of certain ‘developing third world nations’ has been problematic. Many 
governments made promises on policies such as tax concessions, cost 
agreements, arrangements and so on, only for the government to start re­
negotiations once the investors had committed (Evans 1995: 35). This 
therefore becomes an issue of state credibility (Schneider and Maxfield 1997: 
14). It is unlikely that industrial transnational corporations would invest 
operations in areas where the credibility of the government is suspect. 
Examples of poor state credibility include unpredictable changes in laws and 
policies, unstable government, insecurity of property rights, unreliable 
judiciary, and the existence of corruption among officials (World Bank 1997: 
35). On the other hand, governments with credibility are viewed as low risk
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locations for long term investments. Governments can improve credibility 
through the use of certain ‘embedding mechanisms.’ While economic 
mechanisms—such as the offering of economic or financial incentives—could 
be utilized, political and social mechanisms appear more effective in 
improving credibility. The promises of effective governance and institutional 
controls , and the use of familiarity and reciprocity to gain the trust of 
industrial transnational corporations are thus important (see Schneider and 
Maxfield 1997). It is important that industrial transnational corporations— 
because of their profit-seeking nature—would be willing to accept a certain 
degree of uncertainty and risk. This allows states and governments that have 
not previously had positive relations with industrial transnational corporations 
before to demonstrate what capacities they have. The case of the Singapore 
government was one example of this (see Chapter Four). However, although it 
is possible to improve credibility, it is equally possible to lose state credibility.
In the global game of industrial production, competitiveness is a 
critical concept to players in the demand and supply sides. For players in the 
demand side (transnational corporations), competitiveness is central to their 
profitability. For players in the supply side, competitiveness is equally crucial 
to achieving its economic or developmental goals. As there are many 
governments hoping to attract industrial transnational corporations with a 
combination of primary and secondary factors of production (as well as other 
incentives), competition is often very strong. Also, as argued in this section, 
state credibility is another key issue, and itself can be a competitive advantage. 
This has proven to be important under conditions of rapid economic 
globalization, especially after the 1980s.
2 .4  Gl o b a l iz a t io n  a n d  Co m p e t it iv e n e s s
As implied in the discussion, demand-side players such as industrial
transnational corporations—not supply-side players such as governments, 
labour and other local groups—are the prime movers of the global game of 
industrial production. In other words, the global game of industrial production 
is initiated and controlled by those that have the resources (capital) to invest.
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Since the 1980s, there have been massive flows of capital across national 
borders (Oman 2000: 1). On the one hand, states and governments were 
largely responsible, creating more conducive environments for the 
transnational flow of capital:
‘Where the economic policy orientation in the ‘developing and 
emerging economies (including Central and Eastern Europe) and the 
moves in the OECD countries to deregulate markets and liberalize 
policies—with the privatization of state-owned enterprises in both 
groups of countries—have drawn national and sub-national 
governments’ attention, worldwide, to the indispensable role of real 
private investment as an engine of growth and a source of jobs and 
competitive strength.’ (Oman 2000: 16)
However, on the other hand, dynamic and successful industrial transnational 
corporations have made the ‘global shift’ of capital to the most profitable sites 
(see Dicken 1998). These enterprises have also resorted to lobbying 
governments (often through other governments) to liberalize trade and 
industrial policies, ultimately reducing fiscal and legal barriers for the flow of 
capital (see Wade 2000). The result was a wave of ‘liberalization’, which 
referred to the relaxation of state legislation that once restricted both in­
coming and out-going transnational transactions.
‘63 developing countries have liberalized their trade policy regimes 
since the beginning of the Uruguay Round and some 30 developing 
and Central and Eastern European countries liberalized their foreign 
direct investment regimes in 1991 alone.’ (UNCTAD 1992: 7)
It has been argued that the liberalization agenda was forwarded by certain 
interested parties—such as the so-called ‘transnational capitalist class’—to 
‘open up’ markets and states to greater cross-border transactions (see Sklair 
1998 and 2001). With the liberalization agenda, the conditions were ripe for 
‘rapid economic globalization,’ which can be defined as the unfettered 
transnationalization of economic activities (Dicken 1998: 32). The most 
striking consequence of rapid economic globalization is therefore the mobility 
of capital to transcend national borders.
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During the 1980s when economic globalization really took off, the 
mobile capital flows had a dramatic impact on the global game of industrial 
production. On the demand side of the game, industrial transnational 
corporations were shifting capital across boundaries in search of more efficient 
factors of production. In that decade, there were also more enterprises that 
were involved in transnational projects (Oman 2000: 32). On the supply side, 
in addition to the greater number of governments liberalizing their trade 
regimes, the number of states that were encouraging Foreign Direct Investment 
also rose (see Stallings 1990, and Chang 1998). This ultimately meant that 
more players were participating in the global game of industrial production. 
The result was greater competition on both the demand side and on the supply 
side of the global game of industrial production. Demand-side players 
(transnational corporations) competed with each other for market share and 
profit margins, while supply-side players (states, governments and other local 
groups) competed to attract FDI (which might include the location of industrial 
transnational corporation) on the basis of the competitiveness of their factors 
of production. Under such conditions, certain ‘plan rational’ or interventionist 
states would act (see Amsden 1992, and Henderson 1997). These governments 
might argue that inactivity during a period of rapid economic globalization 
would ultimately lead to a loss of national competitiveness, in turn negatively 
affecting the national economy’s growth and development.
R e s p o n d in g  t o  G l o b a l iz a t io n
In the global game of industrial production under conditions of rapid
economic globalization, competition becomes much more intense. Thus,
FDI—especially in industrial projects—can be so eagerly sought that
governments might even grant financial subsidies, tax and regulatory
concessions in addition to offering access to the factors of production in the
area (see Thomas 2000: 8-9). From an economic viewpoint, this competition
might lead to wastages and negative effects. For instance, firm specific
subsidies might lead to less efficient uses of capital, reduce socially desirable
regulations either in the environment or at the workplace, and shifted the tax
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burden away from these highly mobile investors to less mobile actors (Thomas 
2000: 9). Although there have been some attempts to regulate such 
competition in the 1990s—for example the refining of European Union 
competition policy to control state aid (see Oman 2000)—in the rest of the 
world, including the Americas and Asia, there appears to be no rules for 
participation in the global game of industrial production. Supply side players 
can theoretically utilize any strategies to induce investments, leading to a 
situation where many analysts believe there is an inevitable ‘race to the 
bottom.’ (Ross and Tratche 1990, and Thomas 2000) Yet, this race—at least 
by the middle of the 1990s—has either not begun, or has not really had a 
detrimental effect (Oman 2000: 12). The main reasons put forward for such an 
optimistic viewpoint stem mainly from the evidence that while most 
transnational firms might field bids for its investment, the actual location of 
operations tend to reinforce their core business strategy, and ultimately still 
depends on managing costs and risks (ibid.) In essence, the empirical reality is 
that investors still base their locational decision on the ‘fundamentals,’ which 
involves sourcing for the most efficient primary and secondary factors of 
production, especially for long-term projects. This has spurred certain supply 
side players to strategically improve the quality (and/or quantity) of primary or 
secondary factors of production rather than offer financial, tax or regulatory 
concessions as investment incentives. For example, the Irish and Singapore 
governments have invested heavily in improving the quality and level of 
human capital in their respective societies, particularly through national 
educational programmes (see O’Heam 1998, and Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997 
respectively). This programme, coupled with other state-sponsored 
improvements to primary and secondary factors of production, has seen 
subsequent re-investments by transnational corporations in these countries.
Governmental responses to rapid economic globalization are usually 
geared towards minimizing the potential negative effects while simultaneously 
attempting to take advantage of new opportunities. In such situations, 
governments might rationalize that further intervention rather than greater
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liberalization is necessary because the ‘market’ is basically dysfunctional in 
efficiently allocating resources. Furthermore, interventionist governmental 
leaders might argue that the blurring of national economic boundaries, coupled 
with the intensified and apparently unregulated competition in the global 
economy, requires extensive state intervention. In this sense, national 
competitiveness has become a central theme in the nationalistic and political 
discourse of many governments. In many ways, rather than signal the ‘end of 
the nation state,’ rapid economic globalization has led some states to 
rationalize the need for greater governmental intervention in the economy (see 
Held etal. 1999).
To recapitulate, within the theories of interventionist development 
strategies, governments are necessarily motivated to achieve (or maintain) 
economic growth. It follows that governments, especially those with a ‘plan 
rational’ ideology, rationalize that it is their role to intervene in the economy to 
allocate (and reallocate) necessary resources in order to stimulate growth. In 
this sense, they can be understood as ‘developmental states.’ The actual 
strategies adopted by the developmental government depend very much on 
their access to existing resources in society as well as their current economic 
and political conditions. However, in all cases, governments will attempt to 
minimize the negative effects of rapid economic globalization while 
attempting to take advantage of new opportunities. Effective interventionist 
states need to identify specific economic niches within the global economy, 
and devise and execute strategies to exploit them. The most common strategies 
adopted by the developmental state involve encouraging collaboration and 
maintaining or improving competitiveness.
2.5  C o n c l u s io n
There are many governments—at the local, regional or national level—
that have different resources, and motivations and face varying economic and 
political conditions. Within this broad category of states, there are certain 
governments that are motivated to adopt interventionist development 
strategies. One such government is the transnational entrepreneurial state,
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which adopts typically interventionist strategies such as the utilization of 
collaborative and competitive strategies. Competitive strategies involve 
constructing competitive advantages to capture and maintain a profitable niche 
in the ‘market,’ with the main intention to make the national economy more 
globally competitive. Collaborative strategies involve encouraging the 
complementary collaboration of the key partners.
However, this study argues that the transnational entrepreneurial state 
varies from other interventionist states—such as the archetypal developmental 
states—in two areas. Firstly, the transnational entrepreneurial state is primarily 
motivated by generating profits from its strategies, as opposed to just attaining 
‘developmental effects.’ Secondly, its actions, interactions and transactions are 
outside of its national borders, and are often with non-local groups. As a 
transnational entrepreneurial state, the outcome of its strategies are dependent 
not just on its resources, motivations and how it executed its strategies, but 
also dependent on the actions of its competitors and the influence of the 
external environment. The following chapter will construct a methodology that 
will examine the Singapore government’s Suzhou Industrial Park project—as a 
transnational entrepreneurial state participating in the global game of industrial 
production—in order to further the theories of interventionist development 
strategies.
1 See Chu (1995) and Cumings (1999) on the position o f the developmental state theory in the 
history o f ideas between the so-called ‘neo-liberal’ position o f  the World Bank’s ‘East Asian 
Miracle,’ (World Bank 1993) and the ‘cultural’ (Confucianist) position as discussed by Berger 
and Hsiao (eds.) (1986) and Kim (1994).
2 See especially Sklair (1995) on the implications o f global as opposed to international or 
multinational processes.
3 The ‘developmental elite’ is a historically specific group in various countries that, with a 
political and economic agenda, managed to manoeuvre its way to capture power. In Japan, the 
elite came to power through the electoral process, whereas in South Korea, the ‘elite’ came to 
power through a military coup (see Johnson 1982, Amsden 1989, and Kim 1997).
4 It could be argued that the latter objective ‘backfired’ in the long run, as America became the 
consumer market for East Asian exports, causing a huge imbalance in trade (see Wade 1990).
5 It was estimated that U. S. Financial aid to Taiwan between 1950 and 1964 was US$1.5 
billion, while to South Korea it was over US$6 million between 1946 and 1978 (Pempel 
1999a: 154). In addition, the U.S. government structured highly favourable trade policies to 
‘assist’ the growth o f these countries (see Weiss 1998).
48
Chapter Two
6 For details on state-ministry cooperation, see Johnson (1982), Okimoto (1989) for Japan 
between 1950 and 1970, Amsden (1989) for South Korea between 1960 and 1980, and Wade 
(1990) for Taiwan between 1970 and 1990.
7 Within this perspective, the instances where national governments subsidized the outward 
investment o f domestic enterprises, for example as seen in the Japanese case after 1970 (see 
Kojima 1978) ought to be considered both entrepreneurial and developmental in nature.
8 Implicit in this assumption that although a state might be the largest employer in a particular 
country, this form of state employment is seldom ‘productive’ because it neither expands 
national economic activity nor economic growth (see Evans 1995).
9 The ‘problem’ with this form of state support is the potential for ‘rent seeking.’ See Krueger 
(1992) for a discussion on the causes and impact o f rent seeking.
10 The term ‘collaboration’ is identical to ‘co-operation,’ which is more commonly utilized in 
studies o f business ventures (see Child and Faulkner 1998, and Buckley 1996). However, this 
research draws on the concept o f ‘complementary collaboration,’ which was used by Evans 
(1996) in his paper on state-society synergy, and was also utilized by Schneider and Maxfield 
(1995: 15), and Saxenian (1994).
11 For the form and nature o f joint ventures, see Child (1994), Dunning (1993 and 1997). For 
strategic alliances, see Spekman et al. (1998), and Gerlach (1992).
12 See Wade (1990) and McBeath (1998) for the background to the economic conditions in 
Taiwan.
13 Although related, Evans’ use o f the term ‘embeddedness’ is distinct from the theories o f the 
‘social embeddedness o f economic relations’ which stems from the work o f Polanyi (1957) and 
re-cast by Granovetter (1985). See Swedberg (1993) for a summary o f ‘embeddedness’ within 
the field o f economic sociology. In this research, embedding is a purposive strategy to get 
closer to other actors.
14 This definition is adopted from developmental state analyses, where state autonomy was 
defined ‘...as the extent to which leaders can insulate themselves from societal pressures and 
autonomously define national tasks.’ (Shafer 1997: 94)
15 Autonomy allowed the state to avoid being ‘captured.’ Capture refers to a situation o f  
dependency, where one partner is beholden to the other for a variety o f economic, political and 
social reasons, and often finds it difficult to break the relationship (Evans 1995: 14).
16 For ‘markets, hierarchy and networks,’ from an economic perspective see Williamson 
(1996), or Thompson et al. (1991) for an organizational perspective, while the phrase ‘price, 
authority and trust’ is a sociological interpretation o f same mechanisms (see Bradach and 
Eccles 1989).
17 See Biggart (1997) on how the ‘paternalistic’ South Korean government utilized military 
and police power to ‘enforce’ its development strategies, generating resentment from private 
enterprises.
18 These concepts were drawn from Schneider and Maxfield (1997) and Evans (1995).
19 In the literature on the developmental states of Asia, reciprocity ‘means that in direct 
exchange for subsidies, the state exacts certain performance standards from firms.’ (Amsden 
1989: 146) However, for this research, a broader definition is adopted.
20 ‘Trust’ has many different—sometimes problematic— definitions, depending on the 
perspectives adopted (see Seligman 1997). Definitions span from a form o f social capital 
(Fukuyama 1995) to economic measurement tool (Williamson 1996). This research adopts the 
term ‘trust’ as used in the theory o f the developmental state (see Evans 1995, and Woo- 
Cumings 1999).
21 The issue o f guanxi is a factor in the case o f the Suzhou Industrial Park, and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the later chapters.
22 It was argued that the South Korean state’s high degree o f autonomy from the local footwear 
enterprises gave the state the capacity to execute this reallocation, without fear o f political 
consequences (see Evans 1995).
23 The case o f how the once powerful MITI in the Japanese developmental state began to lose 
its embeddedness with private enterprises from the 1970s onwards, particularly over the 
development o f the supercomputer and standardization o f video formats, is remarkably similar.
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See Callon (1995), who provides excellent insights even without utilizing the developmental 
state theory.
24 ‘Late industrialization,’ as originally introduced by Gerschenkron (1962), is qualitatively 
distinct from ‘early industrialization.’ (Amsden 1989, and 1992) The key difference is that 
early industrialization is mainly driven by private enterprises (with the assistance o f the state), 
but late industrialization is mainly driven by the state (with the assistance o f private 
enterprises). Also, late industrialization is a particular condition that occurs under ‘global’ 
rather than ‘colonial’ or ‘imperialist’ capitalism (see Kiely 1998: chapter five).
25 These ‘models’ o f industrialization are not mutually exclusive; depending on the 
motivations, resources and strategies o f the government, these models may be used in 
combination. For example, the South Korean and Taiwanese developmental states executed ISI 
strategies for some industries, and EOI in other sectors (see Fields 1995).
26 It has also been argued that the form and content o f such investments cannot be taken for 
granted; for example, it has been documented that ‘investments’ by foreign enterprises in 
China have also included ‘in-kind’ investments such as pre-used machinery (Strange 1998:
31).
27 Two examples o f this were Singapore at the point o f political independence in 1965 (see 
Chapter Four) and Ireland after the Second World War (see O’Heam 1998).
28 ‘Natural Advantage’ was introduced by Adam Smith, upon which Ricardo offered the 
concept o f ‘Comparative Advantage.’ However, both o f these terms addressed inter-state trade 
dynamics. Later refinements have included ‘Competitive Advantage,’ most commonly 
associated with Michael Porter (1990), who discusses both trade as well as other inter-state 
economic activities. See Michalet (1996) for a discussion o f all these terms.
29 As implied, certain government are uninterested in participating in the game for various 
reasons. Thus, some areas are ‘unavailable;’ for example, there are several countries whose 
governments did not legally permit foreign investments or even foreign enterprises. They 
include China before 1979 or North Korea after 1950. See Dicken (1998).
30 In fact, the political mechanisms of institution-building and development is behind a school 
of thought (the new institutional school) that argues that development— economic, political 
and social— can only be sustained if  institutions are maintained (see Harris et al. (eds.) 1995).
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C h a pt e r  T h r ee  
R e se a r c h  M e t h o d o l o g y
3.1 R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t io n  R e v is it e d
This study intends to develop the concept of the ‘transnational entrepreneurial 
state’ within the existing theories of interventionist development strategies 
through explaining the strategies of the Singapore government in the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project between 1992 and 1999. Towards this end, the study 
formulated a research agenda aimed at evaluating the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s utilization of the competitive and collaborative strategy 
within ‘the global game of industrial production.’ In the competitive strategy, 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state constructed certain attributes 
that would give the Suzhou Industrial Park project a competitive edge over 
other industrial estates in China. The collaborative strategy was designed to 
encourage the collaboration of key players. The focus of the research is 
therefore to sociologically explain whether these strategies were utilized 
proactive or reactive measures within the global game of industrial production.
M u l t i-l e v e l  C a s e  S t u d y  D e s ig n
The research proposes that the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial
state’s utilization of competitive and collaborative strategies within the Suzhou
Industrial Park project serves as an ‘exemplary case.’ (Yin 1993: 12) An
exemplary case, like a critical case, is defined as a single case, which can be
used in testing a theory, providing it meets all the conditions for testing the
theory (Yin 1994: 38). However, an exemplary case is one where the situation
and conditions are significantly different in substance and form despite sharing
basic similarities with other cases1. Extreme or revelatory cases, on the other
hand, are singularly unique, and do not have any similarities with any other
cases (Yin 1994: 38-39). In both situations, the findings from a single case can
be used to determine whether the theory’s propositions are correct or whether
some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant (ibid.). In the
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Suzhou Industrial Park project, the comparative case methodology is not 
suitable because of the lack of cases that have enough similarities for effective 
comparison and contrasting. As discussed in the previous chapter, despite the 
existence of seven other Singapore-developed regional industrial parks in the 
Asia-Pacific region (and one other in China), the Singapore government’s 
involvement in the Suzhou Industrial Park is significantly different. Firstly, the 
Suzhou Industrial Park was the largest, the most expensive and the most 
politically significant of all the regional industrial parks for the Singapore 
government. For instance, the project was originally planned to be a total of 70 
square kilometres, whereas all the other parks were an average of one square 
kilometre.
Secondly, the Suzhou Industrial Park project involved a top-level 
govemment-to-govemment collaboration. The other regional industrial parks 
were mostly joint ventures between a Singapore government linked 
corporations and a local municipal development authority. Therefore, unlike 
the other parks, key leaders of both the China and Singapore governments 
were personally involved in the project. For example, Singapore’s Senior 
Minister was one of the prime movers in the project, and remained as an 
advisor throughout the period between 1992 and 1999. In addition,
Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (Lee Kuan Yew’s son) 
and China’s Vice Premier Li Nanqing both sat on the Joint Steering 
Committee of the Suzhou Industrial Park, which met bi-annually to discuss the 
progress of the project. Furthermore, every Chief Executive Officer of the 
CSSD—the joint venture company formed from the two governments—was a 
central member of the Singapore government (see Chapter Five). Finally, the 
Suzhou Industrial Park involved a formal ‘software transfer,’ which essentially 
referred to the transferring of political and social institutions originally 
developed in Singapore to the Suzhou Industrial Park area. This involved the 
training of many Chinese officials, both in China and in Singapore, with the 
aim of transplanting the so-called Singaporean ‘operating system.’ The other 
regional industrial parks did not have any formalized institutional transfer.
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Thus, because of these factors, the Suzhou Industrial Park empirically stands 
apart from the others2. On the other hand, it shared some similarities with the 
other regional industrial parks developed by the Singapore government, 
including being a self-contained industrial estate offering high quality 
industrial infrastructure, and management by Singaporeans. It could even be 
argued that the Suzhou Industrial Park even shared some similarities to several 
other Chinese industrial parks, such as Pudong New Area, which was 
specifically designed to attract foreign direct investment. Therefore, from a 
methodological perspective, this study approaches the Suzhou Industrial Park 
project as an exemplary rather than critical case, on the basis that it does share 
some similarities with other zones and estates but is ultimately significantly 
different in important aspects. Under these considerations, although exemplary 
cases can generate theories from single cases, relevant cross-references to 
other cases—in this sense, secondary reference to the other Singapore 
developed industrial parks in the region or other Chinese Special Economic 
Zones—may further enhance the findings.
Although the Suzhou Industrial Park project could be viewed as a 
single self-contained exemplary case, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s collaborative and competitive strategies were executed 
during four different phases, each reflecting different objectives. During the 
‘construction phase’ between 1992 and 1994, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s competitive strategy was implemented to construct 
competitive advantages for the Suzhou Industrial Park, while the collaborative 
strategy sought to encourage its main partners—the China government and the 
transnational corporations—to collaborate in the project. In the following 
‘take-off phase’ between 1994 and 1997, both strategies were utilized to 
further enhance the overall competitiveness of the project. Between 1997 and 
1999—the ‘adjustment phase’—the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state utilized the two strategies in response to changes in the global game, 
particularly with the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, and competition 
from other industrial estates in China. During the ‘disengagement phase,’
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which began in 1999, both strategies were utilized by the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state to disengage from the project.
Therefore, the research adopted the framework of a single multi-level 
exemplary case, where each historical phase was treated as a sub-case within 
the larger case. The multi-level case also allowed the research to compare the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s utilization of the competitive 
and collaborative strategies over the various phases.
C a se  B u il d in g
To recapitulate, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s 
competitive and collaborative strategies were designed to enhance the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project’s competitiveness. The competitive strategy was 
designed to give the project competitive advantages over its competitors 
within the global game of industrial production. The collaborative strategy 
utilized embedding mechanisms to encourage or enhance collaborative 
relationships between itself and key partners.
For an analysis of the competitive strategy, the focus of the research 
will be on how the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state sought to 
construct competitive advantages for the Suzhou Industrial Park project. The 
Singapore government believed that the project’s competitiveness—defined as 
having attributes that other competitors did not have—would greatly enhance 
its competitiveness, in turn enhancing the project’s likelihood of success. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate whether the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state was effective (or otherwise) in establishing 
competitiveness for the project, the research would analyze it as an 
entrepreneurial agent. An effective entrepreneurial agent is firstly defined by 
its ability to successfully identify and exploit hitherto unnoticed opportunities 
or competitive niches in the game, and secondly its ability to financially profit 
from the venture. The niche that the Singapore government was attempting to 
capture and dominate was the supply of competitive ‘secondary factors of 
production’—particularly high quality industrial infrastructure and industrial
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management—in regions that had competitive primary factors in China. 
However, from an entrepreneurial perspective, an effective entrepreneurial 
agent necessarily has to maintain the project’s competitive ness over a period 
of time. Indicators of this would include staying ahead of competitors, and/or 
being able to adjust to changes in the external environment, which is the global 
game of industrial production. Therefore, in each of the four different sub­
cases, the research has to firstly identify which ‘competitive ’ attributes the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state was intending to construct within 
the project, and, secondly, how it went about achieving it.
For analysis of the collaborative strategy, the focus is on how the 
transnational entrepreneurial state utilizes embedding mechanisms to 
encourage key players to collaborate in the project, and also to maintain or 
enhance on-going collaboration. From the developmental state model, 
developmentalist elites accept that they do not have all the resources necessary 
to achieve their objectives; instead, they pursue collaboration for pragmatic 
reasons such as the pooling of resources, sharing of investments and reducing 
risk. For this case, the collaboration was a means to an end, which was to give 
the project advantages over other competitors in the global game of industrial 
production. Therefore, to assess the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state’s attempts at achieving embeddedness in the collaborative strategy, the 
focus of the inquiry is threefold: firstly, how did the transnational 
entrepreneurial state utilize the economic, political and social mechanisms to 
encourage the targeted partners to collaborate in the project? In other words, 
how was embeddedness with targeted players achieved? Economic 
mechanisms seek to achieve complementarity and mutual benefit between 
collaborators; political mechanisms seek to achieve governance and control 
over the project, and social mechanisms seek to develop trust and confidence 
between collaborators. A key assumption is that players choose to collaborate 
because they could economically, politically or socially benefit. Therefore, if 
the transnational entrepreneurial state can create economic or financial 
incentives to demonstrate economic complementarity, then targeted players
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will perceive mutual benefit in collaboration even though interests may be 
different. Political mechanisms are often utilized to maintain governance or 
control over the project. Governance refers to the ability of the protagonist to 
ensure that the collaborating players fulfil their commitments, which can be 
itself defined as the investment or performance promises. Finally, social 
mechanisms are utilized to maintain or enhance confidence in the project. 
Confidence and trust performs the function of assuring targeted players that the 
complementarity and mutual benefit will be realized. The assumption here is 
that under occasional circumstances of uncertainty, if  other players are unsure 
about either complementarity or mutual benefit, then they may not commit or 
stay committed to the project. As discussed in the previous chapter, the reasons 
why other players choose to collaborate depend on whether these embedding 
mechanisms can demonstrate complementarity. Therefore, in each of the four 
sub-cases, the research has to identify how the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial attempted to encourage or enhance the collaboration.
While the research agenda is primarily focused on how the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state utilized the competitive and collaborative 
strategies, it will also examine why it embarked upon the project. In order to 
do this, the research will provide the background to the project. It has to 
identify why the Singapore government chose to become a transnational 
entrepreneurial state through examining its internal and external imperatives.
Its internal imperatives can be understood as the resources, motivations and 
strategies of the state elite, as well as the economic, political and social 
conditions of its society. The external imperatives can be understood as the 
influence of processes and dynamics emanating from the global game of 
industrial production. Therefore, by understanding these imperatives, the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s objectives for the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project become clear. In addition, this research would 
consciously make a distinction in its usage of the terms the Singapore 
government, the transnational entrepreneurial elite and transnational 
entrepreneurial state. When the Singapore government is referred to in the
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discussion, specific individual government leaders will be identified when 
possible. The ‘transnational entrepreneurial elite’ refers to the specific 
coalition of Singapore government leaders, senior bureaucrats from certain 
state bureaucracies, ministries and agencies, and several Singaporean business 
leaders . The research would also attempt to pinpoint and identify specific 
individual members of the elite when necessary. Finally, the term 
‘transnational entrepreneurial state’ is used to refer to the arms of the state, 
such as the relevant bureaucracies, ministries, state agencies and statutory 
boards, that are also part of the project.
3.2  D a t a  Co l l e c t io n  
T h e  S a m p le
To develop the concept of the transnational entrepreneurial state, the 
research will analyze how and why the competitive and collaborative strategies 
were utilized over the different sub-cases. Therefore, the next stage of the 
research involved developing an efficient and practical data gathering 
methodology. Broadly speaking, data can be collected from the sample, which 
is defined as the sources where relevant information can be collected. As such, 
this research chose to gather data from both primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources refer to purposefully generating and soliciting information 
first-hand, specifically tailored for the research. For the primary data gathering, 
the majority of the information was gathered from several sub-samples of 
respondents during a research fieldtrip to Suzhou between June and September 
1999 (see Appendix One). In addition, some primary data was collected from 
interviewing key respondents elsewhere, including interviews in Hamburg 
(Germany), London (UK) and Shanghai (China). For the gathering of 
secondary data, existing sources of information that covered the case’s time 
frame (19904-1999) were consulted. Secondary sources refer to pre-existing 
published information that may be used to supplement information that could 
not be directly collected by first-hand means. These included academic studies, 
media reports and other forms of published information on the collaboration in 
Suzhou. The main secondary sources were the Singapore media, particularly
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the two English language national newspapers—the Singapore Straits Times 
and Singapore Business Times—and the Chinese language Singaporean 
newspaper, the Lianhe Zaobao. Several other newspaper and journal articles 
from other countries (including China)—both in English and Chinese—were 
also consulted. This research collected every article from 1990 to 2000 that 
reported on the Suzhou Industrial Park from the Singapore Straits Times, 
Singapore Business Times, China Daily, and UK Financial Times through the 
use of the British Library of Political and Economic Science’s ‘FT-Profile’ 
service5. This service was able to electronically index and retrieve the full text 
of several complete newspaper articles, magazines and certain commercial 
journals. Other relevant documents and publications pertaining to the Suzhou 
Industrial Park since 1991 were also referred to, including publications from 
the Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company itself. Finally, academic 
studies that were related to the Suzhou Industrial Park or the Singapore 
government’s broader regionalization programme were also reviewed, with the 
aim of extracting relevant information.
To analyze the transnational entrepreneurial state’s ability to identify 
and exploit a competitive niche, and how it maintained this competitiveness, 
the research interviewed members and employees of the Singapore 
entrepreneurial state. Members of the Singapore entrepreneurial state referred 
to informants who are part of the Singapore government and senior executives 
of the state’s bureaucracies and agencies. For example, the research 
interviewed two different High Commissioners of the Republic of Singapore 
to the government of the United Kingdom, the first in December 1997 and the 
second in March 2000. Employees of the state refer to those who are employed 
to work in the agencies, both in Suzhou and elsewhere. The research also 
managed to gather useful data from secondary sources to supplement the 
primary data on the Singapore government’s explicit aims and methods behind 
the Suzhou Industrial Park project. These emanated mainly from official press 
releases and statements, newspaper reports and other publications such as 
annual reports of the Singapore Economic Development Board and other state
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agencies. The research also consulted other academic studies that had either 
directly or indirectly approach the issue of the Singapore entrepreneurial state. 
To analyze how the transnational entrepreneurial state encouraged targeted 
players to collaborate, and also how it subsequently enhanced this 
collaboration, this research focused on four main informational sources. The 
first group included individuals from institutions and organizations that they 
were directly involved in applying the strategy; in other words, they were 
members or employees of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state. 
The three other groups were selected on the basis that they had ‘experienced’ 
the strategy. They included members and employees of the China government, 
transnational corporations, private and semi-private Singaporean enterprises. 
To gather primary data from the members and employees of the China partner, 
the research identified that respondents from two organizations, the Suzhou 
Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC) and the Chinese 
Consortium that held the minority stakeholding in the CSSD, were best placed 
to yield information. This was because these two organizations were the most 
obvious ‘recipients’ of the strategy. From the respondents in the transnational 
corporations and the private (and semi-private) Singaporean enterprises that 
were operating in the Suzhou Industrial Park, the research felt that they could 
yield information about the processes and outcomes, again because they were 
‘recipients’ of the strategy. Within these companies, the research identified 
that senior managers would have the most experience with the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategy, as it was often directed at them. 
Furthermore, because of their managerial experience, often drawn previously 
from working in many different countries, they could offer deeper insights. 
Based on these criteria, the research felt it was less fruitful to approach the 
large body of engineer-level managers. Finally, these senior managers would 
also be well-placed to comment on the collaboration between the Singapore 
and the China governments. This research process is known as the 
‘triangulation’ method, where a third party would be asked to provide data or 
comments about two other parties in the social system. Allowances would 
have to be made for issues of ‘accuracy’ and ‘validity.’ However, this research
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felt that such data was valuable, regardless of the issues. At the same time, the 
research also utilized information from secondary data sources to supplement 
the primary data.
Finally, the research also identified that there might be others not 
directly involved in the collaboration who might have been on hand to witness 
how the strategies was applied, such as others interested parties in Suzhou 
which included local academics and non-managerial employees in the park. 
The research also conducted face-to-face interviews with several other 
respondents selected on the basis of their experience or knowledge of the case. 
The Honorary Consul-General of the Republic of Singapore to the government 
of the German government was interviewed in July 19986. Lastly, a total of 11 
informed academics were interviewed in Suzhou, London and Shanghai; one 
official of the Suzhou New District was interviewed, and two officials of the 
Wuxi Industrial Park was conducted in Wuxi (see Appendix One). To 
accommodate the heterogeneity of the sub-sample, the methodology designed 
customized interview and inquiry schedules. In addition, secondary sources, 
such as media reports and official press releases, were consulted to provide 
supplementary information. In addition to asking the main sample to provide 
information about these aspects, the research also corresponded with a 
prominent critic of the Singapore governmental elite7, which proved to be 
useful.
3.3 Th e  F ie l d  R e s e a r c h
O n -S it e  F ie l d w o r k  a n d  In t e r v ie w s
The research conducted a period of extensive fieldwork and interviews
at the Suzhou Industrial Park between July and September 1999. During that
time, 82 companies involved in ‘industrial operations’ had located in the
Q
Suzhou Industrial Park . Also, 10 enterprises had only received their business 
license within the last 6 months and were still in the process of ‘moving in.’ 
All of these 10 declined to be interviewed, mostly citing the lack of time, and 
the non-availability of senior management in Suzhou during the period of the
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fieldwork. A further 10 companies involved in industrial production declined 
to be included in the research. Eight companies cited lack of interest in 
participation and lack of time as their main reasons9. Two companies declined 
to be interviewed as the general manager was not available and the next in 
command did not want to be interviewed. Therefore the research managed to 
perform at least one interview for each of the 56 companies operating in the 
park. The research also interviewed a second respondent—also a senior 
manager—from 8 of these companies, cumulating in a total of 64 interviews 
with transnational corporations and Singaporean companies for the research 
(see Appendix One).
The research maximized the researcher’s own contact networks as well 
as utilized a pattern known as ‘snowballing’ to get in touch with the sub­
sample in Suzhou. Personal contacts played an important role in the data 
collection in Suzhou. I had made several contacts through my personal 
networks with several managers of the transnational corporations and 
Singaporean enterprises who were working at the Suzhou Industrial Park.
Most of these managers were Singaporean expatriates. I had contacted them 
prior to the fieldwork to request for their participation in the research. Through 
this method, seven interviews were secured. The research also approached 
several organizations, including the Singapore Economic Development Board, 
the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company (both 
Singaporean agencies) and the Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative 
Committee (Chinese agency), formally before arrival. The public relations 
departments of these organizations were contacted, and agreed to participate in 
the research.
The ‘snowballing’ technique was useful in gaining further access to the 
sub-sample. This meant using one interviewee to refer or recommend another 
person to be included in the study and interviewed. This proved relatively 
successful for both sub-sample groups (governments and enterprises). For 
example, the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company 
referred the researcher to representatives from the Jurong Town Corporation
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International as well as to several companies operating in the park. Similarly 
the representative from the Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee 
(SIPAC) referred a representative from the Suzhou Consortium. Similarly, the 
managers interviewed from initial personal contacts were willing to 
recommend other managers. This process continued until the leads were 
exhausted. In this research, snowballing accounted for over 60 percent of the 
interviews with the sub-sample of managers of transnational corporations. The 
technique of snowballing has its strengths and weaknesses. Firstly, being 
recommended or referred by a respondent assisted in opening doors to 
companies with whom I had no prior contact. Another advantage of 
snowballing was that the research gained an insight to the social networks of 
the sub-sample. For example, through snowballing, the research discovered 
that there were several informal ‘clubs’ in the Suzhou Industrial Park, 
including the general manager, financial managers and a ‘Singaporean’ club10. 
One weakness of the snowballing technique was that it was often time- 
consuming and dependent on the motivation of the referrer. For example, 
several managers had agreed to recommend their peers to the research, but 
ended up taking long periods of time to actually arrange a meeting.
For companies that were outside the snowball process, the research 
gained access by asking to interview the general manager. During the onsite 
research, there were many occasions when the general manager of the 
company could not find the time to be interviewed, but offered the ‘next-in- 
command,’ such as the assistant general manager, the finance manager, or the 
human resource manager. The research only interviewed three factory or plant 
managers, who were engineers rather than administrative managers. As 
mentioned earlier, the research was able to return to 10 companies to interview 
a second respondent. For the interviews, I identified myself as a Singaporean 
student studying in London doing research on the Suzhou Industrial Park. I 
pre-informed the respondents that the interviews would take around 30 
minutes, and was willing to send the interview schedule ahead if asked. Being 
fluent in both English and Mandarin, I was willing to conduct interviews in
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either language, and the choice was entirely up to the respondents. At the end, 
only four interviews were conducted in Mandarin. One interview with a 
Japanese manager was translated into Mandarin by his assistant manager. 
Finally, one interview had to be conducted over the telephone because of the 
manager’s time constraints. For a summary profile of the interviews with the 
sub-samples, please refer to Appendix one.
I n t e r v ie w  S c h e d u l e
The inquiry framework required both ‘facts’ and ‘views’ from the
respondents. Facts referred to specific data usually relating to the organization 
whereas views sought the personal opinions of the respondents. The format of 
the semi-structured interview was chosen to allow the research to be extremely 
flexible yet have a structured guide and purpose. The semi-structured interview 
is more flexible than a fixed questionnaire (both written and verbal) because it 
does not predict possible answers to any questions. Instead, the respondent is 
encouraged to answer the question in his or her own way, and take as long as is 
reasonable. In addition, by choosing to personally administer these semi­
structured interviews, the research had the advantage of being able to clarify 
any doubts—both from the perspective of the interviewer and the 
respondent—or to probe for greater details should the opportunity arise.
Finally, semi-structured interviews are most effective for gathering ‘views.’
As mentioned earlier, due to the heterogeneity of the sample, there 
were several different inquiry schedules11. This meant that the research had 
one schedule for each of the four main sub-samples: namely they were the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state, the China government, 
transnational corporations and Singaporean enterprises. As a conscious 
decision, the research requested that the interviews be conducted at the offices 
of the respondents. The reasons for this included being possibly invited to visit 
the production factory and collect necessary publications such as brochures 
and news clippings stored by the organizations. However, fourteen interviews 
were not conducted at the respondents’ offices: ten were conducted at dining 
premises (over lunch or dinner, either at the factory’s canteen or at other
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locations), three were conducted at my lodging in Suzhou, and one was 
conducted at the home of the respondent. In addition, there were other custom 
designed schedules that were used to interview other respondents, such as the 
academics and other interested parties in Suzhou.
While the specific details about the methodology and the outcome of 
the interviews will be interwoven in the discussion of the sub-cases in the 
following chapters, there were some generalities. The interview schedules for 
the respondents that were employees of the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state sought to get information on the background to the 
genesis of the Suzhou Industrial Park, the state’s regional programme, the role 
and function of their organization in Suzhou, the reason behind the their 
presence in Suzhou, how they operate (past and present) in Suzhou, and views, 
comments and assessments on the Suzhou Industrial Park (past, present and 
future). For the China partner sub-sample, the focus of the inquiry was on role 
and function of their organization in Suzhou, the reason behind the their 
presence in Suzhou, how they operate (past and present) in Suzhou, and views, 
comments and assessments on the Suzhou Industrial Park (past, present and 
future). From both these sub-samples, information and views were sought on 
aspects such as ‘software transfer,’ ‘disengagement,’ ‘Suzhou New District’ 
and ‘Asian Financial Crisis.’
For the respondents from the transnational corporations and 
Singaporean enterprises, the focus was firstly, to discover gather how the 
‘clients’ viewed the competitive niche of the Singapore government in China. 
Secondly, to identify how the Singapore government’s strategies was utilized 
on them. Thirdly, how did their companies respond to the collaborative 
strategy, as seen from the reasons these companies gave for choosing to 
collaborate and locate in the Suzhou Industrial Park. Finally, the research 
sought to find out whether and how the external environment had any impact 
on the collaboration. In addition, respondents were asked for their views, 
comments and assessments on the Suzhou Industrial Park and their views and 
comments on the relationship between the Singapore government and China
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government (past, present and future). The interview schedule intentionally 
omitted directly gathering background information about the company (unless 
there was additional time after the interview); this information was eventually 
gathered by requesting a corporate brochure or sourcing the information from
1 9other secondary sources . By and large, nearly all the respondents were 
forthcoming with their responses. There were occasions when respondents 
admitted that they did not have the required information, or did not hold a 
particular view. However, the researcher felt that at no stage did the 
respondents attempt to provide false information, or try to mislead the 
research. Many of these respondents were also willing to give published 
materials, including Annual Reports, brochures, and even selected newspaper 
clippings, as a supplement to the interview.
For every question, a list of possible probes was prepared. The function 
of probes in the interview methodology is to pursue further details, clarify facts 
and views. As a conscious strategy, the interview schedule included probes 
that asked the respondent to offer examples of any point that they were trying 
to make. One consequence of asking respondents to offer examples was that 
they tended to tell ‘stories.’ Stories can be useful for certain forms of 
qualitative research, especially those that hope to solicit views and attitudes 
(see Gabriel 1998). On the one hand, stories—at face value—have the function 
of describing the social phenomenon vividly. On the other hand, the research 
has to take these stories with a pinch of salt as individuals might seek to 
embellish or tailor the tales to suit their purposes (Gabriel 1998: 57). In either 
case, since this research sought to get views, the function of stories was 
extremely useful, as they tended to give a very clear indication of the 
respondent’s state of mind and feelings towards specific subjects. For 
example, stories could be told as a form of protest or complaint, or may be told 
in the form of a joke to demonstrate how ridiculous a situation might be. In 
cases where the research was not clear what the point of the story was, a probe 
to clarify was used.
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Finally, I maintained contact with many of the respondents in the 
sample, mainly through electronic mail. The correspondences included 
completing the interviews, clarifying or supplementing the data provided, and 
information on new developments. For pragmatic reasons, the last included 
data source was 1 March 2000.
O t h e r  D a t a  S o u r c e s
During the fieldwork, opportunities were taken to carry out some
participant observation in Suzhou. The objective of participant observation
was to get a feel of the physical and social environment of the park. This
involved observing how factories operated on a day-to-day basis, how the
industrial park related to the old historic city of Suzhou and to a more limited
11
degree, how the park was perceived by the local population . When the 
occasion arose, opportunity was also taken to observe how the park was 
reported by the local (Suzhou) media, both in print and television reports. 
Finally, the opportunity was also taken to visit the Suzhou New District 
(another industrial park in the city), the Wuxi Industrial Park (60 kilometres 
east of Suzhou) in Wuxi city, and also Shanghai-Pudong Development Area 
(90 kilometres to the west) in Shanghai. On all of these visits, representatives 
from the parks themselves welcomed the researcher for a one-day tour. At 
these sites, I took the opportunity to ask the host on their views of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park. This was not difficult because it had a very high profile in 
China. It turned out that even without prompting, the hosts at these other 
industrial sites offered a comparison of their own park with the Suzhou site.
The opportunity was also taken to consult with several interested 
individuals who had some knowledge of the Suzhou Park. These individuals 
could be categorized into three groups: academics with an interest in Suzhou 
and China, non-managerial employees at the park, and other observers. 
Between July and September 1999, the researcher held informal interviews 
with 11 academics. Two of these academics based in Suzhou. This research 
was fortunate that in the middle of the fieldwork, an international conference 
on the urban issues of China was organized in Shanghai. The researcher took
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the opportunity to meet with eight participating academics who had interest in 
Suzhou and China. These academics were based at universities and research 
institutes in other parts of China and the rest of the world. Some interesting 
information and views were gathered from these academics and were 
incorporated into the case building. While in Suzhou, the researcher took the 
opportunity to informally interview 10 non-managerial employees of 
companies based at the Suzhou Industrial Park. Eight of these individuals were 
engineers, while the other two were employed as production workers. These 
individuals did not form the main sub-sample because they could not claim to 
be familiar with the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategy; 
however their perception of the industrial park, the state of the relationships 
between the Singaporean partner and the others, and their own knowledge of 
Suzhou city proved to be rather useful in supplementing the main data. 
Similarly, the research also met with various individuals who could be 
considered interested observers of the park. These included informally 
interviewing members of the public (including taxi drivers, salespersons at the 
Suzhou department stores) and Suzhou University undergraduates. The 
undergraduates gave some particularly interesting views as many of them had 
grown up in the city, and had witness the urban and economic changes that 
have occurred since 1990. In the three months, the research informally 
interviewed seven undergraduates, of whom five were native to Suzhou city14.
3 .4  Co n c l u s io n
The objective of this chapter was to formulate the key research
questions, and to design a data gathering methodology within the resource and
time constraints to analyze the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s
competitive and collaborative strategies within the global game of industrial
production. The research then systematically gathered data for each of the four
sub-cases. From chapters five to eight, the findings of each sub-case will be
presented and discussed within the analytical framework. Before that, the
research addressed an important question, why and how did the Singapore
government choose to evolve into a transnational entrepreneurial state.
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1 Also see Sjoberg et al. (1991), who argue that single case studies can be sub-divided into 
‘normal, deviant or extreme’ forms, each with its own advantages and disadvantages in terms 
o f data coverage, theory generation and reliability.
2 The research will however refer to the experiences o f the other regional industrial parks when 
appropriate. Data for these other industrial parks was based on secondary sources, except for 
information about the Wuxi Industrial Park, another Singaporean industrial park in China, 
where some data was gathered first hand (see section 3.2 in this chapter).
3 It was discovered that several business leaders, who where chief executive officers o f private 
companies in Singapore, were also members o f the ruling People’s Action Party and a few 
were even members of Parliament.
4 Although the Singapore government announced the Suzhou Industrial Park project in 1992, 
earlier fact-finding missions and pre-announcement negotiations from 1990 onwards were 
considered useful data and included in the secondary sources.
5 The full list o f newspapers, magazines and journals can be found in the bibliography.
6 This respondent was appointed by the German government to lead a business entourage to 
Suzhou in 1998. See Chapter Six for the details.
7 This was done through a series o f email correspondences (see Appendix One).
8 There were up to 65 non-industrial enterprises in the Suzhou Industrial Park, mainly because 
o f its other aim o f being an integrated township rather than solely an industrial estate. For 
example, there was one international primary school, one medical centre, two restaurants, and 
one transportation company. The remaining companies were involved in banking, finance and 
insurance services.
9 One manager said: ‘This park is over-studied. We have spent too much time talking to 
students and journalists. We are not spending enough time doing what we are supposed to do, 
that is business. I am sorry, we cannot help you (with the interviews).’ (Telephone 
conversation)
10 The role and function o f these clubs or associations will be discussed in later chapters in 
detail.
11 See Appendix Two for information about the four main interview and inquiry schedules.
12 This included examining the corporate websites o f both the company in question and also of 
the larger parent company where applicable.
13 For instance, the opportunity was taken to chat informally with salespersons in department 
stores, taxi drivers, University students and several other individuals in Suzhou. It was the 
intention o f the chat to understand these people’s perception o f the Suzhou Industrial Park. To 
most o f these people, they automatically assumed I was a typical Singaporean expatriate 
working in the Industrial Park.
14 Throughout the period o f the field research, I stayed at the student dormitories o f Suzhou 
University. Although the months o f July through to September were university vacations, all 
these undergraduates were still there attending ‘summer school,’ in an attempt to gain credits 
in their courses.
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C h a pt e r  F o u r  
Pathw ays to  Su z h o u
The Suzhou Industrial Park project emerged when the development strategies 
of the Singapore and China governments converged at the beginning of the 
1990s. This chapter discusses the economic, political and social forces that 
shaped the motivations of the two governments to embark on the project.
4.1 F D I  a s  a  N a  t io n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t S tr a  t e g y
S in g a p o r e ’s  D e v e lo p m e n t  S t r a t e g i e s  (1965-1980)
The Singapore government was central to the country’s economic
development since political independence in 1965, particularly in devising and 
executing a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) oriented development strategy 
(see Castells 1988, Huff 1994, and Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997). The 
Singapore government shared many similarities with the archetypal 
developmental state. Within the government, a developmental elite—a 
coalition of governmental leaders and senior state bureaucrats—identified that 
Singapore’s development rested on achieving industrialization (Huff 1995: 
1431). The elite—which included the country’s first Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew, other cabinet ministers and senior executives from the Singapore 
Economic Development Board (SEDB)— controlled key economic, political 
and social resources in the country (see van Ekland 1995, and Schein 1996). 
The government leaders had access to political power, while the bureaucrats 
supplied the expertise for designing economic and industrial policies. The 
government had secured over US$100 million of United Nations 
developmental aid and World Bank loans1, which it allocated to the SEDB to 
begin a programme designed to achieve rapid industrialization and economic 
growth (Schein 1996: 40).
Achieving industrialization in Singapore was problematic because of 
the economy’s industrial inexperience (see Peebles and Wilson 1996: 1-2, and
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Huff 1994: 357-8). Before the 1960s, most of the country’s economy revolved 
around the port, the processing of primary exports, tourism and servicing the 
British military bases (see Regnier 1987). Local Singaporean enterprises only 
accounted for less than 15 per cent of the economy if  petrochemical processing 
was excluded (Huff 1994: 234). This led the Singapore developmental elite to 
adopt the most ‘pragmatic’ solution (Schein 1996), which involved a 
significant departure from the developmental state model. Rather than 
fostering local industrial enterprises, the Singapore government chose FDI- 
oriented industrialization. The aim was to achieve ‘developmental effects’ 
such as employment creation, technology transfer and export earnings from the 
activities of industrial transnational corporations in Singapore. Fostering, in 
the developmental state’s model, was not viable because there were no large 
scale local enterprises or conglomerates in Singapore , and that it would be a 
long and tedious process to transform the few small-scale local industrial 
enterprises to levels of international efficiency and competitiveness (Huff 
1995: 1431). On the other hand, transnational corporations had the most 
modem technology, capital inputs, established brands and marketing outlets, 
managerial skills and an in-built capacity to respond to changes in the global 
economy (Peebles and Wilson 1996: 168-9). Of the developmental effects, the 
Singapore government prioritized employment creation and technology 
transfer. At the time, unemployment was a serious problem. In 1957, only 57 
percent of the population was employed, of which 21.6 percent were women. 
By 1970, the situation had not improved: 56.5 percent of the population was 
employed, of which 29.5 percent were women (Singapore Department of 
Statistics 1957 and 1970). In addition, the population was growing at a rate 
faster than jobs were being created (Huff 1994: 292). For technology transfer, 
as Singapore’s industrial structure was technologically backward, the 
government hoped that industrial transnational corporations would not only 
bring in advanced technology but also invest in training local workers (Huff 
1994: 240).
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Encouraging industrial transnational corporations to locate operations 
in Singapore was not going to be easy. As suggested, archetypal industrial 
transnational corporations would choose to locate in areas where profits could 
be maximized and costs minimized. To create conditions that would be 
conducive for such enterprises, the Singapore developmental state offered 
them highly ‘competitive’ factors of production.
C o m p e t it iv e  A d v a n t a g e
Although Singapore had certain comparative advantages such as its
deep harbour, long entrepot history and strategic geographic position in the
Southeast Asian region (Lim et a l 1988: 1-4), its only ‘competitive’ factor of
production was labour. Furthermore, the relative cost of Singapore’s labour in
the 1960s was only marginally more competitive than its geographic
neighbours. In 1969, although hourly compensation costs for labour in
Singapore was less than one eleventh of the United States and other
industrialized countries, they were only marginally lower than those in Taiwan,
Hong Kong and South Korea, and higher than in places such as Latin America
or Mexico (Huff 1995: 1424). Therefore to make labour costs more ‘attractive’
to industrial transnational corporations, the Singapore developmental state
intervened heavily in the economy. Economically, it invested in developing
human resources in Singapore through its public housing, mass education and
public health programmes (Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997: 56-79). Although this
might improve the ‘quality’ of the labour force would benefit the potential
investor3, it was a long rather than short-term project. For the short term, the
Singapore government utilized political mechanisms to suppress the relative
cost of labour to compete with other regions. The state therefore set out to
control the labour unions in Singapore (see Chew and Chew 1995, Rodan
1997, and Deyo 1989). This was firstly done through coercive measures, when
the police was often utilized to disperse strikes after 1965. This was soon
followed by a constitutional amendment that made strikes and work stoppages
illegal in Singapore in 1967 (Chew and Chew 1995: 32). Ultimately this led to
a situation where there was a complete absence of strikes and stoppages in
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Singapore after 19734. Secondly, the Singapore developmental state ‘co-opted’ 
the labour movement5, forming the National Trade Union Congress—an 
umbrella body for unions in the country—for the purposes of ‘pacifying’ 
labour groups (see Deyo 1989). The utilization of these political mechanisms 
was meant to create a ‘pro-business environment’6 in Singapore that was 
supposed to benefit industrial transnational corporations. Within such an 
environment, it was hoped that Singapore’s competitiveness as a location for 
industrial production would improve.
To enhance the island’s competitiveness, the state focused on the 
provision of secondary factors of production. In the first national industrial 
policy, the government intervened significantly in the economy, offering 
economic, tax and fiscal incentives to attract transnational corporations— 
especially those in the electronics and related sectors—to invest in Singapore 
(Mirza 1986: 88-90). In addition, the Singapore government directed the 
Singapore Economic Development Board and the Jurong Town Corporation (a 
statutory board that served as an industrial property developer) to prepare 
ready-built industrial estates (Huff 1994: 330). Also, transportation and
n
communication links, power, water and sewage were built . The objective was 
to relieve the potential investors of the need and costs of building their own 
factories, increasing their returns from any capital investments. In this way, the 
Singapore government’s provision of ‘competitive’ primary and secondary 
factors of production to industrial transnational corporations was similar to the 
utilization of economic mechanisms. However, to industrial transnational 
corporations, these advantages were marginal. Many other governments—
o
which were the Singapore government’s direct competitors in the game — 
offered similar economic incentives and often could offer access to much 
larger local markets (Yeung 1998: 125). Furthermore, Singapore’s industrial 
inexperience constituted a serious ‘risk’, as industrial transnational 
corporations also would be hesitant to locate in unfamiliar areas or deal with 
governments they did not trust or had low credibility, regardless of the 
promised economic incentives.
72
Chapter Four
To overcome these obstacles, the Singapore developmental state once 
again intervened in the economy. It utilized social mechanisms to develop 
familiarity, reciprocity, credibility and trust with transnational corporations. As 
there was almost no prior social contact between the elite and the decision 
makers of the transnational corporations, the state had to begin from scratch. 
The two sides did not share a similar institutional or cultural background, as 
was the case in the Japan (see Johnson 1982, Okimoto 1989, and Callon 1995). 
In the late 1960s, the Singapore government had to make themselves known to 
the key decision makers of transnational corporations, engage in reciprocal 
activities, enhance its credibility and finally win the trust of transnational 
corporations. In practical terms, the first step was to develop familiarity. This 
was achieved through increasing the information available to the other parties. 
The Singapore government despatched Singapore Economic Development 
Board officers to disseminate information about the industrial opportunities in 
Singapore at the headquarters or regional branches of transnational 
corporations (Schein 1996: 42). Also, the Board established offices in North 
America, Europe and Japan in a bid to improve familiarity9. These bureaucrats 
aimed to develop credibility through demonstrating honesty, competency and 
commitment (Schein 1996: 125). Fully aware of the ‘reputation’ of third world 
countries, these bureaucrats took lengths to stress that corruption was not part 
of the Singapore government’s or Economic Development Board’s 
vocabulary10. This eventually turned out to be effective, as many industrial 
transnational corporations made big capital investments in Singapore. A 
chairman of DuPont was quoted about why he could trust the Singapore 
government:
‘What they [Singapore government] said, they stuck to. We had a lot of 
experience in other countries where something would be discussed and 
agreed upon one day, and then the next day or in a week we would get 
a call back saying “Well, we didn’t quite understand,” and/or “We 
can’t do that now.” In other countries things would constantly come 
unglued, whereas in Singapore, once they said something, they stuck to 
it. Or, if  they have to renegotiate, the logic was always very clear and 
very plausible.’ (Edgar Woolard, chairman, DuPont, in 1993, quoted in 
Schein 1996:124)
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The Singapore government also purposively focused on improving levels of 
reciprocity, which refers to the keeping of promises. In the 1960s, several 
transnational corporations cautiously made small initial investments and 
waited to see if the Singapore government kept its promises or made sudden 
policy changes11 (Mirza 1986: 34). As it turned out, the Singapore government 
kept its promises on maintaining a ‘pro-business’ environment, developing 
human resources and providing quality infrastructure. These measures were 
viewed positively by executives of transnational corporations, and led to the 
improvement of credibility and trust. With greater trust and confidence in the 
Singapore government, senior executives were confident enough to 
recommend that they expand their operations in Singapore.
The Singapore government also utilized political mechanisms to 
enhance credibility. It not only created institutions and systems that were 
designed to demonstrate efficiency and competence—particularly in the fields 
of bureaucratic administration, management, and execution of policies—it 
enforced these mechanisms effectively (see Lim et al. 1988, Huff 1994, and 
Perry, Kong, and Yeoh 1997). In many ways, the Singapore government’s 
bureaucratic efficiency had been described as coming closest to Weber’s ideal- 
type of bureaucracy (Evans 1995: 37). This also impressed investors, as 
demonstrated by the following report:
‘In 1973, Texas Instruments simply got browned off with red tape in 
Taiwan and revamped its investment plans to centre on Singapore—the 
company was in operation only 50 days after the investment decision 
was made.’ (Huff 1994: 325)
During this period, the enhancement of the Singapore government’s credibility 
in fields such as institutional administration and governance, particularly in the 
industrial sector, was to prove highly important for its later regionalization 
programme.
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O u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  F ir st  S t r a t e g y
The Singapore government’s FDI-oriented development strategy
between 1965 and 1980 was successful. By the early 1970s, many
transnational corporations responded positively to overtures from the
Singapore developmental state locating large multi-plant factories on the
island (see Table 4.1). Between 1972 and 1978, the total investment in
Singapore was US$2,600.7 million, of which 84 percent were ‘foreign’ and 16
percent were ‘local’ commitments (Lim et al. 1988: 255). In 1981, foreign
firms accounted for 70 percent of the gross output in the manufacturing sector,
over 50 percent of employment, and 82 percent of direct exports in the country
(Bello and Rosenfeld 1990: 293). By 1973, Singapore moved a situation of
labour surplus to labour scarcity (Huff 1994: 326). The unemployment rate fell
to below four percent by 1974 (Rodan 1997: 153). With the rising number of
jobs, women’s participation in the labour force increased from 29.5 percent in
1970 to 44.3 percent in 1980. By the early 1980s, labour was so scarce that the
government eased restrictions on foreign workers.
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Ta b l e  4.1: F o r e ig n  In v e s t m e n t  C o m m it m e n t s  i n  S in g a p o r e  ’s  
M a n u f a c t u r in g  (1966-1984)
Year Annual Amount 
(S$ millions)
Cumulative Amount 
(S$ millions)
Annual Growth 
Rate (%)
1966 82 239 52.2
1967 64 303 26.8
1968 151 454 49.8
1969 146 600 32.2
1970 395 995 65.8
1971 580 1575 58.3
1972 708 2283 45.0
1973 376 2659 16.5
1974 395 3054 14.9
1975 326 3380 10.7
1976 329 3739 10.6
1977 406 4145 10.9
1978 1097 522 26.5
1979 1107 6349 21.1
1980 1189 7538 18.7
1981 1221 8759 16.2
1982 1162 9921 13.3
1983 1269 11190 12.8
1984 1334 12524 11.9
Source: Chia (1989: 32)
The Singapore government’s development strategy was successful. It 
addressed unemployment problems and transformed the economy. By the mid- 
1970s, the degree of industrial activity had grown, especially in the electronics
1 9and other capital-intensive manufacturing sectors (see Table 4.2). During that 
time, employment in manufacturing rose from 74,000 in 1965 to 433,000 in 
1992 (Huff 1995: 741).
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Ta b l e  4.2: P e r c e n t a g e  o f  E m p l o y m e n t  Sh a r e  o f  In d u s t r ie s  i n  Sin g a p o r e  
(1961-1991)
Industry 1961 1971 1981 1991
Food 15.5 6.9 3.5 3.1
Wood products 9.2 7.7 2.9 0.6
Printing and Publishing 15.3 5.2 4.4 4.7
Transport equipment 4.3 13.2 10.1 8.3
Garment and textiles 2.2 9.5 9.9 7.2
Electronics 4.9 8.4 24.6 34.4
Electrical Appliances n.a. 4.7 5.7 5.8
Industrial machinery 5.8 4.7 8.5 6.7
Metal products 7.3 6.5 6.9 8.5
Others 35.5 33.2 23.5 20.7
Total 100 100 100 100
Sources: Singapore Department of Statistics (1983: 84-85, and 1991:
114-5)
Thus, by the mid-1970s, the Singapore government had managed to encourage 
transnational corporations to locate some of their operations on the island. 
Based on the amounts invested by these transnational corporations, and the 
emergence of manufacturing as the largest sector in Singapore’s economy, the 
government’s wider objective of industrialization had been achieved. This, in 
turn, was one of the main factors behind Singapore’s overall economic growth 
(see Table 4.3). Singapore’s per capita Gross Domestic Product increased from 
US$500 (S$l,330) in 1965 to US$15,000 (S$22,587) in 1990.
Ta b l e  4.3: S i n g a p o r e ’s  Se l e c t e d  E c o n o m ic  In d ic a  t o r s  (1960-1990)
Average Annual Growth (%)
Period 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990
GDP 9.1 9.0 7.1
Per Capita Level (S$)
Year 1960 1970 1980 1990
GNP 1,330 2,825 9,941 22,587
Source: Wong andNg (1997: 121).
This does not suggest that these industrial transnational corporations located 
operations in Singapore because they shared national interests with the 
government; instead, transnational corporations came to Singapore because 
they were confident of profitability. From 1974 to 1984, the average rate of
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return of U.S. investment in Singapore averaged 35.4 percent, compared to 
16.9 percent for investment in Hong Kong, 18.4 percent for Taiwan and 15.2 
percent in Korea (Lim et al. 1988: 262). Furthermore, several industrial 
transnational corporations expanded the size and scope of their operations after 
a few years in Singapore (Lim et al. 1988: 235).
However, Singapore’s competitiveness was also enhanced by the 
structure of the external environment, which was the global game of industrial 
production. In the period 1965-1980, from the perspective of transnational 
corporations, the relative cost of Singapore’s primary and secondary factors of 
production were similar to competitor Asian locations such as Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. However, for those hoping to supply the Southeast Asian market, 
with regions such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and China omitting 
transnational corporations in their economic development strategy at the time, 
this meant that as a location, Singapore had fewer direct competitors. 
Therefore, the Singapore government’s success at attracting FDI were both due 
to its embedding strategies as well as due to the structure of the global game of 
industrial production at the time.
4.2 Ch a n g e s  i n  t h e  G l o b a l  Ga m e
By 1980, the global game of industrial production underwent rapid
change. The most important change was that more states were beginning to 
participate in the global game of industrial production. This meant that more 
governments were turning to FDI-oriented strategies to encourage economic 
growth. These governments, by hoping to supply primary factors of production 
in exchange for ‘developmental effects,’ opened up their once protectionist 
borders to the inflow of foreign capital from the beginning of the 1980s (see 
Jomo 1997, and Booth 1999). This ‘liberalization’ reduced the regional 
competitiveness of Singapore’s labour. Furthermore, the growing labour 
shortage in Singapore soon increased labour costs and labour turnover 
(Okposin 1999: 12). With the Singapore government only willing to allow
1 3very small numbers of foreign labour to ease this strain , enterprises involved 
in labour intensive operations experienced diminished profitability (see Lim et
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al. 1988, and Rodan 1997). In addition, with many industrial transnational 
corporations located in Singapore, congestion and land shortages contributed 
to rising rent and land costs14. The transnational corporations’ choices were 
straightforward: become more capital intensive by extracting greater value 
from the capital inputs (labour, land or raw materials), or relocate to another 
area, region or country where costs structures were lower (Krause 1987).
In the 1980s, the Singapore government attempted to re-establish the 
economy’s competitiveness by re-engaging transnational corporations in the 
project of industrial upgrading15. The ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ involved 
a series of highly attractive tax incentives to encourage transnational 
corporations to upgrade their operations in Singapore (see Bello and Rosenfeld 
1990, Rodan 1989, and Chiu, Ho and Lui 1997). In addition, the state 
increased investments in improving Singapore’s human capital. Although it 
appeared that industrial upgrading was a ‘failure’ in the short term, in the mid- 
1990s the upgrading finally took off (Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997, and Ho 
2000). However, during the 1980s, industrial transnational corporations were 
beginning to relocate much of their labour-intensive and low value-added 
operations out of Singapore16 (Kumar and Lee 1991: 2-3). The destination of 
manufacturing operations headed to regions in China and other parts of 
Southeast Asia, including areas in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines and Vietnam. Due to their relatively late entry in the game, these 
regions could offer industrial transnational corporations much cheaper primary 
factors of production. As industrial transnational corporations could relocate 
capital and technology fairly easily, the option to maintain operations in 
Singapore was not economically viable.
E n t e r  t h e  D r a g o n : C h in a ’s E c o n o m ic  R e f o r m
In 1979, the China government ‘partially’ entered the global game of
industrial production. The then-Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping marked a new 
chapter in China’s economic history by opening limited segments of the 
Chinese economy to global capital. Before this, China—operating within a 
centrally planned economic system—was mainly participating within the
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Soviet-centred world economy17. However by the 1970s, the Chinese economy 
faced several structural problems that hindered economic growth, including 
inefficient production from state-owned enterprises, low levels of capital and 
expertise, small international market and trading networks, backward 
technology and poor management systems (see Pomfret 1991, Hsing 1998, and 
Naughton 1995). In 1978, due to pressure from certain local and regional 
leaders, Deng and a small cohort of like-minded Chinese leaders believed that 
the best means of achieving development was to embark upon a series of
1 o t
economic reforms . The ‘modernization’ drive, introduced m 1979, had four 
related dimensions: opening limited segments of China’s economy to global 
capital; reforming the many state-owned enterprises; the encouragement of 
private enterprises in China; and finally, the lifting of price controls in favour 
o f ‘freer’ market mechanisms (see Selden 1992 and Perkins 1998). While the 
modernization drive had important implications for nearly every sphere of 
China’s economy and society—including reforming the massive industrial and 
agricultural sectors as well as the social welfare and legal systems—of 
particular relevance to this thesis was the China government’s (limited) 
participation in the global game of industrial production as a supplier of 
factors of production as a purposive strategy to stimulate the economy.
While there were internal pressures to look outwards, there was also 
strong pressure from economic players such as industrial transnational 
corporations that were lobbying for the China government to open its 
economic borders. They were attracted by China’s abundant and cheap primary 
factors of production. Also, many of these transnational corporations were 
interested in China as a potentially huge consumer market (see Naughton 
1995). Although the China government hoped for foreign investment, it 
wanted to ensure that any economic, political and social changes were 
incremental and remained under its control (see White 1988 and 1991, Selden 
1992 and Breslin 1996). Therefore as a purposive strategy, rather than opening 
the whole country to global capital, the China government initially only 
allowed foreign investment in the designated ‘Special Economic Zones’ of
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Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong, which were all less than 100 
kilometres from either Hong Kong, the New Territories and Macao, and 
Xiamen in Fujian province, which was, across the straits from Taiwan19. The 
purpose of these zones was to obtain capital, modem technology and 
managerial techniques from foreign enterprises (Park 1997: 4). These zones 
resembled ‘export processing zones’ and ‘free economic zones’ that were 
developed by various governments around the world since the 1950s. These 
were self-contained areas where the economic policy could be different from 
the rest of the country (Chen 1995: 597). Such purpose-built industrial areas 
were geared to the offshore sourcing needs of transnational corporations. 
Imports were duty-free on condition that the products assembled or 
manufactured were re-exported. To transnational corporations, one advantage 
of producing in an export-processing zone was to take advantage of low cost 
primary factors of production while not being subjected to other taxes. For the 
host country, the advantage lay in the jobs created and foreign currency earned 
through wages (see Sklair 1993: 6). Another benefit, in theory at least, was that 
export-processing zones provided opportunities for a country to integrate into 
the international division of labour without subjecting the entire economy to 
trade liberalization (see Chen 1995). Despite the evidence from such zones
that transnational corporations usually benefited more than the host country,
0(\many governments still persisted with the establishment of such zones (see 
Sklair 1993 and 1994).
In order to gain access to capital, foreign currency and technology 
transfer, the China government legislated that ‘foreign’ businesses that wanted 
to operate in China had to form equity-joint ventures with Chinese enterprises 
(Huang 1998: 10). This essentially reliev the China government of this 
provision (Leung 1986: 1-2). Also regional authorities were earning revenues 
from taxation and the employment incomes of the ever-growing pool of labour 
in South China (see Crane 1990, and Leung 1986). Secondary interests were 
also to foster closer relations with other countries, particularly Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan (for their overseas Chinese links). In real terms, the China
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government hoped to court the large potential of industrial capital emanating 
from the overseas Chinese in these three regions21.
T h e  ‘O v e r s e a s  C h in e s e ’ C o n n e c t io n
The China government’s strategy to participate in the global game of
industrial production initially was aimed at a particular group of transnational
investors: the overseas Chinese industrial capitalists22. From the beginning of
t V ithe 20 century right until the 1980s, overseas Chinese had continued to retain 
pervasive kinship and village ties in China, regardless of the international 
diplomatic environment or the overseas Chinese’s country of nationality (see 
Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy 1996: 6). Financial remittances made by overseas 
Chinese after the Second World War right through the period of the Cold War 
remained high (Bolt 2000: 41-43). Therefore when Beijing made overtures to 
overseas Chinese business-persons to invest this capital in industrial 
production in China after 1979, the response was overwhelming (see Table 
4.4).
Ta b l e  4.4: S o u r c e s  o f  F o r e ig n  D ir e c t  In v e s t m e n t  i n  C h in a  (1979-1995) 
(c u m u l a t iv e )
Rank Country/Region Number of 
Projects
Contractual FDI 
(US$ millions)
Actual FDI 
(US$ millions)
1 Hong Kong/ Macao 17,713 4 2 ,111 20, 500
2 Taiwan 4, 847 5, 849 3, 162
3 Japan 2,946 7,592 3, 108
4 United States 3,474 7, 471 3, 083
5 Singapore 1,279 8, 666 1,851
6 South Korea 1,975 2, 998 1,043
7 United Kingdom 457 3, 577 914
Source: The Bulletin of MOFTEC (1996), quoted in Luo (1998: 12).
It was not that overseas Chinese capitalists were overtly nationalistic, nostalgic 
or sentimental when it came to investing in China. Rather, as players in the 
global game of industrial production, overseas Chinese capitalists were in the 
best position to take advantage of the opportunities because of their 
‘advantages’: they understood Chinese business practices and guanxi, and
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could utilize their shared ethnicity if necessary (Roehrig 1994: 91). Although 
business in China could operate without these three factors, it was argued that
' J ' X‘outsiders ’ would face greater obstacles and costs because of the 
distinctiveness of the Chinese economy:
‘The problems that non-Chinese investors face have frequently been 
noted: the language barrier, the incompatibility of Western and 
Japanese management styles with Chinese practices, the distinctive 
bureaucratic organization of the workplace, the difficulties of hiring 
and firing workers and of eliminating inefficient work practices, low 
labour productivity, poor quality control, differences in negotiating 
practices and the long time-frame needed for their completion and most 
of all the lack of an established legal framework.’ (Lever-Tracy, Ip and 
Tracy 1996: 67)
Familiarity with these practices gave overseas Chinese capitalists an advantage 
in China, reducing ambiguities and enhancing efficiency. By understanding the 
importance of seniority (also known as hierarchy), ‘face’, consensus, goodwill 
and guanxi when dealing with (traditional) Chinese business-persons, overseas 
Chinese capitalists reduced uncertainty and penetrated China’s markets 
quickly (see Bolt 2000). Guanxi refers to social and obligatory ties between 
parties (Hamilton 1997: 270-4). In the business sphere, guanxi is believed to 
enhance reciprocity, credibility and trust (xinyong) between partners (Tong and 
Yong 1998: 84). Thus, when an actor has familiarity, and by implication, 
expertise with these Chinese business institutions and guanxi, he or she has a 
wider range of resources to maximize over competitors24. The third factor— 
the shared ethnicity—is probably the most problematic one, riddled with 
contradiction. On the one hand, there is a perception that the Chinese—like 
most ‘rational’ human beings—would do business with anyone else regardless 
of ethnicity, so long as there was profit to be made. On the other hand, there is 
a perception that the Chinese not only prefer to do business with other ethnic 
Chinese, but also dislike doing business with non-Chinese. Although this 
research is not directly interested in proving whether these traditional notions 
are still pervasive in the contemporary Chinese business sphere, it accepts that
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these notions are still perceived to be important by players with an interest in 
the Chinese economy.
However, within the global game of industrial production, China’s 
relative lack of exposure to global capital and the legacy of its communist 
economic system incurred higher risk and uncertainty costs for industrial 
transnational corporations. With the added burden of China’s archaic
9^‘Chinese’ business characteristics , these costs would translate into real 
financial costs when they have to learn about the Chinese business system (see 
Roehig 1994). ‘Communist’ hangovers from China’s planned economic 
system included the ‘family register’ labour system, the collectivization 
programme, and the large but apparently dysfunctional bureaucracy (Wong 
1998: 76-77). Also, there were conflicts of management practices; local 
managers were reportedly either unfamiliar with so-called ‘western’ 
managerial techniques, or reluctant to adapt to them (see Weldon and Jehn 
1996, and Hannan 1998). In addition to the costs and risks, transnational 
corporations faced other obstacles—including linguistic, cultural, legal and 
political—when investing in a ‘developing’ country. Furthermore, in China 
corruption was reportedly rife at virtually all levels of government and Chinese 
businesses26. A final risk factor was the geo-political status of the state itself. 
As a world superpower—especially one that had its own nuclear weapons 
programme—the China government’s stance on issues such as sovereignty of 
Tibet and Taiwan (and a host of other military and strategic hotspots) 
constantly left China in a position where trade and economic embargoes were 
commonly threatened. Yet despite all these factors, profit-seeking capitalists 
still hoped to take advantage of the country’s massive potential market and 
attractive costs structures. To them, China was simply a dragon that was 
waiting to awaken. By the mid-1980s, it certainly had. Certain transnational 
corporations with large economic, political and social resources were willing 
to enter the China market regardless of these risks and uncertainties. Others 
entered into strategic joint-ventures as a strategy to familiarize themselves with 
the Chinese business environment (see Nolan and Wang 1999, and Roehig
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1994). There were, however, many other more cautious industrial transnational 
corporations that delayed investing in China because of the deficient secondary 
factors of production.
After five years of limited participation in the global game of industrial 
production, the China government was fairly satisfied with the SEZ 
programme. It had seen the expansion of employment opportunities, increasing 
worker income, and most importantly increasing the state’s foreign currency 
earnings in the country (Duckett 1998, and Luo 1998). Also, the central China 
government in Beijing could reduce its financial subsidies to the regions now 
that tax revenues from foreign investments generated a substantial income for
97the local authorities . However, there were some unintended consequences of 
the Special Economic Zones programme. These included the increasing 
income disparity in urban centres, uncontrolled urban sprawl, environmental 
degradation and the growing black market28. Yet, in the 1980s Beijing pushed
9 0ahead with the rapid expansion of the zoning programme . In 1984, an 
additional 14 cities or towns were designated ‘Open Coastal City’ or ‘Open 
Coastal Economic Area.’ In 1985, the Lower Yangtze Delta, the Pearl River 
Delta and the Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle were designated as 
Coastal Economic Development Zones. In 1985, Hainan Island was designated 
the fifth and last official Special Economic Zone30. By 1990, a ‘myriad’ of free 
trade zones, economic and technological development zones, high and new 
technology industrial development zones, open provincial capitals, border 
region open areas and state tourist vacation zones were approved by Beijing.
By 1995, there were 422 such zones (Yang 1997: 30). In a parallel 
development, the Beijing government began to encourage broader forms of 
foreign investment from 1986 onwards with the passage of the Wholly Foreign 
Owned Enterprise Law, which allowed wholly foreign owned companies to 
invest and operate these zones (Huang 1998: 10). By 1990, it was clear that the 
China government had decided to increase its participation in the global game 
of industrial production as part of the country’s development strategy31.
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4.3 T h e  G lo b a l  G am e o f  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  1990s
By the beginning of the 1990s, China’s entry into the global game of
production—albeit still limited—added to the trend where more national
governments (and indeed local governments) turned to Foreign Direct
Investment as part of their economic development strategies. Many of these
governments hoped to attract the location of transnational corporations within
their shores through offering to supply relatively cheap factors of production.
This had the effect of intensifying the competition to become the suppliers of
factors of production to industrial transnational corporations. It was under such
conditions that the Singapore government consciously and purposively altered
its own development strategy.
S in g a p o r e ’s  R e g io n a l iz a t io n  S t r a t e g y
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Singapore government formulated
the ‘regionalization programme’ within its new national policy known as the
‘Strategic Economic Plan.’ (Wong and Ng 1997: 92) This saw the Singapore
government evolve into an ‘transnational entrepreneurial state.’ The evolution
can be explained by the developmental state’s changed motivations, resources
and strategies. In response to the country’s internal environment, the Singapore
developmental elite was aware that the country could not compete with lower
cost areas for the location of transnational corporations . At the same time, it
identified that the external environment—the Asia-Pacific region—held many
attractive economic opportunities, some of which it believed it could profitably
exploit.
The developmental elite’s main motivation for the ‘regionalization’ 
programme was officially announced as follows:
‘The strategic intent of the regionalisation programme is to build an 
external economy that is closely linked to and which enhances the 
domestic economy by participating in the growth of Asia. This 
programme seeks to form a network of strategic zones in key markets 
with emphasis on building good linkages between our regional projects 
and domestic clusters.’ (Singapore Economic Development Board 
1995: 8)
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This meant that the Singapore government was planning to intervene in the 
regional rather than national economy. In the region, the governments of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand had already opened their once protectionist 
borders to Foreign Direct Investment, particularly between 1987 and 1992 (see 
Jomo 1997, and Booth 1999). A number of factors were responsible for this 
significant inflow including the appreciation of the Japanese Yen since the 
1985 Plaza Accord, rising costs of labour in Japan and other newly 
industrializing countries (South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), increasing lack 
of security in Taiwan and the 1997 reversion of Hong Kong to China. From the 
perspective of transnational corporations, these locations had three attractive 
factors: stable macroeconomic environment, liberal economic regimes and 
competitive rates of return on investment (Tongzon 1998: 27-29). Therefore, 
by opening up these borders, the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and 
China successfully entered the global game of industrial production. These 
governments were motivated to participate not just after observing the success 
of Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan with FDI-oriented strategies, but also 
because of the limited success of their import-substitution industrialization 
strategies. By 1990, it was difficult for Singapore to compete with these 
locations to supply primary factors of production. For example, labour and 
land costs in Malaysia and Indonesia were 75 percent lower than in Singapore 
(Kumar and Lee 1991: 7). Against this background, the Singapore government 
accepted the old adage: ‘If you can’t beat them, join them.’ This had three 
implications. Firstly, the Singapore government sought to move the country 
out of direct competition for low cost manufacturing operations. Secondly, it 
identified that it could generate profits if it were an investor in the region. 
Finally, the surpluses from regional investments could supplement the 
domestic Singapore economy, maintaining or increasing positive growth rates.
The prime movers behind the Singapore government’s regionalization 
programme were the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite. This elite 
was similar to the developmental elite, in that it consisted of key leaders from 
the Singapore government, including Lee Kuan Yew (who had by the 1990s
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retired as Singapore’s Prime Minister and was appointed Senior Minister), his 
son Lee Hsien Loong (who was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Industry and Trade), and senior bureaucrats from state agencies such as Philip 
Yeo, the Chairman of the Singapore Economic Development Board. Again, 
because of the political and social resources of these individuals, they had the 
capacity to direct the various arms of the state, such as the Ministries of 
Finance, and Trade and Industry, and statutory boards including the Jurong 
Town Corporation, in the regionalization programme.
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite was confident about 
the regionalization programme because of its accumulated economic, political 
and social resources. With more than 20 years of positive economic growth, 
the country had large financial reserves33. Politically, it had relatively good 
diplomatic relationships with the neighbouring governments34. Socially, to 
industrial transnational corporations, the Singapore government had credibility 
as an effective and efficient developer and administrator of industrial 
properties, established from the earlier period of industrial transformation 
(1965-1980). With these economic, social and political resources, the 
Singapore government attempted to realize its entrepreneurial motivations.
T r a n s n a t io n a l  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h ip
As discussed in the Chapter One, effective entrepreneurship refers to
an agent’s ability to identify hitherto unnoticed opportunities and devise 
strategies to capture them. In practical terms, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state had identified that there was demand from transnational 
corporations for effective secondary factors of production—particularly high- 
quality industrial infrastructure and efficient industrial management—in the 
region. Thus, it believed that as an experienced and credible developer of 
industrial property for industrial transnational corporations, it could provide 
assistance to companies that wanted to ‘regionalize,’ which mostly meant 
relocating lower value-added operations to the region. Although the Singapore 
government had to financially invest in the region, it was confident that this 
strategy could generate profits and accumulate wealth, which in turn could
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supplement Singapore’s national economy. The Singapore government also 
felt that the country’s diplomatic relations with the neighbouring governments 
could be improved in the process, as mutually beneficial economic 
relationships between regional governments would lay the foundation for long­
term regional geo-political stability (Leifer 1998: 21-22).
The Singapore government’s regionalization programme therefore 
involved ‘transnationalization.’ In this research’s theoretical framework, it is 
defined as the processes that cross national boundaries but do not necessarily 
emanate from states or state agencies (Sklair 2001: 1). In this sense, 
govemment-to-govemment transactions are better described as ‘international,’ 
or ‘bi-national.’ Yet, the Singapore government’s actual role in its 
regionalization programme was not very ‘state’-like, in the sense that it did not 
pursue security, trade or bilateral issues. In many ways, it was closer to that of 
a commercial investor. Thus, these financial investments in the region could 
not be considered ‘international aid,’ as the Singapore government’s profit
nr .
motivation was paramount . In this sense, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state was operating as a capitalistic developer and manager of 
industrial property outside of its national borders. Although it might 
occasionally utilize political resources such as diplomatic pressure, it was 
primarily driven by motivations of profit-seeking and wealth accumulation.
I n d u s t r ia l  P a r k s  P r o g r a m m e
One of the central thrusts of the Singapore government’s
regionalization programme was the Regional Industrial Parks project. As an 
entrepreneurial strategy, this project targeted a niche in the global game of 
industrial production. This niche was created by the demand for high quality 
secondary factors of production in the emerging manufacturing regions of 
Asia. Although the cost of primary factors of production was very attractive, 
these regions lacked high quality industrial infrastructure and administrative 
systems (Kumar and Lee 1991: 12). Therefore, even though production costs 
were low in the neighbouring regions, many transnational corporations viewed 
that investing there carried high uncertainty risks and costs. The Singapore
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government was convinced that its own ‘core competence’ was in industrial 
property development and management. It also had relatively good diplomatic 
ties with the regional governments that could facilitate its operations. Finally, 
the Singapore government had financial resources, accumulated from its high 
economic growth in the earlier period, to invest in the region. Thus, it 
embarked upon a strategy to exploit this niche in the global game of industrial 
production to provide and administer high quality industrial estates in the 
region. The state forecasted that there was, firstly, strong demand from 
transnational corporations for such industrial estates. Secondly, such industrial 
estates could be mutually beneficial to the Singapore government, 
transnational corporations and the local governments. Finally, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state was confident that the programme would be 
financially profitable.
The Singapore government’s pilot industrial park project was situated 
in the Sijori Growth Triangle (see Kumar and Lee 1991). In 1989, the outgoing 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his successor Goh Chok Tong signed 
agreements with Indonesian leaders such as the then-President Suharto and the 
then-Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie to develop an 
industrial estate on Batam Island, an Indonesian duty-free export-processing 
zone. Batam’s attractiveness, at least from the perspective of the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state, was that it was only a one-hour journey by 
boat from Singapore. In 1990, labour and land costs were a quarter of those in 
Singapore (Kumar and Lee 1991: 7-8). The Batamindo Industrial Park, as it 
was called, was established as a formal a joint venture between a Singaporean 
and an Indonesian consortium . The Singapore consortium—consisting of two 
government-linked companies (Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation 
and Jurong Environmental Engineering)—took a 40 percent stake in the 
venture, while the Indonesian consortium—consisting of the Salim Group— 
held the rest (Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997: 175). More importantly, the 
marketing, development and the management of the property of the park 
assigned the day-to-day operations to the Singaporean partner (Grundy-Warr,
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Peachey and Perry 1999: 310). Many transnational corporations—assured by 
the quality of industrial infrastructure and administration—relocated many of 
their lower value-added operations from Singapore to Batam37. At the same 
time, many of these transnational corporations retained some operations 
(including their regional headquarters) in Singapore. By 1991, the park was 
fully functional. Initial responses from investors—both transnational 
corporations and Singaporean companies—were very positive about the park,
OQ
particularly as the projected cost savings were realized . The Indonesian 
government also benefited from the park, as it created employment and 
brought in foreign currency through employment and tax revenues. In 1988, 
just over 10,000 persons were employed in Batam; by 1996,125,000 were 
employed, and the foreign exchange revenue earned per employee jumped 
from US$620 in 1988 to US$27,000 in 1996 (Grundy-Warr, Peachey and 
Perry 1999: 313). Although it was difficult to calculate whether the Park was 
profitable, most indications were that Batamindo was generating healthy 
incomes through the sale of industrial units and the sub-lease of factories as 
well as from management charges (ibid.).
At the Batamindo Industrial Park, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s embedding mechanisms were important in encouraging 
transnational corporations to locate. The economic mechanisms included high 
quality industrial parks that were similar to those in Singapore, but at a 
significantly lower cost. The Singapore government utilized political 
mechanisms such as implementing legal institutions and administrative 
procedures. The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state also utilized 
social mechanisms on industrial transnational corporations, especially in 
capitalizing on the high level of trust and confidence that transnational 
corporations had (Kumar and Lee 1991: 12-3). Simultaneously, the Singapore 
government also utilized embedding mechanisms on with the Indonesian 
government. Economically, it would underwrite the infrastructural investment 
and promised the creation of employment opportunities for Batam. It utilized 
political mechanisms such as its good bilateral diplomatic ties to enhance the
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collaboration. Finally, social mechanisms also proved important because inter­
personal and inter-organizational relations between government leaders played 
an important role in getting the project off the ground (see Perry, Kong and 
Yeoh 1997, and Schein 1996). Buoyed by the relative success of the Batam 
Industrial Park, the Singapore government was confident that similar industrial 
estates in the region would be both in demand and potentially profitable. By 
1992, the Singapore Economic Development Board had planned for 
Singaporean industrial parks to be located in Vietnam, Indonesia, India, 
Thailand and China (see Wong and Ng 1997).
The ‘regional industrial parks’ project had clearly indicated how the 
Singapore government’s development strategies were transnational and 
entrepreneurial. It had identified transnational economic opportunities and 
devised strategies to intervene and capture a niche—the supply of secondary 
factors of production—in the global game of industrial production. With its 
economic, political and social resources, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial elite was confident that such Singapore-run industrial estates 
would be more competitive over other industrial estates in the region. The 
ultimate objective was that this programme would serve as a platform to 
generate financial profits that could supplement Singapore’s economy.
4.4 C o n v e r g e n c e
By 1980, with the many new participants in the global game of
industrial production, Singapore’s earlier competitiveness as a location for 
industrial transnational corporations had declined. Many transnational 
corporations were looking to relocate lower value-added manufacturing 
activities out of Singapore to the new emerging production areas such as 
China, Indonesia and Malaysia. However, for most of them, despite their 
competitive primary factors of production—such as labour, raw materials, and 
land costs—many industrial transnational corporations were still hesitant to 
relocate operations there because of its relative lack of secondary factors of 
production (infrastructure and administration). For China specifically, it also 
had a history of problematic geo-political relations with the ‘West’ (see Shee
92
Chapter Four
1998). Under these conditions, the Singapore developmental elite projected 
that its intervention in the Chinese economy—through its transnational 
entrepreneurship—could not only be profitable to the Singapore economy, but 
potentially beneficial for the China government and industrial transnational 
corporations as well. Thus, that was why China, as a location, was included in 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s ‘regionalization’ 
programme.
B a s is  f o r  C o l l a b o r a t io n
One of the main thrusts of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial
state’s regionalization programme involved collaboration with key partners.
This section analyzes the China government’s motivations for collaborating.
China’s late premier Deng Xiaoping had been an ‘admirer’ of Singapore’s
economic development ever since Singapore emerged as one of the successful
Asian ‘newly industrializing countries’ in the mid-1970s (Wong 1999: 51). He
was particularly interested in how the Singapore government was able to
achieve rapid economic growth and industrial transformation but maintained
its dominance in the social and political sphere:
‘Many top CCP leaders hope that China will follow Singapore’s route 
to prosperity in which one party dominates politics (with token 
representation for other parties) but facilitates private enterprise and 
foreign investment. The system maintains order but spawns wealth.’ 
(Clemens 1999: 7).
Singapore’s version of ‘authoritarian capitalism’ was perceived by Chinese 
leaders to produce low levels of crime, corruption, and environmental 
pollution despite large scale industrialization while retaining centralization of 
power. Furthermore, the Singapore government’s policies for providing public 
housing, education and social welfare were also highly regarded in China 
(Wong 1999: 53). In the other direction, several Singapore governmental 
leaders had long viewed China with great interest. While some might have had 
a cultural interest in forging closer ties with China—as the majority of the 
governmental leaders were of ethnic Chinese descent39—others had economic
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and political motivations. China, to Singaporean leaders, was simultaneously a 
pot of gold as well as a military threat40. Therefore, it was believed that 
constructive engagement with China could be both economically beneficial 
and could reduce the likelihood of political confrontation (Shee 1998: 340).
Before 1980, the China government was actually viewed as a 
‘communist’ threat by the Singapore government. It was accused of supporting 
the Malayan Communist Party, which had in the pre-1965 era been trying to 
destabilise British Malaya and Singapore (see Turnbull 1990). Yet, the 
Singapore government’s ‘Multiracial’ ethnic policy encouraged Singaporeans 
to retain their ancestral cultural and ethnic identity (see Hill and Lian 1995). In 
the national education system, all schoolchildren were required to learn a 
second language; this other language was not of one’s free choice but pre­
determined by one’s ethnicity. Therefore, for ethnic Chinese schoolchildren, 
they would have to study Mandarin. The government also promoted an annual 
‘Speak Mandarin Campaign.’ Although the Singaporean state might not have 
intentionally meant to build bridges with Beijing, its ‘ethnic policies’ certainly 
laid the foundation for future cooperation. With the China government’s 
economic reforms after 1979, trade and bilateral state activities with the 
Singapore government intensified. The Chinese had sent many delegations to 
Singapore to ‘study’ various aspects of Singapore’s development including 
industrial transformation, economic growth, the public housing programme, 
social welfare system (especially the use of the Central Provident Fund), and 
public administration (see Wong 1999).
Also in the late 1980s, many Singaporean private enterprises wanted to 
invest in China to take advantage of the economic potential of the ‘sleeping 
dragon’ (see Tan 1992, Yeung 2000, and Yeoh and Wills 1998). By 1990, 
several Singaporean companies—mostly small and medium sized enterprises 
owned by overseas ethnic Chinese Singaporeans—had ventured into China 
(Yeoh and Willis 1998: 3). Like their counterparts in Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Macau, these Singaporeans believed that they held an advantage in China 
because they were familiar with Chinese business practices, guanxi and shared
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ethnic ties (Yeoh and Willis 1998: 12). Most of their investments were fairly 
profitable, and the news of their success was soon transmitted to other 
companies in Singapore. As Singapore government’s regionalization 
programme was about to be launched in 1990, and also because there was a 
growing demand from Singaporean firms, China was included as a location 
where, firstly, financial assistance would be given for interested firms to 
regionalize and secondly, Singaporean-managed industrial parks would be 
built (see Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997). Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong offered himself as the parks’ ‘chief salesman.’ (Singapore Straits Times 
12 Sep 1994). Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew—a key member of the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite—had gone on record saying that 
the Singapore government would promote such industrial estates all over the 
world:
‘They [transnational corporations] believe that Singapore’s 
participation will ease their way into the unfamiliar surroundings in 
China, and will help them achieve conditions more like what they are 
familiar with in Singapore.’ (Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in Singapore 
Straits Times 29 Sep 1994).
The China government welcomed the Singapore government’s interests in 
China, and signed a memorandum of understanding in 1991 to fully support a 
Singapore-developed industrial park in China. The China government had 
clearly recognized the benefits of collaboration:
‘Westerners find it relatively easy to accept Singapore compared with 
China. And we find it easier to accept Singaporeans than Westerners. 
So Singapore stands right in the middle.’ (Li Juchuan SIP AC Official, 
quoted in Asia INC, 1 March 1996.)
However, Lee made the Singapore government’s objectives about any 
industrial parks very clear:
‘Let us be clear that when we help them (the Chinese), we are not 
doing it for charity. If it was of no advantage to us, we would not be 
doing it.’ (Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in Singapore Business Times 30 Aug
1995).
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The ‘advantage’ was financial profit. Due to the relative success of attracting 
transnational corporations to the Batam Industrial Park and Bintang Industrial 
Park in Indonesia, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite had 
confidence that China would be equally—if not even more eagerly—sought as 
a location for industrial production by transnational corporations. They could 
gain access to the Chinese market (in the long term) and to relatively cheap 
primary factors of production (in the short term). However, in a Singapore 
government-developed industrial park they would have the additional benefit 
of gaining access to high quality secondary factors of production, such as 
Singaporean industrial infrastructure and administration. The local economy 
could benefit from the employment opportunities created and foreign currency 
earned through wages. The area would also benefit from urban development, 
as a new industrial estate would bring new public infrastructure (roads, water, 
sewage and power), communications (roads and telecommunications) and 
other industrial facilities underwritten by the Singapore government. As 
another Special Economic Zone, this Singapore-developed industrial park 
would not be a threat to the economic or political stability of the country as it 
could be incorporated within the China government’s own zonal programme. 
Finally, from the China government’s perspective, by having such a park, it 
could Team’ Singapore’s social and economic development strategies ‘first 
hand.’ Thus, the project was intended to bring mutual benefit for all the 
collaborators.
4.5  C o n c l u sio n
This chapter has discussed the background to the Suzhou Industrial
Park project. It has specifically focused on how the Singapore government’s
interventionist development strategies have been formulated to take advantage
of opportunities within the global game of industrial production. In 1965, the
Singapore government became a variant of the developmental state. It chose to
heavily intervene in its national economy, with the aim of encouraging the
location industrial transnational corporations through offering competitive
factors of production. However, by the late 1980s, Singapore’s
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competitiveness declined because of the many new entrants to the global game 
of industrial production. In response, the Singapore developmental state 
evolved into a transnational entrepreneurial state with its ‘regionalization’ 
programme, intervening in the regional rather than national economy. This 
programme converged with the China government’s own development 
strategies which were FDI-oriented, as well as the interests of expansionist 
industrial transnational corporations which were keen to take advantage of 
China’s cheap primary factors of production. The next chapter discusses how 
these actors brought the Suzhou Industrial Park into reality.
1 These funds came from loans from international overseas aid, the United Nations 
Development Programme and from the World Bank (see Huff 1994). In a typically 
developmentalist mode, the elite invested most o f these funds into economic development 
projects rather than using them for their self-benefit (predatory state), see Evans (1995).
2 In Japan, the developmental state mainly collaborated with the large family-based industrial 
conglomerates known as zaibatsus (Johnson 1982) and in South Korea it was with similarly 
structured chaebols (Amsden 1989, and Kim 1997). The picture in Taiwan was less uniform; 
the state did collaborate with large state-owned and government linked enterprises, but at the 
same time devised an indirect form o f collaboration with the myriad o f  small and medium 
sized family-based enterprises (Wade 1990).
3 As the Singapore government did not have to subsidize many local enterprises, funds were 
made available for social and physical infrastructure development (see Lim et al. 1988).
4 There was only one stoppage reported between 1973 and 1985, with one company involved, 
resulting in 122 workers on strike (see Chew and Chew 1995: 47).
5 In disciplining labour for the benefit for foreign investors, the Singapore government has 
been described as an ‘authoritarian corporatist’ state (see Deyo 1981, and Rodan 1997). The 
aim was both to suppress wages as well as ensuring industrial peace. In this sense, these 
measures were to enhance the relative competitiveness o f Singapore’s workforce.
6 ‘Pro-business environment’ was a phrase regularly utilized by the Singapore government 
(Mirza 1986). It has been used even in the 1990s, as the later chapters will demonstrate.
Several analyses have argued that ‘pro-business’ conditions— defined as favouring investors—  
were also ‘anti-labour’— defined as being highly inequitable to local labour (Deyo 1981,
Rodan 1989, and Bello and Rosenfeld 1990). However, other analysts argued that this was bias 
towards investors was initially accepted by the Singapore government, which it eventually 
rectified by ensuring equitable distribution after economic growth was achieved (Lim et al. 
1988, Huff 1994, and Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997).
7 See Perry, Kong and Yeoh (1997), and Schein (1996) on the role o f the Singapore Economic 
Development Board and the Jurong Town Corporation in building industrial estates in 
Singapore.
8 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Singapore Economic Development Board identified Taiwan and 
Hong Kong as the most ‘serious’ regional competitors, while globally, these included Ireland, 
Malta and Mexico (see Schein 1996: Chapter Two).
9 By the 1970s, the SEDB had opened offices in North America (four branches), Europe (three 
branches), and Japan (two branches) (Schein 1996: 4).
10 In a survey o f senior executives o f the earliest transnational corporations that located in 
Singapore by Schein in the 1990s, he found that these executives perceived the officers o f the
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Economic Development Board to be honest bureaucrats, often inflexible but better than being 
fickle (Schein 1996:125).
11 The record of so-called ‘third-world’ governments in this regard has suggested that many 
were unlikely to keep to their promises for very long; they would soon start to make minor 
alterations to try and benefit more than the transnational corporations. However, transnational 
corporations were reported not to be easily duped by these governments, often being very 
cautious with investments. One strategy was to invest incrementally, thus allowing for the 
possibility o f  quick and seamless withdrawal should the situation sour (see Evans 1995: 35).
12 The Singapore government had also attracted industrial investors in the toys, plastics, and 
textiles sectors in the late 1960s. It always stressed that these were ‘interim’ and ‘temporary’ 
measures (see Mirza 1986). In addition, the island’s entrepot trade, which accounted for 32 
percent in 1960, declined to under 17 percent in 1990 (Okposin 1999: 49).
13 The government cited ‘social’ problems as the main reason why large-scale economic 
immigration was never considered (see Lim et al. 1988, and Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997).
14 While the government had even attempted a land reclamation programme that increased the 
island’s physical size by eight percent, the larger demand for industrial land could not be met 
(Okposin 1999: 12).
15 Another term for this process is called industrial ‘restructuring.’ However, the Singapore 
government leaders frequently used the term ‘upgrading’ (see Rodan 1997, and Perry, Kong 
and Yeoh 1997).
16 The Singapore government was not that concerned about ‘losing jobs’ to the regions, as this 
‘hollowing out’ process actually eased the country’s labour shortage and dependence on 
foreign workers (Chiu, Ho and Lui 1997). In addition, the jobs that were lost were mainly low 
paying and relatively labour intensive. Thus, the ‘political repercussions’ o f hollowing out 
were not serious enough to worry the Singapore government (see Perry, Kong and Yeoh
1997).
17 This was despite a Sino-Soviet political ‘split’ in 1960 (see Pomffet 1991: 2-3).
18 As in 1979, right until the 1990s, there were many powerful critics in China o f the Deng 
reforms (see Naughton 1995, and Chu 1986). However Deng and his colleagues used a 
combination o f political exclusion and regional diversification to keep his critics at bay until 
the reforms began to take effect (see Yang 1997).
19 It was argued that another factor that went in favour o f these two provinces was that they 
were ‘starved o f any investment during the Mao Tse-tung regime in the 1950s and 1960s.’ 
(Yang 1997: 29)
20 While the concessions and incentives offered in these zones often allowed transnational 
capital to benefit from cheap local labour and low taxes, critics o f EPZs found incidences of 
excessive waste in infrastructure provision, fragmented production process, low domestic 
value added, limited job creation, gendered wage inequality, exploitation o f the indigenous 
labour force, especially young female labour, harsh factory conditions, lack o f technology 
transfer, vulnerability to footloose industries, and a lack or absence o f forward and backward 
linkages (see Chen 1995, and Frobel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1981).
21 The two big sources o f unemployment in China have been identified as the fallout from ‘the 
streamlining o f inefficient state owned enterprises’ (see Nolan and Wang 1999 and Wong
1998) and the large levels o f displaced rural labour that were coming to urban areas in China 
(see Wong 1998).
22 The China government also attempted to attract transnational corporations that originated 
from the West; however, it was clear that the main thrust o f its strategies in the first few years 
after 1979 were directed towards the overseas Chinese (see Huang 1998, Lever-Tracy, Ip and 
Tracy 1996 and Naughton 1995).
23 The term ‘Outsiders’ is often used as a shorthand for ‘foreigners.’ The term is often applied 
in an ethnocentric manner by many Chinese businesspersons, making a correlation where 
ethnicity deterministically corresponds with the ability to understand a particular business 
culture or practice. However, as this research will show, not only is it possible that non-ethnic 
Chinese might understand so-called Chinese business practices (see Weldon and Jehn 1997), 
but it is equally possible that ethnic Chinese— including those in Singapore— might not be able 
to comprehend the nuances of these practices.
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24 There was however much evidence that by the mid-1990s, guanxi was becoming less salient 
as a business practice in China (see Guthrie 1998). Some reasons for this change were China’s 
ever-increasing exposure to Western and Japanese business practices, as well as the intensified 
competition between Chinese businesses for foreign capital (ibid.).
25 Several analysts have argued that because o f China’s communist period, certain ‘ancient’ 
Chinese business practices have been ‘locked in time,’ whereas in locations such as Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, Chinese business practices have been ‘modernized’, which is defined as 
having adapted itself to Western capitalism (see Hamilton 1997).
26 Although it is well documented that the China’s top-level government is strongly anti- 
corruption (the punishment is death penalty if  perpetrators are caught), the sheer size o f the 
massive Chinese bureaucracy, which stretches from Beijing through to Provincial, Municipal 
and Local bureaucracies, meant that enforcement was highly problematic (see Wong 1998).
27 See Duckett (1998) on how certain regional authorities were highly ‘entrepreneurial’ in 
strategy—particularly in the real estate market—as they had to raise revenues for their regions 
rather than rely on Beijing for subsidies.
28 See Wu (1999), Park (1997), and Leung (1986) for details.
29 While it might appear that the Central Government appeared to be the prime mover behind 
the zone expansion programme, Yang (1997) argues that in fact, Beijing was under constant 
pressure from other regions in China to grant them the benefits that South China provinces 
received.
30 See Luo for details o f the tax, fiscal and regulatory differences in each type o f zone or area 
(1998: 41-3.)
31 Even by 1999, China could not be described to be fully participating in the global game of 
industrial production because ‘foreign investment’ was still restricted to state-approved zones.
32 In 1980, the Singapore government unveiled the ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ national 
industrial policy, which had limited short-term impact. However, the ‘positive’ effects were 
much more evident in the 1990s. See Rodan (1997), and Chiu, Ho and Lui (1997) for details.
33 The amount has been estimated at US$200 billion in the early 1990s (Perry and Yeoh 2000: 
200).
34 Even the once frosty relationships with Malaysian and Indonesian governments had altered 
significantly in the 1980s, particularly with the development o f ASEAN as a regional 
institution and the overall economic growth o f the region (see Leifer 1998).
35 Even though it has been well documented that the ‘international aid’ man governments offer 
have business and economic motivations (in addition to humanitarian purposes) (see for 
example Stallings 1990), the overt profit-seeking nature o f the Singapore government’s project 
does not fall into this category and should be considered as a entrepreneurial venture.
36 For a holistic view on the Batamindo project, see Kumar and Lee (1991) for the original 
objectives and intentions (studied at the onset of the Park), and Gundy-Warr, Peachy and Perry 
(1999) for a re-assessment o f the park after nearly 10 years.
37 In 1995, there were 77 companies operating in the Batamindo Industrial Park (SEDB 1995: 
23). Also see report in Fortune, 4 March 1996.
38 See Kumar and Lee (1991) where a ‘satisfaction’ survey was conducted o f the managers of  
the transnational corporations and Singaporean companies that located in the Batam Industrial 
Park. The general findings indicated very positive feelings towards the park. However these 
findings must be tempered by the fact that managers were surveyed one year after the park 
began operations. See Gundy-Warr, Peachey and Perry (1999) for the managers’ reactions 
almost 10 years later.
39 In Singapore, around 65 percent of the population are o f ethnic Chinese descent, 15 percent 
are ethnic Malays, and 10 percent are ethnic Indians.
40 China’s military threat was significantly reduced with the 1979 Economic Reforms, but the 
Singapore government, like most other Southeast Asian states, were wary o f flashpoints 
involving the Chinese government, including the border conflict with Vietnam and the issue of 
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and Taiwan (see Shee 1998). Also see Wong (1998 and
1999).
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C h a pt e r  F iv e  
Th e  C o n st r u c tio n  P h a se
Between 1992 and 1994, the Singapore government’s main objective was to 
attract the location of industrial transnational corporations at the Suzhou 
Industrial Park. Towards this end, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state utilized two strategies. The ‘competitive’ strategy involved designing the 
estate to have geographic, infrastructural and institutional advantages, while 
the ‘collaborative’ strategy involved maximizing the inputs of the project’s key 
partners, which were the China government and industrial transnational 
corporations. This chapter analyzes how the two strategies were implemented 
during the construction phase.
5.1 Ge o g r a p h ic a l  C o m p e t it iv e  A d v a n t a g e s
As discussed in the previous chapter, China was included as one of the
destinations for Singapore government investments within the regionalization
programme. In 1991 and 1992, to find a suitable location for its regional
industrial park, several fact-finding missions were conducted by various
members of the Singapore entrepreneurial elite, including Singapore’s Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew1. By the beginning of 1993, the Singapore
government announced it would develop not one but two industrial parks in
China, both of which were in Jiangsu Province. Suzhou had been selected as
the site for the ‘major’ industrial park while Wuxi would house the ‘regular’
estate. The key differences between the two parks were, firstly, that the Suzhou
project would be developed and managed by the ‘Singapore government’ itself
whereas the Wuxi project was ‘assigned’ to a government-linked company and
statutory boards (see Chapter Nine). Secondly, the Suzhou Industrial Park
would cover 70 square kilometres when completed, while the Wuxi Industrial
Park was only one square kilometre in size. Indeed, the Suzhou project was
physically the largest of all the Singapore government’s regional industrial
park (see Table 5.1).
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Ta b le  5.1: S in g apo re  ’s  In d u strial  Pa r k s  in  the  Re g io n  in  1995
Location Start-up Year Projected Final Area Size
Batam Island, Indonesia 1991 500 ha
Bintang Island, Indonesia 1992 4 sq km
Suzhou, China 1994 70 sq km
Wuxi, China 1995 1 sq km
Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam 1997 (projected) 500 ha
Bangalore, India 1997 (projected) 100 ha
Source: SEDB (1995: 12)
Furthermore, the Suzhou project was designated by the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state as its ‘flagship’ project. This indicated that 
the Suzhou Industrial Park was more important in terms of prestige and 
governmental support. Later that year, the two governments signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), giving the Suzhou Industrial Park 
‘special economic zone’ status. This meant that its economic policies had to 
conform to those in the existing five SEZs and Pudong2 (see Appendix Three, 
section one). However, the agreement also gave the Singapore government 
special dispensation to implement its own social and administrative 
institutions at the estate.
‘L o c a t io n , L o c a t io n  a n d  L o c a t io n ’
To industrial transnational corporations, the main factors that affect
locational choices include the economic viability of the location, the costs 
structures, and the potential agglomeration opportunities (Hayter 1997: 12). It 
was no surprise that the Suzhou Industrial Park’s planners were well aware of 
these factors:
‘Firstly, we chose Suzhou because it is geographically near but not in 
Shanghai, the economic centre of China. Suzhou is only 90 kilometres 
away from Shanghai, which is a drive of an hour and a half along the 
highways or a 60-minute ride by train. Shanghai has a population of 
over 13 million, an international airport and seaport, and the location of 
the first stock exchange market of the post-reform era. Shanghai is 
known as the ‘gateway into China,’ it is a thriving financial and 
industrial zone, particularly with the emergence of Pudong.’ (SO 44)
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Thus it was clear that the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s 
intentionally sought to situate its flagship industrial park near Shanghai, as that 
was the economic centre of China (see Olds 1997, and Yeung and Li 1999). In 
fact, several leaders of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite had 
even considered locating the industrial park within Shanghai’s Pudong New 
Area5, which was established in 1990 and designated as a ‘Special Economic 
Zones.’ Shanghai’s Gross Domestic Product grew ten-fold from 1990 to 1997, 
with industrial activities accounting for over 50 percent of the output. It was 
reported that at the end of 1997, over a quarter of a million persons were 
employed in Pudong, and over five thousand overseas-funded projects from 63 
different countries with a total realized investment of US$25.69 billion from a 
pledged investment of US$34 billion (Pudong New Area 1999: 34-35). 
However, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite had reservations 
about locating their flagship project within Shanghai.
‘But after careful consideration, we felt that Shanghai-Pudong was 
industrially ‘saturated.’ This industrial saturation would only serve to 
eventually push costs upwards, through a combination rising wages, 
land prices and service costs through competition. Also, if we located 
the project in Pudong, we probably would have to give up some 
power to the Shanghai authorities. Basically, they have been 
historically very powerful in the overall political and economic 
hierarchy in China.’ (SO 4)
As the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state wanted complete 
autonomy and capacity to build and administer its flagship project, it was wary 
of any potential interference from interest groups. Thus, with Shanghai ‘ruled 
out’ for costs and political reasons6, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial elite chose to locate its projects in the neighbouring Jiangsu 
Province. By the 1990s, Jiangsu was one of the wealthiest provinces in China 
(Yang 1997: 32). If the ‘municipal cities’ such as Beijing, Tianjin and 
Shanghai were excluded from the ranking of provinces, only Guangdong, 
Fujian, and Liaoning had higher average per capita GDP between 1979 and 
1989 (Chen, Chang and Zhang 1995: 694). It had had an average Real Gross
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Domestic Product growth rate of over 12 percent between 1978 and 1996 (see 
Table 5.2).
Ta b l e  5.2: Se l e c t e d  E c o n o m ic  In d ic a  t o r s  b y  P r o v in c e  (1978-1996)
Province Distribution of 
National FDI (%)
Real GDP 
Growth (%)
Population
(m)
Guangdong 30.4 14.0 1.8
Fujian 10.3 13.8 1.6
Zhejiang 3.2 13.8 0.8
Jiangsu 11.2 12.7 1.1
Shandong 6.8 11.9 1.1
Hainan 2.6 11.9 1.8
Henan 1.1 11.0 1.5
Anhui <0.5 10.8 1.4
Xinjiang <0.5 10.8 8.7
Hubei 1.1 10.6 1.4
Source: OECD (2000: 15)
Jiangsu’s ‘level’ of human resource supply was also one of the highest in 
China, promising the availability of highly skilled persons:
Ta b l e  5.3: Se l e c t e d  S o c io -E c o n o m ic  In d ic a  t o r s  C o m p a r in g  J ia n g s u  w ith  
th e  C h in a  A v erag e  (1995)
Jiangsu China Average
Per capita net income of residents (RMB) 2,475 1,578
Savings per capita (RMB) 2,721 2,449
Medical profession (per 10,000) 35 10
College students (per 10,000) 30 9
Source: Wei (2000: 153)
Within Jiangsu Province, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
selected Suzhou because it was ‘...prosperous but not industrial.’ (SO 4) The 
city’s wealth came from tourism and its silk production. Suzhou also had good 
transportation and logistic links. It was along the highly developed Nanjing- 
Shanghai railway line and the Nanjing-Shanghai motorway7. In addition, only 
15 kilometres away was the Changshu Port, which had direct links with 
Shanghai Port further down the Yangtze River. However, another 
consideration was that Suzhou was not already saturated with foreign 
investment or heavy industrial activity.
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‘We looked at sites in Shandong province, which was the next province 
to the north. They have several economic development zones and there 
are many Japanese and Korean companies there. But if  there were too 
many foreign players there, our advantage would be reduced. For those 
reasons, we immediately ruled out the southern provinces of 
Guangdong, Fujian and Hainan Island because of their concentration of 
investments from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau. Beijing would like 
more investments in the northernmost provinces of Liaoning and 
Hebei, but we projected that these areas would be considered too 
remote. Then there was, of course, Beijing and the next satellite town 
of Tianjin. But we ruled it out along with Shanghai because of their 
very high costs structures.’ (SO 4)
This respondent also indicated that the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
elite preferred to operate outside highly developed urban metropoles because it 
sought some degree of autonomy in implementing its plans. Not only were 
Beijing and Shanghai already very built-up, both cities already had strong local 
business, urban and industrial elites . Suzhou, on the other hand was mainly a 
tourist destination.
‘At first, we thought that if we chose Suzhou, and were successful here, 
there would be the potential for participating in developing the tourism 
opportunities. Opportunities for Singaporean companies to come and 
help develop the tourism industry.’ (SO 4)
Suzhou’s history goes back 2500 years. Long known to Chinese as ‘paradise 
on earth’ and the ‘city of gardens,’ because of its scenic canals, it was also 
known as the ‘Venice of the East’ after Marco Polo visited the town in the 
15th century9. The city’s historic gardens were designated as a United Nation’s 
UNESCO World Heritage Site. The town is criss-crossed by a network of 
rivers and canals linked with the many lakes and ponds. There are 175 bridges 
over these waterways within the 14 square kilometres area of the historic city. 
In addition to its role as a historically important tourist resort for the Chinese, 
Suzhou has also been China’s silk production capital for over 500 years. 
However, these were not the only reasons why the Singapore government 
chose to locate its flagship project in Suzhou.
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L e e  K u a n  Y e w ’s P e r s o n a l  In v o l v e m e n t
In a pre-release of his autobiography in the year 2000, Lee Kuan Yew,
a central member of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite, wrote10:
‘In September 1992, together with Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng 
Cheong, I visited Suzhou, China’s Venice. It was in a dilapidated 
condition, with its canals filthy and polluted. But it struck us that we 
could redevelop Suzhou, make it into a beautiful city, and build a new 
industrial and commercial section next to it... Suzhou’s mayor Zhang 
Xinsheng drew me aside after lunch one day to say: “Singapore has 
US$50 billion in reserves.” “Who told you that?” I asked. He had read 
it in World Bank reports. He added: “Why don’t you invest 10 per cent 
of it in Suzhou? Get us industrialised like Singapore. I will guarantee 
you special treatment so that your investments will succeed.” I said: 
“Able and energetic mayors soon get promoted; then what?” He paused 
and replied: “Well, you may have trouble with my successor but, after a 
while, he will have no choice but to go along the route that I would 
have laid down. People in Suzhou want what they have seen of 
Singapore on television, and in the newspapers—jobs, housing and a 
garden city.” I replied: “You have no power to give us a fresh site on 
which we can build a miniature Singapore. You need the central 
government’s authority to do that.” I gave no more thought to this. That 
December, he turned up at my office to say he had approached Deng 
Xiaoping’s office with his proposition. There was a good chance it 
would go through. Could I put up a proposal in a plan? He was close to 
Deng Xiaoping’s son, Deng Pufang. So Ong Teng Cheong11 did some 
artist’s impressions of what old Suzhou could be like after restoration, 
with a modem industrial township next to it. A few months later, when 
Deng Pufang visited Singapore, I showed him sketch plans of a 
restored city, together with an adjoining new industrial township. He 
was enthusiastic. His input, through his father’s office, gave this 
project a push. When Prime Minister Goh visited Beijing in April, he 
discussed the proposal with Premier Li Peng and [President] Jiang 
Zemin. In May 1993,1 met Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji in Shanghai. I 
had earlier written to him on the Suzhou project. I explained my 
proposal for cooperation: a govemment-to-govemment technical- 
assistance agreement to transfer our knowledge and experience (what 
we called “software”) in attracting investments and building industrial 
estates, complete with housing and commercial centres, to an unbuilt 
site of about 100 sq km in Suzhou.’ (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000)
Lee’s personal insights into the origin of the Suzhou Industrial Park
highlighted three important features, which would become more significant in
later years12. Firstly, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite was
keenly aware that regardless of the geographic, economic and structural
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‘fundamentals,’ it believed that any project in China required the strong 
collaboration of the central government in Beijing. In this sense, Lee’s 
optimism at this stage was based on Bejing’s ‘enthusiasm,’ as manifested by 
Deng’s son (and by association Deng himself), and later by the three highest- 
ranking political leaders in China (Li Peng, Jiang Zemin, and Zhu Rongji). 
Secondly, based on the Suzhou Mayor’s ‘aggressive’ tactics to attract the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state to Suzhou, it was clear that there 
was already intense inter-city competition for foreign direct investment in 
China. As discussed in the previous chapter, nearly every region and province 
in China had ‘economic development zones,’ which were courting foreign 
investors (see Yang 1997). While Beijing had its own national FDI-oriented 
industrialization strategies—for example, the national projects such as 
modernization of the automobile and telecommunications sectors (see Nolan 
and Wang 1999)—regional and provincial governments were ‘encouraged’ to 
compete among themselves for additional foreign direct investment. The 
incentive for local governments was that they could retain the majority of taxes 
from foreign operations within their city region or province, remitting only a 
minor proportion to Beijing (see Duckett 1998). This incentive was in addition 
to any ‘developmental effects’—defined as the employment created, 
technology or managerial skills transferred, revenues earned and local 
enterprise linkages formed—that might spill over from the location of foreign 
businesses. On the other hand, because of this ‘relative autonomy’ to manage 
the local economy, it also meant that Beijing could reduce state financial 
subsidies to local governments for economic projects. Beijing might still invest 
in ‘public goods’ development such as telecommunications, roads, water and 
electricity at the local level, but no longer in a socialist sense where it owned 
and financially supported local industry (Zhong 1996: 363-4). The overall 
effect of the post-reform central-local economic relationship created many 
‘entrepreneurial governments’ hoping to raise revenue from foreign capital 
(Duckett 1998: 1-2).
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Finally, Lee’s recollection hinted of the ‘warning signs’ that were 
already present. Lee suggested that the Suzhou Mayor’s impending promotion 
would potentially create problems, as the successor might not share the same 
motivations. As the later chapters would demonstrate, this turned out to be 
true, and was one important factor that led to the Singapore government’s 
disengagement from the Suzhou Industrial Park project.
5.2 I n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  Co m p e t it iv e  A d v a n t a g e s
Another competitive advantage of the Suzhou Industrial Park’s was its
1 ^provision of ‘international standard’ or ‘world class’ industrial infrastructure . 
One of the weaknesses of China as an industrial location was its poor 
industrial infrastructure, especially its lack of reliability of the power supply 
and the quality of water and sewerage systems (Leung 1986: 2-3). Clearly 
aware of this perception, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
decided to build many essential utility plants specifically for the Suzhou 
Industrial Park to ensure quality and reliability14. The power and electricity 
supply was to be supplied from the Suzhou Industrial Park’s own 1,200 
megawatt diesel-fired Huaneng power plant at Taicang (20 kilometres away) 
(CSSD 1999: 18). This was however a major development, and was projected 
to be completed only in the year 2000. Thus, between 1994 and 1999, power 
was supplied from the national grid15. As part of the agreements to develop the 
Suzhou Industrial Park, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
ordered the building of a water treatment plant. This plant sourced its raw 
water from Lake Tai (80 kilometres away) and would supply 150,000 cubic 
metres of water per day initially for Phase One. The capacity could be 
increased to 600,000 cubic metres when the Park expanded into later phases. 
According to the CSSD:
‘This water works treats water better than Chinese and WHO 1993 
potable water standard. Thus there is no need to install filtration 
devices if the water standards meet user requirements.’ (CSSD 1999: 
66)
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The Lake Tai Water Treatment Plant became operational in 1998. In an 
interesting move, the CSSD published its ‘treated water standards,’ where it 
defined the minimum required levels for the quality of the water based on its 
composition. For example, it outlined thresholds for levels of alkalinity, 
chloride, nitrates, iron, lead, copper and DDT (CSSD 1999: 68). This was a 
clear strategy to assure potential investors of how serious the CSSD was about 
maintaining water quality standards. When investors took tenancy at the 
Suzhou Industrial Park, they were given a copy of the water (and other 
utilities) standards. This acted as a legal contract between developer and 
tenant, making the CSSD liable should standards fall below the published 
thresholds. Similar standards were established for the sewage treatment plant 
and the toxic waste treatment centre, both purposively built by the CSSD 
solely for the Suzhou Industrial Park. Gas supplies at the Suzhou Industrial 
Park came from a joint-venture between the global fuel conglomerate Shell, 
Keppel Intergrated Engineering (KIE)16, and the SIP Economic Development 
Company. Keppel was also given the contract to supply steam within the 
Suzhou Industrial Park. The only other utility that was not unique to the 
Suzhou Industrial Park was telecommunications, which was supplied by the 
Suzhou Post and Telecommunications Bureau.
However, the main competitive advantage of the Suzhou Industrial 
Park was its industrial facilities. By 1999, the CSSD reported that it had spent 
over US$500 million preparing the land. The planners had designed the Park 
to be highly ‘rational’ and ‘ordered.’
‘Its not often that these architects, planners and engineers have a totally 
blank canvas to work from; but given this opportunity, we wanted to 
design the most accessible industrial park for the investors. It all boils 
down to ensuring that we design something that somebody would want 
to buy!’ (SO 4)
Allowances were made for the four canals that ran through the Park, but in 
general, the properties were well-spaced and the planners intentionally wanted 
each stand-alone plot to have a small patch of surrounding grass fields. It 
prepared plots of industrial land of various sizes (minimum 0.5 hectares), all
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serviced by roads and utilities. The first eight square kilometres (Phase one) 
was landfilled to more than 2.626 metres above the Yellow River level (CSSD 
1999: 18). This was believed to be higher than the worst flood recorded in 
Suzhou. It was viewed as being absolutely necessary to ensure that the Suzhou 
Industrial Park had ‘international-standard’ infrastructure.
‘What we have done is to install the most modem and most effective 
structures, communications, and technologies to this area. On the south 
side, Xinsu has built its own estate within the estate, mostly with ready- 
built factories. On the north side, we have prepared and treated the 
land, provided the connecting roads, power, communications, sewage 
and water links. For investors, its almost plug and play [a term 
referring to being immediately being able to start operations by just 
putting the plug into the socket].’ (SO 4)
Although CSSD re-leased or ‘sold’ land to companies to build their own 
factory buildings, it legislated many restrictions and controls over what could 
be installed. For example, there was an investment criterion for the Suzhou 
Industrial Park that stated that a minimum investment of US$200 per square 
metre on the Gross Floor Area was required to ensure an adequate standard of
1 7factory buildings in the Park . Also, even though Suzhou is not in an 
earthquake zone, all buildings were still required to be built to sustain an 
earthquake intensity of magnitude ‘6’ on the Richter scale (CSSD 1999: 20). In 
addition, investors were required to comply with all of CSSD’s planning, 
safety, environmental and other regulatory controls, some of which were 
standardized for all of China. The objective of these controls was to ensure 
that the Suzhou Industrial Park not only internally contained the best 
infrastructure (particularly the power, water and sewage supply), but also had 
the appearance of having the best external infrastructure, which referred to the 
architecture of the factories.
‘When we approve projects, we tried to take into consideration how the 
investor’s building would blend in with the background. We of course 
do not dictate what the buildings should look like, but we will—and 
have in the past—object to certain designs.’ (CO 1)
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R e a d y  B u il t  F a c t o r ie s
At the Suzhou Industrial Park, investors could thus either acquire the land 
from CSSD and build the factories themselves, or take the ‘quicker’ option, 
which was to buy or lease a Ready-Built Factory (RBF). RBFs could relieve 
investors of the need to spend time and money building their own factories. 
Between 1965 and 1980 in Singapore, the Singapore government had invested 
heavily in providing RBFs to industrial transnational corporations. Thus, the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state once again projected that RBFs 
would enhance the competitiveness of the Suzhou Industrial Park. The Jurong 
Town Corporation, which was also responsible for building RBFs in the past, 
was awarded the contract for this task. Its overseas wing, known as JTC 
International (JTCI), established Xinsu Industrial Development (Suzhou) 
Company Limited18. Xinsu would acquire the land lease from CSSD in a 
commercial transaction, then develop ready-built factories of several different 
specifications, including stand-alone units or units in multi-storey complexes 
(see Appendix Three, section two). According to Xinsu:
‘At the heart of the vibrant China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park is 
a series of ready-built factories owned, developed and managed by the 
Xinsu Industrial Development (Suzhou) Co Ltd. Modelled after 
Singapore’s successful industrial estates, Xinsu’s factories offer 
international manufacturers the advantage of easy entry into the 
dynamic China market, or to tap China’s vast resources to reach world 
markets. World-class ready built factories, complete with the vital 
infrastructure and services, minimise hassles at start-ups, allowing 
investors to devote their full efforts to building their business.’ (Xinsu 
1999: 1)
At the Suzhou Industrial Park, tenants could sub-lease RBF units for a 
minimum of three years, or buy the leasehold from Xinsu. With the availability 
of RBFs, investors had the possibility of a quick start-up, only undertaking 
minor renovations to customize the RBFs to suit their operations. It also 
allowed certain investors the relative flexibility to ‘test the water’ with an 
initial small-scaled operation in Suzhou. With the relatively short minimum 
sub-lease, and with the relatively low relocation and renovation costs incurred, 
should an industrial transnational corporation decide not to extend its stay in
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Suzhou, withdrawal costs would be significantly lower than if the company 
had built its own factory. By 1999, Xinsu’s RBFs occupied 13.7 hectares of 
the total eight square kilometres at the Suzhou Industrial Park, which 
translated into about 25 percent of the overall area19.
Although the provision of high quality infrastructure was one of the 
key economic mechanisms to attract transnational corporations to the Suzhou 
Industrial Park, it made the Park more expensive when compared to many 
other industrial estates in China. Still, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial elite believed that the project’s overall costs would still be 
lower than in ‘developed’ industrial areas such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore or South Korea.
5.3 I n s t it u t io n a l  Co m p e t it iv e  A d v a n t a g e s
‘Learn from Singapore’s experience, build a Singapore standard 
industrial park.’20 (Banner at entrance of Suzhou Industrial Park, 
reported in Singapore Straits Times 15 Sep 1994)
To many transnational corporations, despite China’s cheap primary factors of 
production, the risk of investing in China was seen as high because of the 
country’s lack of effective secondary factors of production. These include its 
weak governance system, a lack of formal legal institutions and the existence 
o f ‘grey’ institutions (Wong 1999: 55). Actors could overcome these weak 
governance structures by utilizing informal institutions such as Chinese 
business practices or guanxi (see Hamilton 1997). However, as the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state did not want to play this ‘game,’ it decided 
to establish its own ‘rules’ for the Suzhou Industrial Park. More specifically, it 
wanted the Suzhou Industrial Park’s to have a Singaporean operating system 
(OS), especially in administration and governance. The so-called Singaporean 
‘operating system’ could be broadly understood as ‘institutions.’ Institutions 
were defined as ‘...the rules of the game, some formal others informal.’ (North 
1990: 1) Therefore, the main role of institutions is governance or control, 
defining how things should be done, both formally and informally. Thus, the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state introduced both formal and
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informal institutions to provide a stable and predictable operating environment 
for industrial transnational corporations.
‘Pr o -B u s in e s s ’ E n v ir o n m e n t
In order to construct institutional competitive advantages at the Suzhou
Industrial Park, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state sought to
91offer industrial transnational corporations a ‘pro-business environment This 
would be achieved through the transfer of ‘Singaporean software’ to the 
Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC), which was the 
local authority appointed by China’s State Council and the Jiangsu Province 
Government to govern the Suzhou Industrial Park project22 (CSSD 1999: 2). 
SIP AC administered services such as the selling of leasehold rights of the land 
under its jurisdiction, approving investment projects, the planning and 
regulation of the usage of land and natural resources, construction, traffic 
growth and environmental protection of its designated area (CSSD 1999: 6).
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state did not want SIP AC 
to resemble the ‘stereotypical’ Chinese local governments that administered 
the SEZs and other economic zones. Criticisms of these administrations were 
that they either were inexperienced or inefficient in dealing with transnational 
corporations, or corrupt23. Therefore, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial elite formally institutionalized the ‘software transfer’ 
programme with the aim of training SIP AC to operate under ‘international 
standards.’
‘What we need is to train a team of people who will master 
international economic management, gather practical experience and 
have creativity and a pragmatic attitude.’ (Yang Xiaotong, Vice- 
Governor of Jiangsu, quoted in Singapore Straits Times 5 Dec 1994)
‘We have two sets of people looking after the baby, one used to 
looking after the baby in the Chinese way and the other in the 
Singapore way. And we are trying to teach them how to handle the 
baby in the Singapore way.’ (Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister of 
Singapore, quoted in Financial Times (UK) 27 May 1997)
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The programme’s ‘official’ objective was to impart Singapore’s ‘accumulated 
and proven methods of industrial development and administration’ to its 
Chinese partner (CSSD 1999: 10). However, within the theoretical framework 
of this research, this programme had the additional purposes of governance 
and credibility building.
‘Software transfer refers to the sharing of Singapore’s successful public 
administration and economic management experience with the Chinese 
authorities so that they can formulate pro-business policies in the CS- 
SIP, and govern with transparency and efficiency... SIP AC together 
with the SSPO will identify the relevant type of “software” to be 
shared. Mutual visits and training attachments help Suzhou officials 
understand the Singapore way as well as international practices. 
Together with Singapore government officials, Suzhou officials decide 
how best to adapt Singapore’s practices to suit local circumstance by 
selecting and modifying appropriate elements. Singapore sends its 
government officials to Suzhou to assist in this adaptational process.’ 
(Emphasis in the original) (CSSD 1999: 10).
Although the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite accepted that the 
Suzhou Industrial Park would have to operate under the standardized tax 
policies of the other SEZs in China, it could institutionalize how these policies 
were administered.
‘We want SIP AC to be fast, efficient, pro-business, and professional 
towards investors. SIP AC has to be the solution, not the problem. For 
speed, we set specific time periods for nearly every task, from business 
license approvals to answering queries. For efficiency, we wanted 
SIP AC to have at its fingertips answers to every question. For pro­
business environment, we want SIP AC to be sympathetic and 
understanding to the needs of the investor. Of course, we want them to 
be firm and fair at the same time, but we believe these are compatible. 
All this adds up to a sense of professionalism. This is what got 
Singapore a good name, and if they can get it done here, it will give 
them a good name too.’ (SO 4)
It was clear the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state gave this 
programme high priority. The Singapore Software Project Office (SSPO)— 
managed by the Singapore Economic Development Board—was established in 
1993 in Suzhou. By 1996, nearly 50 Singapore government bodies—including 
the Ministries of Labour, Trade and Industry and National Development, the
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Housing Development Board, the Central Provident Fund Board, the National 
Trade Union Congress, the Trade Development Board and the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority—were involved in conducting courses for Chinese 
officials both in Singapore and in Suzhou {Singapore Straits Times 16 Apr 
1996). In 1996 alone, 200 Chinese officers and bureaucrats were sent on short 
training trips to Singapore {Singapore Straits Times 16 Apr 1996). The 
courses, run in Mandarin, covered three areas: ‘economic management,’ 
encompassing marketing, registration of companies and incentive programmes 
for investors; ‘urban management,’ which covered environmental protection, 
building control and town planning; and ‘labour management,’ which included 
employment contracts, health care and labour insurance. In addition, 
specialized courses on customs clearance, waste management, workers’ 
provident fund, human resource matters and real estate management were also 
organized. The Software Transfer Project’s Chief Co-ordinator also reported 
that Singapore officials from various bodies were sent to Suzhou for up to two 
months at a time to train Chinese officials {Singapore Straits Times 16 Apr 
1996). Although no figures were supplied for the cost of these programmes, it 
was evident that this was not a ‘cheap exercise,’ especially to the Singapore 
government that was financially underwriting the Project24.
In addition to these formal institutions, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state introduced informal institutions to SIP AC as well. One 
example was in SIPAC’s recruitment policies. SIP AC was essentially an 
organization under the jurisdiction of the China government; in other words, 
recruitment of its staff should have been entirely its own business. However, 
the Singapore entrepreneurial elite wanted SIP AC to be staffed by highly 
educated techno-bureaucrats. It lobbied the Chinese government to recruit 
some of the best talent in the region . Furthermore, the Jiangsu provincial 
government and the Suzhou municipal authorities were asked to release their 
best bureaucrats to join SIP AC. The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state then encouraged SIP AC to remunerate their bureaucrats at almost 200 
percent above local bureaucrats, and almost 150 percent above the their peers
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in the private sector. This saw, for instance, a person with a PhD degree in 
Chemistry lecturing in Nanjing University joined SIP AC as the Investments 
Officer for the Chemicals Industry Sector. The Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state believed that the high remuneration of these bureaucrats 
was critical for insulation against capture from interest groups. Even though 
SIPAC’s bureaucrats were fluent in both Chinese and English, the appearance, 
the manner and posture of bureaucrats were deemed to be extremely important.
If these institutions were successfully introduced at the Suzhou 
Industrial Park, then the Suzhou Industrial Park would have a Singaporean 
‘operating system’ which was preferred by industrial transnational 
corporations over the ‘grey’ Chinese business system. Thus, the constructed 
institutional advantages functioned as economic mechanisms that encouraged 
the location of industrial transnational corporations.
‘I n n o v a t iv e ’ S y st e m s
However, the aim of the software transfer not just to benefit the
investor. The China government was keen to experiment with the transplanting 
of social welfare and labour management institutions developed in Singapore 
to Suzhou. As suggested in the previous chapter, the China government was 
ambivalent about embracing ‘capitalism,’ and had admired how the Singapore 
government had maintained economic efficiency and industrialization together 
with providing effective social welfare policies (see Wong 1999). In this 
regards, the China government allowed Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state to implement social security and labour management 
systems in the Park. For the labour management system, although Suzhou city 
had a large pool of highly skilled persons, the Singapore entrepreneurial elite 
wanted the employers (transnational corporations) in the Park to be able to 
recruit staff from all over China. This was therefore an opportunity for the 
China government to experiment with its (internal) migration policy. 
Previously, labour mobility was virtually non-existent in China. This was 
because each individual was tied to his or her xiangqu (literally translated into 
village district) or local district. The existing system provided the individual
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with all the social, medical, educational and residential entitlements under 
socialism. If an individual decided to move from one city to another, he or she 
would have to apply for a transfer of xiangqu from one district to another. 
Considering the tight residential situation in urban China, mobility was more 
or less considered impossible. The only exceptions to this were for individuals 
who were civil servants, where the state or provincial authorities would be in a 
better position to facilitate the ‘transfer.’ These civil servants would be issued 
with the Blue Residency Permit, which gave them equal rights and privileges 
as local residents. Secondly, in China, employment matters were managed by 
local renqaiweiliu zhongxin (talent exchange centres), which were state-run 
employment agencies. At the Suzhou Industrial Park, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state established a ‘talent exchange centre’ of its 
own, known as the Suzhou Industrial Park Human Resource Company 
(SIPHRC) in the industrial estate, albeit with a slight but significant difference.
‘Although we had these employment centres, they were very different 
from those in other estates. We [SIPAC] felt that we shouldn’t allocate 
employees to companies. This was certainly not how they hired 
workers, so we felt that by doing this, it would not be ‘appreciated’ by 
the multinationals. We thus allowed the companies to interview, recruit 
and hire employees themselves.’ (CO 1)
Thus, industrial transnational corporations were not obliged to ‘use’ the 
SIPHRC. Instead, it functioned as an information consolidator and 
intermediary for transnational corporations and the workers by assisting in 
setting up recruitment fairs on behalf of employers, or announcing vacancies at 
a company. It could also process ‘transfer of personnel records,’ for persons 
coming to work in the Suzhou Industrial Park, and even the processing of 
passports for overseas training for PRC nationals. However, the most 
significant powers that the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite 
negotiated for was in the area of hiring non-Suzhou residents.
‘Besides hiring from Suzhou, investors in CS-SIP can also hire non- 
Suzhou residents to augment their talent pool. University graduates 
from all over China may be recruited, provided they are not dingxiang 
(pre-assigned) or weike (company-sponsored) students26. College and
116
Chapter Five
specialised secondary school graduates (vocational schools) from other 
cities may also be recruited. All other categories of graduates may be 
recruited with SIPAC’s prior approval. At the lower-skills level, hiring 
of non-Suzhou residents is permitted if the enterprises can show proof 
of their unsuccessful recruitment attempts within Suzhou.’ (CSSD 
1999:31)
To establish a ‘mobile labour’ policy, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state urged the China government to expand the ‘Blue 
Residency Scheme,’ where Blue Permit holders—as discussed earlier—were 
allowed to enjoy similar rights to residents, including educational 
opportunities for their children. For example, the children of Blue Permit 
holders could come under the Suzhou quota for university entrance 
examinations and placement after graduation. Also Blue Permit holders would 
have the same housing benefits and access to public amenities in the Suzhou 
Industrial Park as local residents. The new regulation allowed Blue Residency 
Scheme holders become Permanent Residents after two years of residency.
The key difference was that anyone, not just civil servants, employed in the 
Suzhou Industrial Park would be eligible to apply for the Blue Permit scheme. 
Thus, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state believed that the 
mobile labour system would be perceived by industrial transnational 
corporations as contributing to the estate’s ‘pro-business’ environment. At the 
same time, it also served as a testing ground for China’s own social and labour 
reforms.
Another institution that the China government was keen to implement 
was the Singapore government’s version of the Provident Fund scheme. The 
China government had admired Singapore’s Central Provident Fund system, 
which had been in operation for more than 25 years (Wong 1999: 57). China’s 
own Provident Fund functioned as a communal mandatory savings system, 
where 20 percent of an employee’s wages went into a consolidated communal 
fund administered by the company. In a society where residential, medical and 
education needs are entirely provided by the state, the key objective of the 
communal fund was for retirement support27. However, for the Suzhou
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Industrial Park, the Provident Fund would function as an individual savings 
account, whose use was left up to the individual. In this system, the employee 
and employer would both contribute 20 percent of the income to the
* 90employee’s individual Provident Fund account (see Appendix Three, section 
three). The Singapore government hoped that transnational corporations would 
view that the Provident Fund system contributed to the ‘pro-business’ 
environment as it relieved them of having to officially manage their 
employees’ social security and welfare. However, this scheme, along with the 
mobile labour policy, was also important to the China government as it hoped 
to find an ‘alternative path towards industrial capitalism.’
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state established a variety 
of institutions and practices for the Suzhou Industrial Park. Some were 
specifically designed to enhance the project’s competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
other industrial estates in China, and were thus targeted at potential investors 
(industrial transnational corporations). These institutions served to 
demonstrate to potential investors that the park had a ‘pro-business’ 
environment, and thus assuring industrial transnational corporations that they 
would have to deal with the ‘grey’ Chinese business practices. At the same 
time, there were other institutions implemented that were of particular interest 
to the China government. In this manner, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s strategies during the construction period were intended 
to achieve complementarity and mutual benefit.
5.4 ‘Go v e r n m e n t - to -G o  v e r n m e n t ’ E m b e d d e d n e s s
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s collaborative
strategy with the China government and industrial transnational corporations 
was designed to enhance the competitiveness of the Suzhou Industrial Park 
project. With the China government, not only would the project benefit from 
the China government’s inputs, close ‘govemment-to-govemment’ 
collaboration would demonstrate to potential investors that the Park had a high 
level of importance within China. This in turn had the objective of improving 
the credibility of the project. This section examines how the Singapore
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transnational entrepreneurial state utilized embedding mechanisms to enhance 
its collaboration with the China government.
E m b e d d in g  in  Su z h o u
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s collaboration with
the China government at the local level was formally reflected in the
collaboration between the China-Singapore Suzhou Development (CSSD)
Company Private Limited and Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative
Committee (SIPAC). However, even within the CSSD, there was another level
of Singapore-China collaboration. These multi-level collaborative ventures
made the Suzhou project very different when compared to the Singapore
transnational entrepreneurial state’s other regional industrial parks. In Suzhou,
rather than assigning the development and management to a Singaporean state-
owned enterprise or government-linked corporation29, the Singapore
transnational entrepreneurial state decided that, for a project of this size and
scope, it should become directly involved. Therefore, it formed the CSSD,
whose responsibility was the development and the marketing of the industrial
park. Officially, the CSSD was a legal joint-venture between a Singapore
consortium and a Chinese consortium where the Singapore consortium would
hold 65 percent of the shares in the company, while the Chinese consortium
would own the remaining 35 percent. The Singapore consortium was
registered as the Singapore Suzhou Township Development (SSTD) with a
capital of US$50 million. The SSTD had 24 shareholder companies, which
included publicly listed companies in Singapore, and companies from the
United States, Japan and Korea and the Netherlands (see Appendix Four,
section one). The Chairman of the Singapore Economic Development Board,
Philip Yeo—another key member of the Singapore transnational
entrepreneurial elite—was appointed chairman of the Singapore consortium.
The Chinese consortium was formed from 12 shareholder companies,
including representatives from Suzhou city, Jiangsu Province and nine state-
owned enterprises that reported directly to the Central Government (see
Appendix Four, section one). In 1994, it was reported that each of the
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shareholders had invested US$2.25 million, raising about US$80 million in 
capital (Singapore Business Times 27 Jan 1996). The joint venture had, in 
addition, secured a loan of US$100 million from international banks (China 
Business Information Network 7 Dec 1995) and around US$30 million, from 
various financial institutions in China. The CSSD would use these funds for 
infrastructural development, operations and marketing costs (China Business 
Information Network 9 Apr 1996). The CSSD was an important institution 
introduced by the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite to achieve 
embeddedness with the Chinese partner. In many ways, the CSSD was an 
extension of the Singapore government. The senior executives of the CSSD 
were close and trusted members of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
elite (see Table 5.4).
Ta b l e  5.4: C h a ir m a n /C h ie f  E x e c u t iv e  O f f ic e r s  o f  th e  CSSD (1992-1999)
Name Other designation(s) in Singapore
1994- Lim Chee Onn Member of parliament
1996 (Chairman)
Chan Soo Sen (CEO) Parliamentary Secretary
1996- David Lim (CEO) Member of Parliament, CEO Port
1998 Authority of Singapore.
1998- Lim Neo Chian Chairman Jurong Town Corporation
1999 (CEO)
Source: Compiled from various media sources
At the same time, the representatives from the Chinese shareholders on the 
CSSD’s managerial board were senior political figures in the Jiangsu province. 
Thus, because of its composition, the CSSD’s managerial board only had one 
degree of separation from the Singapore and China governments. This in turn 
meant that the CSSD had direct and immediate information flows to the two 
governments.
This ‘govemment-to-govemment’ collaboration also could be seen at 
the CSSD-SIPAC collaborative level. SIP AC (Suzhou Industrial Park 
Administrative Committee) was the project’s local government, and, 
technically, the legal landlord. This was because in China, economic 
development zones could not be administered foreign companies. In
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procedural terms, CSSD had to acquire the leasehold of the land from SIP AC 
in a financial transaction. Then, once it held the rights to the lease, it could 
prepare the property for industrial, residential or commercial activities. CSSD 
was thus a ‘commercial’ company that re-sold the leasehold—50 years for 
industrial properties, 70 years for residential properties, 40 years for 
commercial properties and 50 years for mixed development (CSSD 1999:
18)—to buyers at a profit. SIP AC’s role was to vet applications from 
companies wishing to establish business operations in the Suzhou Industrial 
Park. Its task was also to collect tax revenue from tenants, maintain the public 
amenities and liase with the Suzhou Municipal Authorities on any urban 
matters.
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state utilized several 
political mechanisms to create institutions to govern the collaborative 
relationship between CSSD and SIP AC. Firstly, both organizations reported to 
the Joint Working Committee, co-chaired by the Suzhou Mayor and the 
Chairman of the Singapore Economic Development Board (see Appendix 
Four, section two). This Working Committee answered to the Joint Steering 
Council, which was co-chaired by China’s Vice President Li Lanqing and 
Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Lee Kuan Yew’s son 
and another key figure of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite. By 
having Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and China’s Vice Premier sitting 
on the Joint Steering Committee, the Suzhou Industrial Park’s level of national 
importance was made evident to investors. Also on the Council were 
ministers, vice ministers and senior bureaucrats from key ministries from both 
countries. Representing China were ministers and bureaucrats from the State 
Planning Commission, the SEZ Officer, the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the MOFTEC, the People’s Bank of 
China and the State Taxation Bureau. From the Singapore side, ministers and 
bureaucrats from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of National 
Development, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and the Economic Development Board were represented (CSSD 1999: 12).
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The Joint Working Committee would meet four times a year, while the Joint 
Steering Council would meet annually if there were no extra-ordinary calls for 
meetings. To the Singapore entrepreneurial elite, these organizations had a 
dual purpose: firstly, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state could 
embed itself onto the Chinese partner. Secondly, with embeddedness onto the 
China government, the close collaboration could act as an economic incentive 
to potential investors. By demonstrating that the Singapore and China 
governments were working closely over this project, the Singapore 
entrepreneurial state hoped that industrial transnational corporations would 
perceive that the political risks of investing in the Suzhou Industrial Park were 
reduced.
E m b e d d in g  w it h  B e ijin g
‘The development and construction of the Suzhou Industrial Park has
established a new model for Sino-Singapore co-operation.’ (President
Jiang Zemin 1993, source unknown, quoted in SIP AC 1999: 1)
At the ‘govemment-to-govemment’ level, complementary collaboration was 
also evident. Complementary collaboration refers to a situation when partners 
contribute different but complementary inputs to the venture. Therefore while 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state invested financial capital as 
well as its expertise in constructing infrastructural and institutional advantages 
for the Suzhou Industrial Park, the China government invested ‘political 
capital’ in the project. This could be seen from the manner and the frequency 
in which it endorsed and supported the Suzhou Industrial Park. Between 1992 
and 1996, central figures of the Beijing administration—such as Zhu Rongji 
and Li Lanqing—were regularly visitors to the project. Also, President Jiang 
Zemin was reported to have said that the Suzhou Industrial Park was the 
‘...priorities of all priorities, and must not be allowed to fail.’ (SIP AC 1999: ii) 
Such top level support was particularly significantly considering that the 
Suzhou Industrial Park was essentially a ‘foreign’ venture and that there were 
422 other economic zones in China.
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The ‘govemment-to-govemment’ embeddedness was important in 
enhancing the competitiveness of the park vis-a-vis other industrial parks in 
China. As mentioned earlier, the high level of state support within China was 
intended to contribute to the project’s credibility and level of prestige. This in 
turn would assure potential investors about the project’s long-term viability. 
But why was the China government so keen on collaborating in this manner? 
Success in the Suzhou Industrial Park project could potentially take away 
investors from other Chinese development zones. One possible reason was the 
nature of central-local relationships in China. As will become evident in later 
chapters, there is a tension-filled and ambivalent set of relationships that have 
evolved since the introduction of economic reform in 1979. In essence, the 
centre (Beijing) still retained most of its economic, political and social power; 
however, after reform, various regional governments now have large resources 
themselves. In this sense, the central Beijing government has been described as 
being a ‘dysfunctional’ developmental state31 (Breslin 1996: 689). While it had 
‘developmental’ motivations, it was unable to gather the necessary resources to 
implement truly ‘developmentalist’ strategies. This ultimately indicated that 
there was little embeddedness between the state and important other players in 
the Chinese economy. However, this autonomy gave Beijing the capacity to 
actually enter into a transnational relationship with the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state in projects that directly benefited China, as a nation-state, 
rather than any one specific region or area. A second possible reason could be 
that in the early 1990s, there were just so many transnational corporations 
interested in entering China that there might be plenty to go around, with or 
without the Suzhou Industrial Park. Even with the most optimistic projections 
in 1994, where the Suzhou Industrial Park was aiming for 100 companies, this 
was really very small compared to any industrial estate in Shanghai, Beijing, 
Tianjin or any of the Special Economic Zones. Even the town of Wuxi has had 
an economic development zone three times the size of Suzhou . Therefore, 
Beijing’s endorsement of the Suzhou Industrial Park carried little economic 
and political costs to competitor zones. In fact, many were hoping to benefit
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from the Suzhou Industrial Park, especially through learning FDI-oriented 
development strategies from the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state.
Therefore, even though the two governments’ bilateral diplomatic 
relationship had long been positive (see Wong 1999), the Suzhou Industrial 
Park project enhanced the relationship further. One indicator of the closeness 
of partners is their degree of embeddedness, especially social embeddedness. 
The example of the SIP’s investment approval procedures demonstrated the 
high degree of social embeddedness between the Singapore and China 
governments, particularly in the sphere of reciprocity.
‘At the beginning, we approached Beijing to give SIP AC the power to 
approve projects up to US$50 million in fixed investment 
commitments without having seek Central Government approval. This 
was because the rule for all the Special Economic and Development 
Zones stated that the local governments could approve projects up to 
US$30 million on their own. For projects above that figure, they had to 
seek approval from Beijing. As many projects in Suzhou might consist 
of large investment commitments, the Singapore government was 
concerned that having to apply to Beijing might be a bureaucratic 
disadvantage, leading to possible delays and increased transaction 
costs. However, if large projects could be approved in Suzhou itself, 
then the turn-around time would be quicker and the investments more 
quickly realized. Therefore, we were asking for a privilege—for greater 
financial decision making autonomy—that the other zones did not 
have. The response from Beijing surprised us. Alright, in 1994, Beijing 
granted SIP AC the authority to approve investments of up to US$50 
million. But in 1995, it gave the SIP AC complete autonomy over the 
financial decision making. In other words, SIP AC could approve 
projects of any size without turning to Beijing. Even though by 1999, 
only a very small handful of investors went above US$30 million, by 
conferring this financial autonomy onto SIP AC, it was a gesture by the 
Central Government that demonstrated its commitment to the project 
which in turn was perceived to make the investment climate for 
transnational corporations more attractive.’ (SO 2)
Another indicator of the China government’s reciprocity in the collaborative 
relationship was its relatively frequent public endorsement of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park. For example, China’s Acting Premier Zhu Rongji was quoted 
as saying that from what was leamt in Suzhou, ‘...we will make the five 
Special Economic Zones and Pudong New District better.’ (Singapore
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Business Times 5 Oct 1995) Implicit in this statement was both an 
endorsement for the Park as well as a criticism of other estates. Similarly, the 
Suzhou Municipal Party Committee, which held its annual meeting in January 
1996, made a statement ‘to exhort the people of Suzhou to wholeheartedly 
support and hasten the pace of development [for the SIP].5 (Xinhua 23 Jan 
1996) There were also many similar public statements from the Co-Chairman 
of the Joint Steering Committee, Li Lanqing, who was also China’s Vice- 
Premier. These gestures developed familiarity and reciprocity. Also, on 22 
March 1996, Wong Hung Khim, the Chairman of Jurong Town Corporation, 
the parent company of Xinsu Development Company in Suzhou, was named 
an honorary citizen of Suzhou (Singapore Straits Times 22 Mar 1996). In the 
same article, it was reported that in October 1995, the Chairman of the CSSD, 
Lim Chee Onn, was awarded the same award.
5.5 ‘P io n e e r  ’ C o m p a n ies
Despite its geographic, infrastructural and institutional competitive
advantages, there was still no guarantee that transnational corporations would
locate in the Suzhou Industrial Park. In many ways, encouraging them to invest
or locate in the Suzhou Industrial Park was similar to encouraging them to
‘collaborate’ in the project. Towards this end, the Singapore transnational
entrepreneurial state utilized social mechanisms.
Once the Suzhou Industrial Park project was formally announced in 
1992, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial elite immediately began 
marketing the park to transnational corporations and Singaporean companies.
‘Although there was a long term objective to completely fill up the 
Park, the short term objective was to get a handful of companies to 
commit immediately. We wanted to announce some takers during the 
ground-breaking ceremony scheduled for 1994. We were intentionally 
hoping that this would create the snowball effect.’ (SO 4)
According to informants from the Singapore Economic Development Board 
and CSSD, ‘snowballing’ was a marketing technique that used the presence of
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some companies in the Park to attract others. Snowballing was based on 
several premises:
‘The first premise was that by getting big brother companies to locate 
in the park, little brothers would also choose to come. This meant that 
if large industrial operators were located at one site, the supplier or 
support companies might decide to locate there as well. For instance, if 
an automobile plant will be located in one place, supplier companies— 
such as those producing individual parts or electronic components— 
might choose to locate nearby to take advantage of the big brother's 
presence, and thus reduce their logistic costs. Therefore, we targeted 
the large finished products manufacturers, hoping that their presence 
would snowball and attract their components suppliers as well.’ (SO 1, 
emphases in original)
The ‘big brother-little brother’ idea was based on industrial ‘agglomeration’ 
(see Hayter 1997). The second premise was to use the presence of existing 
companies to indicate the ‘health’ of the Park to other prospective companies. 
To the marketing personnel, ‘health’ here referred to a combination of strategic 
location, efficiency and prestige:
‘In marketing terms, if the Park could boast the existing presence of big 
name companies that have pumped in lots of money, then it would 
indicate their confidence in the Park. In this sense, the bigger the 
investor—both in terms of brand name or amount invested—the 
healthier the park. The health of the Park could therefore be used to 
attract other companies to come as well.’ (SO 4)
On 14 September 1994 during the project’s ground-breaking ceremony, the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state announced that 14 companies had 
chosen to locate their operations in the park (Singapore Straits Times 15 Sep 
1994). These companies had made their decisions on off-site plans even before 
the Park was operational.
Through an analysis of how these companies were convinced to sign up 
for the project, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s use of social 
mechanisms can be illustrated. Of the 14 companies introduced at the 
groundbreaking ceremony, only six were actually involved in industrial 
activities. Two other companies were property developers, while another 
company was using the park as a base for taxi operations. Three other
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companies in fact never took tenancy at the industrial park33. However, as this 
research found, nine other companies had signed up in 1994, but opted not to 
go public with the announcements. For this reason, they would be considered 
as ‘pioneer’ companies34. Of the 15 ‘pioneer’ companies in Suzhou involved 
in industrial activities, 10 of them were included in the research’s sample. 
Information from these interviews was also supplemented with secondary data 
that existed in the public domain, including newspaper reports, brochures and 
other publications.
At the ground-breaking ceremony, it was announced that the largest 
investments had come from Samsung (semiconductors), which pledged 
US$450 million and had acquired 33 hectares, followed by Lion Nathan 
(brewery), which committed US$250 million on a 15 hectares plot (Singapore 
Straits Times 15 Sep 1994). In the same report, it was said that American 
Micro Devices (microchips) (AMD) and Pokka (soft drinks) had invested 
US$29 million and US$15 million respectively. The other companies that had 
announced that they would take up tenancy at the Suzhou Industrial Park 
included Becton Dickinson (medical devices) (US$50 million), Nabisco 
(foodstuff) (US$50 million), and Solectron (mircochips) (US$45 million). 
Other companies that were coming to the Suzhou Industrial Park within the 
next year included Vickers (mechanical pumps), Siemens-Rexton (hearing aid 
devices), Knowles (medical accessories), MTU (engine parts), Hitachi 
(semiconductors), Singapore Technologies (mechanical parts), Amtek (metal 
stamping) and Delphi (automotive components). The announcements that 
these companies—many of them heralded as so-called ‘Fortune Global 500,’ 
‘US Global 500,’ and ‘Asiaweek 500’ companies—had taken tenancy were 
extremely important to the reputation, status and credibility of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park. The ‘health’ of any industrial zone, country or region, depends 
very much on the size of the investment commitments, the reputation of the 
companies and the number of investors attracted. In this regards, the Suzhou 
Industrial Park could be considered ‘healthy’ for having lined-up this many 
‘large’ investors with their relatively large investment commitments,
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particularly considering that the park itself had not been built. The Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state had especially wanted to utilize the news of 
such investments to encourage other investors to locate at the Suzhou 
Industrial Park.
The marketing wing of the Suzhou Industrial Park, which comprised 
the Marketing Department of CSSD and the Singapore Economic 
Development Board told this research that several of these ‘pioneer’ 
companies were strategically targeted, including ‘big brother’ companies that 
already had prior presence in Singapore such as Samsung and AMD. Samsung 
had announced that they were going to produce household electronic 
appliances in Suzhou. This meant that they would have to source for 
components, including power cables, casings, computer microchips and many 
other items, from other companies35. The hope was that support or supplier 
companies would choose to locate in Suzhou rather than choose to deliver long 
distance. The second rationale for choosing this group of companies was 
because they were already familiar with the Singaporean ‘operating system’ 
from their earlier operations in Singapore. Of the ‘pioneer’ companies that 
were at the Suzhou Industrial Park, only Solectron did not have a factory, 
regional sales or operations office in Singapore. To these companies, the 
Singapore government had credibility and a good reputation as an industrial 
developer and administrator. Already, some of the regional industrial parks— 
such as those in Batam and Bintang—were fairly successful in terms of 
achieving the initial objectives. With the active involvement of both the 
Singapore and China governments, this signalled that the Suzhou Industrial 
Park was of national importance. In addition, many of the informants from the 
transnational corporations in the ‘pioneer’ sample had indicated that they 
believed that the Singapore government was in an advantageous position as it 
was sensitive to the Chinese system of doing business. One respondent said 
that the Singaporean leaders were of a ‘Asian mentality and understood 
Chinese culture and tradition.’ Such factors combined to develop trust on the 
part of the transnational corporations.
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‘Service the investor, draw him in, and give him the support he needs 
so that news will spread. Then better and better investors will come in, 
That is the way we built up Singapore.’ (Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in 
Singapore Straits Times 28 Aug 1995).
While these were some of the more commonly reported reasons why the 
‘pioneers’ chose to invest in the Suzhou Industrial Park, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state hoped to take advantage of its existing 
strong networks of relationships with industrial transnational corporations.
‘The EDB will tap its network of international offices and experience 
in investment promotion to help SSTD and CSSD step up the 
marketing of the SIP. We aim to attract more quality industrial projects 
to make this a top-class industrial park.’ (Philip Yeo, Chairman SEDB 
and Chairman of CSSD, quoted in Singapore Business Times 27 Jan 
1996)
One manager of a ‘pioneer’ company said:
‘We were willing to invest in the Suzhou Industrial Park way back in 
1994 because we were guaranteed that the Singapore government was 
running it. This gave our company assurance that it was not going to be 
a fly-by-night venture, but something with prestige and importance. We 
were sure our money was safe.’ (NA 1)
‘One reason why we were willing to come to Suzhou was because of 
our relationship with the EDB. Throughout our operations in 
Singapore, we had one EDB officer look after us. This same officer 
came to us with the information about the SIP, and provided us with all 
the necessary information. Of course, she was aware that we were 
looking to move some of our lower value-added activities to the region, 
and therefore, Suzhou appeared to be a logical place for us.’ (EU 1).
‘We had been looking to come to China for a long time, but we were 
hesitant because we were concerned about the Chinese way of doing 
business. We have done several feasibility studies in the past, and 
we’ve even gone to China to do fact finding ourselves. But one thing 
the SIP had was professionalism. All the information—from the land 
prices, the laws, rules, everything—was clearly stated in the brochure. 
The Singapore EDB officer was also very helpful in providing 
information. He even accompanied me to report to our headquarters in 
America about the SIP. So in the end, I would have to say that the 
officer was the key reason why we chose Suzhou ahead of maybe other 
sites in China.’ (NA 2).
‘We were actually going to come into China anyway, but the question 
was where. And then our Singapore RHQ was informed about the SIP.
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Also, our boss in Singapore was personally assured by the Chairman of 
the EDB that the SIP would be a great success. And I don’t think that 
Singapore officials make blind or empty promises. I stress that we are 
here not only because of the Singapore presence, but that the Singapore 
presence might have given this Park an edge over others in China.’ (AS 
2).
Thus, familiarity, credibility, confidence and trust were factors that encouraged 
these transnational corporations to locate in the Suzhou Industrial Park. It was 
true that they were going to enter China anyway, but it was important to the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state that they took up tenancy at the 
Suzhou Industrial Park instead of locating elsewhere in China. This not only 
ensured that the project took off, but was the first step in the long process of 
making this park financially profitable.
5.5 C o n c l u s io n
‘We are going to make this succeed, or what will suffer is our 
reputation. When we have succeeded, we will open up branches in 
China. We have not put our brand name in Langfang or 
Shijiazhuang...but here, we will defend our quality, because here, our 
reputation is at stake.’ (Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in Singapore Business 
Times 25 Aug 1995)
In September 1994, when the Suzhou Industrial Park began operations, the 
grand experiment was also underway. Already, pioneer investors had pledged 
about US$200 million in investments. This marked a clear shift in the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s participation in the global game 
of industrial production. From supplying primary factors of production in 
Singapore, the Singapore government now supplied secondary factors of 
production in China in collaboration with the China government. Although the 
motivations of all the major collaborators were different—the Chinese 
government sought local economic growth, the Singapore government wanted 
to further its regionalization programme, and industrial transnational 
corporations wanted to invest in China for profits—the project was 
complementary and mutually beneficial. In this construction phase, the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state utilized the embedding strategy
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separately for each partner. Towards the Chinese partner, it utilized economic, 
political and social mechanisms to increase its embeddedness, not only to 
encourage the Chinese partner to collaborate, but also to establish structures to 
govern the collaboration. For transnational corporations, especially the 
‘pioneer’ companies, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state utilized 
economic and social mechanisms to encourage them to locate their industrial 
operations at the park. Together with the project’s geographic, infrastructural 
and institutional attributes, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
hoped that the Suzhou Industrial Park would be significantly more competitive 
than other zones in China.
1 Lee had stepped down as Singapore’s Prime Minister before the 1990 general elections. 
Upon being re-elected as Member of Parliament for his constituency, the appointment o f  
Senior Minister was created for him to remain on the Cabinet (see Hill and Lian 1995).
2 One reason why Beijing was unable (or unwilling) to allow the Singapore government to 
introduce its own economic and tax policies was to maintain a co-ordinated tax system across 
China for these zones. The Wuxi Industrial Park, the other Singapore government-developed 
park, was awarded ‘Economic Development Zone’ status, which had slightly fewer tax perks 
for foreign investors.
3 Agglomeration was defined as being physically close to as many suppliers and customers as 
possible (Hayter 1997: 32). It was supposed to cut down on transportation and time-saving 
costs; however, agglomeration also had social benefits in terms o f firms being able to network, 
share information and form informal associations for certain purposes.
4 These codes identify the respondents as listed in Appendix One.
5 Pudong was the previously undeveloped area south-east o f the Huangpu River across historic 
Shanghai city. The area’s name was an amalgam of Pu (from Huang Pu River) and Dong 
(which means East).
6 Shanghai is one o f only four municipal cities. This meant that even though it was only the 
size of a city (albeit a rather huge one), it had the political and economic status o f an entire 
province (see Yeung and Li 1999).
7 The Shanghai-Nanjing highway is officially known as Highway 312 in China.
8 See Pearson (1997) for details on urban business elites in several Chinese cities.
9 The economic history o f Jiangsu, the province where Suzhou is located, is discussed in detail 
in Wei (2000: chapter 5).
10 This chapter from Lee’s autobiography was electronically published in September 2000, 
after the research’s fieldwork. Although rather long and the details not verifiable, the 
reproduction o f this text is useful as it brings to light information that even senior officials o f  
the CSSD were not aware of. This version o f the text was released on 27 September 2000 on 
the Singapore Straits Times website, with Lee’s autobiography (part two) due to be released in 
December 2000 in Singapore.
11 Ong was an architect by training. He had always been close to Lee, and when he ‘retired’ 
from politics in 1994 because o f ill health, he was urged by the government to run for 
Singapore’s first elected President. He duly won the election, and stepped down in 1998 at the 
end o f the term.
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12 Also, this research was aware that Lee wrote this chapter retrospectively (after the Singapore 
government chose to disengage from the project), and could therefore be more ‘reflective’ in 
trying to explain the situation in 1992-3.
13 In Xinsu’s marketing brochures, it states: ‘World-class ready built facilities with vital 
infrastructure, professional services and minimal start-up hassles.’ (Xinsu 1999: cover)
14 These contracts were eventually awarded to either Singaporean companies (including state- 
owned and government-linked companies) or Singaporean joint-ventures with other 
transnational corporations. For example, Township Construction, which was awarded a US$10 
million contract to begin development o f the first two square kilometres in Suzhou, was in fact 
a joint venture between Keppel Engineering (government-linked company), Lum Chang and 
Sum Cheong (both private Singaporean companies which had previously done many Singapore 
government projects {Singapore Straits Times 18 Aug 1994).
15 The national grid supplied power capacity at 486 MW, whereas the first phase—promised in 
the year 2000— of Huaneng’s capacity promised power at 600 MW (CSSD 1999: 61).
16 KIE is a Singaporean government-linked corporation. It is directly in charge o f developing 
the other regional industrial parks.
17 As Strange (1998) points out, in China foreign investors could utilize ‘in-kind’ investments, 
which might, for example, involve the relocation o f previously used machinery. Thus, such 
minimum investment standards do not always reflect actual financial investments.
18 Xinsu is an amalgamation o f Singapore and Suzhou. Singapore in Mandarin is pronounced 
Xin Jia Po. JTCI— which develops and manages several others o f the Singapore government’s 
regional industrial parks— was awarded the contract after an ‘official tender,’ although this 
research found that there in fact were very few competitors for this contract because of the 
criteria set by the CSSD.
19 Another 30 percent o f the eight square kilometres in Phase One was allocated to township 
development projects such as housing, schools, commercial centre, and public amenities.
20 This banner was no longer there during the period o f the fieldwork (Jun-Sep 1999).
21 The phrase ‘pro-business environment’ has been frequently used by the Singapore 
government (see previous chapter). Also see Singapore Business Times ‘Suzhou Township 
will create competitive and pro-business climate, says SM,’ (30 Aug 1995).
22 In addition, the 183 square kilometres surrounding the Suzhou Industrial Park also came 
under SIP AC’s jurisdiction. Therefore, SIP AC was in charge o f a total 253 square kilometres 
which had official ‘Economic Zone’ Status from the central government. See Kwok (1986) for 
an overview on the specific role o f such ‘local administrative and development agencies’ in 
China’s Special Economic Zones.
23 See Hutchcroft (1997) for a useful summary o f the concepts o f rent seeking, clientelism and 
corruption. See Wong (1998) and Huang (1998: chapter four) for a discussion of how foreign 
investors felt towards corrupt and inefficient practices.
24 It was interesting that SM Lee Kuan Yew offered to extend the ‘software transfer’ to ‘all 
pats’ o f China. See Singapore Business Times (25 Aug 1995).
25 Even Lee Kuan Yew criticized this regional recruitment strategy. ‘Noting that the majority 
of officials recruited to work on the project were from Suzhou or Jiangsu province, he [Lee 
Kuan Yew] said that the net should be cast wider [to the whole o f China].’ {Singapore Straits 
Times 25 Aug 1995)
26 Dingxiang students were state-level scholarship recipients normally earmarked for posts in 
the civil service, while weike students were expected to serve a bond o f service with their 
sponsored company that had paid for their education.
27 See Liu (2000) for a discussion of China’s social security system after the economic reforms 
of 1979.
28 The Provident Fund scheme was introduced in April 1997 on a trial basis, where 4000 
employees in 63 companies participated {Singapore Investment News 1 Jan 1998). The 
original threshold was 25 percent from both sides; but was lowered to 22 percent when official 
introduced in April 1998. The threshold was lowered to 20 percent as a result o f the Asian 
Financial Crisis (see chapter seven).
29 As mentioned earlier, by 1997 the Singapore government established seven regional 
industrial parks, o f which only the Suzhou Industrial Park was directly ‘managed’ by the
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government. The others were managed by state-owned enterprises or government linked 
corporations.
30 This research has not been able to trace the source and origin o f President Jiang’s statement. 
However, it is also cited in Wang et al. (1997: 2).
31 Also see volumes by White (ed.) (1988, and 1991) for an analysis o f China since 1979 
within the developmental state framework.
32 Wuxi is the most industrial town in the Jiangsu Province. It is 60 kilometres west o f Suzhou, 
and since 1995 has housed another o f Singapore’s regional industrial park, developed and 
managed by Sembawang Corporation, a Singapore government-linked corporation. Also see 
Chapter nine, which has a compares the Suzhou Industrial Park with the Singapore-run Wuxi 
Industrial Park.
33 The research found out that one company had problems with getting its business license 
approval, while two others later cited financial difficulties and withdrew from the project 
(SOI, S02, and COl).
34 The term ‘pioneer’ was brought to my attention by both officials o f the Suzhou Industrial 
Park as well as by several managers o f ‘pioneer’ companies.
35 Data gathered from interview (SO 1). Items such as circuit boards and metal casings were 
sourced by other Samsung subsidiaries in other countries.
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C h a pt e r  Six  
Ta k e  O ff  P h a se
6.1 Tr a n s n a  t io n a l  C o r p o r a  t io n s  a  t  t h e  S IP
The period immediately after the opening of the Suzhou Industrial Park was
crucial to the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state. The demand for
industrial property at the Park would give a very clear indication of whether
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategies—including the
design and creation of the Park’s competitive advantages and the collaboration
of its partners—were effective or otherwise. To evaluate the effectiveness of
these strategies, this chapter analyzes the data from the interviews with
managers of industrial transnational corporations located at the Suzhou
Industrial Park. Respondents were firstly asked to rank all the reasons why
their companies chose to locate in the Suzhou Industrial Park. Secondly,
respondents were asked to comment on their tenancy at the Park so far, and to
evaluate whether their companies’ initial expectations had been met. Also, the
interview used a series of secondary probes to gather qualitative responses
from the informants. These probes were used to clarify any ambiguous points,
and other exploratory issues such as why they had not chosen alternatives (to
China, to Suzhou and to the Suzhou Industrial Park), and what was their
company’s previous links with Singapore or the Singapore government.
Finally, secondary data sources—such as newspaper reports, official
documents, and marketing brochures—were used to supplement the primary
sources.
P r o f il e
The profile of the companies included in the research indicated that all 
of them were ‘expansionist industrial transnational corporations,’ which can be 
defined as enterprises that transcend borders to establish an additional 
operating unit (or units). All the companies included in the sample were ‘pre­
existing’ enterprises; none of them were newly formed companies. All the
134
Chapter Six
respondents said that the enterprise in the Suzhou Industrial Park was an 
additional or subsidiary operation. Also, all the tenants at the Suzhou Industrial 
Park were officially ‘foreign’ businesses (see Table 6.1). The CSSD’s 
categorization of the ‘country of origin’ was based on ‘the country of origin of 
the main stockholder,’ (CSSD 1999b: 1) even though the named categories 
were regions such as ‘North America,’ ‘Europe,’ and ‘Asia Pacific.’
Ta b l e  6.1: C o m pan ies  L o cated  in  the SIP a n d  Th o se  In c lu d ed  in  the  
Sam p le ; Categ o rized  b y  C o u n tr y  o f  Or ig in  (o f  L a r g e s t  Shareholder)  
(n =56)
Overall Included in Sample
Country/Region Number Percent Number Percent
European 18 21.7 15 26.8
Japan 19 22.9 7 12.5
Singapore 18 21.7 10 17.9
North America 28 33.7 24 42.9
Total 83 100 56 100.0
Source: Compiled from CSSD (1999b)
Many of the companies were affiliates of global conglomerates, where the 
domiciled status of the largest shareholder was not only very difficult to 
ascertain, but sometimes had shareholders from Europe, North America and 
even Asia. Finally, the categories did not reflect the varied nature of some of 
the projects, as this research found that there were companies included in the 
sample that were joint-ventures between a Japanese and American company, a 
Japanese and Singaporean company, a European and American company, and 
a Japanese and Hong Kong company. An official from the CSSD 
acknowledged that the categorization was neither absolutely accurate, nor even 
crucial. The exercise was more for ‘marketing’ rather than ‘operational’ 
purposes:
‘We don’t really care where they come from, so long as they do come 
and invest here. The compilation of these stats [statistics] is for 
marketing purposes. There is a real mentality among some 
multinationals that having lots of US, European and Japanese 
companies shows the park to be in good health. So we tailor our charts 
to reflect that. But if we went to Europe, I might break out this other 
chart that shows where the European companies here come from, like
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so many from the UK, Finland, Germany and so on. In the end, its just 
marketing.’ (SO 1)
‘Actually, if you look very carefully at some of the multinationals here, 
on paper they might sound American or British. But look even closer, 
and you see that some of them are Singaporean companies in heart and 
soul, but multinational outside. Many of these companies came to 
Singapore in the 70s, and localized there. So when they decided to 
penetrate China, the head office told the Singapore RHQ to take over.’ 
(SO 2)
None of the companies included in the sample ‘relocated’ operations from a 
previous site to the Suzhou Industrial Park. ‘Relocation,’ in this sense, meant 
that companies closed one plant and shifted the entire operations elsewhere. 
Instead, all the respondents said that the Suzhou entity was an additional unit, 
and thus nearly all of them had affiliate production sites and/or regional offices 
(including sales, marketing and other services) elsewhere in the Asia Pacific 
region. Many of the non-Singaporean companies either had current or former 
operations in Singapore. Only two companies out of the 46 non-Singaporean 
companies did not have any prior business activities in Singapore. More 
significantly, nearly half of the non-Singaporean companies included in the 
sample had Regional Headquarters (RHQs) located in Singapore. Five of these 
had chosen to locate or were in the process of taking up leases to locate at 
other Singaporean regional industrial parks at Batam, Bintang, and Bangalore. 
Thus the majority of the sample had prior contact and familiarity with 
Singapore, which would prove to be important, as the later sections will 
discuss. However, based on the total absence of wholly indigenous Chinese 
companies, the Park had—intentionally or otherwise—managed to capture its 
main market, which comprised of industrial transnational corporations (which 
in this case included Singaporean companies). Furthermore, this ‘national’ 
distribution becomes significant when the 90 percent total occupancy rate of 
the Suzhou Industrial Park’s Phase One was considered. Therefore the Park’s 
near-full occupancy was not buffered by local indigenous companies, but had 
in fact, satisfied demand for property from industrial transnational 
corporations. Also, the managerial respondents as well as respondents who
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were officials at the Suzhou Industrial Park could not name any industrial 
estate in China other than the Wuxi Industrial Park—which was developed and 
managed by a Singaporean government linked company—that had a total 
absence of local (Chinese) enterprises. At the Suzhou New District and 
Pudong, wholly Chinese owned enterprises accounted for half and a third of 
the tenants respectively1.
Another indicator that the Suzhou Industrial Park was quite 
uncharacteristic of other Chinese estates was the types of business licenses 
held by the tenants. In both the research’s sample as well as in the overall list 
of tenants, Sino-Foreign joint ventures accounted for less than 10 percent of 
the tenants (see Table 6.2). This is significant, especially when compared to 
the national averages in China, where wholly foreign owned enterprises only 
accounted for a quarter of all ‘foreign investments’ (see Table 6.3).
Ta b l e  6.2: Co m pan ies In clu d ed  In  Th e  Re se a r c h  Ca teg o rized  b y  B u siness 
L ic e n se  T ype  (n =56)
Sample (1)______ Overall (2)
Type Number Percent Number Percent
Joint Venture 3 5.4 8 10
Wholly Foreign Owned 53 94.6 74 90
Total 56 100.0 82 100
Source: (1) Interview data, (2) compiled from CSSD (1999b).
Ta b le  6.3: P r o p o rtio n  o f  b u sin e ss  lic en se  types  o f  F o r e ig n  D ir e c t  
In v e st m e n t  in  China (1979-1996)
Total (US$m) Percentage
Equity joint ventures 90,726 51.4
Contractual joint ventures 38,034 21.5
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises 42,551 24.1
Joint exploration 5,281 3.0
Total 176,595 100
Source: MOFTEC, various years, compiled by Wei (2000: 116)
The high proportion of ‘wholly foreign owned’ business licenses at the Suzhou 
Industrial Park suggested that the industrial transnational corporations which 
chose to locate there were not motivated to form equity or contractual joint 
ventures in China. Although joint ventures could have beneficial business
137
Chapter Six
advantages—such as having a local partner that could ‘deal with all the grey 
areas of Chinese business practices and laws’ and assist in localization—there 
were also significant disadvantages, such as the difficulty of finding a suitable 
local partner, the incompatibility of management and operational cultures (see 
Wu and Strange 1997: 213). Other obstacles might include the high costs 
incurred from having to ‘buy into’ a Chinese company. Furthermore, certain 
industrial transnational corporations were not interested in relinquishing their 
managerial and operational autonomy, which was expected in joint ventures 
(see Yan and Gray 1996: 108). Thus, the Suzhou Industrial Park was perhaps 
the most logical location for these foreign enterprises, as it promised that the 
bureaucratic administration would resemble the ‘Singaporean operating 
system’—which had established a reputation for being widely accepted among 
transnational corporations—rendering the imperative of finding a local partner 
to deal the Chinese bureaucracy redundant. It was probable that these 
industrial transnational corporations were willing to pay the higher financial 
premium for industrial property at the Suzhou Industrial Park, accepting that 
this might actually be a savings as opposed to having to buy into Chinese 
companies. On the other hand, it could be argued companies that could form 
joint ventures therefore did not need a site like the Suzhou Industrial Park, and 
could theoretically locate in any of the other Chinese industrial estates open to 
foreign investment. The discussion will eventually return to this issue in the 
later chapter, especially during the discussion of the impact of the Asian 
Financial Crisis on the Suzhou Industrial Park (see Chapter Eight).
In the sample, the overwhelming majority of companies were involved 
in manufacturing activities (see Table 6.4). ‘Manufacturing’ was defined both 
by the CSSD as well as the companies themselves to include production of 
products as diverse as footwear, pharmaceuticals, electronic components, 
appliances, computers and computer peripherals, polymer materials, 
automotive parts, primary and secondary telecommunications equipment, and 
food and drinks. Of the others, two companies were involved in software- 
related activities, one was in software development and design, while the other
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was involved in multimedia publishing. The single company involved in 
providing services operated as a machinery repair centre and support office.
Ta b l e  6.4: C o m panies Inc lu d ed  In  Th e  R e se a r c h  Ca  tego rized  b y  B usiness  
Se c to r2 (n =56)
Number Percent
Manufacturing 52 92.8
Software 2 3.6
Support 1 1.8
Services 1 1.8
Total 56 100.0
Source: Compiled from CSSD (1999b)
Most companies in the sample—a combined 70 percent—had been in 
operation for less than two years (before July 1999) (see Table 6.5). There 
were slightly more companies that had chosen to build their own factories as 
opposed to those that selected Ready-Built Factories (see Table 6.6). This 
might suggest that most companies included in the sample had long-term plans 
for their operations in the Suzhou Industrial Park.
Ta b le  6.5: C om pan ies  I n clu d ed  In  Th e  Re se a r c h  Ca teg o rized  b y  L e n g th  
o f  O c c u p a n c y  (n =56)
Length of Occupancy Frequency Percent
Less than 1 yr 24 42.9
1-2 yrs 15 26.8
2-3 yrs 10 17.9
Over 3 yrs 7 12.5
Total 56 100.0
Source: Interview data
Ta b le  6.6: C o m pan ies  In clu d ed  In  Th e  Re se a r c h  Ca teg o rized  b y  Fa c t o r y  
T ype  (n =56)
Type Frequency Percent
Commercial 1 1.8
Own 31 55.4
RBF 24 42.9
Total 56 100.0
Source: Interview data
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In this brief survey of the profile of the companies included in the research, it 
could be concluded that the Suzhou Industrial Park was a location for 
expansionist industrial transnational corporations that generally sought to enter 
China as ‘wholly foreign owned’ enterprises.
6.2 Co m p e t it iv e  A d v a n t a g e  
W h y  C h in a ?
As discussed earlier, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
specifically designed the Suzhou Industrial Park to have certain competitive 
advantages vis-a-vis other special economic zones in China in order to attract 
the presence of industrial transnational corporations. This section explores 
whether or not these advantages were actual factors that encouraged the 
companies to locate in the Suzhou Industrial Park, or whether there were other 
factors. In the data, the two most frequently cited reasons were to gain access 
to the country’s market and its cheap factors of production (see Table 6.7).
T a b le  6 .7: R e s p o n s e s  t o  ‘W h y  C h in a  ? ’ (n =64) 3
Reasons Response Rate (%) Mentioned as Most Important (%)
Market 100 75
Costs 100 25
Supply Chain 30 0
Other 10 0
Source: Interview data
Although these reasons came as no surprise, the logic behind them was 
interesting. For many respondents, China’s ‘market’ was perceived as a 
potential rather than existing market. The products manufactured by these 
industrial transnational corporations were not immediately meant for domestic 
consumption. In fact, many of the companies had not chosen to apply for 
domestic distribution and sales. Instead, for the vast majority of the companies 
in the sub-sample, their products were re-exported (see Table 6.8)
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Ta b le  6.8: D estin atio n  o f  p ro d u c ts  for  c o m pa n ie s  in  th e  sa m p le  (n =56)
Destination Number Percentage
100% re-export 43 76.8
Over 50% re-export 6 10.7
100% domestic 7 12.5
Total 56 100
Source: Interview data
Even though the Suzhou Industrial Park was predominantly an export- 
processing zone, as in all other China special economic zones, a percentage of 
its products could technically be sold domestically subject to state approval. 
The definition of domestic sales covered both supplying other industrial 
producers as well as the public. However, domestic sales did not appear to be 
an important short term motivation. Instead, these companies were more 
interested in gaining a foothold in the China market while they were waiting 
for ‘...the dragon to wake up.’ (NA 27)
‘We know China will eventually open up; its going to be sooner rather 
than later. And we know that one day, the population’s buying power is 
going to be up there. So we have to be here early to learn about the 
Chinese system, and be ready to pounce when the opportunity comes. 
We have to develop a reputation for being able to conquer the Chinese 
market. And that comes from having experience in China. So we are 
actually more interested training our workers, middle managers, and 
area managers, who are all local, than in our re-exports.’ (NA 28)
‘While we are mainly involved in re-exports—we send nearly all of our 
products to Japan and Southeast Asia—we want to establish our 
company’s brand name at the same time. This means we want our 
products to be known in China, even if  it is not sold here. And we want 
to be known as a good and decent employer. All these things add up. 
Five or ten years down the road, we will have an advantage over new 
arrivals in China.’ (AS 1)
Several companies did, however, already have domestic consumers for their 
product.
‘Our strategy is to be located close to our customers with the highest 
quality products in the marketplace. We currently serve the fast 
growing China electronics market with products from our five 
locations in Asia. We made the decision to invest in China to meet the 
demand we see for laminate circuitry materials in the near terms and
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the outstanding prospects we see for growth in the future.’ (Don Jobe, 
Vice President and General Manager Asia Pacific, Allied Signal 
Laminates, quoted in Singapore Straits Times 15 Apr 1996)
‘Chemfab is the global market and technology leader in our industry. 
This new operation in China will further strengthen our position in 
Asia, the most exciting and rapidly growing market in the world, by 
being close to our customers with efficient, low cost manufacturing 
capability and effective sales and service.’ Duane C. Montopoli, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Chemfab, quoted in Business 
Wire, 16 Apr 1996)
Also, for many transnational corporations included in the sample, their choice 
of establishing operations in China did not necessarily mean that other 
locations were ignored. Of the 35 transnational corporations interviewed, 10 
already had prior production plants elsewhere in China. Also, 15 of these 
companies reported that they had either already established production 
facilities in other countries around the same time, or were planning to in the 
very near future, in India, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
W h y  S u z h o u ?
The ‘Why Suzhou (as a region)?’ question was meant to establish 
whether the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s choice of Suzhou 
was viewed as a geographic competitive advantage—as explained in Chapter 
Five—by the transnational corporations. The data tended to confirm that it did 
(see Table 6.9). To recapitulate, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state selected Suzhou because of the city’s geographic proximity to Shanghai, 
and its relatively high quality of human resources (see Chapter Five).
T a b le  6.9: R e s p o n s e s  t o  ‘W h y S u z h o u ?  ’ (n =64)
Reasons Frequency (%) Most Important (%)
Shanghai 100 50
Human Resources 50 10
SIP 50 40
Other 30 0
Source: Interview data
‘We have selected Suzhou for its access to customers, transportation 
logistics, an the availability of labour, engineering resources and
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materials.’ (Ken Tsai, President Solectron Asia, quoted in Singapore 
Investment News, 1 Jan 1998)
‘The region is very industrialized and is an excellent location for us to 
source for raw materials and market our products to the surrounding 
companies.’ (C.F. Chai, Vice President of Littelfuse OVS (Suzhou) 
quoted in Singapore Investment News, 1 May 1996)
‘I think Suzhou is really good. We are one hour away from Shanghai’s 
airport. And Shanghai has a major port. That means we cut down on 
internal transportation times. That’s costs savings. And there’s this new 
highway (Nanjing-Shanghai highway), where I can get people to or 
from Shanghai quickly.’ (EU 1)
‘In fact, my main office is in Shanghai. All we have here is one floor 
manager and the production team. I can hop over here within an hour— 
traffic conditions permitting. And we can stay in Shanghai to be close 
to the banks, diplomats, whatever. Any further inland and we would 
have to consider opening a full office together with the plant.’ (EU 14)
However, Suzhou’s human resource supply and relative prosperity were not 
really important factors to the sample, but that having them were ‘bonuses’.
‘Human resources may have played a part in our decision, but to be 
honest, China is so uniform that we will find plenty of university 
graduates, technical school graduates and high school leavers wherever 
we go. Also, high quality HR is not always necessarily good. Too many 
educated people means we end up paying more for salaries.
Sometimes, for certain types of operations, we prefer less educated 
people to be workers. But over here [Suzhou], I can say we have no 
real complaints.’ (NA 25)
It also emerged that for many companies in the sample, Suzhou as a location 
by itself was not a major contributing factor. In fact, several respondents 
reported that their companies had chosen to locate simply on the basis of 
where the Singapore industrial park would be located.
‘We evaluated this park on a cost and benefit basis starting from the 
position of where the Singapore government was (going to set up). 
Now, the Singapore government isn’t going to choose some God­
forsaken wilderness; of course they want to get the location right. So 
once they chose Suzhou, we looked at whether this place was suitable 
for us. The alternatives were to go to Shanghai, or to Beijing. We were 
not interested in locating anywhere else.’ (NA 14)
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W h y  SIP?
For the ‘Why SIP?’ question, the responses were less homogeneous (see Table 
6 .10).
T a b le  6.10: R e s p o n s e s  t o  W h y  SIP? ’ (n =64)
Reasons Frequency (%) Most Important (%)
Singapore System 100 75
Singapore government 100 25
Govt-to-Govt 100 0
Infrastructure 60 0
Information 60 0
Ready Built Factories 50 0
Other 30 0
Source: Interview Data
It emerged that competitive advantages such as ‘Singapore system,’ ‘Singapore 
government’s presence,’ and ‘govemment-to-govemment level importance’ 
(which will be discussed in the next section) were unanimously cited. 
Interestingly, ‘infrastructure’ did not appear to be the most important factor for 
the majority of the companies. This might be influenced by the company’s 
nature of operation or business sector. From the interviews, it was quite clear 
that companies in two sectors— the pharmaceutical and the chemical 
sectors—ranked the provision of ‘high quality industrial infrastructure’ as very 
important. Companies in the telecommunications and the semiconductor 
sectors did rank infrastructure as important but was not paramount.
‘We decided to come here because of our Singapore connection. We 
have a plant in Singapore, and from there, we know that when the 
Singapore people say that they will have international standard 
infrastructure, they deliver. And we were proven right. Well, we might 
have been proven wrong at the other sites—as in they would have 
delivered too—but head-office would not have taken that gamble.’ (NA 
15)
‘For our company, the infrastructure was vital. We make medicines, 
and we need high quality water and a regular supply of electricity and 
steam. When we surveyed several sites in China in 1996, it became 
obvious that only one site would meet our HQ’s standards: this one 
(SIP). Right now, we are not producing anything. Our application to 
sell locally produced drugs is being processed somewhere in Beijing, 
so even though all our equipment is here and ready to go, we can’t
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begin. We could, however, produce to export. However, ‘a made in 
China’ product would never sell to the public back home [Japan] 
because they think China is some un-developed area. If only the people 
saw this place.’ (AS 2)
‘We produce mechanical parts here. We don’t really need world-class 
infrastructure. But having them certainly helps. We’ve been here nearly 
two years, and we haven’t had any brown-outs [loss of power supply], 
contaminated water, etc. etc. Things here work nearly all the time, 
which is a major compliment in China, I can tell you.’ (EU 9)
Half the respondents cited the availability of ‘Ready Built Factories’ (RBFs) as 
an important consideration. As mentioned in earlier chapters, RBFs played an 
important role in Singapore’s industrial transformation between 1965 and 
1980, enhancing the country’s competitive advantage. They relieved investors 
of the financial burden of building their own factories. RBFs also facilitated a 
quick start-up for investors as investors only had to do minor renovations to 
customize the property to their specifications.
‘RBFs are really good for medium sized companies like ours. This is 
our first venture in China, and we were not absolutely sure about our 
long-term strategy. So we took a three-year lease at Xinsu. Because we 
didn’t have to build our own factory, we kept costs low and move in 
here fast. If our venture does well, we will then decide to expand or 
build our own factory. If it fails, we pack up and go home. Don’t want 
to be in a situation like [company name suppressed], who built their 
own factory, then had to leave China. Now they’ve got to sell their 
custom made factory.’ (AS 22)
‘RBFs were useful to us, because we wanted to start here quickly.
What was the point of giving us our business license in six weeks if it 
took one year to build the factory? Well, we wanted to hit the ground 
running. So we took a three-year lease here, and started renovations as 
soon as we got our license. Took us a grand total of one month to do 
the place up to fit our machinery, and maybe another month to get it 
approved. Our first products took a grand total of six months to appear. 
Quite amazing. We could only achieve this sort of results in first world 
countries.’ (EU 8)
‘One of the reasons why we are here is because of the RBFs. We took a 
short-term lease (three years) when we first came in 1998 and began 
moving in some of the operations straight away. Then we acquired our 
own plot over at the north side of the park, and after all the planning 
and checking, began building our own factory. That should be ready in 
six months (year 2000). Then we will shift out of the RBF into our own 
home. By then, our operators would have been trained, we already have
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exports and we really don’t have to worry about the old plot. I’m sure 
Xinsu will lease it to somebody else.’ (NA 12)
For example, in 1999, several companies such as Glaxo-Wellcome, Nokia and 
Andrew Telecoms were temporarily operating out of RBFs while their own 
factories were being built. The ‘other’ reasons for locating at the Suzhou 
Industrial Park included agglomeration objectives, and ‘...dumb luck.’ As 
discussed earlier, agglomeration could be defined as locating to take advantage 
of supply links or being spatially close to one’s business partners. This was 
frequently articulated as: ‘We are here, because we supply so-and-so who is 
also here.’ This implied that companies which located to take advantage of 
agglomeration would probably have located wherever else their recipient 
company had chosen. However, this research found that only seven companies 
in the sub-sample had agglomeration objectives. Although this was not a direct 
incentive of the Singapore entrepreneurial elite, it had planned to attract such 
‘big-brother’ companies to correspondingly attract support companies. If 
logistical factors were cited by these support companies, it could also be 
argued that they could have located near but not within the Suzhou Industrial 
Park in areas that were comparatively cheaper and still had Special Economic 
Zone status. For example, the Suzhou New District, Kunshan Industrial Park 
and the Wu Industrial Area are all less than 20 kilometres away from the 
Suzhou Industrial Park. In addition, there was a SIPAC-govemed area that was 
outside the Suzhou Industrial Park that was another option for companies. 
Despite these alternatives, these support companies had still chosen to locate 
in the Suzhou Industrial Park.
Interestingly, one company was came to the Suzhou Industrial Park not 
because of its promised or actual competitive advantages, but because of 
Tuck’:
‘Our company located here simply by chance, what you might call 
dumb luck. We wanted to be in Shanghai Pudong, because our 
customers were all there. But our competitor had good connections 
with powerful people there. So we actually had applied for a business 
license, and it got rejected several times, for reasons that we felt were
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unreasonable. So over one weekend, the former manager decided to 
come for a sightseeing trip to Suzhou, drove past this industrial park, 
which was actually only a signboard at the time. He noted the name, 
and cabled to our HQ to follow up. Three months later, we had the 
business license in our hands.’ (EU 13)
Still, it would appear that the data generally supported the premise that the 
tenants did not locate at the Suzhou Industrial Park solely because of its 
geographic and infrastructural competitive advantages; instead, institutional 
competitive advantages were reportedly most important.
6.3 I n s t it u t io n a l  C o m p e t it iv e  A d v a n t a g e s
In the previous section, the Suzhou Industrial Park’s institutional
features were most frequently cited and ranked as most important by the
respondents. As suggested in the Chapter Five, the Singapore transnational
entrepreneurial state envisaged that the Suzhou Industrial Park’s institutional
competitive advantages had several facets, including its ‘Singaporean
operating system’ and the ‘govemment-to-govemment’ collaboration. To the
respondents, the Singapore ‘operating system’ entailed having corruption-free
officials, rule of law policies and a pro-business orientation. Thus, the key
litmus test of this would be judged from the effectiveness of the ‘software
transfer’ to SIP AC, the local Chinese authority administering the estate.
A s s e s s in g  t h e  S o f t w a r e  T r a n s f e r
This research found evidence that the Singapore officials and the
Suzhou bureaucrats both felt that the ‘Software Transfer’ was generally
successful4.
‘The Chinese officials have shown that they can learn fast and 
thoroughly. They also were very interested and serious about the 
training. They weren’t in Singapore for a holiday for sure. Having been 
here for nearly four years, I personally can say that they were trying to 
implement what they learnt. Don’t just ask me, ask the companies.’
(SO 1)
‘These SIP AC officials are a breed apart. Today [1999], they are miles 
ahead of their peers who are administrators in other zones. They think 
and act with the aim of assisting companies to do well here. We’ve
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shown them that if  companies do well, they also do well. If companies 
feel that these fellows are not doing their job, they tell other companies 
not to come, and these officials’ jobs would be at stake. This is how 
they remain motivated and committed to the training we gave them.’ 
(SO 4)
‘We learnt a lot from the Singaporeans. But what is most satisfying is 
that I can say that we can see the results of this training. Companies are 
happy with our work. This gives us the will to maintain this standard.’ 
(CO 3)
‘Sometimes, it is difficult for us. We have to behave in one way when 
we deal with the companies and the Singaporeans, and when we go 
downtown (Suzhou city), we have to use different system. But we can 
do it, and by now, we are used to it. It just takes getting used to.’ (CO 
1)
The software transfer was also cited as the most successful adaptation of the 
Suzhou Industrial Park project in a study conducted by the Department of 
Business Studies at Nanjing University5. However, of greater relevance was 
whether these institutional competitive advantages were actually realized, or 
whether they remained as empty (or partially fulfilled) promises from the 
Singapore government. In this regards, most managers unanimously gave the 
software transfer the symbolic ‘thumbs-up.’ (see Table 6.11)
T a b le  6.11: R e s p o n d e n t ’s  V iew s o n  SIP AC (n =64)
Aspect Percentage
Evaluation o f  SIPAC’s Operations Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied
Business license approval procedures 96 4 0
Transparency 90 10 0
Professionalism 85 15 0
Competence 75 25 0
Speed 75 15 10
Respondent’s Views o f  SIP AC Agree Neutral Disagree
Better than Singapore 25 25 50
Same as Singapore 40 40 20
Better than other parts of China 80 20 0
Worse than other parts of China 0 0 100
Source: Interview Data
Nearly all the companies were satisfied with SIPAC’s performance, especially 
in ‘business license approval’ procedures. On the average, it took an average
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of a fortnight for SIP AC to approve most projects, compared to an average of 
three months in other zones in China.
‘We are a Western multinational company. We operate entirely above 
board. We don’t like hidden costs and personal benefits in business.
We came on the basis that there would be a Singaporean system here. 
We can justify every single entry honestly in our account books.’ (EU 
5)
‘We chose to invest in the SIP because we have confidence in the 
Singapore-style management adopted by the Suzhou authorities. SIP 
has a pro-business environment.’ (C.F. Chai, Vice President of 
Littelfuse OVS (Suzhou) quoted in SEDB Press Release, 25 March 
1996)
‘SIPAC was fast, clear and efficient. When we had not supplied the 
correct information, or had some vague figures, they contacted us for 
requests for information. We took over a month for our application, but 
some of that was our own fault, not theirs.’ (SG 4)
‘SIPAC has performance targets it set itself, and it states on its 
application forms that it estimates that it will take between two and 
four weeks to process, upon receipt of all the forms and necessary 
documents. In reality, they got ours done in a week and a half. This was 
amazing, because we submitted all our papers from Singapore by post 
and we weren’t even physically here. I heard that when other branches 
were applying to other zones in China, they had to wine and dine 
officials as part of the process. We didn’t face anything like that. The 
license came back so quickly, that in fact, it was a minor cost to us 
because we couldn’t operate—our factory hadn’t been renovated yet— 
but had to begin paying license fees and those sorts of things. But 
better to have that, than being stuck in some red tape somewhere 
between here (Suzhou) and Beijing.’ (EU 17)
In November 1998, SIP AC made the unprecedented move of publishing 
‘performance vows.’ {Singapore Straits Times 10 Nov 1998) SIP AC 
announced that, for example, it would deal with emergencies within 24 hours 
(or within 72 hours for major breakdowns); respond to enquiries or answer 
correspondence within seven working days; and where matters required 
approval outside the authority of SEP AC, the agency would work with the 
relevant local departments to ensure the requisite approval is obtained within 
three working days in general or seven working days at the latest (ibid.). It was 
even reported that these ‘performance vows’ were designed ‘...to improve the 
investment environment further at the industrial park and to raise standards of
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service for domestic and foreign investors.’ (ibid.) Although such a gesture 
might appear symbolic, it was highlighted by the Chinese media as being the 
first of its kind. More importantly, even though other industrial estates might 
claim to be more efficient, with this publication of the performance vows,
SIP AC had institutionalized its service standards. Thus, it could theoretically 
be held against its words by dissatisfied tenants. Based on the research, most 
respondents from the companies included in the sample knew of this 
performance charter.
‘That they dare to state their duties so formally must put an awful 
amount of pressure on themselves. Imagine if they—for some reason— 
cannot deliver. I can just about imagine heads rolling. Come on, it is 
quite safe to say that nobody [companies] are going to read every letter 
of the law to SIP AC, but at least its there. They can’t fudge it later, or 
make up some rule as they go along. In the end, we benefit.’ (NA 5)
Most managers, when asked, credited this to the Singapore government’s 
influence. The ‘influence’ was a combination of the Software Transfer, the 
Singapore government’s presence and the closeness between CSSD and 
SIP AC. Another aspect that the companies reported satisfaction was SIPAC’s 
‘transparency.’ This was defined, by most companies, as an absence of ‘grey’ 
practices; instead, they were impressed by SIPAC’s adherence to ‘published’ 
procedures.
‘For every problem, there is a black and white solution sitting in their 
investment guidebook. These officials carry this guidebook everywhere 
they go, and refer to it like a bible. So whenever we ask questions, they 
flip it open and refer to it. Everything is above board. If the answer is 
not in that book, they will get back to us in writing. I think in the west, 
if bureaucrats carry the rules around, something is wrong. Over here, 
its a bonus!’ (NA 1)
The majority of managers interviewed felt that SIP AC officials were 
‘professional,’ in terms of being committed and competent at their duties. 
Ironically, when asked to elaborate on this ‘transparency’ and 
‘professionalism,’ most of the managers found it difficult to think of specific 
examples because they reported that everything proceeded mostly according to
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procedure and there was in fact no exceptional or outstanding aspect that stuck 
in their mind. But as one manager put it: ‘We prefer such dull but predictable 
transactions over uncertainties.’ (AS 2)
Therefore, from the perspective of the respondents, which included 
Singaporean and China officials and managers of companies in the park, the 
Software Transfer had achieved its objectives. The software transfer was 
effective for two main reasons: firstly, it had the backing of the Beijing 
government, and secondly the Singaporean institutions and practices did not 
seriously conflict with any pre-existing formal or informal practices. In 
addition, by operating as an autonomous authority in a relatively small area, 
the software transfer did not threaten the status quo elsewhere in the city6. 
Also, SIP AC bureaucrats had to justify their relatively high salaries (when 
compared to other Chinese bureaucrats); many employees probably were 
worried that if they performed poorly in administrative terms, they would be 
‘replaced.’ From the perspective of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state, having Chinese bureaucrats operating along the same ‘frequency’ was 
critical in order to reduce its own transaction and operational costs in Suzhou. 
By the end of 1996, SIP AC had emerged with flying colours, equally admired 
by the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state as well as by the 
executives of the transnational corporations located at the Park. Such 
efficiency and professionalism gave the Suzhou Industrial Park a distinctive 
competitive edge over other special economic zones in China.
6.4 GO VERNMENT- TO- GO VERNMENT COLLABORATION
‘Their [The Chinese and Singapore governments] co-operation and 
commitment in locating a world-class industrial park in Suzhou is a 
tremendous achievement and was very important to us in making the 
decision to locate our new factory here.’ (W. Russell Morcom, VP and 
GM, Harris Semiconductor Products Division, quoted in Singapore 
Investment News, 1 May 1996)
Another frequently cited reason that influenced industrial transnational 
corporations’ choice for locating in the Suzhou Industrial Park was the 
‘govemment-to-govemment’ collaboration. As discussed in the previous
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chapter, this collaboration was meant to enhance the credibility of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park.
When respondents cited ‘the Singapore government’s presence’ and the 
‘govemment-to-govemment’ collaboration, they viewed this both as a means 
of maintaining the prestige level of the project, as well as a way by the 
Singapore government of ‘keeping an eye’ on the Chinese officials.
‘The actual on-site presence of the Singapore government made a 
difference to our decision making. You see, in the other Singaporean 
parks in India or Thailand, the Singapore government is not really there 
on a day-to-day basis. It shows up once in a while, and it comes for 
major events like anniversaries, ground-breaking for big companies 
and audits. But they are here [in Suzhou]. This means that if there’s a 
problem, it does not take them two or three days to hear about it.’ (EU
ii)
‘The presence of the Singapore government gave us assurance that this 
park would operate with rules of law. We believe that many other 
places might promise this, but here, we are confident that this would be 
carried out because the Singapore government are actually here 
monitoring the situation.’ (AS 5)
Beijing’s own strong presence was important to some respondents.
‘I think having Beijing put a lot of effort and support into this Park was 
a factor in our decision to come here. You see, Beijing cannot afford to 
let this place fail. They have their reputation to protect. Whereas in 
some locally run estate, Beijing might not have any idea what’s going 
on, and may not even bother. We need this sort of long-term 
guarantees. We’re here for the long haul.’ (NA 8)
Many respondents stated they did not base their locational decisions solely on 
the ‘govemment-to-govemment’ collaboration. Most respondents reported that 
the close relationship between the two governments had more advantages than 
disadvantages. The most commonly cited advantage was that the collaboration 
increased the park’s credibility, in turn improving the park’s viability (long 
term future) and operational efficiency. Several respondents cited that because 
the Suzhou Industrial Park was high on the China government’s agenda 
despite its relatively small size, it meant that the prestige level of the park must 
correspondingly be high.
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‘Remember, China is a world superpower, and therefore it has 
superpower issue to deal with. Yet it appears to have given the SIP a 
lot of priority.’ (NA 3)
‘To get any concessions out of China government is a major coup. You 
see the WTO negotiations, and the NAFTA thing with the Americans. 
China never gives anything away. And they simply do not negotiate 
over things like Hong Kong, Macau and of course Taiwan. But look 
what the Singapore government got out of this. The SIP gets SEZ 
status, placing it as one of the most important sites in China. And then 
all these privileges. This made the SIP very prestigious in China, which 
only benefited investors.’ (NA 2)
‘At the time (1994-1996), we were monitoring the relationship between 
the Singapore and China government. We saw that the relationship was 
rock solid, perhaps based on the fact that here were two Asian 
governments with a lot in common; culture, ideas, business practices 
and so on. Then we saw the agreements signed and development work 
started, all going very smoothly. Then we saw the software transfer 
supported by both sides. Also very smooth. So we decided that this 
place was for us.’ (AS 2)
‘I think the relationship between Singapore and Beijing is very good. 
The leaders seem very friendly and understanding with each other. I 
think that’s important. And of course, there was the incentive that if 
this place succeeded, both sides would benefit. Our company felt 
secure under this umbrella.’ (EU 6)
Finally, another regularly cited advantage was that the govemment-to- 
govemment collaboration could enhance operational smoothness at the park.
‘If there are operational problems, such as tax problems or legal 
obstacles, we believe that by having top level support at this park, we 
can get these sorted out faster and more efficiently. For example, we 
complained about one particular tax item, where we felt we were being 
taxed twice. When we brought this up with the park authorities, within 
days Beijing had a response. Its very important to have a direct line 
both to Singapore and to Beijing. And it is also very important that the 
line between those two is also good.’ (SG 12)
However, this research found that the ‘govemment-to-govemment’ 
collaboration was also viewed by some respondents to have some 
disadvantages. One respondent said that having such high profile backing 
could potentially bring some negative effects, mainly in the sphere of ‘control.’ 
He suggested that the China government might not take too kindly to
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Singapore’s orders, especially when the relative size and the power of the two 
governments are taken into consideration.
‘A good long-term joint-venture requires the relationship between the 
partners to be squabble-free. Squabbles lead to bad relationships, and 
subsequently bad business performance. These two governments want 
to make this place the best in China, they have remain committed to 
fully supporting it, through thick and thin.’ (NA 1)
Therefore, because of the economic complementarity of the project, both the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state and the China government— 
more specifically the top leadership in Beijing—were keen to improve their 
mutual embeddedness. Such embeddedness or closeness was important to the 
companies located at the Park, as strong ‘govemment-to-govemment’ 
relationships did increase the credibility of the park, in turn acting as an 
incentive to encourage companies to locate. It could be concluded that during 
this period, the embeddedness between the two governments had contributed 
to enhancing the competitiveness of the Suzhou Industrial Park vis-a-vis other 
industrial estates in China.
6.5 K e e p in g  C u st o m e r s  S a  t is f ie d
‘One good word from the investors is worth 10 good words from us,’ 
(Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in Singapore Business Times 11 Sep 96)
Another strategy that the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state utilized 
to enhance the Suzhou Industrial Park’s competitive advantage was to achieve 
embeddedness with tenants. Such embeddedness would improve their 
economic, political and social relationships, which might in turn lead to 
positive referrals from the existing tenants. The underlying rationale was that if 
these tenants were ‘satisfied’ with the Park, ‘the good word’ would get around 
the business community and potentially attract additional investors. Positive 
referrals firstly function as accurate information from reliable sources. In this 
case, accurate information becomes a highly valuable commodity that had the 
real impact of reducing uncertainty and risk (see Lewegie 1999). Secondly, 
positive referrals of the SIP improved its credibility. To examine whether
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tenants were ‘satisfied’ with their tenancy at the SIP, respondents were asked 
to list and rank all the reasons why their company was satisfied (or 
dissatisfied) about their tenancy at the Suzhou Industrial Park. This would also 
give an indication of whether these companies had their initial expectations 
realized after starting operations at the Park. Additional probes were prepared 
to inquire whether these respondents had offered referrals to other potential 
investors.
The research found that three aspects were commonly cited as being 
‘satisfactory’: Singapore system, SIPAC’s performance, and the quality 
infrastructure (see Table 6.12).
Ta b l e  6.12: ‘Sa t isf a c t io n ’ In d e x (n =64)
Aspect Response (%) Ranked First (%)
Singapore Government 50 10
Singapore System 100 10
SIPAC 100 10
Infrastructure 75 20
Human Resources 10 5
Business 50 25
Costs 10 0
Source: Interview Data
The data indicated that the ‘Singapore [operating] system’ was the most 
‘satisfactory’ aspect.
‘We’ve been here over two years now, and by and large, you can say 
this place resembles Singapore more than China, especially in terms of 
the rules and the laws, and the management of the park. We didn’t 
actually believe that this was possible in China. We thought that maybe 
the Singapore government could implement 50 percent of their system 
here, which is a pretty good achievement already. Instead, I would say 
that it probably achieved 80 percent and above.’ (NA 3)
‘I would say that a Singapore system was one where the administrators 
were pro-business, efficient and predictable. These are the most 
important. By saying that this area is pro-business, the administrators 
treat us as important clients, look after our welfare, and do whatever it 
takes to help us in our operations. This park is efficient because, just 
like in Singapore, every action has a response time. For example, this 
request has a fixed three-day response time, or queries have a two-hour 
response time. Very good. And predictability is the most successful; I
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mean we have very few surprises over here. Rules, tax rates or 
conservancy charges don’t change. Well, they did change, but we were 
given six months prior notice!’ (AS 1)
‘The Singapore system gave our company a solid foundation for 
coming to China. This is our first venture in China, and without the 
system, we would have probably incurred much higher costs to secure a 
local Chinese partner, learn their system and then try to build our own 
factory. We didn’t have to do any of these, and because we’ve been in 
Singapore for 10 years, coming here, we know what to expect, how 
things are done.’ (AS 2)
On the aspect of ‘service,’ many respondents were satisfied with the assistance 
provided by both CSSD and SIP AC during the businesses’ ‘start-up’ phase and 
the ‘after-sales’ service. Some respondents also identified the willingness of 
CSSD and Xinsu to try to solve problems, receive feedback and criticism as 
being ‘satisfactory.’ Several respondents also said that CSSD’s willingness to 
act on behalf of the tenants under certain circumstances, especially when 
having to clarify certain legal or financial policies, was very helpful.
‘We have 12 other plants in China. This was number 13. Lucky or 
unlucky number? Well, this plant took six weeks for the business 
license to be approved, and three months renovation to the ready-built 
factory. From the day headquarters approved this plant until the day we 
ran our first line, it was six months. The other 12 plants took an 
average of one year to start up. On the one hand, you can say we are a 
lot more experienced about doing things in China, after all, we’ve filled 
that business application form many times. Personally, I’ve filled it up 
three times [started-up three other factories]. But the process here was 
by far the smoothest and easiest. The CSSD and SEP AC officials were 
very efficient and helpful.’ (NA4)
If tenants were generally satisfied with the Singapore system, the service and 
SIP AC, and the infrastructure, it was therefore rather surprising to find that 
only half the respondents were satisfied with the Singapore government. This 
could be attributed to the research being conducted immediately after the 
events of June and July 1999, when the Singapore government announced it 
was disengaging from the project. Therefore, this aspect will be examined 
separately in a later section. It was also interesting to find that several 
respondents indicated that they were satisfied with their ‘business operations,’
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despite the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis that began in the latter half of 
19977.
However, several others were dissatisfied with the Park’s costs 
structures (only 10 percent voluntarily said that they were satisfied with the 
Park’s costs—see Table 6.12, and Table 6.13). A reason for this could be that 
these respondents would not generally or publicly report that business was 
poor, even if it actually was. This might be because as senior executives of the 
company, poor business performance might reflect their own individual 
performance. Therefore, when probed, several respondents modified their 
responses to state that ‘business operations were satisfactory...given the 
conditions.’ The conditions, more often than not, referred to the Asian 
Financial Crisis.
T a b le  6.13: ‘D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ’ I n d e x (n =64)
Aspect Response (%) Ranked First (%)
Business 50 50
Costs 90 50
Human Resources 10 0
Service 10 0
Laws (China) 10 0
Others 10 0
Source: Interview data
The particular aspect that was most commonly cited as causing 
‘dissatisfaction’ was the Suzhou Industrial Park’s relatively high per unit land 
cost. This affected companies that both bought the leasehold to the property as 
well as those that were sub-leasing Ready Built Factories. It was found that in 
1996, the land cost at the Suzhou Industrial Park was 25 to 40 percent higher 
than a similar plot across town at the Suzhou New District. Several 
respondents indicated that they felt that conservancy charges—such as water, 
gas and electricity charges—were also too high, especially compared to other 
industrial estates in China. When these respondents were asked if  they felt they 
were getting value for money from the park, all of them retreated by 
suggesting that they understood that their companies were paying for premium
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services. Indeed, these respondents said that they would not consider 
relocating to another industrial estate in China. The reasons given included the 
high relocation costs, the availability of a Singaporean operating system, and 
the assurance of quality infrastructure and utilities at the SIP. In this sense, 
these respondents simply wished that the costs were lower so that their 
operating margins would Took better.’ Other ‘costs’ that some respondents 
found to be ‘unsatisfactory’ included having to provide free meals to 
employees, high building or renovation costs (for their factories), and high 
expatriate living costs (bome by the company). Certain companies in particular 
sectors said that they were dissatisfied with the Human Resources for the 
town. For instance, one company said that getting factory operators was easy 
but finding supervisors and administrative managers was very difficult. 
Furthermore, there was ‘poaching’ practised by tenants within the park, where 
they would ‘steal’ employees from their neighbours by offering higher salaries 
and perks. This drove costs up as companies had to compete to acquire or 
retain staff, or had to recruit from outside the region.
The qualitative data from the interviews generally indicated that the 
tenants at the Suzhou Industrial Park were more satisfied than dissatisfied. In 
other words, the majority of these companies felt that their expectations for 
locating had been generally met. Most companies were ‘willing to pay the 
(financial) premium’ to be located in the Suzhou Industrial Park. It was found 
that the CSSD’s marketing department was aware of that most companies were 
generally satisfied being located in the estate and attempted to take advantage 
of this.
‘One of our most effective marketing tools is to use the referral system. 
For instance, when we get a prospective company visiting the park, we 
will try to set up a meeting with existing tenants. We will make all the 
appointments, and we will leave once the prospective client walks 
through the factory gates of the company he (or she) is visiting. We 
don’t tell the existing tenants what to say, we are very confident that 
we will get a positive referral. We don’t even pre-select the companies 
for the prospective client, we always ask them who they would like to 
visit. So in this light, a Japanese company might ask to see an existing
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Japanese tenant here, and so on. We are confident of our achievements 
at this park, and so we have nothing to hide.’ (SO 1)
Several respondents reported that they had given the Suzhou Industrial Park 
very positive referrals in the past. Many respondents had also actively 
encouraged related companies to locate in the Park, some of which came to 
fruition. Several respondents in the sample said that they themselves had 
solicited information from existing tenants before recommending establishing 
operations here.
‘Our company was interested in locating here as early as 1995. 
However, we could not be absolutely sure that the Park would work out 
in the way the two governments promised. So we chose to wait. And 
after this place got going, we came and visited several companies. They 
told us about the good and bad aspects, and we concluded that the good 
overwhelming outweighed the bad, which was high costs. So in that 
sense, we were influenced by referrals.’ (NA 10)
However, nearly all of them said that they would be more cautious about any 
advice they gave in the future. This drastic shift in attitude came about directly 
because of the Singapore government’s announcement of disengagement in the 
summer of 1999. This issue would form the focus of the next chapter. Yet, the 
sub-conclusion of this phase was that tenants had responded positively to the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s embedding mechanisms. When 
most respondents indicated that they were generally more satisfied than 
dissatisfied with their tenure at the Suzhou Industrial Park, this would indicate 
that its competitive advantages were mostly actualized. This should have been 
the springboard for further enhancing the competitive advantages of the 
Suzhou Industrial Park as a good referral from the existing tenants would 
generally be perceived in the business community as being highly credible. 
However, this did not take place, not least because of the upheavals that were 
about to hit the Suzhou Industrial Park in i997.
6.6 Co n c l u s io n
‘It has been a long two years since we started up, but we have now 
established the most important aspect of any China project: trust and
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understanding between partners.’ (Chan Soo Sen, Chief Executive of 
CSSD, quoted in Singapore Straits Times 15 Feb 1996)
During the first two years of the Suzhou Industrial Park’s operations, it was 
evident that it was successfully ‘taking off.’ In many ways, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategies to enhance the competitiveness 
of the Suzhou Industrial Park were effective. The project’s geographic, 
infrastructural and institutional competitive advantages proved to be effective 
in encouraging companies to locate at the Suzhou Industrial Park. The 
embedding mechanisms utilized on the China partners—the Beijing 
government and the local Chinese authority SIP AC—were also generally 
successful. The primary objective was to enhance the Park’s credibility. 
However, it was also evident that the embedding mechanisms had a secondary 
objective, which was to ensure governance and control over the project. Thus, 
there appeared to be congruence between the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s objectives and its outcomes. In this light, it could be 
argued that the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state was an effective 
entrepreneurial agent in the sense that it managed to successfully identify a 
particular niche in the global game of industrial production, and subsequently 
managed to devise and execute a strategy to capture this niche. The evidence 
suggests that the current tenants (industrial transnational corporations) were 
responding to the Singapore government’s supply of secondary factors of 
production. However, for an entrepreneur to be regarded as being completely 
successful, it would not only have to demonstrate entrepreneurial vision, but 
the ability to realize financial profitability, and also the ability to adapt to 
changes in the market. The latter two aspects will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
1 Data for the SND was gathered from a SND official (SND 1), while data for Pudong was 
from the Pudong New Area marketing brochure (Pudong New Area Information Office 1999: 
12).
2 See Table 7.1 (Chapter Seven) for the breakdown by business sector for all companies 
located at the Suzhou Industrial Park.
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3 56 companies agreed to participate in the research, offering at least one respondent.
However, in 8 o f these companies, the research managed to interview a second respondent. 
Thus, the sub-sample was a total o f 64 respondents.
4 The research included a sub-sample of eight officials from both the China and Singapore 
partners. A customized interview schedule was designed for each official (see Chapter Three 
on methodology).
5 This was published as Wang, J.R. et al., (1998) Explorations o f  the Initial Adaptations o f  
SIP’s experience, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 67pp. (In Mandarin.)
6 In fact, as will be shown in later chapters, ‘problems’ arose when the other areas began to 
leam from the software transfer, and began offering similar institutions.
7 The impact o f the Asian Financial Crisis on all the three main players at the Suzhou Industrial 
Park will be discussed in depth in the next chapter, which covers the period 1997 and 1999.
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C h a pt e r  Se v en  
Sh o c k s  to  t h e  Sy st e m
By early 1997, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategies to 
attract industrial transnational corporations to locate at the Suzhou Industrial 
Park had appeared to be successful. However, from the end of 1997 up until 
1999, the project was not only unable meet profit targets but also losing 
money. This chapter explains why things—from the perspective of the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state—started to go wrong, and how 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state utilized its competitive and 
collaborative strategies to deal with the situation. The two main threats to the 
project’s competitiveness were the Asian Financial Crisis, and the strong 
competition from another industrial estate in Suzhou.
7,1 Th e  A s i a n  F in a n c ia l  Cr is is
‘The Asian economic crisis, as it has developed since 1997, has had 
disastrous consequences at a number of levels. Most obviously, it has 
led to bankruptcies, collapsing currency values, falling gross domestic 
product (GDP) and dramatic declines in the living standards of swathes 
of working and middle class people in those economies that have been 
most deeply affected.’ (Henderson 1999: 2)
Although China itself was outside the orbit of the Crisis (see Naughton 1999), 
and Singapore only narrowly survived with its economy intact (see Chua 1999 
and Low 1999), the Crisis heavily affected the competitiveness of Suzhou 
Industrial Park vis-a-vis other industrial estates in China.
T h e  C r is is  h it s  t h e  C o m p a n ie s
The Asian Financial Crisis1 began as a ‘currency crisis’ but soon turned
into ‘a crisis of the productive economy’ (Wade 1998: 1535). Many East and
Southeast Asian economies were ‘dragged down’ by a ‘contagion’ effect
(Chua 1999: 782). As a result, their markets for manufactured products shrank
rapidly (Henderson 1999: 2). For many companies located at the Suzhou
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Industrial Park, with their production geared less towards the China market—
^  • * *the Park was very much an export-processing zone —the diminishing Asian 
and regional market was a significant worry. The first sign of ‘trouble’ could 
be seen when several of the companies operating at the Park were struggling to 
stay financially afloat. The four sectors in the global economy that were most 
heavily affected by the Crisis were the electronics, semiconductors, consumer 
goods and computer-related products (see Legewie 1999). At the Suzhou 
Industrial Park, the majority of companies located there were involved in these 
sectors (see Table 7.1).
Ta b l e  7.1: A ll  Co m pan ies L oca ted  In  Th e  SIP Ca  teg o rized  B y  B u siness 
Se c t o r s3 (1999)
Sector Percent
Electrical and Electronics 27
Chemical, Pharmaceutical & Healthcare 23
Precision Engineering 17
Supporting Industries 13
Food & Beverage 10
Others 10
Total 100
Source: CSSD (1999c)
This research found that only one company located at the Suzhou Industrial 
Park ‘went under’ in the last quarter of 1998 specifically because of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. This company was involved in producing ‘wafers’ in the 
semiconductors sector.
‘I was the first general manager for company x. I was posted to China 
to acquire the property from the park developers, and I ordered the 
building of the factory. I was about to hire around 200 workers for our 
factory in 1997 when suddenly the US HQ told me to halt all 
operations. The world semiconductor market had dried up, and our HQ 
projected that operations here [in Suzhou] was no longer viable. In the 
first quarter of 1998,1 was headhunted by company y, who were also 
planning to come to Suzhou. They were involved in a totally different 
sector, and wanted somebody with local experience. They knew I was 
not happy sitting in a factory with one security guard and one secretary. 
Some time in the middle of 1998, company x s US HQ and they told 
me that they had decided not to proceed with operations in Suzhou. I 
was ‘retrenched’ as a sign of goodwill, and free to join this new
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company. However, in return, I have assisted in trying to find a buyer 
for the idle factory. It is very difficult because it was custom built to 
suit our operations. And frankly, it would only suit semiconductor 
operations.’ (NA 3)4
Nearly three quarters of the managers in the sub-sample reported that the 
Asian Financial Crisis had affected their operations ‘negatively,’ while the rest 
reported ‘no effect.’ Of those who reported negative effects, two thirds blamed 
the weak global demand for their products, which was directly caused by the 
Crisis. Also despite the Asian Financial Crisis, none of them had laid off 
employees although 15 out of the 56 companies had lowered output levels. 
They were also not aware of other tenants retrenching any employees. 
However, many companies had hired fewer employees than they had originally 
planned.
‘Our company chose to proceed cautiously when we realized the Crisis 
was not going to be a short-term problem. Our masterplan involved 
establishing operations in January, and only hiring the bulk of our 
operators in May, when students in technical school graduated. We 
were looking for maybe 50 to 75 operators this year. But with the 
Crisis, head office in America told us to halve output, because they 
were worried about excess capacity. So we only hired 30 operators. 
Maybe this was a blessing in disguise, as I could then train them 
properly. 75 brand-new operators might have been a bit problematic, 
especially for our first venture in China, from a training and human 
resource point of view.’ (NA 11)
Some respondents justified this strategy by stating that their companies were 
still in the process of starting-up or ‘slowly growing;’ several said that they 
would recommend to their headquarters to recommence their original plans 
‘. . .after the Crisis had blown over.’ This tenants’ ‘sub-optimal’ level of 
production and employment had ‘disappointed’ the Chinese officials5. The 
Suzhou Industrial Park project was supposed to be a powerful engine that 
generated employment for the local area. Instead, the most optimistic figure 
that was offered by one official was 14,000 employees, which was 
significantly lower than the projected figure of around 40,000 for Phase One 
alone.
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‘I think the employment figure is an interesting issue. You see, we have 
almost full occupancy here in Phase One, in terms of number of 
companies taking up leases. But most companies were under-hiring 
workers. This was something we had a bit o f problem explaining to the 
higher authorities. High tenancy, low employment.’ (CO 1)
‘This was one area we couldn’t do anything about; we couldn’t 
pressure the companies to hire their original projected staff, we 
couldn’t expect them to utilize every square inch of their factory if  they 
didn’t want to. And anyway, employment wasn’t our jurisdiction.’ (SO 
2)
Therefore, one of the benefits for the China government to collaborate in the 
venture was not realized. Still, as will be discussed in the following section, 
the China partner was not in a position to act; it had to wait for the worst to 
pass.
It was also found that for several companies in the sample, the Suzhou 
Industrial Park’s relatively high operating costs caused problems.
‘We are going to have a hard time breaking even because of the high 
land costs here. As we paid quite high for this plot, it would take us a 
longer time to break even, even though we are actually operating at a 
pretty good capacity. So although we are producing well, and others are 
buying our products, it was always going to take a long time to break 
even. Our HQ knows that, and they are not pressing the short term 
panic button; they know we are alright, and if  the region picks up, we’ll 
be fine.’ (EU 1)
‘It doesn’t help that this place is so expensive. But what can we do?
We paid for a premium site, got premium infrastructure and services, 
and if it weren’t for the Crisis, I wouldn’t be complaining. We won’t 
move. We can’t move. That would be suicide. I don’t expect them to 
lower prices, and so the only thing we can do is to figure out a way we 
can lower costs on our part to keep going.’ (AS 3)
When asked to be specific, this respondent said that the charge for utilities 
(water, electricity and gas) and the monthly lease his company was paying to 
Xinsu6 was much higher than other sites in China. However, all the 
respondents—including the few that were ‘complaining’ about the higher costs 
of the Suzhou Industrial Park—stressed that they would not relocate.
Ironically, the main reasons offered were that none of the other estates could 
provide the level of quality infrastructure or industrial management service.
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Still, in mid-1999, the overall mood at the Suzhou Industrial Park was 
not completely pessimistic. There were several tenants that reported profits 
and ambitious expansion plans throughout the Crisis period. Of the 56 
companies that were part of this research, 11 of them had already begun 
expansion. Three companies had already moved into larger premises within 
the estate. Two of these companies moved from the smallest RBF unit to the 
largest unit, while the other company moved from a multi-storey RBF to larger 
stand-alone factories. Four other companies had taken additional units in the 
RBF estate. Four other companies built extensions or annexes to their existing 
plants. Interestingly, all 11 of these companies had established ‘very 
conservative or cautious’ initial operations, both because they were unsure of 
the actual operating costs at the Park and the ‘mood of the market for their 
products’. When operations proved to be profitable, they began expansion 
programmes, some as soon as within six months. Of the 11, five were in 
mechanical sectors (including motors and light industrial machinery) and three 
were in the medical-related sector (medical devices and pharmaceutical).
The Crisis had directly reduced the Suzhou Industrial Park’s 
competitiveness because it emphasized how much higher its basic operating 
costs were compared to other industrial estates in China. However, because of 
the high fixed costs, the lack of alternative locations, and the perceived 
temporary nature of the Crisis, nearly all of the tenants said they would not 
recommend relocating. However, existing tenants were not the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state’s main problem; instead, the most serious 
problem was finding new tenants.
T h e  C r is is  h it s  t h e  L a n d l o r d  a n d  B r o k e r
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s projections for the
Suzhou Industrial Park included a growth rate of about five to eight percent 
according to one Singaporean official based at the park. Growth—to the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state—was defined as number of new 
companies taking up lease at the Park; on the other hand, growth, to the China 
partner, referred to increasing amounts of foreign direct investment . This
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projection was already conservative, considering that China’s national 
economic growth, which was as high as 11 percent in the late 1980s, and 
averaged eight to 10 percent in the early 1990s8. Between 1994, when the 
project began operations, and 1997, when the Asian Financial Crisis took hold, 
most available units in the Park’s Phase One were mostly taken by industrial 
transnational corporations. However, by 1999, 10 percent of the units for 
Phase One were unsold. Although the 90 percent occupancy rate had actually 
met the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s expectations, the ‘type’ 
of investors was worrying:
‘We hoped that the multinationals would locate large scaled production 
here. Instead, by 1999, many of the companies could be categorized as 
being “small and medium” sized investors.’ (SO 1)
This was corroborated by the primary data gathered by this research as well, 
particularly in terms of land-space occupancy and employment numbers (see 
Table 7.2).
Ta b le  7.2: C o m pan ies In clu d ed  In  Th e  Re sea r c h , B a se d  On  S iz e  Of  
Fac to ry , N um ber  Of  E m p lo yee s  A n d  F ix e d  Capital  In v e st m e n t  (n =5 6).
Size Size of factory Number of 
Employees
Fixed Capital 
Investment
Small under 3000 sqm 22 under 20 13 under US$10m 10
Medium 3000-5000 sqm 24 20-50 30 US$10-30m 31
Large 5000-10,000 sqm 5 50-100 6 US$30-50m 10
Very Large over 10,000 sqm 5 over 100 7 over US$50m 5
Total 56 56 56
Source: Interview data
Of the 20 other companies located in the Suzhou Industrial Park that were not 
part of the research’s sample, only four occupied large or very large premises. 
As the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s main financial profits 
would have come from the value-added after the sale of industrial property in 
this park. By 1999, it was clear that the project was not achieving its goals. 
The income from the property sales was much lower than the investments in 
infrastructure and the cost of day-to-day operations. The additional income 
earned from management and service charges were small and considered
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supplementary. Although the majority of the ‘large’ and ‘very large’ industrial 
plots in Phase One had been already occupied, CSSD officials reported that 
there were almost no new clients seeking such large plots for future phases. 
Worse still, the overall demand for industrial property, based on ‘prospective 
inquiries,’ also fell significantly.
‘You can say that business at the office has been slow since 1997. The 
new companies that started between 1998 and 1999 were those that 
were signed up before or during the early months of the Crisis. Yes, we 
have had some business, but definitely not of the size and the scale we 
got in the early days, and mostly smaller than we hoped for. I would 
attribute the slowdown to the Crisis itself. You see, the type of 
multinationals that come here are mostly those that are in the process of 
expanding operations, and willing to shift some lower end operations 
here. Under the pressures of the Crisis, there was no logical reason for 
any company to be expanding.’ (SO 1)
This was part of the reason why Phase Two—originally slated for January 
1999—had not been launched on time9:
‘In the initial blueprint, which was itself based on the how Phase One 
was doing, we were supposed to start marketing Phase Two in late 
1997. In our line, we work on a two-year lag time, so we wanted to tie 
up some investors by mid-1998. This was to report that we had secured 
several investors at the official launch of Phase Two in 1999. But 1998 
was a real slow year, and 1999 was not much better. In fact, many of 
the prospective companies during that period consisted of such small 
investors that we could fit them into the unsold plots in Phase One.’
(SO 4)
In addition, most respondents from the managerial sub-sample reported that 
their companies had implemented ‘belt-tightening’ measures by mid-1999.
This meant that their expansion plans were placed on hold, or that plans were 
‘. . .revised to fit with the current environment.’ This meant that the companies 
that might have taken additional factory space at the Suzhou Industrial Park 
postponed the expansion plans, with a small handful reporting that the 
postponement was ‘indefinite.’ Unable to sell additional units, the Park’s 
profitability was severely weakened.
‘I was actually given the go-ahead to acquire additional premises for 
production in late 1997, early 1998. Right now, the plant only produces
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two out of a total out of four hundred components worldwide. HQ 
wanted to increase the number to six, but when the Crisis came, I was 
told to hold all activities at the current level. Had I gone ahead with the 
expansion, I probably would have acquired another floor in this block 
(RBF). Instead, we hesitated which was probably a good decision, if 
viewed from a worldwide sense.’ (EU 6)
Still, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state tried to improve 
conditions at the Park for the existing tenants by utilizing economic and social 
embedding mechanisms. This research found that SIP AC announced 
reductions in the mandatory contributions to the Provident Fund system at the 
beginning of 1998, effective April 1998. In effect, the employers’ contribution 
was reduced from 23 to 20 percent of the employees’ monthly salary. Although 
the Singaporean bureaucrats and officials refused to confirm that the decision 
emanated from the Singapore entrepreneurial elite, they were willing to 
concede that this decision came after ‘. . .consultation with all parties 
concerned.’ (SO 1) According to another official, this was a business-related 
decision that would help companies ‘.. .without affecting the welfare of 
workers.’ (CO l)10 In reality, this decision did affect employees. While it 
might appear that the employees’ take-home salary was not reduced, they were 
in effect getting less in net terms because the employer was contributing less to 
their provident fund savings. As such, the officials of the Suzhou Industrial 
Park were keen to stress this was not a ‘pay cut.’ Also, the three percent 
savings apparently meant a great deal to the employers. When asked, many 
respondents from the companies included in the sub-sample said that *.. .the 
measure was not critical, but no doubt helped.’ (NA 4)
This research managed to informally interview a small handful of 
employees of the companies, who were mainly working as factory operators, 
about this adjustment to the Provident Fund. The response from all of them 
was unanimous; they were unhappy but felt it was much better than losing the 
job altogether. Several were fairly confident that the initial rate would be 
restored after the Crisis. Some managers interviewed mentioned that they had 
heard that the Singapore government was negotiating with the China
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government for tax concessions to specifically ride out the Crisis. When asked, 
all the officials and bureaucrats interviewed denied knowledge of this issue11. 
Still, even if this request was unsuccessful, the ‘gesture* and the Provident 
Fund reduction was viewed by tenants that still attempting to be ‘pro- 
business,* in turn improving its credibility with industrial transnational 
corporations.
The Chinese partner—SIP AC—also was keen to maintain its 
developing relationship with the transnational corporations as well. This could 
be explained by SIPAC’s fear that the affected companies might pack up and 
leave, taking away a large number of jobs. Therefore, by not pressuring the 
companies to meet their original employment targets immediately, they were 
hoping that once the global economy picked up, the companies would 
reciprocate. To these officials, the best-case scenario was if the companies 
eventually begin employing large numbers of people, or expanding their 
production. As one official said:
‘If they do badly, we do badly, there’s no point in kicking when they
are down. We only hope they remember what we did for them, and
repay us when times are better.’ (CO 1)
The case of the Asian Financial Crisis demonstrated how the external 
environment—processes emanating from outside the project—affected the 
competitiveness of the Suzhou Industrial Park. With the reduced global 
demand for products, many companies at the Park had to scale down 
operations and very few were planning to expand. At a wider level, with the 
Crisis negatively affecting many industrial transnational corporations, their 
motivation to expand operations was very low. Thus, there were not only 
fewer prospective companies coming to the Suzhou Industrial Park, 
expansionist investments in China fell as well. This diminished demand for 
industrial property at the Suzhou Industrial Park meant the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state was unable to ‘sell’ new industrial units. As 
a direct consequence, the project’s profitability fell. Many respondents in the 
managerial sub-sample said that the Singapore government would have
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accepted that the Park’s weak financial showing was a result of the Crisis; 
however these respondents were sure that what really got under the 
government’s skin was the ‘problem’ brewing across Suzhou.
7.2 S ib l in g  R iv a l r y
T h e  Su z h o u  N e w  D is t r ic t
The growth and development of the Suzhou New District (SND) was
identified by most managers interviewed as the main factor that led to the
deterioration of the relationship between the Singapore government and the
China government. This section explains how the SND, which was run by the
local Suzhou authorities, became a very effective competitor in the global
1
game of industrial production . The Suzhou New District was located to the 
west of Suzhou13. It was developed in the late 1980s when the Suzhou 
Municipal Authority was ordered by Beijing to relocate industrial operations 
out of Suzhou in order to preserve historically important monuments, rivers, 
canals, parks and gardens14. This was also to improve the bid in the early 
1990s by Beijing and the local Suzhou authorities sought to get UNESCO 
recognition as a ‘World Heritage Site15.’ Although much of the earlier 
industrial activity in the city was ‘light’—textiles, consumer goods and 
foodstuff production—they were contributing to the pollution in the canals, 
which in turn was threatening the historic buildings and many gardens. In 
1992, the SND was granted the ‘economic development zone’ status, which 
permitted the location of foreign businesses. In 1994, it was conferred the 
‘High-Tech Zone’ status, which not only allowed foreign capital, but also had 
certain additional tax perks for investors that qualified as ‘high tech’ 
companies16.
By 1996, the SND was reporting high growth. In 1995, the number of 
Taiwan-invested firms reached 1,800 (Chinese Business Information Network 
6 Feb 1996). By 1998, it had attracted 101 ‘Hong Kong funded companies,’ 
accounting for 32 percent of the overseas-funded companies in the district
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{China Business Information Network 1 July 1998). Also, by that time, the 
SND had attracted many ‘Fortune 50017 companies’:
‘Over 340 foreign funded enterprises from 30 countries, including 
MNCs, such as DuPont, Motorola, Siemens, Philips, Sony, Panasonic, 
Mitsubishi, are investing in SND. 13 of the World Top 100 and 5 of the 
World Top 5 are investing here. There are 12 projects whose total 
investment is no less than US$100 million each.’ (SND 1999: 5)
The utilization of the Suzhou New District as a vehicle of economic growth by 
the Suzhou Municipal Authority can be explained by its motivations, resources 
and strategies. The motivations were the same faced by nearly every local 
authority in China. By the mid-1990s, local and provincial authorities were 
faced with many new (re-) entrants to the job market as a result of the on-going 
‘efficiency and rationalization’ programme undertaken by large Chinese state- 
owned enterprises (see Nolan and Wang 1999). With local authorities unable 
to create many new jobs on their own, the solution—one that was both 
favoured by local authorities and Beijing—was to look to the potential jobs 
that transnational corporations could generate (see Yang 1997 and Huang 
1998). The SND’s first foray into the global game of industrial production was 
also to capture a niche market. Like other Chinese Special Economic Zones, 
the Suzhou Municipal Authority had focused on attracting Taiwanese and 
Hong Kong industrial investors to take advantage of their overseas Chinese 
connections, which turned out to be highly successful. However, by 1998, the 
SND turned to attracting the location of larger transnational corporations. This 
was not entirely unexpected as the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state was probably realistic enough to accept that some degree of competition 
was inevitable. For example, the Singaporean and Chinese bureaucrats and 
officials included in the research often spoke of competing with other 
industrial estates for investments, particularly the five official Special 
Economic Zones and Pudong in Shanghai. However, it was the Suzhou New 
District’s particular manner of competing that was the source of the problems 
in Suzhou.
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Although this research did not cover companies located at the SND, it 
asked respondents from the SIP about the ‘other’ park. This turned out to be 
fruitful as many managers of companies in the SIP had good information about 
the SND. Most managers constantly gathered information about competitors, 
collaborators or cohorts as a basic norm of business operations. During the 
fieldwork, an opportunity was also taken to visit the SND Administration 
where one official was interviewed. Also, I was given a tour of the park, and 
was shown an audio-visual presentation that was designed for marketing 
purposes. In addition, the SND official also provided the research with 
brochures and publicly available documents.
U n f a ir  C o m p e t it io n ?
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state was particularly upset
at two ‘tactics’ that the Suzhou New District Administrative Committee 
utilized to attract investors; the first was to ‘undercut industrial property 
prices,’ and the second, was a ‘smear campaign.’ According to the leader of 
the Singapore entrepreneurial elite Lee Kuan Yew, the Suzhou authorities were 
playing ‘bureaucratic shenanigans.’ {International Herald Tribune 21 March 
1998) Both strategies were designed by SND AC to ‘...steal potential 
investors.’ (SO 1) This research found that the SND had significantly lower 
industrial property prices. It turned out that between 1996 and 1999, the SND’s 
per unit prices were 25 to 40 per cent lower than comparable units over at the 
SIP18.
‘They [SND AC] could even afford to give away the land free if they 
wanted to. The Singaporean developers, on the other hand, had to first 
buy it from SIP AC, then add on their infrastructure costs, and then their 
all-important profit-margin, and then re-sell this to us. We even heard 
that SND was willing to offer almost zero per unit costs if companies 
were going to take a 25 year lease. You know why? They can sit and 
collect tax revenues, and more importantly for them, create jobs. After 
all, that’s what they have set out to do. Over here, Singaporeans want 
profit, not jobs or technology transfer or whatever. And that only 
comes from selling the property at a premium.’ (NA 14)
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The second tactic—the so-called ‘smear campaign’— apparently arose from 
one specific incident. In early 1997, the vice-mayor of Suzhou went to 
Germany both in his political capacity, and as the Chairman of SND 
Administration trying to secure foreign investments for his own park. When 
meeting with business leaders of many enterprises in Hamburg, as a strategy to 
attract investment to the Suzhou New District, he was reported to have openly 
‘discredited’ the Suzhou Industrial Park.
‘He told us that Beijing did not support the Suzhou Industrial Park in 
any special way. He said that the President and the Premier supported 
every industrial estate in the same way, and no one had preferential 
treatment. Therefore, the Suzhou Industrial Park was nothing special. 
Coming to the Suzhou New District or the Suzhou Industrial Park or 
any other area would be just the same. In fact, the Suzhou New District 
had even better tax incentives than many other parks, including the 
Suzhou Industrial Park.’ (HG19)
Germany’s Honorary Consul-General of the Consulate-General to the Republic 
of Singapore immediately reported this to the Singapore government, asking 
for clarification. Upon receiving this news, the Singapore entrepreneurial elite 
was reportedly ‘...incensed.’ (SO 2) Furthermore, as will be discussed in the 
next section, news of this incident and the Park’s poor financial performance 
broke in Singapore, giving the political opposition parties an opportunity to 
gain some political capital. Although there had been ‘rumblings’ that the 
SNDAC’s marketing department was playing dirty to steal investors, this 
incident in Hamburg was ‘concrete proof.’ (SO 1) Ultimately, this was the 
straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back.
When asked to comment on this incident, the respondent from the 
Suzhou New District Administrative Committee said:
‘Certain mistakes had been made by certain people, especially those 
who have political rather than business capacity. But one small incident 
was really blown out of proportion. I mean, the SND and the SIP are 
like brothers, both bom from the same mother: Suzhou. And as you 
know, sometimes brothers fight. But in the end, things will always 
work out between them. You know what people say about the two 
estates? They are the two wings of one bird; the bird is Suzhou city, 
and Suzhou will only fly when both wings flap together.’ (SND 1)
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The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state could not claim to be 
completely unaware of the Suzhou New District. The Suzhou Municipal 
Authorities offered the Singapore elite the option of developing the Suzhou 
Industrial Park either inside or beside the New District in 1992. The offer was 
turned down because the Singapore party felt that ‘...it preferred a clean slate 
rather than an already built-up area to work from.’ (SO 3) Thus when the elite 
chose to build the Suzhou Industrial Park on the other side of town in 1994, it 
dismissed the Suzhou New District as a serious competitor for investors in the 
global game of industrial production. According to the Singapore officials, 
between 1994 and 1996, they perceived that there would be a tacit ‘division of 
labour in Suzhou between the two parks.’ The ‘up-market’ companies—such 
as high technology transnational corporations that needed high quality 
infrastructure—would go to the SIP, while the ‘down-market’ companies— 
such as low value-added assembly and manufacturing, mostly indigenous 
Chinese companies or overseas Chinese joint ventures (from Hong Kong or 
Taiwan)—would go to SND.
‘Its like buying a car you see. Some people would pay for a Mercedes 
Benz [premium car], while others would only pay for a Lada [budget 
car]. In the end, its still four wheels to bring you around, but different 
people will want different things from each car. And I think its good to 
have differentiation of products, and this gives the consumer choice!’ 
(SO 520)
Apparently, no one body or agency co-ordinated this ‘distribution.’ Instead, 
Singaporean officials argued that ‘market forces simply directed where the 
various companies would locate.’ (SO 2) In other words, companies had to 
decide whether to pay the higher ‘premiums’ to locate at the SIP to benefit 
from the infrastructure and the administrative system, or choose the low cost 
but no-frills option of the SND. Before the Asian Financial Crisis, the SND 
Administration was probably willing to accept the role of servicing lower- 
value added transnational corporations. However, after 1997, the situation was 
different. The Singapore entrepreneurial elite had misjudged several important 
elements. Firstly, it underestimated the learning capabilities of the SND,
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assuming that the SND would always be only interested in ‘picking up scraps 
that fell off the SIP’s table.’ (SO 3) Secondly, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state was ‘unable’ to respond to changing external 
circumstances, including the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. These 
elements combined to reduce the SIP’s competitiveness, and in relative terms, 
make the SND appear more competitive.
The Suzhou New District Administrative Committee’s learning 
capabilities were very evident. The Suzhou New District had many features 
that strongly resembled the Suzhou Industrial Park’s strongest competitive 
advantages, particularly administrative efficiency and creating a ‘pro-business’ 
environment. For example, the SND prospectus highlights to potential 
investors that it is operates under the principle of the ‘small government’ and 
that ‘priority is always given to investors.’ (SND 1999: 1) Small government 
was defined by the SND as:
‘The district is concentrating its efforts on creating a new governmental 
structure and corresponding rules and regulations under the principle of 
small government. With the aim to serve, administrate, guide and co­
ordinate the government’s authority mainly covers planning, land, 
finance, taxation, project approval, industry and commerce, in addition 
to providing economic administration similar to that of a municipal 
government.’ (ibid.)
SND AC thus claimed to give the SND the same ‘one-stop’ capability as the 
SIP. This was achieved not by reducing the size of the local state bureaucracy, 
and by making each office in the administration more efficient and capable. 
Instead, SND AC simply created another office to specifically ‘do the running 
around for the investor.’ (SND 1) This office was staffed by young, highly 
well-educated bureaucrats who often spoke European or Japanese languages 
but were familiar with the Chinese bureaucratic system. This ultimately meant 
that while the paperwork had to go through the local state bureaucracy, the 
investors themselves did not have to deal with the bureaucracy. Based on
91information gathered from other scholars in the field , such a pro-active 
administrative office did not exist in the many other economic development
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zones in China. Instead, even the established zones were reported to be still 
rife with inefficiency, corruption and red-tape. Foreign investors had earlier 
put up with these practices by rationalizing that the savings made in terms of 
factor costs outweighed the obstacles brought about by dealing with the 
Chinese bureaucracy (Park 1997: 35-6). In this case, the Suzhou New District 
had learnt from the Suzhou Industrial Park, made the adaptations quickly and 
reaped the benefits. The SND’s learning capabilities were also evident in the 
marketing brochures and other use of media, such as the audio-visual 
presentation, that were specifically aimed at attracting foreign investors. Also, 
unlike many other economic development zones, the SND made expatriate 
housing22 and the existence of ready-built factories crucial components of their 
marketing strategy. In simple terms, the SND had looked over the fence, 
figured out what made the SIP attractive to industrial transnational 
corporations, and reproduced it. To cap it off, as discussed earlier, the SND 
could offer these competitive advantages at a lower price.
As an entrepreneurial agent, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s showed that it was unable to react to changing external 
conditions. By late 1997, it had no contingency plans for the Asian Financial 
Crisis. The Crisis had caused a slowdown of transnational corporations’ 
demand for industrial property in China. This meant that with fewer potential 
foreign investors, the competition from other zones and industrial estates for 
these investors intensified significantly. Even more significantly, many of the 
prospective investors appeared more concerned about the costs rather than 
quality of the factors of production. In this new environment, the Suzhou New 
District had emerged as a strong player in the China segment of the global 
game of industrial production. It cornered a particular niche for being a ‘good’ 
site for industrial location that was not one of the five nationally-designated 
Special Economic Zones, not in the core cities of Beijing or Shanghai, and of 
course, not run by Singaporeans. It appeared to be well-run, efficient and 
effective as its competitive advantage. More importantly, it could offer 
industrial transnational corporations much lower production costs.
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The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s Suzhou Industrial 
Park, on the other hand, was unable (or unwilling) to slash production costs to 
compete.
‘We faced a dilemma. Should we lower the property prices to match 
the other estates in China? If we did, we would be operating at a loss. 
After all, we acquired the land from the China government in a 
financial transaction and at almost market prices at the time. So you 
could say that there was already a base cost for us. And then we put in 
the value-added, which is the infrastructure, communications and so 
on. Now selling the properties at a loss might not sound like such a 
crazy idea; after all, if we managed to get tenants, then we might make 
it back from management or service charges. But that would be in the 
long term. However, the real reason why we didn’t slash is that we 
didn’t want our park to resemble the others. We couldn’t allow 
investors to think that if  our costs were the same as the others, then 
what they would be getting [in terms of infrastructure and so on] would 
be the same as the others. The SIP is a premium site, so we made a 
decision to stick by our prices. And anyway, it wasn’t a pure matter of 
mathematics. There was a lot else involved, as you well know.’ (SO 2)
This research attempted to ascertain exactly how many companies had either 
been lured away from the SIP to the SND, or had defected to the SND from the 
SIP. The SIP and SND officials were asked, along with the research’s 
managerial sub-sample. The research found that no companies had been lured 
away or had ‘defected’ to the SND23. Many respondents did say that they 
understood why some transnational corporations would be impressed with the 
SND—for the administration’s ‘professionalism’ and more importantly with 
its cost structures’—and they added that they would not hesitate to recommend 
it to other companies. Yet, they would not however recommend their own 
company to move across town, for reasons such as requiring the SIP’s quality 
infrastructure, and high relocation costs.
‘From what I see, many of the multinationals over at the SND located 
there because (1), they did not need the Singapore connection, and (2) 
they were much more cost conscious than us. Over at the SND, many 
of the multinationals there are joint-ventures, unlike over here. As a 
JV, they already have means to deal with the Chinese, by using their 
local partner! For the others that are wholly foreign owned enterprises, 
they very clearly use the local, Hong Kong or Taiwanese connection, 
installing local [ethnic Chinese/Chinese national] managers very
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quickly. So I would conclude that we are here and want to stay here, 
because we need the Singapore connection. If not the Singapore 
government directly, then the Singapore system that our company is 
used to.’ (NA 26)
7.3 A r r o w s  F l y
‘Right now, the energy is divided between two industrial estates. That’s 
wasting time, energy and causing too much friction.’ (Lee Kuan Yew, 
quoted in Singapore Business Times 5 Dec 1997)
The emergence of the Suzhou New District created problems for the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state. In December 1997, Lee arrived in Suzhou 
for what should have been a routine visit. Instead, he began berating officials 
in Suzhou (‘SM Lee airs frustrations over Suzhou project,’ Singapore Business 
Times 5 Dec 1997). Even though there were rumours of problems at the 
Park—mainly information filtered back to Singapore through the fairly large 
body of Singaporeans who were working as expatriates in Suzhou—Lee’s 
offensive officially signalled that all was not well at the Suzhou Industrial 
Park.
F r u s t r a t io n s
Due to the high profile of the Suzhou Industrial Park in Singapore 
itself, largely due to the support the pro-government media offered, the 
public’s expectations of its success and profitability were raised during the 
‘take-off phase between 1994 and 1996. However, by late 1997, when news 
that the Park’s growth was distinctively much slower filtered back to 
Singapore, the opposition political parties soon began questioning the wisdom 
of the state’s China investments24. In 1997, even though there were only three 
members of parliament from opposition political parties, they managed to 
force the ruling regime’s hand by tabling questions in parliament about the so- 
called ‘Suzhou fiasco.’ At the beginning of 1998, almost three year after the 
Park’s ground breaking ceremony, another key member of the Singapore 
entrepreneurial elite, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (Lee Kuan 
Yew’s eldest son), was forced on the defensive when opposition members of
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parliament wanted to know more about the above-mentioned ‘Hamburg’ 
incident:
‘We were astonished to learn that the vice-mayor of Suzhou had gone 
to Hamburg, Germany and told the special commissioner who is 
responsible for German-Singapore-China joint projects: “You should 
not go in with Singapore, come in alone, we don’t need Singapore. 
President Jiang Zemin does not support Suzhou Industrial Park.” ’ 
{Singapore Business Times 15 Jan 1998)
During this session of parliament, members of the Singapore entrepreneurial 
elite also had to answer questions by the opposition members of parliament on 
whether the SIP was losing money and whether the China government had 
abandoned the project. The objective of this line of questioning was not so 
much for the desire to get an accurate picture of events in Suzhou but rather an 
opportunity for the often-subdued opposition members of parliament to earn 
some political capital by taking shots at the regime. In reply to a specific 
question about how much money had been spent at the SIP, the Singapore 
Business Times reported:
‘He [Lee Hsien Loong] said the developer, China Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park Development Company (CSSD), believes that the four- 
year old SIP can become profitable in the medium term, that is, five to 
six years from the start. He disclosed that Singapore statutory boards 
and government-linked companies have so far invested some US$65.5 
million (S$l 14 million) in equity and loans while other Singapore- 
registered companies have put in US$65.5 million. Non-Singaporean 
multinationals which are partners of the Singapore consortium, 
Singapore Suzhou Township Development Private Ltd, have put in an 
additional US$24.22 million. To-date, the SIP has attracted 99 projects 
with investment commitments of US$2.7 billion, of which 80 are 
industrial projects worth US$2.1 billion. The average size of the 
projects at US$27 million each was the highest in China and 44 were 
already in production with another 22 under construction. {Singapore 
Business Times 15 Jan 1998)
In the same session, Lee Hsien Loong disclosed that the Park’s progress was 
being affected by the ‘aggressive promotion’ of the Suzhou New District. He 
assured parliament that the problems were being dealt with at the highest 
levels, national as well as municipal.
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‘We are in contact with them (the Chinese authorities). We have not 
negotiated the issues in further detail. We are now studying the 
problem in order to have a considered, mature response which we will 
convey to the Chinese side as our view of how to deal with this 
problem and we expect the Chinese side to study that and give us their 
response in due course.’ {Singapore Business Times 15 Jan 1998)
Even more perplexing—from the perspective of the elite at the time—was why 
Beijing was unable to ‘control’ a relatively small local government. At the top- 
level govemment-to-govemment relationship, the objectives and motivations 
were fairly clear: both governments would give their full economic, social and 
political backing to the Suzhou Industrial Park. At the local or municipal level, 
it was quite evident that the Suzhou Municipal Authority, which was in charge 
of the Suzhou New District Administrative Committee, did not share the same 
objectives and motivations with the top leadership in Beijing. For instance, 
Beijing was willing to give its full backing to the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s project, mainly because it would directly benefit from 
this, both economically and diplomatically. However, the priorities of the 
Suzhou Municipal Authorities were rather different; it did not have to concern 
itself with forging strong diplomatic ties with the Singapore government, nor 
did it feel that it directly benefited from the presence of the Suzhou Industrial 
Park. This negatively affected the collaboration between the sub-groups within 
the Chinese partner. This would in turn weaken the party’s collaboration with 
other partners. In the words of a Singaporean official: ‘Its no good if the 
people upstairs agree if those downstairs cannot agree.’ (SO 1)
T h e  R e a l  G u l f
As discussed in the theoretical review in Chapter One, collaboration is 
a multifaceted system of interactions. Critical to the outcome of collaboration 
include the complementarity of the project, the levels of embeddedness (and 
autonomy), not just between the two parties, but within each party as well. In 
the case of the Suzhou project, the case of the Suzhou New District’s 
emergence could be explained by the Suzhou Municipal Authority’s high 
degree of autonomy from the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state.
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This can be understood through examining the motivations, resources and 
strategies of the Suzhou Municipal Authority with regards to the Suzhou 
Industrial Park. The Suzhou Municipal Authority had little motivation to see 
the Suzhou Industrial Park succeed economically, especially not at the expense 
of its own Suzhou New District. To the Suzhou Municipal Authority, the 
Suzhou Industrial Park only brought in indirect benefits. Tax revenues were 
remitted by SIP AC directly to Beijing, by-passing downtown Suzhou. Thus, 
the SMA could realistically claim that the SIP only created employment for the 
local population. Yet, these benefits—however important—were indirect. 
Furthermore, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state had not fostered 
any social relationships with Suzhou. In fact, by rejecting the Municipality’s 
offer to situate the industrial park in its New District back in 1992, the 
Singapore government probably marginalized the Municipality.
Between 1994 and 1996, the relationship between the main 
organizations in the SEP and the Suzhou Municipal Authorities was more 
‘business-like’ than social, as explained by a SIP AC official:
‘We do business with them [Suzhou government]. If we need anything 
from the Suzhou government, we pay for it. For example, we pay them 
for electricity, water and even the public bus services. We are not 
obliged to do anything for them, nor are we obligated. I think this is a 
good way of coexisting.’ (CO 2)
This meant, as far as the social dynamics between both sides, there was little 
reciprocity. An example offered by a local Suzhou academic researcher drove 
home this point rather clearly:
‘In summer 1997, Suzhou was hit by floods. The whole SIP was 
landfilled by three feet (0.9 metres), and therefore completely escaped 
flooding. However, downtown Suzhou and the SND were quite 
seriously affected by the floods, with problems such as factories unable 
to operate because workers could not get to work, or that the flood 
water made operating the machines impossible. From what I gathered, 
rather than offer sympathy or help to the SND, the SIP used this 
incident as a case to prove their superiority. Of course this upset the 
Suzhou Mayor and the SND. This only strengthened the Suzhou 
government’s perception that the SIP—and I mean both the
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Singaporeans and the Chinese officials administering the park—were
simply arrogant.’ (SA 1)
While this anecdote was only one observer’s interpretation, it illustrated the 
weak social relationship between the administrators of the two parks, and by 
extension, the relationship between the main organizations of the SIP and the 
Suzhou Municipal Authority. The Suzhou Municipal Authority and the SND 
Administration had no economic reasons or social motivation to support the 
Suzhou Industrial Park, which was for all intents and purposes, a competitor.
In this sense, the Suzhou Municipal Authority was hardly embedded to the 
Singapore entrepreneurial state; its high level of autonomy only served to 
strengthen its resolve to pursue on its own objectives and motivations.
This was no consolation to the key members of the Singapore 
entrepreneurial elite. During the first half of 1998, they regularly complained 
in public not only about the SMA’s ‘undercutting’ or ‘cloning’ but also about 
the ‘smearing’ strategies. The ‘outbursts’ were reported not just in Singapore 
but in several international newspapers and magazines as well25. In January 
1998, it was reported that Lee Kuan Yew took the opportunity of his visit to 
Beijing to raise his dissatisfaction with the Suzhou Industrial Park project with 
President Jiang Zemin. Lee was unhappy with ‘...the attitude of Suzhou 
authorities who were felt to be dividing their support between the SIP and a 
project of their own.’ {China Economic Review 23 Jan 1998) Lee was reported 
to have threatened to withdraw Singapore’s financial support for the project. In 
the same report, Jiang assured Lee that China was committed to the SIP and 
arranged for a ministerial meeting to take place in April 1998 in order to 
resolve the matter (ibid.). In the context of the Singapore entrepreneurial 
elite’s strategy, it was utilizing political and social mechanisms on the China 
partner. Lee had ‘called in’ his personal relationship with the top leaders in 
Beijing over this problem at the SIP.
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7,4 B e i j i n g  A c t s
It might appear incredible that the leader of a nation-state with a
population of around three million would have the ability to reprimand or
threaten the China government. More surprising then was that Beijing’s
response was swift and quick to give the Suzhou Municipal Authority the
metaphorical slap on the wrist.
P a c if ic a t io n
In March 1998, Chen Deming was installed as the new mayor of 
Suzhou26. His first statement with regards to the SIP-SND ‘rivalry’ was that 
the Suzhou Industrial Park was ‘the priorities of all priorities,’ (Singapore 
Straits Times 10 Mar 1998) repeating the phrase used by President Jiang in 
1995.
‘We will make it the most important project in the whole of Suzhou, 
because what is most important to the country is, of course, most 
important to Suzhou. We hope to ensure that it (SIP) would break even 
this year. After three years of profits, we will float it on the stock 
market. We will definitely follow Jiang’s principle which is to steam 
on resolutely ahead with this project. As Mr Jiang has said, there will 
be no backsliding, no failure, and we will co-operate to the end and 
work together for success.’ {Singapore Straits Times 10 Mar 1998)
It also emerged that in May 1998, Premier Zhu gave his personal backing for 
the Suzhou Industrial Park {Singapore Straits Times 29 May 1998). Thus, in 
the final quarter of 1998, the China government took several measures to 
highlight its support of the Suzhou Industrial Park. The People’s Daily— 
China’s main national newspaper—gave the Park front page coverage, 
reporting that the Suzhou Industrial Park had very quickly become the fourth 
largest zone in China for attracting foreign investments because of the 
successful of transfer of Singapore’s experience. It stated that the SIP’s 
administrative system was ‘streamlined, co-ordinated and highly efficient, 
requiring two-third fewer administrative staff compared to similar zones’ 
{People’s Daily 22 Oct 1998)27. In November 1998, the SIP was invited to 
participate in a China State Council exhibition in Beijing celebrating 20 years 
of foreign investment in China {Singapore Straits Times 27 Nov 1998). In the
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exhibition, the SIP was allocated a booth, alongside 46 other kiosks assigned 
to the country’s 21 provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities, 
five Special Economic Zones, three cities with sub-provincial status, with 
eight remaining kiosks assigned to 20 ministries and bureaus. In the report, 
being allocated such a booth ‘highlights the importance which the Chinese 
central government accords the project.’ (Singapore Straits Times 27 Nov
1998)
In December 1998, Xinhua—the Beijing government’s official news 
agency—released a report that once again showed Beijing’s support of the 
Suzhou Industrial Park. It read:
‘In the SEP, the relationship between government and business is not 
one between the regulator and those who are regulated, but is instead a 
relationship between a service provider and its clients. It is also a 
special development zone because it is the only one in the country at 
present that draws on foreign economic and public administrative 
experience. Through strict laws and regulations, and drawing on 
Singapore experience of honest and clean government, not a single 
civil servant in the park’s administrative committee has broken the law 
or committed a crime. This has earned the committee the high acclaim 
of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.’ (Quoted in the 
Singapore Straits Times 11 Dec 1998)
As another gesture from Beijing, the SIP was given exemption in January 1999 
from a new national tax on foreign investments. The new tax was to provide 
fairer income distribution between the development zones and the rest of the 
country where the new tax rule terminates tax refunds given by the central 
government to local administrations of such zones. Previously, local 
governments in these zones were allowed to retain (and not remit to Beijing) 
100 percent of their tax collections for ten years. Originally, Beijing had 
designed for these tax revenues to be used by the local authorities for their own 
local development. Thus, Beijing was trying to appease other regions that did 
not have foreign investments. The new tax system was to reduce the ‘rebate’ 
by 25 percent each year until zero, which effectively meant that by the fifth 
year, local authorities were expected to hand over 100 percent of tax revenues 
to Beijing. However, the Suzhou Industrial Park would receive a special
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concession, where a five-year grace was given at 20 percent per year 
(Singapore Straits Times 9 Jan 1999). Publicly, the China government went 
on record to say that the concession was given to the Suzhou Industrial Park 
because the development was launched late compared to other zones (ibid.). 
The SIP was launched in 1994 while the other SEZs had been in existence 
since 1979 and most other development zones took off in the mid-1980s.
Beijing’s ‘conciliatory’ gestures were an attempt to pacify its partner— 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state—by utilizing economic and 
social mechanisms. As will be shown in the next chapter, right up to the 
beginning of 1999, there was no progress in resolving the ‘rivalry’ between the 
two estates in Suzhou. The reason for this was not just that the Suzhou 
Municipal Authority was autonomous from the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state, but was also autonomous from Beijing as well.
S u z h o u ’s  A u t o n o m y
Between 1997 and 1999, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial
state expected Beijing to effectively deal with the Suzhou Municipal 
Authority. However, the Singapore entrepreneurial elite misjudged the nature 
of Chinese politics in the late 1990s. Unlike earlier periods, Beijing did not 
have the high level of control over the various regional and provincial 
authorities (see Yang 1997). The commonly cited reasons for this change in 
governance include the new strategic relationships from centre to the 
periphery, and also economic autonomy of the regions. The former explanation 
is based on the ‘reinvention’ of the Chinese communist party with the passing 
of the old guard, which began with the death of Mao Tse Tung but intensified 
during the final phase of Deng Xiaoping’s rule (see Zheng 1999, Zhong 1996, 
and Dittmer and Wu 1995). In brief, the new generation of leaders ‘traded’ 
power for autonomy because it was unable to command total control of the 
provinces and regions due to a lack of political and economic resources (Zheng 
1999: 1160-1). While this might sound like a contradiction in terms, in actual 
fact, they exchanged autonomy in certain spheres—particularly in the 
economic and political sphere—for allegiance (Huang 1996: 655). Upon
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receiving autonomy, regional and provincial governments began their own 
power-building programmes. For some traditionally powerful regions—such 
as the south China regions bordering Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan—these 
authorities took advantage of Beijing’s Special Economic Zone policies to 
become economically and politically more powerful than in the past (Wu 1999 
and Ma 1999). This created mini-entrepreneurial states—more accurately, 
provincial governments with entrepreneurial motivations—each competing 
with each other and other East Asian states (and other regions) for 
investment28 (see Breslin 1996, and Duckett 1998). The Suzhou Municipal 
Authority was no exception.
During the period between 1997 and 1999, although the Suzhou 
Municipal Authority had publicly acknowledged that the Suzhou Industrial 
Park was more ‘important,’ it never stated that it would stop promoting its own 
Suzhou New District. Chen Deming, the Mayor of Suzhou, when asked about 
the ‘problems’ between the two parks, said that there ought to be better co­
ordination over the marketing of the two parks, particularly with the 
discrepancy over unit land prices {Singapore Straits Times 10 Mar 1998). To 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state, this was outright defiance. 
Some respondents in this research said they knew that key leaders of the 
Singapore entrepreneurial elite had specifically asked Beijing to close down 
the Suzhou New District completely. Other respondents said that the 
Singapore side proposed that all new investments should go to the Suzhou 
Industrial Park; only when it was full should the Suzhou New District be 
utilized again. If these rumours were true, such proposals could not have 
endeared the Singapore party to the Suzhou Municipal Authority. As an 
indicator of its defiance, Mayor Chen regularly reminded the international 
media that the Suzhou Municipal Authority had offered the New District to the 
Singapore entrepreneurial elite when the feasibility study of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park was done in 1992, but was rejected. He criticized the Singapore 
government for unduly worrying over the ‘small’ Suzhou New District, 
which—in his words—was not built to the SIP’s ‘...high international
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standard.’ {Far Eastern Economic Review 8 July 1999). He said that 
competition was not just from SND, but also from neighbouring zones in 
Wuxi, Kunshan and of course, Shanghai.
Furthermore, the Suzhou Municipal Authority frequently cited official 
state statistics to demonstrate that the Suzhou Industrial Park’s was always 
doing much better than the Suzhou New District. For the first half of 1998, the 
Suzhou Industrial Park reported its largest increases in new investments. 
Although the SIP had only secured US$45.45 million in new investments 
pledges for the first quarter of 1998 {Singapore Business Times 30 Apr 1998), 
by the end of June, the total for the first half of the year surged to US$495 
million {Singapore Business Times 8 July 1998). By September 1998, it had 
secured over US$1.1 billion in new investments {Singapore Business Times 27 
Oct 1998), surpassing the original projected target of US$1 billion for the
9Qentire year . This figure was even more striking if compared to the revised 
target—that took into account of the Asian Financial Crisis—of US$800 
million. Around that time, it was also announced that the tax revenues from 
the Suzhou Industrial Park peaked at RMB 400 million (US$50 million), an 
increase of 79 percent over the previous year {Singapore Straits Times 24 May
1999). Rather than being ‘good news’, leaders of the Singapore entrepreneurial 
elite were ambivalent about these figures. On the one hand, the elite could take 
heart that investors were still taking up properties at the Suzhou Industrial 
Park, and more importantly, pumping in large amounts of foreign direct 
investment. This would assist the marketing and public relations strategy of the 
CSSD, which still had many industrial units to sell or lease, by pointing out 
that certain investors still showed confidence and trust in the Park. However, 
on the other hand, the investment figures for 1998 did not really reflect the 
investors’ sentiments for the year itself. Instead, the majority of these projects 
were actually committed either in late 1996 or 1997. There is a time lag on the 
announcement of investment figures, mainly because the investors and the 
authorities have to ensure that the paperwork and accounting procedures were 
completed. Furthermore, for 1998, rather than have many new projects for the
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Suzhou Industrial Park, it attracted a small handful of ‘massive’ projects, such 
as Nokia’s US$100 million plant {Singapore Straits Times 29 Oct 1998), 
Glaxo-Wellcome’s US$100 million plant {China Britain Trade Review 1 Feb 
1999), and Andrew Telecom’s US$120 million plant {Singapore Straits Times 
24 Mar 1999). Park officials reported that these investments were the 
exceptions rather than the norm. However, these figures were utilized by the 
Suzhou Municipal Authorities to demonstrate that ‘all was well at the SIP.’ 
Several members of the Singapore entrepreneurial elite felt that ‘...salt was 
being rubbed into their wounds.’ (SO 2) Finally, despite the high tax revenues, 
none of it would benefit the Singapore economy, as all of it went to the 
Chinese partner.
7.5 Co n c l u sio n s
The ‘adjustment’ phase of the Suzhou Industrial Park was difficult to
the transnational entrepreneurial state. The Asian Financial Crisis caused a
change in the external environment that affected the Suzhou Industrial Park’s
competitiveness vis-a-vis other industrial estates competing for foreign
investors. One such competitor was the Suzhou New District. Thus, the
pressure was on the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state to maintain
its competitive niche to maintain or enhance the project’s profitability. As
discussed earlier, it could not or would not compete on the basis of price.
Instead, it attempted to utilize its embedding mechanisms on the China
government to keep the Suzhou Municipal Authority under ‘control’, even
though it could even be argued that the SND had not actually ‘stolen’ any
clients from the SIP. This strategy was not effective because of the local
Suzhou authority’s high degree of autonomy both from the Singapore and
Beijing governments. Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn from this
period is that the Suzhou Industrial Park project lost its competitive edge
because it could not maintain its competitive advantages in the changed
environment. Furthermore, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s
solutions—requiring the collaboration of the Beijing government—were
mostly not effective. This led to the prospect of poor profitability for the
189
Chapter Seven
Suzhou Industrial Park project, and greatly contributed to the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state’s decision to disengage.
1 The Asian Financial Crisis has had many explanations, including the debt burden theory (see 
Wade 1998), the ‘moral hazard’ theory— also known as ‘crony capitalism’ theory— (see 
Pempel 1999b), and the weak financial governance perspective— also known as the ‘soft- 
budget constraints’ theory (see Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick 1999).
2 See Table 6.2 (Chapter Six) for the ‘destination o f products’ o f the companies included in 
this research.
3 Also see Table 6.3 (Chapter Six), for the breakdown o f companies included in this research 
by business sector.
4 As o f September 1999, the factory was still unoccupied. CSSD has attempted to assist 
company x  in selling the lease, but has not been able to find takers.
5 This was indicated by respondents CO 1 and CO 2.
6 See Chapter Five for information about Xinsu, which was the name o f the Jurong Town 
Corporation International’s mini-estate o f Ready Built Factories within the Suzhou Industrial 
Park.
7 For cumulative FDI at the Suzhou Industrial Park, see Table 1.2 in Chapter One, for figures 
reported in the press.
8 In 1997, China’s GDP reached US$900,867 billion (7th in the world), 5.92 times that when 
the country began implementing reform and open policies. Between 1979 and 1997, the 
national economy grew at an average o f 9.1 percent (Information Office o f the State Council o f  
the People’s Republic o f China 1999: 1)
9 The other main reason was the hold-up over the future ‘leadership’ o f the Park (see Chapter 
Eight). By September 1999, work on a ‘modified’ Phase Two had begun. However, the details 
behind this are taken up in the following chapter.
10 In the same report, it was announced that the relevant parties (employers and Provident Fund 
officials) would meet regularly to review further adjustments to the PF system {Singapore 
Straits Times 14 Feb 1998). It should be noted that such measures were adopted by the 
Singapore government when Singapore’s economy faced a recession in the mid-1980s, and 
again in 1997 during the height of the Crisis.
11 The tax changes— involving reduction of certain preferences and duties— that were 
introduced in January 1999 had been announced as early as 1995, and were designed to 
harmonize the tax system between Special Zones and other ‘non-zone’ areas (see Singapore 
Straits Times 9 Jan 1999).
12 See Singapore Straits Times ‘Suzhou Park plagued by rivalry,’ 14 May 1999.
13 The Suzhou Industrial Park was located to the east o f Suzhou city. This research learnt that 
the Suzhou Municipal Authorities had chosen not to develop the New District to the east (on 
the current SIP site) because it was being used as farmland. This explanation could not be 
corroborated.
14 ‘Scenic Suzhou city orders all factories to move out o f town,’ {China Business Information 
Network 17 June 1996).
15 The Suzhou Gardens and Canals were officially awarded UNESCO’s World Heritage Site 
status in 1995. See UNESCO Report (1999) and website 
(http://www.unesco.org/sites/china/index.html).
16 Unless attributed, the information in this section was gathered from an official employed by 
the SND interviewed in Suzhou (SND 1).
17 Fortune magazine publishes an annual list o f the 500 largest corporations in the world, 
based on various criteria. See Sklair (2001) for an analysis o f this exercise.
18 According to one respondent, the average land price in the SIP was USS50-70 per square 
metre, compared to US$80-100 per sqm in Pudong (Shanghai), and US$30-40 per sqm in SND
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(CO 2). The research was unable to verify these figures, as all the respondents declined to 
supply actual figures, stating that only potential clients were privy to such information.
19 This research managed to confirm the events o f ‘Hamburg’ incident. The ‘special 
commissioner’ was the Honorary Consul-General (HG) o f the Consulate-General o f the 
Republic o f Singapore. An interview with this respondent was conducted on 4 Sep 1997 in 
Hamburg, Germany where he is based.
20 It is important to note that this interview took place in 1998, before the Singapore 
government announced the disengagement.
21 During the period o f the research, I attended an international conference o f Urban Sociology 
in Shanghai. The opportunity was taken to compare notes with fellow scholars and to share 
capsules from other economic development zones in China from them.
22 It was interesting that several respondents in the research were staying in the Suzhou New  
District even though they worked across town. One of the most common reasons given for this 
was that the rents were significantly lower, even though the daily trek across town was a major 
problem.
23 It was highly unlikely that any o f the respondents would be unwilling to offer the truth. For 
example, the SIP’s officials would in fact dearly like to cite a specific case where they lost 
clients to the SND; however, they could not supply such evidence at all.
24 See for example, ‘Chee and Jeya press for change’ (Singapore Straits Times 1 Apr 99). In 
addition, opposition parties and social critics resort to other means o f information 
dissemination, including the use o f the Internet. For example, see social critic Tessensohn 
(1999), who titled his opinion piece ‘Why not transform Suzhou into a high tech theme park?’ 
(see ‘other’ information sources in the Bibliography and References section).
25 Newspapers and journals that did not originate from Singapore or China that covered the 
Suzhou Industrial Park ‘problems’ included the International Herald Tribune, The Financial 
Times (UK), the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), Forbes, Fortune, Asiaweek and the 
Far Eastern Economic Review (see Bibliography for a complete list).
26 Chinese officials o f the SIP interviewed could not be sure whether the change o f leadership 
in March 1998 at the Suzhou Municipal Authority was in any way related to events at the Park 
itself.
27 The Singapore Straits Times pounced on this, placing the P eople’s Daily report on its own 
front page {Singapore Straits Times 22 Oct 1998). This could be understood as a measure to 
pacify the growing restlessness among the Singapore population over the SIP. This ‘popular 
unrest’ will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
28 Breslin, who analyzes the China government as a ‘dysfunctional developmental state’ makes 
an interesting point that it is not always entirely clear whether economics or politics are in 
command, or whether the two issues are even separate in contemporary China (1996: 690)
This has often given rise to murky plans and policies, and even murkier implementation 
strategies.
29 The official ‘new investments’ figure for the year Jan-Dee 1998 was set at US$1.2 billion 
{Singapore Business Times 3 Feb 1999).
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C h a pt e r  E ig h t  
D ise n g a g e m e n t
The focus of this chapter is to explain why and how the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state decided to disengage from the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project. The chapter begins with the details of the 
disengagement itself, followed by an analysis of how the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state utilized the competitive and collaborative 
strategies during the disengagement process.
8.1 D is e n g a g e m e n t
‘The Singapore Government will hand over control of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project to the Chinese Government in 18 months’ time 
under a framework unveiled yesterday. Singapore will cut its stake in 
the massive project to 35 percent from 65 percent and hand over 
management of the park on Jan 1, 2001.’ {Singapore Straits Times 29 
June 1999)
This section deals with the events immediately before and after the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state formally announced that it would disengage 
from the Suzhou Industrial Park project. The information for this was gathered 
from secondary sources—such as newspaper and other press/media reports— 
and from respondents in Suzhou1. The term ‘disengagement’ was never used 
by the Singapore government; however for this research it is the most 
appropriate concept to explain the situation. Here, disengagement is defined as 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategy to relinquish 
control of the project. Officially, the Singapore consortium would still be 
involved in the project after 2001, but only as a minority shareholder. 
However, as this section will discuss, at another level, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state was ending the collaboration with the China 
government. Also, disengagement is different from ‘disembedding.’ Indeed, 
the disengagement strategy was an attempt to increase embeddedness with 
certain players.
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In the first quarter of 1999, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state was still hoping Beijing could intervene to put the Suzhou Industrial Park 
project back on track. In February 1999, it submitted a detailed but 
confidential proposal to Beijing that would resolve conflicts over their joint 
venture of the Suzhou Industrial Park:
‘In Singapore’s view, this proposal best serves the key interests of 
investors, and maintains the good bilateral relations between China and 
Singapore. The Singapore side looks forward to a positive Chinese 
response to this proposal.’ (Lim Neo Chian, CEO of CSSD, quoted in 
Singapore Straits Times 10 Mar 1999)
Although the CEO of CSSD refused to give any details of this proposal, the 
same newspaper report stated that the Singapore partner made a request to 
Beijing to have the Suzhou New District closed or suspended:
‘But the Chinese side [Beijing] has explained to the Singapore side that 
it is very difficult for them to close or suspend SND.’ (Lim Neo Chian, 
CEO of CSSD, quoted in Singapore Straits Times 10 Mar 1999)
As discussed in the previous chapter, the leaders of the Singapore 
entrepreneurial elite were unhappy about the ‘unfair’ competition from the 
Suzhou New District, particularly the latter’s ability to price itself below the 
Suzhou Industrial Park. This directly affected the SIP’s competitiveness, which 
was the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s sole means of 
generating an income from the project. The response from the Suzhou 
Municipal Authority was swift. Suzhou Mayor Chen Deming told Lianhe 
Zaobao2:
‘.. .the SND should be allowed to continue to grow as its development 
had already been underway for some time. It was more important for 
both parties to come up with a good way to allow the two industrial 
parks to co-exist.’ (Chen Deming, Mayor of Suzhou, quoted in Lianhe 
Zaobao 15 Mar 1999)
Thus, the Suzhou Municipal Authority was not going to back down. Already, 
throughout 1998, it was clear that Beijing had not been able or chose not to 
deal with the Suzhou authorities in the manner that the leaders of the
193
Chapter Eight
Singapore entrepreneurial elite had hoped. Indeed, the Suzhou Municipal 
Authorities had developed the confidence to assert its own interests by 
positioning the Suzhou New District to compete alongside the Suzhou 
Industrial Park for foreign investors in the global game of industrial 
production.
By the beginning of May 1999, the uncertainty surrounding the Suzhou 
Industrial Park’s future was causing financial problems for the CSSD. This 
filtered out to the public—via the local Chinese and foreign media—as if the 
CSSD had ‘...defaulted on its payment’ (Singapore Straits Times 10 May 
1999). This was damaging the Singapore entrepreneurial elite’s credibility, 
already beleaguered by rumours that the Suzhou Industrial Park was in deep 
financial trouble. While the political opposition parties in Singapore were 
quick to pounce on this information , the credibility of the elite was being 
eroded especially in the eyes of ordinary Singaporeans who were used to the 
government being effective and efficient in economic matters. However, to 
counter this ‘blow,’ the CSSD issued an official statement explaining that the 
Singaporean consortium—which owned 65 percent share-holding in the 
project—had chosen not to repay an instalment on its capital loan estimated at 
around US$10 million. It instead asked for an extension until the future of the 
Park was determined. The statement said that the shareholders felt that there 
were too many uncertainties surrounding the Park, and would act when the 
‘negotiations’ were concluded and the future of the Park determined. The 
request for an extension—which was approved—was confirmed by the 
creditor banks4.
The first indication of a step forward came in June 1999, when Senior 
Minister Lee—a key figure in the Singapore entrepreneurial elite—openly said 
that the Singapore partner was proposing to complete just the first segment of 
the Suzhou Industrial Park and hand over the rest of the development to its 
Chinese counterpart (see Singapore Straits Times 6 Jun 1999, and Singapore 
Business Times 10 June 1999).
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‘Obviously we are not happy because we are not getting the kind of 
attention we were assured we would get—special attention. Indeed 
what we are getting now is competition. So I think the problem has to 
be sorted out. So that it can be done as an example of what the whole 
sector could have been if we had completed it. But having completed 
the sector, we will say: “Now you do it; you compete with your own 
rather than we compete with them. And we will help you do it as best 
as you can. But you will do it.’ (Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in Singapore 
Business Times 10 June 1999)
In June 1999, there was an official announcement that the Singapore partner 
would hand over the Suzhou Industrial Park on 1 Jan 2001 to the Chinese 
partners (Singapore Straits Times 29 June 1999). The Singapore side would 
undertake the completion of Phase One—the first eight square kilometres 
originally scheduled for completion in 1999—before reducing its stake in the 
project to 35 percent while the Chinese consortium would correspondingly 
increase its stake to 65 percent5. Therefore, after 2001, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state was planning to relinquish control of CSSD 
and the project. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the 
Singapore Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and a 
party secretary of the Jiangsu government. Also included in the agreement was 
that the Singapore partner would officially continue its ‘software transfer’ 
programme until 2001 training Chinese officials in Singapore through 
attachment and relevant training courses. Finally, to proceed with development 
of further phases of the Suzhou Industrial Park, an additional US$100 million 
was required to meet operating and development costs:
‘Both sides view that CSSD should plan and work to significantly 
enhance its financial performance. They will assist CSSD to achieve 
this turnaround as soon as possible. Meanwhile, CSSD requires a new 
loan of US$100 million to meet its operational needs. For this purpose, 
both consortiums will guarantee their share of the additional loan in 
accordance with their relative share-holding in CSSD. Beyond this 
commitment, it is up to SSTD and CSIPC to independently decide 
whether to inject new funds or to guarantee new loans depending on 
the financial performance of CSSD.’ (CSSD, MOU, 28 June 1999, 
paragraph 11)
Further details were reported:
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‘It is understood that Singapore had wanted the Chinese to suspend the 
marketing of the SND for five years, so that full attention could be 
given by both sides to accelerating the SIP’s development. But the 
Chinese refused. As a result, both countries have agreed to the new 
course of action. The agreement specified that the Suzhou municipal 
government would now respect SIP’s priority status by recommending 
all suitable projects to the park. The Suzhou Mayor will chair regular 
meetings to avoid disorderly competition between the two parks for the 
same project so as not to confuse potential investors.’ (Singapore 
Straits Times 29 June 1999)
Therefore, with this Memorandum of Understanding, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state’s objectives had been redefined as the 
project was not competitive vis-a-vis other industrial estates in China. The 
elite therefore decided to minimize its financial losses through selling its 30 
percent of the shares to the Chinese partner. Yet, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state felt it should not appear to ‘...wash its hands of this 
project and abandon its partners.’ (SOI) This would have a negative effect on 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s wider credibility, especially 
with many other on-going ventures in the ‘Regionalization’ project. Thus, after 
the ‘official’ disengagement announcement, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state began its own ‘disengagement strategy’ immediately.
C r isis  o f  C r e d ib il it y
With the disengagement, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial
state was concerned about a loss of ‘credibility.’ Credibility is an important 
social mechanism that acts to encourage players to enter into ventures or to 
collaborate. This research sought to find out if the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s credibility was affected by the disengagement, by 
interviewing respondents from the companies included in the sample (see 
Table 8.1).
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Ta b l e  8.1: Re s p o n d e n t s ’ Vie w s  o f  th e  D is e n g a g e m e n t  b y  p e r c e n t a g e  
(n=64)
Factor Agree Don’t Know Disagree
A good business decision for Singapore 10 80 10
Improved Singapore government’s 10 10 80
credibility
Sympathy for the Singapore government 20 50 30
Source: Interview Data
When probed, some respondents reported:
‘I feel the Singapore government took the easy way out. It was more 
concerned about short term profits, and took the first available 
opportunity to cut losses and get some money back. Withdrawal does 
not place the Singapore government in a favourable light; they 
resemble opportunists rather than true entrepreneurs. Such a hasty 
withdrawal by the Singapore government certainly weakens any claims 
to being a trusted brand name as a regional economic player.’ (EU 10)
‘Investments in infrastructure never make quick profits. That’s a given. 
So why did the Singapore government pull out so quickly, especially 
after an extra-ordinary event like the Asian Financial Crisis? It must 
indicate that something is very wrong with the long-term potential of 
the Suzhou Industrial Park. That is not comforting news to us. We are 
here on the assumption that this park has a long term future.’ (NA 15)
‘The Singapore government gives the impression that they are quitting 
because they cannot handle one small little local authority [the Suzhou 
Municipal Authority]. That’s essentially what we hear around here. 
How can that be? What happened to its support from Beijing? It cannot 
be because of the Suzhou New District alone. There must be something 
else fundamentally wrong about this park. They should be totally 
honest and tell us what this is. It’s like buying a house from an agent 
who is quite obviously shying away from telling you the whole truth.’ 
(NA 3)
‘The Singapore government has to make its own forecasts and 
predictions. And we have to make ours. They don’t see a future here, 
that’s their problem. We do. And if  this place gets going after pulling 
out of the [Asian Financial] Crisis, they [the Singapore government] 
will lose out, won’t they?’ (EU 5)
‘I can tell you that the word has been going round, not just here in 
Suzhou or China, but around the world, that the Singapore government 
is losing it. This “I quit” attitude has not gone down well, and indeed 
surprised a lot of business people. They [the Singapore government] 
should have stayed and solved whatever problems there were. This
197
Chapter Eight
could come back to haunt them, not just in China, but probably even in
Singapore too.’ (NA 7)
These views generally indicated that these respondents were questioning the 
economic and political credibility of the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state. The general feeling among managers of industrial 
transnational corporations was that the Singapore government ‘abandoned’ the 
project.
Thus, the agenda during the disengagement phase was more than a 
financial damage limitation exercise; it was a strategy by the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state to retain its important relationships with its 
partners for the future, even though by 2001 the Park would be of minor 
financial interest to Singapore. Even though there were no formal legal 
contracts between the Singapore government and the companies at the Park, it 
had social obligations. Many of these companies were economically and 
socially tied either to Singapore or the Singapore government. For instance, in 
addition to the Singaporean companies located in the Suzhou Industrial Park, 
there were many transnational corporations that had regional headquarters or 
other operations in Singapore. Also, it was still in the Singapore government’s 
interest to ensure that the project did not incur future large losses or debts, as 
its 35 percent minority share-holding might still negatively affect Singapore’s 
economy. Finally, there was the issue of pride and reputation. The leaders of 
the Singapore elite probably did not want to portray itself as being sloppy, 
incompetent and easily distracted, especially as it was still participating in the 
global game of industrial production, from supplying factors of production in 
Singapore and in other regional industrial parks in Asia. Therefore, there were 
both social and economic reasons to ensure that the Suzhou Industrial Park 
project remained afloat even after the Singapore government’s disengagement. 
As the following sections will discuss, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state had formal and informal disengagement strategies.
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8.2 D is e n g a g e m e n t  S t r a t e g ie s
F o r m a l  S t r a t e g ie s
The formal disengagement strategies mostly reflected the Singapore
entrepreneurial elite’s own personal views. Since the most important objective
of disengagement, as far as the leaders of the Singapore entrepreneurial elite
was concerned, was to retain the tenants’ trust and confidence in the Suzhou
Industrial Park, the elite directed the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial
state to utilize economic and social mechanisms. The disengagement strategy’s
main thrust was to convince the tenants that the Singapore government’s
decision to disengage would not be economically detrimental to tenants. This
was achieved through insisting that it was not ‘abandoning’ the project.
Singaporean officials pointed out that the Singapore government, firstly, still
retained a 35 percent stake in the project and secondly, had promised to assist
the CSSD after 2001 in marketing and in financing part of the project if
requested. Finally, it wanted to demonstrate that it expected the Park to
become profitable in the future. Lee Hsien Loong, a key member of the elite
and son of Lee Kuan Yew, was quoted as having said:
‘Shall we then assume that what we have committed is lost? No I never 
assumed that. I’ll continue fighting and try to get back as much as 
possible.’ (Lee, quoted in Singapore Straits Times 17 Sep 1999)
This comment was probably meant to indicate to tenants that the Singapore 
government was still interested in seeing the Park become profitable, not just 
because their reputation rested on it, but more so because they wanted to get 
some money back.
Another economic mechanism utilized to retain trust was the 
intensification of the ‘software transfer’ programme. This programme had 
been favourably received in Suzhou and China (see Chapter Six). Leaders in 
Beijing were also satisfied with SIP AC, as they had seen how ‘lean and 
efficient’ the organization was, especially in comparison with similar 
authorities of other industrial parks and economic development zones in China 
(Singapore Straits Times 11 Dec 1998). Therefore, when the Singapore
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transnational entrepreneurial state wanted more Chinese officials to participate 
in the ‘software transfer’, it was a strategy to assure the existing investors that 
the Singapore ‘operating system’ at the Suzhou Industrial Park would remain 
regardless of the presence of Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
itself.
Finally, to retain the trust of industrial transnational corporations, the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state reiterated the competitive 
advantages of the Suzhou Industrial Park. The strongest advantage was still in 
the govemment-to-govemment relationship, which indicated that the Suzhou 
Industrial Park was still a high priority of the Beijing government. This in turn 
could be seen as an indication that the Park would not be allowed to fail for 
fear of a dramatic loss of face, not so much by the Suzhou officials, but by the 
top leadership in Beijing, including President Zhu and Premier Jiang of China, 
who both personally backed the Park. Another aspect was the support of the 
local community in Suzhou. The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state 
believed that the Suzhou Industrial Park had brought ‘real’ benefits to local 
employees, creating new possibilities (such as self-financed home ownership) 
and enhancing their quality of life. The local Suzhou employees at the Suzhou 
Industrial Park held ‘Singapore’ in high regard and many believed that their 
lives had improved considerably from its presence6. Being aware of the overall 
public support, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state hoped to 
utilize some of this support in attempting to demonstrate its level of 
embeddedness to the project.
This research also found that the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state also utilized social mechanisms in the disengagement 
strategy to retain trust. Upon the announcement of the disengagement, officials 
of the CSSD were sent to meet with the companies located in the Park. Their 
objective was not just to explain the Singapore party’s reasons for 
disengagement, or the terms and conditions of the MOU, but also to give this 
exercise a personal touch.
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‘Yes, they came. Explained the MOU, the future, and then allowed us 
to ask whatever we wanted. They tried to see every GM, but a lot of 
them are away now for their summer holidays7.’ (AS 3)
‘They came to ask us about our concerns, saying that they would 
transmit the feedback and incorporate our concerns as part of the 
software transfer. They tried to be professional, but many of them 
[officers] had become our personal friends. So that officer who came to 
see me actually apologised about the disengagement. It was a nice 
touch, but as he would be the first to admit, the gesture was quite 
meaningless in the world of hard-nosed business decisions.’ (EU 2)
However, it was interesting that in addition to explaining the ‘Singapore 
government’s line’ on the disengagement, these officials and employees of the 
project utilized informal strategies to retain the trust of the tenants.
I n f o r m a l  S t r a t e g ie s
While the Singapore entrepreneurial elite had its formal strategy of
retaining confidence and trust in the Suzhou Industrial Park, there was an
informal strategy emerging from ‘bottom up.’ This informal strategy had the
effect of improving social dynamics in rather difficult times. As discussed in
the opening chapter, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state was a
specific coalition of individuals who had an interest in the Singapore
government’s ‘regionalization’ programme. This elite—because of its
economic, political and social resources—dominated and controlled various
arms of the state, effectively directing the latter in certain strategic directions.
As such, many of the Singaporean officials working at the Suzhou Industrial
Park were not members of the Singapore entrepreneurial elite but were
employees of the state. Although these Singaporean officials appeared to be
loyal to the elite—as witnessed by their commitment to the project—they had
some autonomy. As such, they were found to be ‘selectively’ critical of the
elite.
All the Singaporean officials interviewed in Suzhou as part of this 
study said that they were ‘...not the Singapore government.’ They stressed that 
they were employees and that their commitment to the project was from a 
professional rather than nationalistic standpoint.
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‘Am I here to help Singapore? Well, no. I am here to do well for 
myself. If I do well, then Singapore benefits, I guess. But I am not 
doing this FOR Singapore. I mean, I approach my job as if  it were any 
other job for any other employer. If this means coaching the China 
football team—and we have to face the Singapore team—I’d coach to 
win. Same is true here.’ (SO 2)
‘I am here as an employee. The company may belong to the 
government, but I am here to earn a living. Being here and working
o
hard is totally different from us doing NS , right? NS was duty, 
obligation and for the country. This is totally commercial. I mean, if 
there were no money in this, forget it. But don’t get me wrong, I am not 
just here for the money. In order to earn this money, I got to give 
something back right?’ (SO 4)
This relative distance and psychological autonomy allowed these officials to 
step back from their appointments as officials acting on behalf of the 
Singapore government when necessary. This allowed some of them who were 
included in the research to criticize ‘the Singapore government.’
‘There were too many agendas in the SIP. Political agendas, business 
agendas, personal agendas...sometimes these don’t fit with each other. I 
am glad the government has made a decision to take a lower profile in 
the future because then we can concentrate specifically on making 
money, not some politician happy.’ (SO 2)
‘The people upstairs made too many mistakes. We came in with pots of 
money, thinking that we can afford to pay for the best—the best water 
treatment plant, the most up to date power substation, and all the rest of 
the frills. We could have been more prudent, then we wouldn’t have 
this big red figure in our P and L [profit and loss]...but what to do? For 
a project where PMs [Prime ministers] and Presidents are involved, we 
had to go big and splash out. I think from now onwards, business 
decisions will prevail. No grandiose plans to showcase Singapore’s 
industrial success or whatever, just simple business common sense.’ 
(SO 1)
These employees of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state also 
transmitted some of these views to the investors during the ‘clear-the-air 
sessions’ and also during marketing presentations to prospective investors. For 
the latter, three other points were frequently raised to potential investors: 
firstly, that ‘less government was actually better for the park,’ which directly
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contradicted the ‘govemment-to-govemment’ aspect of the Suzhou Industrial 
Park.
‘We would say that less day-to-day interference by politicians means 
more space for effective business. This is not just common knowledge 
among businessmen, but this is something many would hope for. But at 
the same time, we have G-to-G [govemment-to-govemment] support, 
both morally and financially. Meaning: the G-to-G gives us the best 
possible environment and support, while in the day to day, we get on 
with what we do best, business not politics.’ (SO 2)
A second interesting viewpoint was ‘with China in charge, the future would be 
even brighter.’
‘Now with the Chinese in charge, do you think they dare let this place 
fail? You know the Chinese just cannot bear to lose face. So, if this 
place closes down in five years, then the Singaporeans would say to the 
rest of the world that the Chinese really are no good at this industrial 
park game, only Singaporeans are good. Do you think Beijing would 
let this happen? Do you even think that the Suzhou Mayor, who’s got 
to run this place after 2001 will let Singapore win? No way. In either 
case, who wins? Investors win. The Chinese will go out of their way to 
make sure this place succeeds, and maybe aim to better the 
Singaporeans.’ (SO 2)
The third viewpoint addressed the Suzhou Industrial Park’s relationship with 
the Suzhou New District.
‘We’ve heard that the two Parks are going to come under one body 
from 2001 onwards would mean more benefits for everyone. Pricing of 
units can be better co-ordinated. The two parks could even share more 
things, such as information, and cut down on wastages such as 
competition. It could even be possible that when companies currently 
in one park want to expand, they could locate extra production at the 
other park. The co-ordinating body could do specialized zones over the 
two parks, for example, invest heavily in a chemical cluster over here 
[SIP], or a food processing area over there [SND] and so on.
Everybody wins.’ (SO 4)
While such views from the employees of the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state might appear to resemble psychological ‘coping 
strategies,’ they did need some ‘sensible’ answers to present to potential 
investors, where the most commonly raised questions by potential investors
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were, predictably, focused on the future effect of the Singapore government’s 
disengagement. These officials reported that providing the ‘official line’—the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s formal disengagement 
strategies—often failed to satisfy potential investors. Thus, by offering the 
‘new lack of politics,’ ‘the China in charge,’ and the ‘better co-ordination 
between two parks,’ they hoped to increase the level of confidence and trust 
for potential investors of the Suzhou Industrial Park.
‘Whether or not the investor believes us is of course an entirely 
different matter. These are our views. I personally believe them, but I 
do not have a crystal ball. 2001 is two years away, and anything can 
happen between now and then. But based on the information I have, 
this is how I see things unfolding. But this is China, you never can tell 
what’s around the comer. Just take this Taiwan thing [Taiwan’s claims 
of national sovereignty]. It could turn nasty and poof everything we’ve 
built goes down the drain.’ (SO 4)
‘If you have not worked in China before, you will believe the 
media.. .about like how Singapore got cheated, and so on. But if you 
know China, the perception will be different. The basics are still here. 
There will be not much impact [of disengagement]. Of course, its bad 
publicity and might worry people like the common man back home [in 
Singapore]. But businessmen don’t automatically believe these stories. 
They have much better ways of gathering more accurate information 
and assessing places. You can’t judge this place today. You have to 
come back in five or ten years time.’ (SO 3)
Indeed, as the following section demonstrates, the existing tenants already 
began making contingency plans.
8.3 R e a c t io n s  t o  D is e n g a g e m e n t
‘On June 28, Singapore and Chinese officials struggled before an 
audience to explain an agreement that transferred majority ownership 
of a huge industrial park in China to state-owned mainland developers. 
A Singapore investor with operations in the park stood up and asked a 
basic question. When he didn’t get an answer that satisfied, he 
doggedly asked it again: “What happened? What happened in 
Suzhou?” ’ {Far Eastern Economic Review 8 July 1999)
Reports of such ‘stunned’ responses from tenants at the Suzhou Industrial Park 
were probably exaggerated9. Still, the following section examines the reaction
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of the respective partners in the project, namely the transnational corporations, 
and the Chinese partner. Reactions from parties not immediately within the 
collaborative circle—such as the Suzhou authorities and other interested 
academics—will also be discussed here.
T e n a n t s ’ V ie w
The overall view from the tenants about the disengagement could be
summarized in one phrase: ‘We’re concerned, but we have to continue to get
the job done.’ Nearly all the respondents felt that their own operations would
not be affected, or affected significantly. However, nearly all of them felt that
the disengagement might have a negative effect on potential investors (see
Table 8.2)
Ta b l e : 8.2: R e sp o n d e n t s ’ Vie w s o f  the  Im p a c t  o f  D ise n g a g e m e n t  
(percent)  (n =64)
Negative Negligible Positive
Affect Your company 25 60 15
Affect potential investors 80 20 0
Affected Singapore’s future credibility 40 60 0
Affected China’s future credibility 60 40 0
Source: Interview Data
The relative lack of concern by the respondents from transnational 
corporations was probably because they had become established at the Suzhou 
Industrial Park, and required little else from the Singapore government. The 
responses from Singaporean companies, which were slightly different, would 
be discussed in the next chapter as a special case.
‘If you came to the SIP solely because of the Singapore government, 
then you shouldn’t be here at all. The Singapore government’s presence 
should be one of many factors, but not the overriding factor. Over­
reliance on this factor makes bad business sense. We’re here because of 
the trickle down effect that the Singapore government brought—the 
infrastructure, the system and employment conditions. But once we are 
here, whether we make money or not, we cannot blame the Singapore 
government! Once we are up and running, our fate is in our hands. If 
we go bust, we cannot blame the Singapore government.’ (NA 4)
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‘I admit we needed the Singapore government around during our 
development stage, but not now. We are established and we are 
considering expanding, regardless of who is in charge. We stay out of 
the politics, and stick to business. And business in China is good.’ (NA 
3)
‘[With the disengagement], we’re concerned about the future of this 
park, but then again, like any good business, we’re always concerned 
about the future. There was some concern from headquarters, not so 
much about the Singapore government’s presence in the future, but 
whether their protracted bad relations with Suzhou itself might cause 
us some problems down the line. My own reading is that if  Suzhou was 
in charge, then this problem should disappear.’ (AS 3)
‘We have seven plants in all of China. The other six don’t have the 
Singapore government anyway, so for us, this [disengagement] is 
minor. Even without them [Singaporeans], the infrastructure and 
system should remain. Its working well, and why should they change a 
good thing?’ (EU 11)
‘We are definitely worried about the issue [disengagement]. But what 
can we do? We have invested very heavily in this plant, and it would 
cost too much to relocate now. Maybe five or ten years down the road, 
we will have a review of operations here; and if things are not 
conducive, we will move.’ (AS 8)
‘We take the position that we were already privileged to benefit from 
the earlier presence of Singapore government, which was extremely 
instrumental in aiding our smooth start-up in China. We came here 
because we were promised a smooth entry to China; we’ve got that 
now. Since then, the last two years have been fantastic for us. So the 
next step is to expand. In that regards, the presence of the Singapore 
government is not a factor. The main factor is our business strategy 
from here on end.’ (EU 2)
‘If the China government want to retain their customers, they have to 
maintain this standard at least, if not do better. Even giving us the 
treatment that you get at an average zone would be bad for us. But the 
Chinese are not stupid, and they are also good businessmen. So I 
expect this place to do alright.’ (EU 7)
The most likely reason for the transnational corporations’ overall lack of 
visible concern was their status as key players in the global game of industrial 
production. Within the game, they were the prime movers. Should conditions 
deteriorate, they have the resources to uproot and relocate to a more conducive 
environment. Furthermore, few senior executives of transnational corporations 
would ever admit that they were dependent on any government. This would
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probably be perceived as corporate weakness, and could be seized upon by 
rival competitors to gain an advantage. As mentioned before, transnational 
corporations do not concern themselves with ‘local’ issues such as 
employment and technological development; their main objective is realizing 
profits for their shareholders. Therefore, should they decide to ‘move’ or 
‘leave,’ they do not have any social obligations to the host government or 
community.
‘As long as we make money and business is good, we don’t care who
we pay our rent to.’ (NA 3)
C h in a ’s  R e a c t io n s
In this section, ‘Chinese officials’ referred to politicians, bureaucrats or 
officials within any one of the Chinese partner’s sub-groups. This included 
members of the China government, Jiangsu provincial government, SIP AC 
and the Chinese financial consortium. Excluded, for the moment, are those 
affiliated with the Suzhou Municipal Authority. With the announcement of the 
Singapore government’s disengagement, Beijing chose to remain silent. 
Between July and December 1999, Beijing was more occupied with issues of 
admission to the World Trade Organization (see Far Eastern Economic 
Review 25 Nov 1999, and also Strange 1998: 35-7) and trying to contain a 
religious cult known as ‘Falun Gong’ (see Time 9 August 1999). However, 
equally possible was the fact that Beijing chose to distance itself from the 
disengagement announcement, especially when it was very probable that it was 
unable to influence the Suzhou Municipal Authority in favour of the Singapore 
entrepreneurial elite’s wishes. It was equally clear that—as a strategic 
imperative—inter-governmental relations between Singapore and Beijing 
remained ‘healthy,’ which would in part explain why the Singapore 
entrepreneurial elite opted not to directly deal with Beijing over the details of 
disengagement10. Instead, the Jiangsu provincial government became the main 
point of contact for the Chinese partnership.
‘A Chinese official apologised for failure to make more money and
predicts bigger earnings for township in future. Likening the venture
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between the Singapore and Chinese governments to a marriage, he 
pledged that there would be no divorce. He described the problems 
between Singapore and local officials over the SIP as “nothing 
significant,” adding that problems were normal at the initial stage of a 
large project.’ {Singapore Straits Times 14 Sep 1999)
The official in the quotation was Chen Huanyou, the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Secretary. In the same report, Chen was quoted as saying that ties between 
Singapore and Jiangsu had a sound foundation. This was probably true, since it 
did not include the Suzhou Municipal Authority. Respondents from the 
Chinese side all generally indicated that they deeply regretted the turn of 
events, but looked forward to the future as a great challenge.
‘I am sure that there could have been other alternatives. The Suzhou 
Industrial Park will turn the comer once this Crisis is over, and it will 
make real money very quickly. We have the foundation for out- 
competing any industrial zone in China, except maybe Beijing and 
Shanghai. But it is sad that the Singapore government is impatient, and 
let some minor irritations affect its decision.’ (CO 1)
‘I feel that maybe the Singapore government made the wrong decision. 
The future for this park is very healthy. They should convince the 
consortium that roughing out the hard times is in everybody’s best 
interests. I don’t know why they think that the current difficult times 
will carry on. It won’t. Take a good hard look at the whole of China; 
you think that we had a hard time? Go visit any other industrial park 
since 1997, and show me one park that has done relatively better. You 
won’t find one.’ (CO 2)
‘Even though we regret that Singaporeans are reducing their interest in 
the project, we have total confidence in that we can maintain the high 
standards that the investors in the Suzhou Industrial Park have come to 
expect. We are proud to say that we are by far the most progressive 
administrative committee in China. Officials from other zones come to 
us for guidance and advice. No one need worry about any changes. You 
do not change something that works.’ (CO 3)
Thus, all the respondents from the Chinese partner sounded optimistic about 
the future. They believed that they, as an organization, had acquired 
competitive advantages such as having been trained by Singaporeans, and had 
established a reputation over the past few years as being efficient and effective 
industrial administrators (see Chapter Six). These competitive advantages were 
important to transnational corporations and would therefore stand SIP AC in
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good stead for the future. However, in reality, based on the views gathered 
from the transnational corporations, the Chinese partners’ outlook might be 
slightly too optimistic. After all, many existing tenants appeared to hold the 
view that potential investors would be hesitant to locate in the Suzhou 
Industrial Park at the point when the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state was disengaging. These respondents predicted that many potential 
investors might adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude, particularly considering the 
business community’s general mood of caution after the Asian Financial 
Crisis11. The Chinese officials, however, were already prepared for this.
‘Its early days, but I have a strong feeling that we will be able to get 
investors in. In the past, the focus was on getting companies that had a 
previous relationship with the Singapore government. Maybe—I stress 
maybe—we can now focus on companies that have a good relationship
19with China. Maybe we can get the Volkswagens or General Motors to 
come. We will definitely try.’ (CO 2)
‘This place has just so much potential. Our combination of service and 
facilities is probably the best in China. We just need to get the 
investors to come and have a look. We need to get information to them. 
Once they are here, I’m sure they will be impressed.’ (CO 3)
On the issue of inter-estate rivalry, these officials were confident that things 
would get better.
‘I think everybody knew that the main problem was that the 
Singaporeans did not give the SND enough face. If we are in charge, 
we will work harder at building bridges with the SND, and probably 
with other regional industrial estates as well. We need to work together 
as a family. The most pressing issue is to make sure that everybody 
wins.’ (CO 1)
8.4  ‘S in g a p o r e a n 9 Co m p e t it iv e  A d v a n t a g e s ?
Even though the announcement of the disengagement reflected the
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s lack of optimism about the
future economic prospects of the Suzhou Industrial Park, it also suggested that
as an entrepreneurial agent in China, it was less than effective. As discussed in
earlier chapters, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state believed that
it had competitive advantages in the China economy, including a shared
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ethnicity, understanding Chinese business practices such as guanxi13. Based 
on data gathered for this research as well as in the findings from another 
survey14, Singaporeans—including the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state—appeared not to actualize these competitive advantages. This research 
asked all the respondents to assess the Singapore government’s record in 
China based on the Suzhou Industrial Park project. The question posed was: 
‘How good was the Singapore government in doing business in China?’15 On 
the whole, most respondents gave the Singapore government a ‘poor’ grade, or 
declined to comment (see Table 8.3).
T a b le  8.3: R e sp o n ses  t o  ‘H o w  G o o d  Was T h e  S in g a p o re  G o v e r n m e n t  I n  
D o in g  B u s in e ss  in  Ch in a  ? '  (n=103)
___________ Good Average Poor Don’t Know/ Decline to Comment
Percentage 5______5_______40 50____________________________
Source: Interview Data
When probed, many respondents identified two indicators that demonstrated 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s lack of competency in 
China: firstly, the leaders of the Singapore entrepreneurial elite did not 
understand the nature of the internal political system in China, and secondly, 
they underestimated the strong social basis that underpinned all 
relationships—regardless of whether they were economic or political—in 
China.
P o l it ic a l  N a iv it y
On the issue of politics in China, an analyst in the consulting industry
from Pricewaterhouse Coopers’ C.W. Chey assessed the SIP’s problems as
emanating from: ‘[The Singapore government] misjudged the ability of the
local authorities to ignore orders from Beijing.’ {Singapore Business Times 18
Sep 1999) This was also admitted by one key member of the Singapore
entrepreneurial elite:
‘...I think we underestimated the length of the chain of command 
between the centre and the locals, and the extent to which the locals
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have latitude.’ (Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, 
quoted in Singapore Straits Times 10 July 1999)
In essence, the Singapore entrepreneurial elite could not cope with the ‘centre- 
versus-regional’ politics that have emerged in China since the 1979 economic 
reform (Breslin 1996: 365). While the centre (Beijing) kept a tight rein over 
certain aspects of society, it had ceded control on many other aspects. In 
Suzhou’s case, it was fairly evident that Beijing had limited influence over the 
city’s political and economic decision-making. Also, the nature of centre- 
region relationships was certainly more two-way rather than top-down (also 
see Duckett 1998), whereas politics in Singapore was generally ‘top-down’ 
(see Chua 1999).
‘They [the Singapore entrepreneurial elite] assumed that the China 
government functioned in exactly the same way as the Singapore 
government. They might have accepted that it might have been bigger, 
but they probably expected Beijing to be organized along the same 
lines. To Singaporeans, if the top said “Jump,” the bottom would say 
“how many times?” This is not how things work in China.’ (NA 24)
‘I think that the Singapore government made the serious mistake of 
only dealing with Beijing. You can see that whenever there is a 
problem, Singaporeans go to Beijing. But if the problem is a Suzhou 
problem, you ought to deal directly with the Suzhou Mayor. Beijing 
talks loudly but does not act very much at local level. You want 
anything done, you do it at the local level. In fact, Suzhou is at least a 
couple of layers removed from Beijing. Suzhou Mayor reports to the 
Jiangsu Governor before anything gets to Beijing.’ (EU 3)
Some respondents—particularly those that were fluent in Mandarin— 
identified that the Singapore government’s greatest mistake was to 
misunderstand China’s guo qing. Translated literally, the term means ‘nation’s 
sentiments.’ Thus, some respondents said that the Singapore government did 
not realize how important guo qing was to the Chinese, and often took actions 
that ‘hurt’ China’s guo qing.
‘Let’s take the software transfer: the Singaporeans came in here and 
told everyone that what they were doing was all wrong, and they had to 
learn the right way. This was a direct accusation that the Chinese way 
was backward. This couldn’t have gone down well with the Chinese.’ 
(NA 23)
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‘Sometimes, the Singaporeans want things changed, and changed 
quickly. For example, they feel that a particular department did not 
require 10 people to do a certain job, so they should cut four 
employees. This is not the Chinese way of doing things. To even 
suggest this was to insult the four that were to be cut.’ (NA 9)
‘I remember a particular incident when the Singaporeans wanted the 
Jiangsu officials to sign a MOU or contract regarding when the 
Shanghai-Nanjing highway would be completed, and exactly how 
many access roads the SIP would get to the highway. The Jiangsu 
official just told him [Singaporean delegate] not to worry, everything 
would be sorted out when the time came. However, the Singapore side 
persisted, and although the Chinese gave them this contract, the 
damage had been done.’ (NA 17)
Therefore, according to these respondents16, the problem boiled down to the 
Singapore government’s ‘arrogance.’ This arrogance, they explained, was not a 
serious issue when there were no extraneous problems, but under unfavourable 
conditions—such as during poor economic conditions caused by the Asian 
Financial Crisis—these issues would surface. When asked about guo qing, the 
Singaporean officials had quite a different view of the problem.
‘Guo qing can be translated into: “We can’t change.” It’s just a lousy 
excuse for not taking that extra step to catch up with the rest of the 
world. The problem—the real problem—is that they are not interested 
in becoming more professional, or more efficient. They want the best 
of both worlds. Come on, you can’t have your cake and eat it.’ (SO 1)
‘Yes I have heard that many Chinese say that Singaporeans don’t 
understand China’s guo qing. Personally, I fully understand how it 
works. It says you can’t cut jobs, make people work harder and faster, 
and be more efficient, simply because that’s how it always has been. 
But to me, if the guo qing hinders modernization, then there is 
something wrong with them not us! ’ (SO 3)
Most respondents felt not only were the leaders of the Singapore 
entrepreneurial elite naive about Chinese politics, but also failed to understand 
how important the social basis of all relationships in China. They felt that 
personal relationships, both real and metaphorical, were absolutely essential in 
order to ‘get ahead in China.’
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S o c ia l  N a iv it y
‘Its not just about guanxi, but being sociable and close to everyone you 
do business with in China is very very important. I’ve been in China 
for close to 10 years with a variety of different multinationals, and the 
reason why they want me to run this plant is because I know how to 
develop good relations with the Chinese wherever I go. Now, would it 
have been so impossible for the Singapore government to give the local 
Suzhou leaders some face? The Suzhou people were always trying to 
be supportive, but I did not see the Singaporeans give anything back.
So I can understand why there were problems of communication at the 
ground level.’ (NA 15)
According to most respondents, the lack of reciprocity was the key strategic 
‘mistake’ made by the Singapore entrepreneurial elite. Although reciprocity 
was carefully cultivated with the China government (in Beijing) and with 
industrial transnational corporations, at no time did the elite ever demonstrate 
that it was interested in developing reciprocity with the local Suzhou 
authorities.
‘I think the Singaporeans over here are quite out of touch with the new 
reality of doing business in China. We have heard that they distanced 
themselves from the Suzhou side because of their fear of guanxi. But in 
reality, this guanxi thing was not about personal favours or corruption. 
It was about having good social ties. In this context, by not even being 
interested in being friendly with the local authorities was certainly a 
snub and caused them to lose face. The Suzhou people would therefore 
see the Singaporeans as high and mighty, and they don’t really care for 
them much.’ (EU 1)
‘The problem with China is that even though the economy is 
developing fast. There is much talk that guanxi is losing its grip. I am 
not so sure; I think deep down, it matters. I suspect that when it suits 
the Chinese, they drop guanxi, especially if they stood to gain. 
However, when they want to, they will use guanxi. It is my own view 
that no matter what goes on, whether these Chinese managers get 
Harvard MBAs [Master of Business Administration], or even after 100 
years, I don’t see guanxi disappearing.’ (NA 3)
‘Doing business in China is more than just about having guanxi. Its 
being sensitive to local conditions. We have operations in five 
continents, and even though our logo is the same, operations vary. 
Why? Because we believe that to be effective, we must adapt and 
maximize the local conditions. As they say, when in Rome, do as the 
Romans do. The Singaporeans tried to bring Singapore to China. They 
talked about software transfer. Don’t they know that for software to be
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transferable, the hardware must be compatible? You can’t run Apple 
[software] programmes on IBM! It was like doing a blood transfusion 
of two different blood types. Appeared to work for a short while, and 
then failed miserably later.’ (NA 11)
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s social distance from the 
Suzhou Municipal Authority contrasts directly with the close ties it had with 
Beijing. However, for local projects, embeddedness with Beijing would not 
always guarantee success at the so-called ‘ground level.’
‘From the ground level, the Suzhou Mayor sees the Singaporeans as 
only interested in dealing with Beijing, whereas Beijing does not have 
that much influence here. Sometimes I get the feeling that they only 
turn to Beijing when they need something; otherwise, they much prefer 
Beijing to leave them alone.’ (SG 2)
It was also interesting to discover the Suzhou Municipal Authority’s 
assessment of the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state. Upon the 
announcement of the disengagement, the Suzhou Mayor, Chen Deming, told 
the press that ‘Singapore investors should be cautious in future tie-ups.’
(Singapore Business Times 29 June 1999) He went on to say that Singapore 
and China resolved their differences over the Suzhou Industrial Park showed 
that were was a ‘cultural divide’ between the two:
‘In our co-operation in the past five years, that we have to use an MOU 
[memorandum of understanding] to solve our problems is because of 
the cultural differences in the two countries, and the different 
understanding of the items in the documents.’ (Chen Deming, Mayor of 
Suzhou, quoted in Singapore Business Times 29 June 1999)
Thus, at one level, Chen was suggesting the obvious: that Singapore’s 
legalistic and ‘by-the-book’ approach—hence its frequent use of MOUs and 
contracts—was not common practice in China. At another level, he was 
criticising the Singapore party’s lack of reciprocity, particularly towards the 
Suzhou Municipal Authority. Some respondents commented on this issue:
‘Singaporeans like to stick to the rules, even when the rules don’t work 
anymore. I think this is what upset many Chinese people, because they 
felt the Singaporeans could have put the book down and talked to us. 
They could have tried to be more understanding of our problems. That
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way, the Chinese would certainly have been more understanding of 
your problems.’ (CO 2)
‘Another thing Singaporeans don’t understand is the importance of face 
to Chinese people, especially Chinese leaders. If you appear to slight 
them in any way, you have immediately made an enemy. Sometimes, 
the Singaporeans acted as if the Suzhou Municipal Authority simply 
did not exist, going straight to Beijing for everything. This must have 
upset the Suzhou Mayor deeply.’ (SA 1)
Thus, the Suzhou Mayor’s statement that there was a cultural divide between 
the two parties was an implicit criticism of the leaders of the Singapore 
entrepreneurial elite. Earlier in the history of this project, the elite had 
regularly said that it could perform the role of being the gateway for ‘Western’ 
investors into China. Its claim of expertise and competency in doing business 
in China were based on its claimed ethnic affinity, and its claimed competence 
with Chinese business practices. However, by late 1999, most observers felt 
that Singaporeans generally lacked an understanding of the ‘finer nuances’ of 
Chinese business practices:
‘The view that many people in China have of Lee Kuan Yew is that 
he’s Chinese on the outside, and a Westerner on the inside. And like 
many other naive westerners, people are saying he got swindled by the 
Chinese.’ (AC 3)
Therefore, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state did not realize all 
the projected competitive advantages, especially those that were supposed to 
be advantageous for doing business in China. Instead, the Singapore 
government appeared to be as far removed as the stereotypical ‘western’ 
business person in China. The Singapore entrepreneurial elite was possibly 
even worse off than the ‘westerner’ because in some circumstances, the 
westerner was willing to learn Chinese business peculiarities, whereas the 
Singapore government opted to ‘import’ Singaporean practices instead. As 
suggested in the previous chapter, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state also marginalized the local Suzhou authorities. Ultimately, the poor 
social relationships at the local level did negatively affect the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project.
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8 .5  Th e  E l i t e ’s  R e f l e c t io n s
After the announcement of the disengagement, some key leaders of the
Singapore entrepreneurial elite had been asked by the media to account for and
evaluate the Suzhou Industrial Park project. This section analyzes the elite’s
own assessment of the project, as this provides a useful insight into its
motivational and strategic processes. Generally, the Singapore entrepreneurial
elite’s responses could be divided into two camps: those that believed the
project was a ‘valuable lesson,’ and another camp that ‘blamed the Chinese’
for its failure.
V a l u a b l e  L e s so n
‘Valuable experience...it was an ambitious project, but the alternative is 
worse, never to try risky things, which we get blamed for too. We 
learned a lot of things from this project—how they work together with 
them so that you can get things done despite the difficulties.’ (Lee 
Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, quoted in 
Singapore Straits Times 10 July 1999)
The ‘valuable lesson’ view was that the project had some benefits as well as 
some problems. On the one hand, the elite was proud that they had correctly 
identified an economic niche in China’s economy, and devised effective 
strategies to capture it. It had successfully provided high quality industrial 
infrastructure and managed to transplant a Singaporean ‘operating system’ in 
the Suzhou Industrial Park for the benefit of the investors. On the other hand, 
they admitted that they misjudged the length of the chain of command from the 
top (Beijing) to the local level (Suzhou), assuming that Singapore’s strong and 
close relationship with Beijing would solve all of its problems. For example, 
Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong—a key member of the elite—was 
interviewed by Fortune magazine:
FORTUNE: Do problems recently in Suzhou cause Singapore to think 
differently about creating economic space offshore?
BG LEE: We have to do it perhaps more soberly. The main problem 
was we didn’t pay enough attention to the local interests and the role of 
the local government. We assumed that if the central government 
wanted it, it would happen. China doesn’t work like that...
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FORTUNE: You didn’t realise that?
BG LEE: Well, we didn’t realise it forcefully enough. {Fortune 25 Jan 
2000)
In addition, on assessing the level of collaboration between the Singapore 
government and the China government, Lee Hsien Loong said:
‘We’ve been able to overcome them in a way which does not do harm 
to our overall ties, and which establishes confidence between both 
sides, in good faith, and in the fact that interests have to be respected 
and cannot just be trodden on. The SIP was not an exercise where one 
side is being Santa Claus to another either way. It has to be—what the 
Chinese call—ping deng hu hui hu li, or equal mutual benefit. But in 
interpreting those few characters, in real life, there’s a whole new 
chapter which can be written that’s complex, that depends on working 
relationships, depends on mutual confidence and goodwill, depends on 
establishing a way of working which both sides can have faith in and 
that’s what our people have been trying to do day by day.’ {Singapore 
Straits Times 17 Sep 1999)
This showed that despite the problems at the project, close ties with Beijing 
were paramount. However, the key objective of this project—creating an 
external income that would supplement Singapore’s economy—was not 
realized. Not only has the Suzhou Industrial Park been unprofitable, it 
appeared to be losing money. The root of the problem was the contradictions 
between economics and politics, and there was a clear change in focus after 
disengagement.
‘It’s [the Suzhou Industrial Park] not an easy model to implement 
where you have more than one objective. I think if it was purely a 
commercial project it would have been easier to handle. Or if  it is a 
project that is entirely government, again it would be easier to handle.’ 
(Lim Neo Chian, CEO of CSSD, quoted in Far Eastern Economic 
Review 26 Aug 1999)
Thus, there were no mixed signals for the ‘new look’ CSSD. It made plans to 
boost profit margins, including undertaking real estate development and 
cutting costs by ‘localising’ {Singapore Business Times 20 Sep 1999). Lim, the 
CEO of CSSD, was quoted as saying that developing, building and selling 
residential properties—particularly low and medium cost flats in the area—
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were immediate priorities. This was because between 1998 and 1999, private 
developers reported a strong demand for ‘non-expatriate’ housing in the area. 
Residential projects such as ‘Orchid Manor’ and ‘Xincheng Garden’ had 
already sold the majority of flats within the Suzhou Industrial Park’s housing 
belt even before any of them were completed. Although the large majority of 
buyers were employees of companies located in the Suzhou Industrial Park— 
as they could utilise their Provident Fund as the deposits for these properties— 
there were several buyers who were employees of companies located 
elsewhere17. It was in response to this strong demand that the CSSD itself has 
targeted developing such flats with the aim of raising its income.
For the ‘localisation’ strategy, the objective was to simply cut costs 
because the CSSD’s operational overheads were too high considering the lack 
of direct income. Therefore, the most obvious strategy—at least from the 
company’s perspective—was to reduce the number of Singapore expatriates 
employed by the CSSD. In 1999, the company had employed 24 Singaporeans, 
down from the initial 57 in 1996 {Singapore Business Times 20 Sep 1999).
The next step, according to respondents at the Suzhou Industrial Park, was to 
lower this to under ten. Between 1992 and 1999, the SIP’s officials that were 
Singaporean nationals were remunerated at levels equal or higher with their 
peers in Singapore, whereas Chinese nationals employed were remunerated at 
the local (Suzhou) market rate. This meant that the Singaporean expatriate 
manager at CSSD was earning five times more than his Chinese counterpart. 
However, at another level, with the impending change of majority 
stakeholding at the beginning 2001 in favour of the Chinese consortium, it was 
also a deliberate strategy to reduce the Singaporean influence in the office. To 
several respondents in China, such a change would ultimately mean that the 
CSSD’s development, marketing and management decisions in the future—if 
staffed by Chinese nationals—would reflect Chinese interests and system 
more18. To achieve this, the CSSD would frilly take advantage of the ‘software 
transfer’ in the intervening two years, hoping to train Chinese nationals to 
perform at the levels and expectations of Singaporean managers. Thus,
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whereas in the past the CSSD might have based its decisions on reasons such 
as political imperatives—for example having grand and extravagant designs 
that would have high political prestige value—its new role and objectives have 
been very clearly defined: make money.
S o u r  g r a p e s ?
The ‘valuable lesson’ perspective was quite different from Senior 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s own personal views. The Suzhou Industrial Park 
failed because of one factor: ‘The Chinese authorities.’
‘Because they do not close the Suzhou New District, and they do not 
suspend the SND, they will always be running round giving extra push 
to SND. And whatever we do in SIP, they will reproduce in SND. So 
there is a loss of focus.’ (Lee, quoted in an interview given to Channel 
News Asia 30 Sep 1999)
It was clear that Lee blamed the competition from the Suzhou New District— 
directed by the local authorities—as the key source of the Suzhou Industrial 
Park’s problems. He also criticized China’s lack of effective governance, 
which was defined as having top-down control. This could be seen from the 
same report when Lee was asked whether going somewhere else within China 
would make a difference, he replied:
‘If you ask me, the ideal situation is to go to a place like Beijing, where 
the Central government is in charge, who knows exactly what’s going 
on, or to go to Tianjin, which is near Beijing, which has the status of a 
province, where the municipal is also the provincial government, so 
there’s no one layer down.’ (Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in an interview 
given to Channel News Asia 30 Sep 1999)
This showed that Lee either did not or chose not to accept that political 
structures in China were very different from those in Singapore. There was 
further evidence of Lee’s single-mindedness about ‘top-down’ approaches in 
an interview by Forbes magazine:
FORBES: What mistakes were made in Suzhou and what lessons did 
you learn?
Lee Kuan Yew: We would have done better if  we had chosen a city 
with the shortest and most direct chain of command from the Chinese
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centre [i.e., Beijing]. Proximity to the top leaders would have helped, 
with fewer administrative layers between them and the project.
FORBES: What are the lessons to be drawn from the Suzhou 
experience by foreigners doing business in China?
Lee: We have learned that not only must there be a common purpose 
and interest between the central government and you [but also] that 
common purpose and interest must be shared by the local partner you 
have to work with.
FORBES: Last year, you told us that patience and determination are 
required to achieve one's objectives in China. Do you now see that 
other ingredients are needed to be successful?
Lee: When dealing at provincial and lower levels, you have to live with 
their business culture. It requires you to be flexible, to compromise and 
do things half their way. We thought that they wanted to learn to do it 
the Singapore way, according to proper rules and strict procedures.
That was what the centre wanted. But the reality at the local level could 
not be overcome.
FORBES: Will Singapore's experience with the Suzhou project deter 
future industrial collaboration between Singapore and China?
Lee: No, it will not. Ordinary business investors have to adopt their 
standards when working with local authorities. Now both sides have 
agreed that the Chinese side will take over majority shares of the 
project from Jan 1, 2001. We will help the Chinese team to be ready to 
take charge, and we will stay on as a minority partner until 2003. If 
they want the Singapore consortium to stay on beyond that, they will 
need to make good use of the intervening period to win over the 
international investors in the Singapore consortium.
FORBES: China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping said in the 1980s that 
China should use Singapore as a model. Does the Suzhou Industrial 
Park show that Deng's idea is impractical?
Lee: It depends on the commitment of the top leaders in Beijing and 
the resources they put into a project. When the centre wanted to build a 
satellite singing “The East is Red,” it succeeded. To build an industrial 
park in Suzhou, like the one in Singapore, requires a somewhat similar 
commitment in time, energy and resources. Singapore can be a model, 
just as other countries are models for China. However, the result will 
always be “with Chinese characteristics.” (Forbes 15 Nov 1999)
It was unclear whether Lee could not or would not grasp the nature of politics 
in China. What also distinguished Lee from the other faction in the elite was 
his outright bitterness over the Park’s failure. In the same interview, Lee took 
swipes at the Suzhou authorities.
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‘And unlike the SIP, where recruitment is by open selection, whereas in 
SND, recruitment is by guanxi. So there is a very deep obligation and 
personal sentiments in not making people unemployed or redundant.
So you have all these complicated items that prevent a rational, 
objective solution.’ (Lee, quoted in an interview given to Channel 
News Asia 30 Sep 1999)
Lee’s frustrations over the Singapore entrepreneurial elite’s eventual 
disengagement from the Suzhou Industrial Park could perhaps be understood if 
his own personal stake in the project is factored in.
‘This [the Suzhou Industrial Park project] is an experiment which will 
not fail. Mr Lee Kuan Yew himself has said that Singapore would view 
it as a personal failure if the industrial park did not succeed.’ Zhang 
Xin Sheng, Mayor of Suzhou (1996), quoted in Financial Times 9 Jan
1996)
Lee was central to the project, from the very conceptualization right through to 
its disengagement. In many ways, it was his ‘baby.’ Although Lee did not 
appear to have any personal financial stake in the project, he invested his 
personal and political reputation heavily. When his previous track record for 
economic and political decisions were further factored into the mix—Lee was 
credited for successfully leading the Singapore developmentalist state through 
the periods of industrial infancy to maturity—it could be argued that his 
bitterness over Suzhou was because he was simply not used to failure.
8 .6  Th e  D u s t  S e t t l e s
‘The Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park is anticipated to chalk up 
accumulated losses of US$90 million by the end of next year [2000]. 
However, Singapore and Chinese leaders who oversee the development 
of the govemment-to-govemment joint venture expressed confidence 
that the project would turn profitable some time. The CEO of the 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Co (CSSD), the 
township’s developer, said yesterday that yearly losses averaged 
US$23-24 million19 since the park was established five years ago ...
The losses were attributed to interest costs, operating losses and a one­
time write-off on the sale of water and sewage plants in the SIP.’ 
{Singapore Straits Times 15 Sep 1999)
221
Chapter Eight
After nine years—two years for planning (1992-1994) and five operational 
years (1994 to late 1999)—the date for the curtain to come down on the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s role as the majority shareholder 
and prime mover in the Suzhou Industrial Park was set for January 2001. 
While it might appear that the Singapore entrepreneurial elite’s overall 
credibility in the eyes of transnational corporations might have been 
diminished, it could at least be assured that capitalist clients often have short 
memories, mainly of their focus on profitability. Companies that might openly 
regret the change of share-holding at the Park would have to admit that their 
over-reliance on the Singapore state in this context was actually poor business 
strategy. From the perspective of the Chinese partner, Beijing’s silence over 
the Suzhou affair allowed it to remain aloof of the domestic squabbles. On the 
one hand, a world superpower could not afford to deal with some weeds in the 
backyard. Yet, by appearing to appease the Singapore government, Beijing 
ensured that diplomatic ties, at least at the highest governmental levels, 
remained unaffected by this phase. As this chapter has shown, the Suzhou 
Industrial Park’s disengagement phase was similar to other earlier phases. It 
was as much about maintaining the project’s competitive advantage for the 
future, as it was about maintaining good collaborative relationships with key 
partners.
1 The main period o f the fieldwork for this research was conducted between July and 
September 1999 in Suzhou, almost immediately after the official announcement o f the 
disengagement on 28 June 1999.
2 Lianhe Zaobao is a Chinese-language daily broadsheet that emanates from Singapore.
3 Some sense o f the Singapore political opposition parties’ line o f attack can be seen from their 
websites. See ‘other’ information sources in the Bibliography and References section.
4 In this report, the CSSD was due to pay a tranche o f US$10 million o f the overall US$50 
million loan it had secured from a consortium of banks, managed by Keppel TatLee Bank, a 
Singaporean bank (.Singapore Business Times 10 May 1999).
5 On exactly how the change o f shareholding will take place, paragraph 10 in the MOU read: 
‘In order to adjust the share-holding proportions o f CSSD, its assets will have to be valued. 
Both sides agree that, under “PRC’s Law on Joint Venture Enterprises,” and the 8th Clause o f  
MOFTEC and o f the State Administration for Industry and Commerce’s “Rules on Changes in 
Share-holding o f Foreign Enterprises,” valuation agencies will be engaged to evaluate CSSD’s 
shares. The valuation results will be used as a basis for computing share prices.’ (CSSD, MOU 
28 June 1999: paragraph 10). The complete text o f the MOU is reproduced in Appendix Five.
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6 In the sub-sample for the research, 30 respondents were China nationals, o f which 24 were 
native to Suzhou or surrounding counties (see Appendix One). In addition, the research also 
took the opportunity to chat informally with many local Suzhou people during my stay there 
between July and September 1999.
7 The research was ‘fortunate’ in that many GMs were recalled from their summer break to 
Suzhou upon news of the disengagement, and thus could be interviewed.
8 ‘N S’ refers to ‘National Service,’ which is mandatory for all Singaporean men over the age of 
17. The service entails a period o f full-time attachment o f two and a half years, and a 
subsequent annual part-time attachment (of up to 28 calendar days) to one o f Singapore’s 
armed forces— including the army, navy and air force— or civil defence forces (fire-fighting, 
disaster rescue and others).
9 This quotation comes from an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review , which itself has 
had relatively poor social dynamics with the Singapore government. In 1994, due to certain 
articles published that were highly critical o f the Singapore government, the magazine’s 
circulation in Singapore was virtually banned until 1997.
10 See, for instance, DPM Lee Hsien Loong’s comments that ‘Suzhou difficulties handled well 
enough to leave bilateral relations healthy,’ as quoted in Channel News Asia, 23 Sep 1999.
11 It appears that for some governments and regions, the Crisis has not ended. However, from 
the business community’s perspective, when they refer to the Crisis being over, they probably 
mean the ‘worst’ period, which was between 1997 and 1999.
12 In China, automobile production plants have been among the largest foreign direct investors. 
See UNCTAD (2000).
13 As an example o f how the Singapore government believed it understood these practices, see 
Singapore Business Times, ‘Know the mles in China, otherwise fill the gap’ (5 Nov 1995).
14 One study reports that Chinese managers perceived that Singaporean investors did not have 
good understanding of Chinese business practices, culture and the mentality o f their Chinese 
counter parts and workers. In this respect, Chinese respondents ranked Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese investors above Singaporean investors (Wang and Seah 1998: 3).
15 See Appendix Two for details about the interview schedule.
16 See Appendix One for background information o f the respondents. For instance, these three 
respondents (NA 3, 4 and 9) are China nationals working for transnational corporations.
17 For example, some respondents reported that they knew o f individuals working in downtown 
Suzhou and in the Suzhou New District buying such properties.
18 On this issue, a Singaporean manager in the CSSD said: ‘As a professional, I don’t care who 
is paying me to do the job, I will do the job well. If the Chinese are willing to maintain my 
salary at current levels, I gladly would work for them and devote all my energies to make this 
Park successful. However, in the current economic reality, I don’t think they can afford me. 
And anyway, I’m not afraid of my future...I have China experience. This is a major thing to 
sell to multinational or even Singaporean companies!’ (SO 1)
19 The CSSD issued a statement correcting the financial figures supplied, suggesting that the 
average annual losses were US$15 million between 1994 and 1996 and US$23 million 
between 1997 and 1999 {Singapore Straits Times 21 Sep 1999).
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C h a pt e r  N ine  
Su z h o u  a n d  Sin g a p o r e ’s R eg io n a l iz a t io n
In the previous chapters, the research has focused on explaining the ‘mixed 
fortunes’ of the Suzhou Industrial Park project. The focus has been on the 
actions, interactions and transactions between the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state, the China government, industrial transnational 
corporations and the local Suzhou authorities, who together basically for the 
project’s ‘inner circle.’ From the analysis so far, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s competitive and collaborative strategies have been 
effective under certain conditions, and less effective under others. However, 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state also utilized these strategies 
on three other entities: Singaporean enterprises in the Suzhou Industrial Park, 
the Wuxi Industrial Park, and the other Singapore-developed industrial parks 
in the Asia Pacific region. This chapter therefore examines the ‘outer circle,’ 
with the intention of providing a comparative foil to the Suzhou Industrial 
Park project.
9.1 S in g a p o r e a n  I n d u s t r ia l  E n t e r p r is e s
Although less overt and obvious, the Singapore transnational
entrepreneurial state also utilized its collaborative strategy onto Singaporean
enterprises in the Suzhou Industrial Park project. In 1999, 18 out of 83
companies in operation were either wholly private owned or state-owned and
government-linked Singaporean companies1. Previously, Singapore enterprises
had played a marginal role in the Singapore government’s development
strategies between 1965 and 1980 (Lim et al. 1988, Huff 1994, and Perry,
Kong and Yeoh 1997). Initially, the government felt that they were too small
and technologically backward to be the engines for generating rapid economic
development and growth in Singapore. Instead, the Singapore government
planned for the presence of large transnational corporations to bring
developmental effects, mainly because of their resources, technological
224
Chapter Nine
capability and wide networks of markets (Peebles and Wilson 1996: 3). 
However, after the ‘relative failure’ of the Second Industrial Revolution2— 
where transnational corporations declined to collaborate in the industrial 
upgrading project—the Singapore government decided to incorporate 
Singaporean enterprises in its development strategies (see Wong and Ng
1997). Therefore, in the 1990s, the Singapore government’s collaborative 
strategy sought to enhance its embeddedness with local enterprises. With 
greater embeddedness, the state could then have the capacity to direct local 
enterprises in nationally important economic projects3. Thus, in the ‘Strategic 
Economic Plan’ unveiled in 1990, there were many measures that encouraged 
local enterprises to collaborate in national economic projects such as the 
‘Regionalization’ programme.
In the programme, the state utilized economic mechanisms such as tax 
incentives and overseas market access information services for Singaporean 
enterprises. It even set up Singapore-run international schools to assist 
expatriate Singapore families with school-aged children in selected cities, 
including Suzhou (Wong and Ng 1997: 130). Local enterprises could also 
apply for an investment grant of up to 20 percent of intended foreign 
investment. Furthermore, a S$130 million (US$80 million) venture capital 
fund was launched by the Singapore Economic Development Board and a 
government-linked company, Transpac Capital, to help private Singapore 
companies ‘go regional.’ The fund, known as the Regional Investment 
Company (RIC), offered small and medium-sized Singapore businesses low- 
cost loans of up to S$600,000 (US$400,000) for investments in regional 
projects {Singapore Investment News 1 Jan 1995). Singaporean enterprises 
with larger projects could approach the Singapore Economic Development 
Board for other financial assistance packages. In 1995, the Singapore 
Economic Development Board (SEDB) created a S$1 billion Cluster 
Development Fund to assist local enterprises to ‘regionalize.’ Between 1994 
and 1995, the SEDB awarded S$170 million to 10 projects under the Overseas 
Investment Incentive, S$465 million to six companies in the Regional Venture
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Funds Incentive, about S$1 million to eight companies under the Investment 
Study Grant, and S$3 million under the Regionalization Training Scheme to 
150 companies (see Wong and Ng 1997). Thus, as part of the state’s larger 
regionalization strategy, Singaporean enterprises became as important as 
transnational corporations. The companies that most visibly took advantage of 
the regionalization incentives were those in property development and 
engineering activities; a few of these were government-linked corporations but 
the majority were wholly private owned enterprises (see Yeung 2000). The 
Singapore government’s reasons for including Singaporean enterprises were, 
once again, entrepreneurial:
These developments enabled Singaporean firms to export their 
expertise in infrastructure planning, engineering development, and 
project management, but through equity stake, they also allow 
Singapore firms to share in the future industrial growth of the 
regional economies.’ (Wong andNg 1997: 131)
The Singapore government was keen to encourage the ‘collaboration’ of 
Singaporean enterprises in the regionalization programme because their 
regional growth would filter back to supplement Singapore’s economy. By the 
late 1990s, it was already clear that the take-up rate on many of the subsidies, 
loans and venture funds was very high (see Pang 2000, and Okposin 1999). 
One reason was that these subsidies were economically more attractive to 
Singaporean enterprises than turning to ‘normal’ capital-raising sources such 
as private capital investment firms in Singapore. By 1995, China was one of 
the most popular destinations for Singaporean outward investments (see Table 
9.1).
Ta b l e  9.1 D estin a  t io n  o f  S in g a p o r e a n  C o m p a n ie s  ’ O verseas  In v e st m e n t s
Country 1994 1995 Total Total (%)
China 100 160 260 43.49
South Asia 44 96 140 23.43
Indochina 30 62 92 15.39
Southeast Asia 38 63 101 16.89
Others 5 0 5 0.01
Total 217 381 598 100
Source: Singapore Economic Development Board (1995: 72)
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The reasons for this investment pattern could be in part explained by China’s 
own economic attraction as a major market, but also in part explained by the 
strong ethnic links that many Singaporean business persons retained. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, almost 65 percent of Singapore’s population are 
those who would claim descent from China. However, the most important 
reason for the investment patterns of Singaporean enterprises proved to be 
heavily influenced by the Singapore government. The Singapore government’s 
embedding mechanisms also had the function of directing collaborating 
Singaporean enterprises towards participating in its regional projects as well. 
Strong evidence of this could be found in Suzhou.
S in g a p o r e a n  E n t e r p r is e s  in  S u z h o u
Although the specific location of Singaporean investments in China
was fairly evenly geographically distributed across the more popular zones 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, the Five SEZs, and the Eastern Coastal Provinces4 
(which included Jiangsu and Shandong Provinces), the investment patterns 
within Jiangsu Province were unusual. Firstly, investments were heavily 
concentrated in two cities, Suzhou and Wuxi. Secondly, within these two 
cities, Singaporean investments were entirely located in Singaporean- 
developed industrial estates5. Were the locational strategies of Singaporean 
enterprises influenced by the Singapore government? To examine this aspect, 
the research approached Singaporean enterprises in the Suzhou Industrial Park. 
The interviews were conducted with the same inquiry schedule that was used 
for the rest of the sample (see Appendix Two). However, there were additional 
probes on whether they came to the Suzhou Industrial Park to support the 
Singapore government and what role the Singapore government played in their 
company’s locational choice.
To the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state, Singaporean 
enterprises—just like industrial transnational corporations—were ‘warm 
bodies’ that bought or leased industrial units.
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‘We really don’t mind who we sell the units to, so long they meet 
the investment criteria (for environmental standards and sector 
profile). If they [Singaporean enterprises] didn’t come, there would 
be a rather large hole in our sales chart.’ (SO 1)
‘Singaporean enterprises have taken up a quarter of the units here in 
Suzhou. Perhaps most of them went into RBFs, and the vast 
majority of them are small investors, but that’s understandable.
There are no Singaporean equivalents of General Motors or IBM or 
any of the other giants. And in fact, we actually have the biggest 
Singaporean investors anywhere in the region located here in the 
park.’ (SO 2)
Even though all the Singaporean enterprises included in the sample reported 
that their investments in China sought to take advantage of Chinese market 
and its lower costs structures (in comparison to Singapore), their choice of 
locations within Suzhou heavily favoured the Suzhou Industrial Park. Many 
added that they specifically wanted to locate in Singapore government- 
developed industrial parks and would not have located anywhere else in 
Suzhou. In other words, they did not consider locating at Suzhou New District, 
Kunshan or Wu industrial areas, which were zones that allowed foreign 
investment geographically within Greater Suzhou city. When asked to 
elaborate, the three most commonly cited reasons why their companies 
preferred a Singapore government-developed industrial estate were: security, 
incentives and familiarity, in order of importance.
The ‘security’ of the Suzhou Industrial Park was defined by several 
respondents as its ability to ‘minimize risks’ and provide a ‘stable 
environment’ for operations:
‘For us, we are a SME [small or medium sized enterprise], so we 
don’t have the big information networks as the big MNCs 
[multinational corporations]. We have to take extra measures to 
minimize risks. I mean the big boys can afford to open and close 
plants, lose a couple of million (dollars), won’t hurt them at all. But 
us, this is our first venture outside the country, and we have a lot 
riding on this. So to us, having the Singapore government here, both 
in body and spirit, is very important. We believed that the Singapore 
government’s presence gave us peace of mind.’ (SG 1)
‘I think that as a Singaporean company, we could not risk going to a 
place where rules and policies could change overnight. Bigger
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multinationals probably could deal with that. But for us, we needed 
the guarantee of a stable environment provided by the Singapore 
government. I mean, the guarantee was not really legally enforced, 
but it gave our company a peace of mind.’ (SG 11)
Economic incentives were also important factors to Singaporean companies. 
Of all the 10 companies interviewed, only one did not get a subsidy, loan, 
grant, or any other form of state support. The rest took incentives ranging from 
financial injections to grants for overseas feasibility studies. The financial 
subsidies taken by these companies ranged from S$500,000 (US$300,000) to 
S$1.5 (US$1) million. When asked if these companies could have taken the 
subsidies and gone elsewhere in China, the responses were affirmative6. 
However, they stressed that it was their choice to come to Suzhou for the other 
reasons, such as being close to ‘big-brother’ companies (agglomeration), 
specific markets like Shanghai and the security of the Singapore government. 
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state had other forms of 
‘subsidies’ to encourage Singaporean companies to locate in the Park. A 
general incentive was the ‘special concessionary’ rental rate given by the Park 
developer to Singaporean companies. If these companies were members of the 
Singapore Confederation of Industries (SCI)—a formally recognized business 
association in Singapore—they would enjoy a discounted per unit rate for the 
first two years of operation. According to Steven Chong, senior manager of 
CSSD, ‘...we are a Singaporean regional industrial park, and want to help all 
SCI members participate in the Suzhou Industrial Park.’ (Quoted in Singapore 
Straits Times 20 Aug 1996)
There was also evidence that the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state utilized ‘co-investment’ as another economic mechanism. 
One company—the largest Singaporean investor in the Suzhou Industrial Park 
in terms of its committed investments—signed a ‘co-investment’ pact with the 
Singapore Economic Development Board. According to the respondent from 
this company, the SEDB’s Investment Department ‘bought’ shares worth 
nearly US$5 million in newly created plant in Suzhou.
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‘Of course, as a shareholder in this company, they [the SEDB] had a 
say in where this plant should be located. But it was not as if they 
insisted we come here; we had already envisioned to come to a 
Singapore-run park, so it was down to Wuxi or here. And in the end, 
we—not them [the SEDB]—chose to locate here.’ (SG 3)
In addition to security and incentives, ‘familiarity’ was cited by nearly all the 
respondents from Singaporean companies. It emerged that the familiarity was 
not psycho-social but very functional and economic in nature. Psycho-social 
familiarity, in the form of a shared kinship or allegiance—to a nation, club, 
ethnic group and so on—acts as conduits for collaboration (see Schneider and 
Maxfield 1997: 14). Yet, what emerged from the interviews were the 
economic benefits of familiarity.
‘We have chosen this park because we are familiar dealing with 
Singaporean officials, Jurong Town Corp people, and most 
importantly, Singapore-style system. This saves us a lot of time and 
headache. We did not have to learn new rules or systems. Even the 
forms we fill up look like those at home. When we deal with 
(Chinese) officials, we felt that they were almost like Singaporeans 
(in terms of efficiency).’ (SG 4)
‘The Singapore system here was very important to us. This was our 
first venture in China, and we needed to be up and running quickly, 
so we didn’t have the time to leam about how to get things done the 
Chinese way. Even if the other zones might claim to be international 
standard, going there would still have given us another worry about 
whether it was true or not. Here, we felt we were working with old 
friends, like the Singaporean officials at the CSSD or those at the 
EDB.’ (SG 9)
Based on these responses, it was clear that the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state was overtly utilizing embedding strategies on the 
Singaporean enterprises to get them to locate at the Suzhou Industrial Park. 
Thus, the evidence suggested that the utilization of the collaborative strategy 
on Singaporean enterprises—at least those covered by the research—was 
effective. However, at the same time, these companies willingly allowed 
themselves to be ‘steered’ towards the Suzhou Industrial Park, mainly because 
of the high degree of complementarity and potential economic benefits. The 
potential drawback of being embedded in this case was the lack of company
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autonomy. For example, private enterprises ought to have the autonomy to 
choose their investment locations. However, for this issue, it emerged from the 
data that these companies almost never considered alternative locations.
Another interesting aspect emerging from the data was the question of 
‘nationalism.’ In this sense, there was almost total agreement among the 
respondents that their operations in China had business-oriented rather than 
nationalistic underpinnings.
‘We didn’t come here to support the government, carry the 
Singapore flag, or whatever. We came here because we think we can 
make money.’ (SG 2)
‘In 1996, if  you were in manufacturing and you didn’t come to 
China, you’d be missing out on a tremendous business opportunity. I 
would still say that despite the Crisis and all the other problems 
[disengagement], we’ve done rather well here.’ (SG 11)
‘We are not a very big company, so when we felt that manufacturing 
in Singapore was not viable, we wanted to move out. The question 
was to where? We had such a wide choice: Indonesia or Malaysia, 
which was closer, or Vietnam, which was cheaper. But in the end, 
the basic fundamentals directed us here to China.’ (SG 3)
One respondent even cited his company’s closure of certain operations in 
Singapore in order to come to Suzhou, in the process laying off nearly 100 
employees. He argued that he had to think of his company’s survival first, even 
before thinking about Singapore’s economy. He was quick to add that 
Singapore’s economy would not sink or swim on the account of his company’s 
plans.
Even from this small sub-sample of Singaporean companies, it might 
be concluded that the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s 
embedding mechanisms had significantly influenced the Singaporean 
companies’ choice to locate at the Suzhou Industrial Park. It was more difficult 
to prove that they were ‘directed’ or ‘ordered’ to come to the Park. Several 
Singaporean companies were interested in China but lacked certain attributes 
that would have encouraged them to venture by themselves. By collaborating 
with the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state, these companies
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strategically took advantage of the created conditions. As such, it would be 
inaccurate to say that these companies were manipulated by the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state; a better description would be to suggest that 
these companies consented to be directed because of the potential benefits. The 
Singaporean companies got their financial incentives and security blanket 
while Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state benefited from having 
companies acquire units in Suzhou. Thus, these Singaporean companies chose 
to ‘collaborate’ on the basis of complementarity and mutual benefit.
9.2 A f t e r  D is e n g a  g e m e n t
Given the Singaporean enterprises’ relatively high degree of
embeddedness onto the Singapore government, what were their responses to
the latter’s impending disengagement? Research on the industrial transnational
corporations included in the sample indicated that although many were
disappointed with the Singapore government’s decision, nearly all of them
stressed that they would continue their operations nonetheless. This indicated
that industrial transnational corporations could accept the embedding strategies
of the Singapore government without necessarily becoming deeply embedded.
However, the Singaporean enterprises were different from archetypal industrial
transnational corporations particularly in their resources owned and business
strategies. Compared to the transnational corporations included in the research,
only 4 of the 10 Singaporean companies included in the sample had other
foreign operations. In other words, there were six Singaporean enterprises that
only had production plants in Suzhou and Singapore. One reason for this lack
of ‘global’ spread could be explained by the resources of the Singaporean
enterprises, many of whom described themselves as being ‘small and medium
sized’ companies. 9 of the 10 companies included in the research employed
fewer than 50 employees in Suzhou. Furthermore, there was not much
difference between private and state-owned or government-linked Singaporean
enterprises in this sub-sample, in terms of investment commitments, scale of
operations and persons employed.
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In terms of business strategy, another indication that these Singaporean 
companies were not ‘archetypal’ transnational corporations was their relative 
dependence on the Singapore government. Based on the data gathered in 
Suzhou from Singaporean companies, several of the Singaporean companies 
used the terms ‘over-dependent’ and ‘under-prepared.’
‘It was only after the announcement of the Singapore withdrawal 
that it hit us: we were under prepared for going overseas. We are a 
small operation, and we could have remained in Singapore; but 
when this park was open, and with the cost of labour being only a 
fraction, we had to come. When we came, we were well taken care 
of, by the Singaporeans here. We’ve been operating mostly as if this 
was Singapore, but at a cheaper cost structure. Now, we will have to 
find our own way, as the Singapore government is not going to be 
here for much longer.’ (SG 9)
‘Our company might have been over dependent on the Singapore 
government. We trusted them too much, especially in assuming that 
they would be here for the long term. Still, we cannot complain 
about the situation, we are doing quite well, and perhaps we are 
ready to go solo.’ (SG 2)
When asked how their (Singaporean) companies would react to the Singapore 
government’s withdrawal from the Suzhou Industrial Park, 9 out of the 10 
respondents sounded ‘worried.’
‘For nearly two years, we operated here as if this place [the Suzhou 
Industrial Park] had a Singapore postal code. There are 
Singaporeans all over the place, the place is more or less run by 
Singaporeans...there even is a silly tree-planting day or cleanliness 
campaign just like back home. And you know there’s that 
Singaporean food court near Singa Plaza? Even the operators 
[employees] are becoming so Singaporean...talking about their 
provident fund and buying their own flats when they get married.
And in fact, I am supplying our sister company back home with 
products. I mean, for all intents and purposes, I could close my eyes 
and imagine I had to send a shipment from Jurong [in the west of 
Singapore] to Kallang [in the east]. I suspect with the Singapore 
government now gone, its not quite going to be the same.’ (SG 4)
‘Actually, I won’t say that we will miss the Singapore government 
but we are concerned about future business conditions. You see, we 
[Singaporean companies] are all small and medium size companies, 
which mean we are very susceptible to market volatility. If this park 
was Singapore-run, in tough times, we could perhaps negotiate with
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the Singaporean officials for breaks or postponements and so on. 
Without them, well, we just don’t know how the Chinese would do 
things. Maybe it will be the same, maybe not. It’s just that we don’t 
feel so comfortable without the Singapore umbrella.’ (SG 1)
‘I think there is a general concern among many Singaporean 
managers. But I think this is because we got complacent. I fully 
admit that we always thought the Singapore government would be 
here long term. We never worked hard at learning the Chinese way 
of doing things, or to get to know the Chinese better. If we had gone 
to Shenzhen or Shanghai, we would have had to. So over here, 
we’ve been spoon fed, and pushed around in the pram. Now we’re 
suddenly told we’re on our own. Whose fault is it that we have not 
grown up? Our own, and I freely admit that I am guilty of this 
complacency. The only good thing is that it is not too late to learn. I 
hope.’ (SG 3)
‘Our company’s biggest concern about the future is that without the 
Singapore government around, the Chinese might make sudden 
decision shifts. They are famous for that, and it happens all the time 
elsewhere in China. We haven’t faced that here, and I believe this is 
because of the Singapore system established by the government. 
However, with them gone, nobody is going to stop the Chinese from 
doing as they please. Now if we were big MNCs, we can probably 
absorb it, do some creative accounting and sweep it under the 
carpet. But not us, we’re a small company and any small change for 
the worse would affect us quite seriously.’ (SG 8)
While there might have been some pessimism in the tone of these responses, 
every informant clearly attempted to put on a brave face. None of them said 
that their companies had contemplated withdrawing, scaling down or even 
postponing expansion plans. All of them said their companies were going to 
give the Suzhou Industrial Park ‘a go.’ Just like managers of transnational 
corporations, managers of Singaporean enterprises displayed some ‘corporate 
pride,’ which can be described as a form of outward display in order to 
demonstrate his or her own managerial capability to overcome obstacles.
One exception was a Singaporean company that could be described as 
being more ‘globally connected.’ Although originated from and still legally 
domiciled in Singapore, it had several units in other countries. The response 
from this manager suggested that the company was evolving more into an 
archetypal transnational corporation. To him, wherever they establish
234
Chapter Nine
operations or when it is time to think about relocating, the company thinks in 
terms economics, geography, politics and society, in that order of importance. 
Their focus was singularly on profits. Governments, according to this 
respondent, were a secondary consideration that affected the first four factors, 
and was not a main factor by itself.
‘Our business is to supply them [transnational corporation across the 
road] with the circuit boards. We did it for them in Singapore, when 
they told us they wanted to come here, we decided to trail them. So 
we are here not because the Singapore government is here, but 
because they [other companies] are here. Yes we have benefited 
from the Singapore government’s presence, but we are pretty 
independent. If they [big brother] had chosen to go to Inner 
Mongolia, we probably would have followed, with or without the 
Singapore government.’ (SG 1)
The concern among the Singaporean companies—especially those that were 
small and medium sized—regarding the disengagement of the Singapore 
government could be generally explained by their lack of experience in the 
global sphere. Their over-embeddedness—translated into over-reliance—to the 
state, coupled with their small scope of business activities and firm size did not 
induce them to Team’ how to effectively function in the global game of 
industrial production. For the single Singaporean enterprise that had greater 
experience in the global game, it was much more confident without the 
Singapore government.
Thus, the evidence from Singaporean enterprises—regardless of 
whether they were private or state-linked—that were located at the Suzhou 
Industrial Park indicated that they were effectively embedded onto the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state. The embeddedness had brought 
mutual benefits for both sides. Singapore enterprises had benefited from the 
‘secure’ environment created by the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial 
state, relieving them of learning and other adaptive costs. Furthermore, the 
Singaporean companies’ high degree of familiarity with the Suzhou Industrial 
Park’s Singaporean system greatly reduced their transaction costs. However, 
the embeddedness led several Singaporean companies to become—in their
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own words—complacent and over-reliant on the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state.
9.3 Th e  Wuxi I n d u s t r ia l  Pa r k
The Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state developed not one
but two industrial parks in China. While the Suzhou Industrial Park was its
‘flagship’ project, the other project—the Wuxi Industrial Park—resembled the
other seven ‘regular’ regional industrial parks, in that its development and
management were designated to a Singaporean government-linked
corporation. However, as a direct contrast to the Suzhou project, the Wuxi
Industrial Park project offers a comparison of the utilization of the competitive
and collaborative strategies.
‘Suzhou [industrial park] is very much a Beijing-Singapore 
[government] affair so the cooperation between Singapore and the 
municipality has not been as smooth as in Wuxi, which is a project 
between Singapore Technologies and the municipality.’ (Goh Toh 
Sim, General Manager of CSSD, quoted in Asiaweek, 21 June 1996)
Being only 60 kilometres west of Suzhou, this research took the opportunity to
n
study the Wuxi Industrial Park . This park was initially planned to be one 
square kilometre (approximately 10 hectares) in size {Singapore Business 
Times 10 May 1995), which meant that it was even smaller than Suzhou 
Industrial Park’s Phase One (eight square kilometres). Another difference is 
that the Wuxi Industrial Park is located within the Wuxi Municipal Authority’s 
‘New Zone,’ a large plot of land just outside central Wuxi city8. Between 1995 
and 1999, the Wuxi Municipal Authority has been developing the Wuxi 
National High Tech Development Zone, while Singapore Technologies and 
later Sembawang Corporation oversaw the development of the Wuxi Industrial 
Park. The only thing separating the two estates is the Shanghai-Nanjing 
highway.
During its ground-breaking ceremony in October 1995, the Wuxi 
Industrial Park announced that it had 25 companies signed up, committing 
US$320 million {Singapore Straits Times 9 Oct 1995). In 1998, there were 48
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investors including transnational corporations such as Siemens Components, 
Seagate, Sumitomo Electric, Matsushita Refrigeration, Hitachi and Maxell, 
committing US$585 million (Singapore Investment News 1 Jan 1998: 12) The 
‘nationality’ of the investors were reported as follows: Japan 37 percent, Asia 
(including Singapore) 31 percent, Europe 17 percent and America 15 percent 
(ibid.)
The Wuxi project’s collaborative strategy differed significantly from its 
twin in Suzhou. The Wuxi Industrial Park was developed by a company that 
was a joint venture between Singapore Technologies and the Jurong Town 
Corporation International—both Singaporean government-linked 
corporations—and the Wuxi New Zone Development Company, an agency 
linked to the Wuxi Municipal Authorities. Unlike the project in Suzhou, this 
company did not have high level govemment-to-govemment support. Thus, 
the focus of the collaborative strategy was at the local rather than at the 
national level. This was also reflected in the relatively ‘local’ composition of 
the Wuxi project’s board of directors, which was made up of representatives 
from the main shareholders only, and not from the national governments9. In 
1997, Singapore Technologies sold its shares to Sembawang Corporation, 
another Singaporean government-linked corporation. Secondly, the 
collaborative strategy did not involve any ‘formal’ transfer of software.
Instead, any technological or managerial expertise transfer was carried out 
informally. In this sense, the officials of the Wuxi project indicated that the 
transfer was two-way, as they claimed that the Singaporean agency was as 
willing to learn Chinese practices, as they were keen on Singaporean systems. 
Finally, the collaborative strategy was singularly focused on commercial 
interests. Unlike the Suzhou project, there was no agenda to experiment with 
social welfare reforms, or labour management issues. The Singaporean 
partner’s inputs included the development of infrastructure, and the marketing 
of property units. The local partner’s inputs were its administrative and 
logistical support. Yet, despite these commercial interests, the pressure to
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realize profits, especially in the short-term did not appear to be as intense as it 
was in the Suzhou project.
Compared to the Suzhou Industrial Park, the Wuxi project had much 
less media coverage. This made secondary data gathering relatively more 
difficult. However, the research asked every correspondent to compare the two 
Singaporean industrial parks in China, and the emergent information was very 
interesting. The overwhelming view was that the Wuxi Industrial Park was 
‘.. .doing better.’ (See Table 9.2)
Ta b l e  9.2: R e s p o n d e n t s ’ Vie w  o f  th e  Wu x i In d u s t r ia l  P a r k  (n = 102)
Proposition Agree
(%)
Don’t Know 
(%)
Disagree
(%)
The Wuxi Industrial Park is doing 
better than the SIP
95 5 0
The Wuxi Industrial Park is a better 
location than the SIP
25 25 50
Source: Interview Data
‘Doing better’ was explained by respondents in two ways: firstly, they 
identified that the Wuxi Industrial Park did not appear to be losing money, and 
secondly, it did not have poor local-foreign relationships (as the Suzhou 
Industrial Park apparently did). It was significant that nearly all the 
respondents based in Suzhou were aware that the collaborative relationships in 
Wuxi were much better than those in their own park. However, when asked if 
the Wuxi Park was a ‘better location,’ most respondents stressed that the 
Suzhou Industrial Park’s infrastructure and administration was probably the 
best in all of China.
‘I’ve been in China for over three years. I have been in occasional 
contact with some managers based at Wuxi. They tell me they are 
very pleased with the Wuxi Park. They saw that being over there, 
they are big fish in a small pool. If they were here, they’d be small 
fish in a big pool.’ (AS 2)
‘I actually was bom in Wuxi, so I was very pleased to see the Park 
there do well. My family still live there, and they are surprised to 
hear that the mood over here [Suzhou] is very tense, whereas the 
mood over there—between the Singaporeans and the Chinese—is 
actually very good.’ (NA 5)
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‘The reason why the Wuxi Industrial Park is doing well is because it 
is away from the spotlight. Left alone by the foreign media, Chinese 
officials, Singaporean officials, and you students too. They just get 
on with the business of doing business. Over here, there’s always 
something going on.’ (EU 3)
‘I surveyed the Wuxi Industrial Park. I think the tax policies and 
everything else were more or less the same [as the Suzhou Industrial 
Park]. Then we figured that the quality of the infrastructure was also 
about the same. But they did not have any software transfer, and we 
were a little concerned, at that time about the local authority. 
However, we did like the atmosphere over there, less competitive. I 
mean, I remember meeting with the Singapore developers and the 
Chinese developers at the same time. They welcomed us together, 
and discussed with us what we wanted out of the industrial property. 
At one stage, the Chinese developer said that perhaps the 
Singaporean option would suit us more. I couldn’t believe my ears!’ 
(NA 7)
This research interviewed two officials of the Wuxi Industrial Park. They— 
both China nationals employed by Sembawang Corporation—explained that 
the Wuxi Industrial Park was considered to be a ‘specialist’ estate within the 
Wuxi New Zone. Both respondents said that they worked very closely with 
their Wuxi counterparts on issues such as marketing and administration.
‘When we meet prospective clients, I will not hesitate to refer them 
to the High Tech New Zone if it would suit them more. We have 
done referrals in the past, and they have referred some to us. We win 
some, lose some. Sometimes, we refer clients to go to Suzhou too. 
We have our reputation to think about. We don’t want an unhappy 
client here.’ (WX 1)
‘We have regular quarterly meetings to iron out any administrative 
issues. My department is assigned to deal with tax issues, so 
sometimes we meet with colleagues from all the Wuxi zones to 
discuss solutions.’ (WX 2)
‘I think the reasons why our relations here are good, as compared to 
over there [Suzhou], is that our expectations are low, our goals and 
objectives are modest. Over there, there is this do or die mentality. 
Over here, we have a long term development programme, where we 
expand slowly and a at pace where we can cope, the estate can cope 
and the city can cope.’ (WX 1)
Therefore, as suggested earlier, the imperative for profitability at the Wuxi 
Industrial Park was not as high as compared to the Suzhou Industrial Park.
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From one estimate, Singapore Technologies had only invested around US$5 
million into the Wuxi Industrial Park, as opposed to figures almost ten times 
higher in Suzhou. Furthermore, the main partner in the venture had developed 
effective social relationships, which might have defused any competitive 
tensions. Even Lee Kuan Yew could not help but be impressed with the degree 
of embeddedness in Wuxi.
‘I wish Wuxi was placed in Suzhou and Suzhou was in Wuxi.’ (Lee 
Kuan Yew, quoted in Singapore Business Times 5 Dec 1997)
S u z h o u ’s A s s e s s m e n t  o f  W u x i?
It was also interesting to hear how the organizations in the Suzhou Industrial 
Park viewed the Wuxi Industrial Park. What was clear was that the Wuxi 
Industrial Park often took the role of being a minor player in the global game 
of industrial production; however, with the Suzhou Industrial Park’s eroding 
competitiveness, was it possible that Wuxi was viewed as an antagonistic 
competitor as well, particularly as it could boast of offering ‘Singapore-styled’ 
infrastructure and management?
‘We don’t consider Wuxi a threat. We can’t go around regarding 
everybody as a threat. We have to focus on our core competence and 
maximize our offensive strategies, and not constantly worry about 
defensive strategies. Furthermore, even at the upper levels, Wuxi is 
not considered a loose cannon; it plays within the rules of the game, 
just like the vast majority of industrial estates in China and all over 
the world. So we don’t consider it a problem at all.’ (SO 1)
‘I think they have a good relationship with the Chinese because it is 
virtually a Chinese dominated joint venture. The Singapore side is a 
sleeping partner. Well, it might have financed most of the project, 
but now it is not really calling the shots. It is sitting back and 
waiting for the project to bring in the money. Good luck to them.’
(SO 2)
‘I think we can learn something from Wuxi. I think we can learn 
how to get along with the local authorities without conflicts. I think 
that is going to be very important for us in the future.’ (CO 1)
‘For all the good spirit in Wuxi, they face tremendous difficulties. 
They can’t seem to get enough investments; the growth there is very 
slow. They are very fortunate that one or two big Japanese 
companies liked Wuxi, and along came a whole bunch of little
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brothers to tag along. I am unsure about the long term viability of 
the Wuxi Industrial Park. To an outside onlooker, they do not have 
any unique characteristics, nothing special.’ (SO 3)
‘I don’t think we could have adopted the Wuxi model [relationship 
with municipal authority]. To be absolutely frank, that would have 
meant cutting the pie for more people to share. That means less for 
us, which would have almost certainly have meant that we would 
not have even embarked upon the project as we know it [high 
government intervention]. We were quite sure, in the beginning, that 
our model would have brought in greater profits than the Wuxi 
model. But we were proven wrong in some respects. So, in 
hindsight.. .which model was better? Both have some advantages 
and disadvantages.’ (SO 1)
The ambivalence that these officials of the Suzhou Industrial Park towards the 
Wuxi Industrial Park is perhaps understandable. The Wuxi Industrial Park 
project appeared to have been more effective in finding a system of co­
existence between the Singaporean and Chinese collaborators. Thus, from the 
surface, their relationship had weathered hard times, including the Asian 
Financial Crisis. It could be argued that because the Singapore-local 
collaborative relationship in Wuxi was positive, the prospect for Wuxi’s long­
term viability was enhanced. In comparison, the top-down govemment-to- 
govemment approach favoured at the Suzhou Industrial Park has actually 
threatened the long-term viability mainly because of the ineffective 
embeddedness at the local level10. So was the relative success of the Wuxi 
project implicitly a criticism of the Suzhou project? This was difficult to 
ascertain. From an entrepreneurial perspective, the Wuxi project could not 
match the economic growth of the Suzhou project, especially between 1994 
and 1997. Yet, over the long term, the Wuxi project appeared to have greater 
stability and prospects. Therefore, in many ways, the Suzhou project might 
represent the proverbial ‘hare’ that sprinted ahead, but might be eventually 
caught by the Wuxi ‘tortoise’ that was developing slowly but surely.
9.4  Th e  O t h e r  R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r ia l  Pa r k s
Finally, a cursory survey of the other Singapore government-developed
industrial parks was useful, because they act as a comparative foil for the
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Suzhou Industrial Park case, and would contribute to providing a wider picture 
of the transnational entrepreneurial state. All the information on the other 
regional industrial parks was gathered from secondary sources, and thus any 
conclusions drawn remain speculative. Although the Suzhou Industrial Park 
was the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s most ambitious project 
of the ‘regionalization programme,’ it was but one of eight Singapore 
government-developed industrial estates in the Asia Pacific region. As 
discussed in chapter four, regionalization—to the elite—was a means of re- 
stimulating Singapore’s economy in the 1990s, where the development 
strategies were transnationally rather than nationally oriented. The 
regionalization programme also had an overtly entrepreneurial agenda; it was 
designed to take advantage of new economic opportunities in the region for the 
purposes of creating profits. Within the programme, the Singapore 
entrepreneurial elite—particularly Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the 
Chairman of the Singapore Economic Development Board Philip Yeo—was 
especially keen on the ‘regional industrial parks’ projects in Indonesia, China, 
Thailand, Vietnam and India. At all of these projects, the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state utilized the competitive and collaborative 
strategies.
Evaluated as an entrepreneurial activity, by the end of 1999, the 
regionalization programme could be best described as being only partially 
effective. The aspects that appeared to be most effective included the accurate 
identification of the economic niche in the market, and the initial strategies to 
capture this niche. Firstly, the clearest indicator that the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state had designed a highly competitive ‘product’ 
was from the high demand for industrial property by industrial transnational 
corporations, at least between 1992 and 1997. This was the case in the Suzhou 
project, and others studies on a few Singaporean industrial parks in the region 
have also found this to be true (see Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997, Grundy-Warr, 
Peachy and Perry 1999, and Perry and Yeoh 2000). In Batam, where there 
were eight industrial estates designated for export processing, only the
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Singapore-developed Batamindo Industrial Park reported near capacity 
tenancy, while the other seven—managed by Indonesian agencies—remained 
largely vacant (Grundy-Warr, Peachy and Perry 1999: 316). The Vietnam- 
Singapore Industrial Park, 35 kilometres outside Ho Chi Minh city, reported 
16 companies signing up for industrial space before the park was operational 
(iSingapore Straits Times 24 May 1997). While tenancy was negatively 
affected by the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis after 1997, in late 1999, 
Singapore’s regional industrial parks saw a renewed interest in industrial units 
after a Tull’11. Secondly, most investors appeared to be very satisfied with 
their operations within these industrial parks, especially in terms of actualizing 
costs savings (see Kumar and Lee 1991, and Perry and Yeoh 2000).
However, even though these industrial parks were competitive, their 
profitability was less clear. There are some reasons offered: firstly, investments 
in infrastructural projects usually do not yield short-term profits. Secondly, 
even if the period of five to ten years is considered ‘medium-term,’ the 
economic performance of these parks was affected by the Asian Financial 
Crisis, which could not be forecast. For example, the launch of the Thai- 
Singapore Industrial Park in Rayong (Thailand), scheduled for 1997, was 
delayed for nearly two and a half years12. This was because the developers—a 
Singaporean government-linked corporation—were extremely concerned about 
the impact of the Crisis on the wider Thai economy. There were even rumours 
that this particular project would be abandoned (see Bangkok Post 10 
September 1998). In addition, other ‘spillover effects’ of the Asian Financial 
Crisis also unexpectedly affected the Singapore-developed parks. In 1999, 
during the height of the political turmoil in Indonesia caused by the Crisis, the 
Batam and Bintang Industrial Parks were affected by riots, work stoppages and 
other problems, including an ethnically driven conflict between the Batak and 
Flores Indonesians on the islands (see Far Eastern Economic Review 12 Aug 
1999; Singapore Straits Times 2 Aug 1999). At one stage, the Singaporean 
government-linked corporations contemplated withdrawing from all their 
industrial parks operations in Indonesia for safety reasons {Singapore Straits
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Times 2 August 1999). In these industrial parks, projections of profitability 
were completely revised.
Finally, the Singapore government was in some respects even more 
entrepreneurial in the other regional industrial parks than in the Suzhou 
project. This was because in the other projects, the state’s only concern was 
generating profits that would eventually supplement the Singapore economy. 
However, at the Suzhou project, it attempted to transfer Singapore’s ‘operating 
system,’ social welfare and labour management practices to Suzhou, perhaps 
as a political and social experiment for the benefit of the China government. 
Thus, when there were difficulties and problems in Suzhou, as reported in the 
previous chapter, economic and political agendas appeared in conflict.
From another angle, the Suzhou Industrial Park and the other 
Singapore-run industrial estates did create an outlet for Singaporean 
enterprises—both private and government-linked—to diversify their activities 
through the collaborative strategy. Although the regionalization of these 
enterprises also have not yet turned profitable—again mainly due to the impact 
of the Crisis—at least many have already established a foothold in the region 
and gained valuable experience. It could further be argued that if and when the 
region recovers, the Singapore government (as an entrepreneurial agent) and 
Singaporean enterprises would be in a promising position to take advantage 
once again. Thus, in ‘interventionist’ terms, the Singapore transnational 
entrepreneurial state evaluated the country’s economic position within the 
global game of industrial production, and subsequently identified, devised and 
executed strategies to achieve national economic growth. This intervention 
was ‘transnational’ in nature, as the potential for national growth was not 
promising. Thus, from a sociological perspective, the Singapore 
entrepreneurial state transcended its national boundaries and intervened to act, 
interact and transact in the regional arena with other players in the global game 
of industrial production. This thesis is not meant to explain the wider 
regionalization programme; however, based on this study of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project—as it was one of the most ambitious and important
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projects within the larger programme—certain conclusions can be drawn. It is 
a truism to say that most actions could carry intended as well as unintended 
consequences; indeed ‘interventionist’ economic or industrial policies are no 
exceptions. The intended consequences of pursuing state-led transnational 
strategies has allowed the Singapore economy to benefit from the economic 
opportunities from the wider region which otherwise would not have been 
there. It could be hypothesized that had the state not devised the regional 
industrial parks project, the relocation by industrial transnational corporations 
of their lower value added operations to the emerging regions would have 
brought either no benefit to the Singapore economy or even weakened it. 
Instead, with state intervention, an attempt was made to (financially) benefit 
from such relocation. However, the old adage, ‘live by the sword, die by the 
sword,’ also holds true in this case when the exposure to the region (and by 
implication global dynamics) left the Singapore government’s strategies 
vulnerable to global downturns, as seen during the period of the Asian 
Financial Crisis13. Yet, to adopt another old adage, perhaps for the Singapore 
government, ‘...it was better to have loved and lost, than not to have loved at 
all.’ The key question is therefore whether the Singapore state has 
‘entrepreneurially’ learnt from this experience as it enters the new millennium.
‘The Suzhou Industrial Park was an expensive lesson for the 
Singapore government. The regionalization strategy will continue, 
but in a different form. The state’s presence will be less obvious. It 
will perform a more facilitative rather than directive role from now 
onwards.’ (SO 6)
9.5  C o n c l u s io n
In the previous chapters, the research has examined the dynamics of the
inner circle of the Suzhou Industrial Parks project, explaining the actions,
interactions and transactions of the key players such as the Singapore
transnational entrepreneurial state, the China government, the industrial
transnational corporations, and the local Suzhou authorities. This chapter has
widened the focus to examine the outer circle, focusing on the Singaporean
enterprises at the Suzhou Industrial Park, the processes ongoing at the Wuxi
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Industrial Park, and the other Singapore government-developed regional 
industrial parks. The conclusions that could be drawn from these cases were in 
many ways very similar to the processes surrounding the Suzhou Industrial 
Park. These other cases had initially benefited from the Singapore 
government’s interventionist strategies: Singaporean enterprises had taken 
advantage of the regionalization strategies; and the other regional industrial 
parks had initially captured the intended niche in the regional economy. 
However, when the external conditions turned unfavourable, these 
Singaporean enterprises and state-driven projects consequently were negatively 
affected. Therefore it could be argued that the outer social circle of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park mirrored processes within the inner circle.
1 This research’s sample included 10 o f these 18 Singaporean enterprises (see Chapter Six, 
Table 6.1).
2 The Second Industrial Revolution (1980 onwards) was an economic policy that encouraged 
private enterprises to upgrade their operations towards higher value-added activities. However, 
instead o f upgrading, the majority o f the enterprises in Singapore— which were industrial 
transnational corporations— opted to relocate manufacturing to the emerging regions (see 
Chapter Four).
3 See Yeung (1998) for details on how the Singapore government had fostered a few state- 
owned enterprises and government-linked corporations in a developmentalist mode. However, 
in Singapore’s wider context, with the state’s heavy reliance on industrial TNCs, the effects 
were relatively minimal (see Lim et al. 1988).
4 See Okposin (1999), Yeung (1998), and Yeoh and Willis (1998) for some data on 
Singaporean companies in China.
5 Information gathered from interviews with officials o f the SIP and WSIP.
6 Three companies were reported to have taken state subsidies to establish additional plants in 
other parts o f China.
7 During the course o f the fieldwork in China, the Wuxi Industrial Park was visited several 
times, with interviews with park officials conducted in August 1999 (see Appendix One).
8 The Wuxi Municipal Authority oversees eight development zones, all o f which allow the 
issue o f foreign business licenses.
9 Unless attributed, the information presented here was gathered from a research trip to the 
Wuxi Industrial Park, where two officials were interviewed (23 Aug 1999).
10 The alternative argument is that without the top-down govemment-to-govemment 
relationship, the economic forecasts o f the Suzhou Industrial Park would have been too low, 
and the project would not have been viable in the first place. In any case, these issues are 
tangential to the main argument, as this research is not solely focusing on the economic 
performance o f the estates.
11 Channel News Asia reported that ‘Singapore JTC’s Industrial Parks in Asia see improving 
occupancy rates,’ 7 Oct 1999.
12 Construction for the Thai-Singapore 21 Industrial Estate was originally planned for 1996; 
however, it only began building in September 1998 {Bangkok Post 10 September 1998), and 
the first tenants began operations in 1999 {Bangkok Post 9 May 1999).
13 A strong argument could also be made to show that even if the regionalization programme 
did not exist, Singapore’s economy would have still suffered from the Crisis.
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C h a p t e r  T e n
T h e  S o c io l o g y  o f  t h e  T r a n sn a tio n a l  E n t r e pr e n e u r ia l
State
This study has examined one government’s utilization of interventionist 
development strategies to deal with rapid economic globalization at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The Singapore government embarked upon the 
Suzhou Industrial Park project—which was the largest, most ambitious and 
politically significant project within its regionalization programme—in order 
to generate financial profits that could supplement Singapore’s national 
economy. This chapter will reiterate that this project was an exemplary case of 
a transnational entrepreneurial state participating in the global game of 
industrial production. It will conclude by situating this case within the existing 
theories of interventionist development strategies.
10.1 E v a l u a t in g  t h e  S u z h o u  I n d u s t r ia l  P a r k
Inevitably, the question: ‘Was the Suzhou Industrial Park project a
failure?’ will be asked. The answer, as always, depends on who is asking this
question, and what interest he or she has in the project. This research did not
have the intention of analyzing the Suzhou Industrial Park from a business or
management perspective, or even a prescriptive policy-oriented perspective; its
objective was never that of identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the
project for purposes of generating recommendations that would improve future
projects. Instead, this research has a sociological objective: to explain the
relationships between key actors interacting and transacting within a particular
economic, political and social environment over a specific time period. In this
case, the study sought to develop the concept of the transnational
entrepreneurial state participating in the global game of industrial production.
More specifically, this study sought to explain the actions, interactions and
trausactions of the Singapore government within the Suzhou Industrial Park
project between 1992 and 1999.
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The Suzhou Industrial Park project was the ‘flagship’ project within 
the Singapore government’s broader ‘regional industrial parks’ project, which 
was designed to develop highly profitable industrial estates in the 
neighbouring countries. In this project, the Singapore government utilized 
interventionist development strategies, especially with the use of competitive 
and collaborative strategies. In the competitive strategies, the objective was to 
intervene in the ‘market,’ supplying high quality secondary factors of 
production—particularly industrial infrastructure and bureaucratic 
administration—which were deficient in China at the time. In the collaborative 
strategies, collaboration with key players such as the China government, 
industrial transnational corporations and Singaporean enterprises was 
encouraged as a purposive strategy to further enhance the competitiveness of 
the project. The competitive strategies were initially very effective. The 
infrastructural and institutional attributes, as well as its prime geographic 
location, gave the project a significant competitive advantage over other 
industrial estates in China. This demonstrated that the Singapore government 
had accurately ‘read’ the market, and intervened successfully to capture a 
niche. Furthermore, the project’s overall competitiveness was further improved 
by the collaborative strategy, which maximized the inputs of other players, 
such as the China government, transnational corporations and Singaporean 
enterprises. These players were motivated to collaborate because of the 
effectiveness of the Singapore government’s embedding mechanisms and 
because collaboration was mutually beneficial. The embedding mechanisms 
achieved complementarity, effective governance, and confidence and trust 
among collaborators. Industrial transnational corporations benefited from the 
collaboration, as they could enjoy the Suzhou Industrial Park’s high quality 
industrial infrastructure and administrative system, which was closely 
modelled on the system in Singapore. The China government also benefited 
from the collaboration as the project had given it an opportunity to experiment 
with an ‘alternative’ model of economic development and industrialization. 
This included the successful implementation of the Provident Fund scheme for 
employees in Suzhou, as well as successful training of SIP AC as efficient
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administrators. Also, to the central China government in Beijing, the 
objectives of employment creation, technology and management transfer, and 
foreign currency generation were met, at least between 1992 and 1997. To the 
Singapore entrepreneurial elite, this transfer validated their view that effective 
implementation of large-scale projects required the full govemment-to- 
govemment support. This support was both necessary to get the project off the 
ground, as well as served as a means of further attracting potential investors.
However, the Suzhou Industrial Park’s competitive strengths were 
ironically its weaknesses. By focusing the collaborative strategies on the top- 
level govemment-to-govemment relationships, the Singapore government had 
marginalized key local players. Without the input or support of the local 
Suzhou Municipal Authority, the Singapore government soon found that day- 
to-day operational problems were suddenly magnified, especially after 1997. 
Part of the reason was that the leaders of the Singapore government did not 
fully understand the nature of politics and business in China. It assumed, 
incorrectly, that local governments would be fully aligned with national 
concerns. Also, the Singapore government assumed that the solution to solve 
local problems was through the national government. As the Singapore 
government eventually discovered, the regional-central relationships in post- 
1990 China were much more complex. In addition, the Singapore government 
was unable to maintain the project’s competitive edge over time. This was 
both because of the increasing competitiveness of other estates as well as the 
impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. For example, the Suzhou Municipal 
Authority had quickly observed and adopted the Singapore government’s 
competitive strategy, eventually utilizing it for their Suzhou New District. 
With the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the transnational 
corporations’ demand for industrial property in China diminished. This placed 
the two Suzhou industrial estates in direct competition with each other. As the 
Suzhou Industrial Park could not compete on the basis of price because of the 
fixed investments in infrastructure, it was at a disadvantage when trying to
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attract expansionist industrial transnational corporations that were seeking to 
relocate lower value added operations to low cost areas such as China.
Therefore, the ‘mixed fortunes’ of the Suzhou Industrial Park project 
was not just the result of the Singapore government’s strategies. Equally 
responsible were the resources, motivations and strategies of the other 
participating collaborators and competitors, as well as the influence of the 
external environment, particularly the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
There was a possibility that the Singapore government and the Suzhou 
Municipal Authority could have collaborated rather than competed for clients. 
Although it may not be an appropriate comparison, the case of the 
collaboration between the Singaporean developer—which was a Singaporean 
government linked corporation—and the local Wuxi Municipal Authority at 
the Wuxi Industrial Park, demonstrated that this was at least a possibility. 
However, the Singapore governments’ top-level govemment-to-govemment 
strategy effectively eliminated this option; indeed, it demonstrated a distinct 
unwillingness to compromise on this issue. The reason could have been 
economic in nature, as it did not want to share the spoils of the profits with yet 
another partner. By mid 1999, the Singapore government had re-assessed its 
position in Suzhou, and subsequently chose to disengage. This was seen as one 
measure to reclaim some of the financial losses, and also a means of 
exempting itself from any future financial liabilities that might occur.
The resources, motivations and strategies of the China partner—in this 
case referring to the political elite of the central government in Beijing—also 
contributed to how events turned out between 1992 and 1997. From Beijing’s 
viewpoint, its collaboration in the Suzhou Industrial Park has been fruitful. Its 
input in the venture has not carried serious or negative costs; indeed, its 
‘investments’—which involved politically and ‘morally’ supporting the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategies—achieved most of its 
developmental objectives, which was to create employment opportunities, 
achieve technology and managerial transfer, and generate income from 
taxation. Also, it could be argued that Beijing’s secondary objective of
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experimenting with an alternative path of ‘capitalism,’ as witnessed from 
SIP AC demonstrating that it could be both efficient and effective and the 
apparent successful transplanting of various social welfare schemes such as the 
Provident Fund and the internal migration policy1. However, as suggested 
earlier, Beijing was not in a position to intervene any further in Suzhou, mainly 
because of the changed political dynamics in post-1990 China. Local, regional 
and provincial authorities had grown more autonomous from Beijing, and the 
new political and economic relationship was much more finely balanced than 
in the past.
The strategies of the industrial transnational corporations were also 
important to the outcome of the project. Although as capitalist enterprises their 
prime motivation was profitability, the means of achieving this was less 
homogeneous. As this research has shown, certain industrial transnational 
corporations that came to the Suzhou Industrial Park were more ‘dependent’ 
on secondary factors of production; for instance enterprises involved in 
semiconductor, pharmaceutical and chemical processing required high quality 
industrial infrastructure and utilities. On the other hand other industrial 
transnational corporations chose Suzhou to take advantage of low primary 
factors of production, particularly labour costs. Also, there were other 
companies that saw the Suzhou Industrial Park as being able to supply both 
factors of production competitively. The differences in motivations of these 
industrial transnational corporations were initially not an issue to the 
Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state. All that mattered was that there 
was a regular stream of prospective tenants. However, with fewer customers 
during difficult times (such as during the Asian Financial Crisis), the structure 
of the global game of production shifted drastically. With the Crisis reducing 
global consumer demand, industrial transnational corporations had to reduce 
capacity and output. Thus, expansionist plans were either abandoned or 
postponed. This led to a reduction in the demand for ‘new’ industrial units 
such as those on offer in the Suzhou Industrial Park. Furthermore, with many 
new competitors also seeking to attract foreign investors, there was a large
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oversupply of industrial properties in China. Finally, where there were new 
investors, the size and scale of their investments were also significantly 
smaller. Therefore, from the perspective of the suppliers, the game had turned 
into one of intense competition for a small handful of clients.
10.2 Th e  Tr a n s n a  t io n a l  E n t r e p r e n e u r ia l  S ta  t e
This study has shown that the transnational entrepreneurial state is a
particular ‘interventionist’ state that closely resembled the archetypal 
‘developmental state’ in its actions. The similarity arises from its utilization of 
collaborative and competitive strategies to minimize the negative effects of 
rapid economic globalization and to take advantage of new opportunities. 
Developmental states have proven that selective intervention within the 
economy, particularly through collaboration with key private indigenous 
enterprises (and the exclusion of other groups seeking to interfere), has 
provided the platform for improving national competitiveness and in turn led 
to positive economic growth (Johnson 1982, Evans 1995, and Woo-Cumings 
1999). The transnational entrepreneurial state, however, differed from the 
model in that it was, firstly, primarily motivated to generate financial profits 
(entrepreneurship) from participating in the global game of industrial 
production. Secondly, its sphere of actions, interactions and transactions were 
outside of its own borders (transnational).
In this sense, the Singapore government’s regionalization programme, 
of which the Suzhou Industrial Park project has been an exemplary case, 
demonstrates how and why a transnational entrepreneurial state’s participated 
in the global game of industrial production. Although economic growth was an 
ultimate objective, its primary motivation was profit generation. Furthermore, 
any ‘developmental’ motivations were primarily focused on benefiting 
Singapore rather than Suzhou. This had serious implications in the course of 
the Suzhou Industrial Park project. Being singularly focused on generating 
profits, the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state was saddled with 
fixed costs (the price it had paid for the property to the China government in 
1994) and its own investment costs (the value added for developing
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infrastructure) during the years of the Asian Financial Crisis. On the other 
hand, competing local Chinese authorities could afford to disregard income or 
revenue generation as long as ‘developmental effects’—which referred to 
employment creation, technology and managerial transfer—were taking place. 
Thus, local Chinese authorities could theoretically afford to give away land 
‘cost free’ to foreign investors and wait for the worst of times to blow over. As 
such, the profit motive of the Singapore government becomes even more clear 
when it decided that institutional transfer to China—the so-called ‘software 
transfer’—was unprofitable from a financial viewpoint . This ultimately 
explained why the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state chose to 
disengage and recoup some of its financial investments by selling 30 percent 
of its shareholding to the Chinese partner.
The Singapore government had demonstrated that as an entrepreneurial 
agent, it could (initially) effectively identify economic opportunities in the 
global game of industrial production, devise and execute strategies to exploit 
these opportunities. This applied not just to the Suzhou Industrial Park project 
but also to its other regional industrial parks within the regionalization 
programme. The niche in the Asia Pacific sector of the global game of 
industrial production was the supply of high quality industrial infrastructure 
and bureaucratic administration. However, in order for it to remain an effective 
entrepreneurial actor, it had to constantly maintain its competitive edge. 
Theoretically, this might be done through regularly monitoring the 
environment and being quick to adapt when circumstances change. In reality, 
the Singapore transnational entrepreneurial state—in its involvement in the 
Suzhou Industrial Park project—was unable to maintain the project’s 
competitive edge, especially when it was clear that competitors had caught up, 
and also when the external environment changed. Within the sociology of 
development, the state’s inability to adapt and change is not unique; even the 
classic developmental states have demonstrated that they might be able to 
‘keep up’ with their own fostered enterprises in the changing global economy. 
In South Korea, the state-fostered chaebols had grown so large and resource-
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rich in the 1980s that they no longer required the state’s support in many 
spheres. Without taking the financial subsidies from the state, many chaebols 
therefore were not beholden to state directives any longer. This has led the 
South Korean government after the 1980s being described as ‘devolving’ from 
a ‘comprehensive’ developmental state to a ‘limited’ developmental state (see 
Kim 1997). The reasons why states could not adapt are manifold and often 
context specific; however, the commonalities indicate that the resources, 
motivations and strategies of the various agents and the influence of the 
external environment (or the global economy) matter significantly.
The Singapore government cannot be described as a failed 
transnational entrepreneurial state on the basis of its decision to disengage 
from the Suzhou Industrial Park project. Even though entrepreneurs are 
supposed to constantly maintain their competitive edge, in reality, this is rather 
difficult. Furthermore, having the foresight to change streams when a project 
was no longer viable was itself a sensible business decision. In other words, 
there was no sense in flogging a dead horse. The more pertinent question 
would be whether the entrepreneur had learnt from this experience, and 
whether this learning added to the stock of resources for future entrepreneurial 
ventures?
10.3 I n t e r  v e n t io n is t  S ta  t e s  i n  t h e  Gl o b a l  E c o n o m y
The transnational entrepreneurial state can be understood from within
the theories of interventionist development strategies. Like other 
interventionist states, the transnational entrepreneurial state’s strategies were 
designed to minimize the negative effects of rapid economic globalization and 
to take advantage of new opportunities. However, a transnational 
entrepreneurial state’s strategies differed from the model because it was 
primarily profit oriented, and it acted, interacted and transacted transnationally 
rather than locally.
Within theories of interventionist development strategies, states or 
governments pro-actively intervene in their national economies in order to
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enhance their competitiveness within the global economy. More specifically, 
the theory argues that governments will attempt to minimize the negative 
effects of rapid economic globalization while attempting to take advantage of 
new opportunities. In this light, the Singapore government’s choice of 
interventionist strategies is not surprising. States or governments that are 
motivated to encourage or maintain economic growth will try to come up with 
the most realistically possible strategies given their existing resources. In the 
past, governments have focused their interventions on their domestic 
economies because they either feel that local intervention would be most 
economically effective, or they feel that do not have the necessary resources to 
transcend their national boundaries. Furthermore, the nature of the intervention 
also depended on the state’s resources and the current structure of the domestic 
economy. Thus, from the theories of interventionist development strategies, 
developmental states opted for co-investment (collaboration) with domestic 
enterprises because this was the most efficient means to achieve global 
competitiveness (see Henderson 1997 and Woo-Cumings 1999). Alternatively, 
because of the political and economic resources they held, socialist states 
opted to nationalize and control all productive domestic enterprises as their 
development strategy (Block 1994). Some states, including the Singapore 
government before 1990 and the Irish government after 1960 (O’Heam 1998), 
adopted development strategies based on the location of industrial 
transnational corporations within their borders because of their lack of 
economic resources and the lack of productive domestic enterprises. Between 
these many options, there is a wide range of ‘hybrid’ developmental strategies, 
which may include any combination of EOI, ISI or FDI strategies3. Such a 
variation can be explained by the fact that governments will choose particular 
development strategies because of their resources and motivations, which are 
designed to minimize the negative effects of the global economy as well as to 
take advantage of new opportunities.
However, when a particular government—in this case the Singapore 
transnational entrepreneurial state—actually identified that it had the necessary
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resources, and there were imperatives within its own national economy it thus 
made the choice to become a transnational agent itself. In the case of the 
Suzhou project, the Singapore government demonstrated that it had the 
necessary economic, political and social resources. At the beginning of the 
1990s, it had financial surpluses, which it was seeking to invest profitably. 
Politically, it had good diplomatic relations with the host governments of the 
countries where it planned to invest. Finally, it had social resources such as the 
expertise and credibility in the fields of industrial infrastructure development 
and bureaucratic administration, not just with transnational corporations but 
also with the host governments. At the very same time, the Singapore 
government viewed that domestic industrial expansion was limited and there 
was also a lack of domestic enterprises which it could ‘send abroad4,’ with the 
intention of remitting profits back to the national economy. Therefore, from a 
theoretical perspective, a transnationally-oriented state would emerge under 
specific historical and economic condition where a particular government 
identified that intervention in the national economy would not be effective, 
and/or forecasted that transnational intervention was more beneficial.
Furthermore, even if such a state had the necessary resources, the 
outcomes of its strategies did not just depend on its actions, interactions and 
transactions with other key players, but would also depend on the dynamics of 
the external environment. This raises the most interesting theoretical 
implication of the concept of the transnational entrepreneurial state 
participating in the global game of industrial production. A transnational 
entrepreneurial state may be initially successful with its competitive and 
collaborative strategies. Yet, the game is never static. Competitors have the 
ability to learn and adapt. And as seen from the Suzhou project, the 
competitors could be actors such as a rival local government, the Suzhou 
Municipal Authority. Furthermore, when the Asian Financial Crisis began in 
1997, the number of players from the demand side in the global game of 
industrial production fell dramatically, as industrial transnational corporations 
were undertaking belt-tightening strategies. The Singapore government, as a
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profit seeking entrepreneurial agent, did not have the patience to sit out the 
storm, nor was it confident it could compete under the conditions after 1997. 
Therefore, a holistic sociological analysis of the concept of the transnational 
entrepreneurial state participating in the global game of industrial production 
must factor in the participation of local, regional, provincial and national 
governments, in addition to industrial transnational corporations. From a 
theoretical perspective, how these players participate in the game is therefore 
dependent on their respective conditions, resources, motivations and strategies.
W h a t ’s N e x t ?
At the macro level, this study has focused on developing a theory that 
can explain governmental strategies under conditions of rapid economic 
globalization. At the micro level, this study examined the case of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park project between 1992 and 1999. The most obvious route for 
future research is to examine whether the China government-run Suzhou 
Industrial Park would be able to compete in the global game of industrial 
production effectively in the future. In addition, would the software transfer 
‘pay o ff?  In the sense that if and when the China government finally takes 
down all its barriers for transnational capital, would the Suzhou Industrial Park 
have unique competitive advantages to distinguish it from the rest of the 
country? Also future research could examine the outcome of the other 
institutions incorporated in the Suzhou Industrial Park, particularly as a unique 
economic, political and social experiment for the China government. Due to 
the time frame of this research, the full impact of the new social security 
system—with the Provident Fund Scheme—in Suzhou cannot be fully 
understood for at least 10 to 15 years. The most significant aspect of this 
Scheme is the financial empowering of individuals in Suzhou, especially in 
terms of being able to purchase their own private or semi-private housing. 
Would this two-tier system—where some employees have the Provident Fund 
and others across town do not—create class structures in Suzhou? Also, the 
Suzhou Industrial Park has institutionalized more ‘liberal’ migration schemes
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for professionals. Would this in any way challenge the existing systems of 
‘local citizenship’ in the region? Only time, and additional research, will tell.
Although this research cannot explain the dynamics of global 
capitalism, it has opened an insight into the global game of industrial 
production and more specifically shed light on how interventionist states might 
participate in it. The game is as dependent on each player’s resources, 
motivations and strategies as it is dependent on the external environment. 
There has been a growing trend towards ever intensifying competition within 
the global game of industrial production that has been felt (and has been 
caused) by both sides. On the demand side, global capitalism has intensified 
the industrial transnational corporations’ motivations to dominate markets, 
leading to ever greater transnationalization of activities. On the supply side, a 
greater number of governments—national, sub-national and local—have 
adopted FDI-oriented industrialization as an economic growth strategy. Will 
other governments eventually be ‘pressured’ as a result of endogenous and 
exogenous factors to evolve into transnational entrepreneurial states? Only the 
future will tell.
1 See Chapter Six for details on these schemes, most o f which were only launched after 1997. 
Unfortunately, because o f the time frame for this research meant that an analysis o f these 
schemes was not possible. However, initial responses from the SIP’s officials indicated that the 
implementation o f these schemes went smoothly, and forecasts for their prospects were 
generally positive.
2 This would be a strong case to argue that the Suzhou Industrial Park project was clearly a 
profit oriented rather than ‘aid-oriented’ project.
3 Hybrid strategies include the dual use o f developmental and FDI-led strategies, as seen in the 
Korean and Taiwanese economies, where the governments fostered (and protected) indigenous 
industrial enterprises, but at the same time, also created Export Processing Zones (EPZs) to tap 
into foreign capital (see Fields 1995 and Chen 1995).
4 It could be argued that the rest o f the Singapore government’s regional industrial parks 
project shared many similarities with other ‘transnational’ states such as the Japanese and US 
governments that encouraged domestic enterprises to venture abroad. This was because the 
other regional industrial parks were developed and managed by Singaporean state-owned 
enterprises or government-linked corporations that were financially supported by the 
Singapore government. This therefore made the Suzhou project, where the Singapore 
government itself was actively involved in developing and management, significantly different 
(see Chapter Nine).
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A p p e n d ix  O n e
Th e  S a m p l e
S e c t io n  O n e : S u b -S a m p l e  o f  C o r p o r a t e  T e n a n t s
Summary No
Number of Companies from Europe 15
Number of Companies from Asia (excludes Singapore) 7
Number of Companies from Singapore 10
Number of Companies from North America 24
Total Number of Companies Covered in the Research 56
Total Number of Managerial Respondents Interviewed 64
1. 1 L is t  o f  R e s p o n d e n t s  f r o m  C o m p a n ie s  L o c a  t e d  a t  CSSIP
No Code Appt(l) Nat (2) Cn Exp (3) Gender Age
eul, BOC GM CN Yes M 35
eu2, Dorma GM CN Yes M 35
eu3, Glamox GM SG Yes M 30
eu4, Glaxo HR CN Yes F 30
eu5, Grundfos GM MY No M 35
eu6, LJF GM FR Yes M 35
eu7, L'Oreal OM CN Yes M 35
eu8, Mahr GM HK Yes M 35
eu9, MTU AGM CN Yes M 30
eulO, Nokia GM FI Yes M 40
e u ll, Rexton GM SG Yes M 40
eu l2, Saurer GM CN Yes M 40
eu l3, Vesuvius AGM BE Yes M 40
eu l4, Volex AGM SG Yes M 35
eu l5, ZF GM SG Yes M 50
asl, Je Je GM SG Yes M 35
as2, Advantest GM JP No M 50
as3, Daito GM JP No M 50
as4, Eisai GM JP No M 35
as5, Fujitsu GM JP Yes M 50
as6, Fujitsu AGM CN Yes M 30
as7, Mitutoyo GM JP No M 40
as8, Pokka GM JP Yes M 40
sgl, Amtek OM SG Yes M 30
sg2, Clearpack GM IN No M 30
sg3, Gul Tech GM SG No M 45
sg4, Hong Guan OM SG No M 35
sg5, Keppel GM SG No M 35
sg6, Keppel OM SG No M 35
279
sg7, Lion City GM SG Yes M 40
sg8, Lion City AGM SG Yes M 45
sg9, Microform GM SG Yes M 40
sglO, NCS HR SG No F 25
sg ll, Sing Tech GM SG No M 35
sgl2, Xpress GM SG No M 35
nal, 2-6 GM SG No M 35
na2, 2-6 AGM SG No M 35
na3, Allied Sig Cat HR CN Yes F 35
na4, Allied Sig Lam HR CN Yes F 35
na5, AMD HR SG Yes M 45
na6, Andrew GM US Yes M 50
na7, APC GM SG Yes M 45
na8, Aptar GM FR Yes M 35
na9, Baxter HR CN Yes F 35
nalO, Becton AGM MY No M 35
nal 1, BlackDecker GM UK Yes M 50
n al2, BlackDecker HR CN Yes F 35
nal 3, Com Dev FM CA No F 25
nal4, Com Dev AGM CA No M 30
nal 5, Copeland FM CN Yes F 25
nal 6, Culter GM MY Yes M 35
nal 7, Culter FM CN Yes F 25
nal 8, Delphi GM SG No M 40
nal 9, Dryvit FM CN Yes M 35
na20, Gates FM CN Yes M 35
na21, Jacobs HR CN Yes F 25
na22, Knowles GM TW Yes M 45
na23, Lilly GM US Yes M 45
na24, Lilly FM CN Yes F 25
na25, Littlefuse GM HK Yes M 45
na26, Millipore GM CN Yes M 35
na27, Nabisco FM CN Yes M 35
na28, Richs GM US Yes M 30
na29, Technic FM CN Yes M 25
Notes:
1. Appointment: GM-general manager, AGM-assistant/deputy general 
manager, HR-human resource/personnel manager, FM-financial 
controller/manager, OGM-operations/floor manager
2. Nationality (passport): CN-China, SG-Singapore, MY-Malaysia, FR- 
France, TW-Taiwan, IN-India, HK-Hong Kong, BE-Belgium, JP- 
Japan, CA-Canada, FI-Finland.
3. China Experience: Yes/No.
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1.2  A p p o in t m e n t s  o f  R e s p o n d e n t s
Appointment Frequency Percent
Assistant/Deputy General Manager 8 12.5
Finance Manager 8 12.5
General Manager 36 56.5
Human Resource Manager 8 12.5
Operations Manager 4 6
Total 64 100
1.3 P r ev io u s  China Wo r k  E xperien c e  o f  R e sp o n d e n ts
Frequency Percent
No 19 30
Yes 45 70
Total 64 100
1.4 R espo n d e n ts  Ca tego rised  b y  Gend er
Frequency Percent
Female 11 17
Male 53 83
Total 64 100
1.5 N a t io n a l it y  o f  Re spo n d e n ts
Frequency Percent
Asia-other 7 11
China 20 31.2
Europe 5 8
Japan 6 9
Singapore 21 32.8
North America 5 8
Total 64 100
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S e c t io n  T w o : S u b -S a m p l e  o f  O f f ic ia l s  a n d  O t h e r s
1.6 L is t  o f  Of fic ials  Inter  viewed
No. Code Organization Nationality Gender Age
1. SOI CSSD SG M 35
2. S02 CSSD CN M 35
3. S03 Xinsu SG M 35
4. S04 SEDB SG M 35
5. COl SIPAC CN M 30
6. C02 CSIP CN M 35
7. SND1 SND CN M 30
8. WSIP1 WSDP CN F 30
9. WSIP2 WSIP CN F 25
10. HG German Government DE M 50
11. S05 High Commissioner SG M 60
12. S06 High Commissioner SG M 55
Note: Unless specified, interviews conducted in Suzhou or Wuxi, 
China (Jul-Sep 1999)
1. Interview conducted in Hamburg, Germany, September 1998
2. Interview conducted in London, UK, October 1998
3. Interview conducted in London, UK, March 2000
1.7 O th ers  in ter  viewed
No. Code Organization Nationality Gender Age
1. SA1 Suzhou University CN M 35
2. SA 2 Jiangsu Research Inst. CN M 55
3. SA 3 Hangzhou University CN M 35
4. SA 4 Tongji University CN M 50
5. AC 1 SUNY Albany US M 50
6. AC 2 University of Calgary CA F 40
7. AC 3 Ford Foundation, Beijing US M 45
8. AC 4 Oxford, Oriental Institute HY M 35
9. AC 5 Liverpool UK M 45
10. AC 6 Beijing CN F 30
11. AC 7 u s e US F 36
12. O 1 Lawyer, Tokyo SG M 34
13. 0 2 National University of 
Singapore
SG M 55
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A p p e n d ix  T w o
Th e  I n t e r  v i e w  S c h e d u l e s
S e c t io n  O n e : S u b -S a m p l e  o f  C o r p o r a t e  T e n a n t s
1.1 S c h e d u l e  f o r  M a n a g e r s  f r o m  C o m p a n ie s  L o c a t e d  a t  CSSIP
No. Question Options
1. Investment Strategy
la. Why China?
lb. Why Suzhou?
lc. Why SIP?
2. Rate SIP AC Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
2a. Business license approval procedures Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
2b. Transparency Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
2c. Professionalism Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
2d. Competence Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
2e. Speed Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
2f. Better than Singapore Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
2g. Same as Singapore Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
2h. Better than other parts of China Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
21. Worse than other parts of China Satisfied/Neutral/Dissatisfied
3. Evaluate Tenancy
3a. What aspects of the SIP are you Singapore Government, Singapore
satisfied with? System, SIP AC, Infrastructure, 
Human Resources, Business, Costs, 
others (specify)
3b. What aspects of the SIP are you Singapore Government, Singapore
dissatisfied with? System, SIP AC, Infrastructure, 
Human Resources, Business, Costs, 
others (specify)
3c. What is your view of your company’s 
relationship with Singapore?
3d. What is your view of your company’s 
relationship with China?
3e. What is your view of Singapore’s 
relationship with China?
3f. What is the impact of the Asian 
Financial Crisis to your company?
4. Disengagement
4a. What are your views on Singapore’s 
disengagement?
4b. Will Singapore’s disengagement 
affect your company?
4c. Will Singapore’s disengagement
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4d.
affect the SIP?
Will Singapore’s disengagement 
affect future investors?
5. Other estates
5a. What are your views of the SND?
5b. What are your views of the Wuxi 
Industrial Park?
5c. What are your views of any other 
estate in China?
6. Collect respondent’s background
6a. Respondent’s appointment
6b. Respondent’s gender
6c. Respondent’s nationality
6d. Respondent’s China work experience Yes/no, how long.
6e. Respondent’s age group under 30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 
over 50
7. Collect company’s background
7a. Company’s ‘country of origin’
7b. Business license type WFO, JV, Chinese etc.
7c. Business Sector of operations Manufacturing, software, support, 
services etc.
7d. Length of occupancy under 1 year, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, or over 4 
years.
7e. Factory type Own, RBF, commercial, or other 
(specify)
I f . Factory size (by floor size) under 3000 sqm, 3000-5000 sqm, 
5000-10,000 sqm, over 10,000 sqm
7g. Number of employees under 20, 20-50, 50-100, over 100
7h. Size of investment under US$10m, US$ 10-30m, 
US$30-50m, over US$ 50m
7i. Destination of products Local, part-local, re-export etc.
7i- Any other manufacturing operations 
in China? How many? Where?
7k. Any former or current operations in 
Singapore?
7.2 S c h e d u l e  F o r  Sin g a p o r e a n  O f f ic ia l s
1. Intended Competitive Advantages
la. Geographic
lb. Infrastructure
lc. Institutional
2. Assess competitive advantages
2a. Geographic
2b. Infrastructure
2c. Institutional
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3. Describe investment environment
3 a. 1992-1996
3b. 1997-1998
3c. 1999 onwards
4. Disengagement
4a. Reasons for disengagement
4b. Methods of disengagement
4c. Reactions to disengagement
5. Others
5 a. Assess SND
5b. Assess Wuxi
5c. Assess other estates
5d. Views on China economy
5e. View on Asian Financial Crisis
6. Background information
6a. Respondent’s appointment
6b. Respondent’s gender
6c. Respondent’s nationality
6d. Respondent’s SIP work experience
6e. Respondent’s age group
1.3 S ch ed u le  F or S IPAC /C h in ese  Of fic ials
1. Intended Competitive Advantages
la. Geographic
lb. Infrastructure
lc. Institutional
2. Assess competitive advantages
2a. Geographic
2b. Infrastructure
2c. Institutional
3. Describe investment environment
3a. 1992-1996
3b. 1997-1998
3c. 1999 onwards
3d. Asian Financial Crisis
4. Disengagement
4a. Reasons for disengagement
4b. Methods of disengagement
4c. Reactions to disengagement
5. Others
5 a. Assess SND
5b. Assess Wuxi
5c. Assess other estates
5d. Views on China economy
6. Background information
6a. Respondent’s appointment
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6b.
6c.
6d,
6e.
Respondent’s gender 
Respondent’s nationality
Respondent’s SIP AC work Length of time 
experience
Respondent’s age group
1.4 S c h e d u l e  F o r  O f f ic ia l s  o f  O th er  E st a t e s
1. Intended Competitive Advantages
la. Geographic
lb. Infrastructure
lc. Institutional
2. Assess competitive advantages
2a. Geographic
2b. Infrastructure
2c. Institutional
3. Describe investment environment
3a. 1992-1996
3b. 1997-1998
3c. 1999 onwards
3d. Asian Financial Crisis
4. Others
4a. Views on Singapore’s disengagement
4b. Views on other estates
4c. Views on China economy
1.5 S c h e d u l e  F o r  ‘O bse r  vers/O t h e r s  ’
1. Views on SIP
la. SLP’s strengths
lb. SIP’s weaknesses
2. Views on Singapore’s disengagement
2a. Assess the Singapore government
2b. Assess the China government
2c. Assess the Suzhou government
3. Views on other estates
3 a. Views on SND
3b. Views on Wuxi Industrial Park
3c. Views on any other estates
4. Views on China economy
4a. Before Crisis (pre-1997)
4b. During Crisis (1997-1999)
4c. The future (after 1999)
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A p p e n d ix  T h r e e
S e c t io n  O n e : E c o n o m ic  P o l ic ie s  in  t h e  S u z h o u  In d u s t r ia l  P a r k  
Source: CSSD (1999: 15)
‘The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park is awarded the same status as 
the five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Pudong. The corporate income 
tax rate is reduced to 15%, compared to 30% in most of China. At the same 
time, the local corporate income tax of 3% is exempted.
The preferential tax incentives available to foreign manufacturing enterprises 
and infrastructure developers in the park are shown in the table on the next 
page.
In v e s t m e n t  E n v ir o n m e n t - Ta x  In c e n t iv e s  o f  th e  SIP
Corporate Income Tax______________Tax Rate Reduction/Exemption Policy
Foreign Invested Enterprises of a Production Nature 
General 15%
Period of operation exceeds 10 years 15%
Exporting enterprises 15%
Technologically advanced enterprises 15%
Others
Enterprises developing harbours, 15% 
wharves and other infrastructure
Financial institutions with more than 15% 
US$10 million capital investment
Exempted from 3% Local Income 
Tax
As above. In addition, exemption for
2 years from first profit-making year. 
Reduced tax rate of 7.5% for next 3 
years
As above. After first 5 years of 
enjoying the additional tax incentive, 
if export value in any year exceeds 
70% of output value, tax rate is 
reduced to 10%
Exempted from 3% Local Income 
Tax. Exemption for 2 years from first 
profit-making year. Reduced tax rate 
of 7.5% for next 3 years. Thereafter, 
enterprises pay a rate of 10% for next
3 years.
If intended period of operation 
exceeds 15 years, exemption for 5 
years and reduced tax rate of 7.5% 
for next 5 years.
Must exceed 10 years period of 
operation. Exemption for 1st profit- 
making year and reduced tax rate of 
7.5% for next 2 years._____________
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Tax Rebates for re-investments
Re-investments in the same 40%
enterprise, or a new FIE rebate
Re-investments in export-oriented or 100% 
technology advanced enterprises rebate
New FIE must have an operation 
period of more than 5 years; rebate is 
based on corporate income tax 
already paid on sum re-invested 
New FIE must have an operations 
period of more than 5 years; rebate is 
based on tax already paid on sum re­
invested
Withholding Tax
Dividends remitted to foreign 
shareholders
Interest, rental, capital gains, leasing or 
franchise fees
0% Complete Exemption
10% May be further reduced depending on 
Double Taxation Agreements signed 
between China and other countries after 
payment of 5% business tax.
Source: CSSD (1999: 16)
S e c t io n  T w o : T y p e s  o f  R B F s (R e a d y -B u il t  F a c t o r ie s ) in  S u z h o u
OFFERED BY XlNSU
Type Size Notes
LI Standard Factory 4, 258 — 6,300 sq m (total size) 
1,995 — 2, 033 sq m (floor area)
Single and Double-storey 
units
L2 Standard Factor 7, 600 — 8, 700 sq m (total size) 
3, 618 — 3, 786 sq m (floor area)
Double-storey units
M l Flatted Factory Average 2, 820 sq m (floor area) Multi-storey, multi-tenant
HI Flatted Factory Average 3, 778 sq m (floor area) Multi-storey, multi-tenant
Source: Xinsu (1999)
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S e c t io n  T h r e e : S o c ia l  Se c u r it y  a t  t h e  SIP - P r o v id e n t  F u n d  (PF) 
S c h e m e
From 1 April 1997, a new social security system is being implemented in CS- 
SIP. This system is modelled after the Central Provident Fund (CPF) Scheme 
in Singapore. As at end of May 1999, there were 198 companies with 10,697 
employees participating in the PF Scheme.
H o w  P F  Wo rk s
Individual Account
Consolidated Fund Retirement account Medical account 8- Ordinary account
5% 4% 16% (depending on 75-83%
age)
Use of PF Savings
Transition Withdrawable only Major illnesses Purchase and Rental
Management (Used after retirement Hospitalisation (for non-Suzhou
by PF Center) Insurance (4%); residents) of
Outpatient Housing
‘From 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2000 (two year period), both employers 
and employees contribute an equal share of 20% of monthly gross salary. The 
money is deposited with the SIP Provident Fund Management Center (PFMC). 
Of which 95% of contributions are credited to the individual employee 
accounts, while 5% is put into a consolidated fund.
Sa l ie n t  F ea t u r e s  o f  th e  PF S c h e m e  in  CS-SIP
• It applies to PRC employees only; expatriate staff are not included
• Both employers and employees have to contribute to PF monthly
• The rate is the same for employees of all ages, positions and salaries
• The PF contribution is subject to an upper limit. The upper limit (maximum 
contribution) is based on 3 times the average annual gross salary of the 
previous year. The upper limit in 1999 is RMB 2, 600 per month.
• Gross salary includes bonuese, allowances and overtime pay
• Each contributing employee has his/her own individual PF account
• PF contributions are a tax-deductable expense (for employer), and a non- 
taxable income (for employee)
• PF savings are interest bearing
• PF savings are guaranteed by the Finance and Taxation authorities
• Beside PF and work-related injuries, other benefits are provided by 
employers on their own accord and are not mandatory
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Why is  PF b e in g  Im p l e m e n t e d
The PF system is designed to promote joint responsibility of employers and 
employees, and to relieve employers of the administrative burdens of social 
security. It is a break from the old social security system which lumps the 
major part of contributions into a common pool. Instead, the new PF system 
emphasizes individual social security savings and encourages the individual to 
be prudent in consuming housing and medical benefits. In addition, by 
centralising the management of PF savings with the SIP Provident Fund 
Management Center (PFMC), the scheme significantly reduces the 
administrative responsibilities of employers. In drawing up the PF scheme, the 
policies makers’ key considerations are:
• There should be no increase in labour costs to employers
• There should be no decline in employees’ take home pay
• There should be shared responsibility in social security
• PF savings must be secure
• PF should improve attractiveness of working in CS-SIP
• PF must be administratively efficient
•
PF IMPLEMENTA TION
The PF system in CS-SEP is the first of its kind in China, combining 
managment of all 3 major social security elements i.e. housing, medical care 
and retirement.
Employees who are members of PF can make use of the medical account 
savings for themselves and their children’s medical expenses. After the 
ordinary account of PF reaches a certain amount, they can also make use of the 
ordinary account for purchase or rental of a house.
SIP PFMC has published a ‘100 Q&A on PF’. Interested parties may obtain a 
copy from the PF Center.’
Source: CSSD (1999: 38-9).
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A p p e n d ix  F o u r
S e c t io n  O n e : D e t a il s  A b o u t  t h e  CSSD B e f o r e  D is e n g a g e m e n t  
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Co Ltd
Source: CSSD (1999: 8-9)
‘CSSD is the company who is responsible to develop the infrastructure and 
marketing of CS-SIP. It is a joint venture between a Singapore consortium and 
a Chinese consortium.
The Chinese consortium CSIPC has 12 shareholder companies and holds 35% 
of the shares in CSSD. Among the Chinese joint venture partners, there are 
representatives from Suzhou city, Jiangsu Province, and 9 state-owned 
enterprises that report directly to the Central Government.
CSIPC: C h in e se  Sh a r e h o l d e r  o f  CSSD
Jiangsu International Trust and Investment Coprporation 
SIP Economic Development Co Ltd
China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corp 
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co.
China Huaneng Group
China Agricultre Bank Finance Co Ltd
China National Chemicals Import and Export Corp
China National Technical Import and Export Corp
China Energy Conservation Corp
China Central Television
Bank of China Trust and Consultancy Co
China Great Wall Industry Corp ____________ _________________
‘The Singapore consortium SSTD has 24 shareholder companies and is 
chaired by Mr Philip Yeo, Chairman of the Singapore Economic Development 
Board. It holds 65% of the shares in CSSD.
The Singapore consortium of 24 companies includes some of the largest 
publicly listed companies in Singapore and ocmpanies from United States, 
Japan, Korea and Netherlands.
Two key Singapore agencies have also invested in CSSD through their 
investment arms. EDB Investment and Juriong Town Corporations 
International (largest industrial land developer in Singapore) are both 
shareholders.
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SSTD: Foreign Shareholders of CSSD
CDL-Suzhou Investment 
Centerpoint Properties Ltd 
EDB Investments 
GE Capital Services 
Hong Lim Investments 
Hua Ye Holdings
Huaten Investment and Development
JTC International Pte Ltd
Keppel Corporations Ltd
Keppel Land
KMP China Investments
Liang Court Suzhou Investment
Lum Chang (Suzhou) Investment
Mi-Mi Investment Singapore
NTUC Cooperatives Suzhou Investments Pte Ltd
RMA Land Developmemnt
Rodamco China B.V.
Samsung Corporation 
Sembawang Resources Ltd 
Shing Kwan Investment 
SLF International 
STIC Investment 
Sum Cheong (China)
Wing Tai Holdings ___________________
Se c t io n  T w o : O r g a n is a t io n s  In  T h e  S IP
J o in t  Wo r k in g  C o u n c il  (JWC)
• At the working level, the softtware transfer program is uspported by the 
Joint Working Committee (JWC) co-chaired by the Suzhou Mayor and 
EDB Chairman, Philip Yeo.
• The JWC meets regularly (at least once every quarter) to look into 
challenges and issues to the industrial park’s development.
J o in t  S te e r in g  C o u n c il  (JSC)
• At the higher level is the Joint Steering Council (JSC) co-chaired by 
Chinese Vice-Premier Li Lanqing and Singapore Deputy Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong.
• The JSC’s members also include ministers and vice ministers from key 
ministries in China such as the State Planning Commission, SEZ Officer, 
State Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry of Finance, MOFTEC, 
People’s Bank of China and the State Taxation Bureau.
• The JSC meets regularly to review the progress the Park.
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ILLUSTRA TION OF THE ORGANISATIONS IN THE CS-SIP 
________________________Joint Steering Council
VP Li Lanqing DPM BG Lee Hsien Loong
MOF MOFTEC 
SPDC SETC 
State Taxation Bureau 
Jiangsu Government 
Suzhou Government 
General Admin of Customs
Min of Environment 
Min of Trade & Industry 
Ministry of National Development 
Min of Foreign Affairs 
EDB
Joint Working Committee
Suzhou Mayor Chairman SEDB
SH3AC
EDB Suzhou 
(Marketing Support)
SSPO 
(Software Transfer)
CSSD
CSIPC 
35% shareholding
SSTD 
65% shareholding
Source: CSSD (1999:12)
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A p p e n d ix  F iv e
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BY THE CHINESE AND 
SINGAPORE TEAMS ON SUZHOU INDUSTRIAL PARK’S 
DEVELOPMENT
Based on views agreed upon by both sides, the Chinese team represented by 
Mr Liang Baohua, Mr Chen Deming and Mr Xie Jiabin and the Singapore 
team represented by Mr Khaw Boon Wan, Mr Lim Chee Onn and Mr Lim Neo 
Chian have held talks on the relations between Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) 
and Suzhou New District (SND) as well as issues concerning SIP’s 
development. Opinions have been exchanged in a candid and friendly manner 
and consensus has been reached on the following issues.
1. Both sides recalled the agreement between two governments on the 
joint development of SIP. The objectives of the project are to develop good 
bilateral ties, broaden bilateral economic and technological cooperation, 
and deepen the friendship between the two peoples. An industrial park of 
considerable size will be developed in Suzhou. It will have new and high 
technologies as its leading sector and modem industries as its core and will 
be complemented with tertiary industries and social amenities. In the course 
of development, the SIP will independently and selectively adapt 
Singapore’s experience in economic management and pubic administration, 
while taking into account the conditions of The Peoples Republic of China.
2. A review by both, teams shows that SIP has made impressive 
progress in the least 5 years. It has met the targets of the initial phase—by 
becoming one of China’s fastest-growing and most competitive 
development zones. At the same time, positive results have also been 
achieved in adapting Singapore’s economic management and public 
administration experience in developing an industrial park. Both sides share 
the view that the leaders of both countries have consistently accorded a high 
degree of importance and support for the SIP. The achievements of SIP are 
a result of the friendly cooperation and joint efforts between China and 
Singapore.
3. To be carried out in stages, the full development of SIP, which is 
master-planned for 70 km2 will take many years. Both sides agree that 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Co Ltd (CSSD)’s 
current priority is to concentrate on developing the first 8 km2 and strive to 
complete it by 1 Jan 2001, so that it can serve as a model for the remainder 
of the 70 km2. With the help of Singapore Economic Development Board 
(EDB), CSSD will complete the marketing of the remaining industrial land 
in the first 8 km2 (about 70 ha).
4. Consultations have been held on the issue of marketing SIP and 
SND to the outside world. It is agreed that SIP is the largest govemment-to- 
govemment project between China and Singapore—the priority of all
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priorities in Sino-Singapore economic and technological co-operation. Both 
sides declare that they will continue to take every possible measure to speed 
up SIP’s development. The Suzhou Municipal Government (SUM) and 
Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC) will give 
priority by recommending all suitable projects to SIP. The Suzhou Mayor 
will chair regular meetings to avoid disorderly competition between both 
parks for the same project and in order not to confuse investors. SUM and 
SIP AC will further strengthen their cooperation with CSSD to promote SIP 
by actively encouraging investors to make SIP their choice investment site 
and providing investors with a most competitive environment. SUM will 
make a public announcement to reaffirm its full and continued support for 
the priority status of the SIP.
5. SUM will actively encourage and support SND’s participation in 
SIP’s growth as well as forge a good partnership between the two. SUM 
will also take effective measures to encourage population from Suzhou old 
city to move to the park to accelerate SIP’s development and growth. An 
initial population target of 20,000 has been set.
6. One key objective of the adaptation of Singapore’s experience is to 
train and groom a team of Chinese managers who are able to effectively 
take over the management responsibility of CSSD as soon as possible. Both 
sides have reviewed the progress in this effort and agree that the Chinese 
managers will be fully ready to take over the management of CSSD on 1 
Jan 2001.
7. As such, both sides discussed and agree that CSSD will adjust the 
proportions of shares held by the Singapore and Chinese consortiums 
respectively from 1 Jan 2001 .The Chinese consortium will increase its 
shareholding from the present 35% to 65%, while the Singapore consortium 
will reduce its shareholding from the present 65% to 35%. At the same 
time, the majority shareholder’s responsibility of large tract development 
will be handed over to the Chinese side.
8. Both sides agree that the adaptation of Singapore’s experience will 
be accelerated. Software adaptation will focus on (a) speeding up the 
training of Chinese managers; (b) adapting Housing Development Board’s 
experience in public housing, township management and Jurong Town 
Corporation’s experience in industrial parks; (c) adapting Singapore’s IT 
promotion and developmental experiences.
9. Based on SIP’s master plan and principle of phased implementation 
and ‘rolling development’, CSSD will focus its energy on developing the 
first 8 km2. Its movement forward will be in line with the SIP masterplan. It 
will construct infrastructure in advance and at an appropriate pace so that 
SIP’s development will continue uninterrupted towards the set targets.
10. In order to adjust the shareholding proportions of CSSD, its assets 
will have to be valued. Both sides agree that, under ‘PRC’s Law on Joint 
Venture Enterprises’, and the 8th clause of MOFTEC and of the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce’s ‘Rules on Changes in
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Shareholding of Foreign Enterprises’, valuation agencies will be engaged to 
evaluate CSSD’s shares. The valuation results will be used as a basis for 
computing share prices. Both teams have considered SSTD and CSIPC 
shareholders’ intention to restructure CSSD in the future and agree to 
respect their aspirations. Both sides express confidence in CSSD’s future 
prospects and will assist CSSD, through concrete actions, to enable CSSD’s 
early listing.
11. Both sides view that CSSD should plan and work to significantly 
enhance its financial performance. They will assist CSSD to achieve this 
turnaround as soon as possible. Meanwhile, CSSD requires new loan of 
US$ 100 million to meet its operational needs. For this purpose, both 
consortiums will guarantee their share of the additional loan in accordance 
with their relative shareholding in CSSD. Beyond this commitment, it is up 
to SSTD and CSIPC to independently decide whether to inject new funds or 
to guarantee new loans depending on the financial performance of CSSD.
12. The Singapore and Chinese commercial teams have held discussions 
on the outstanding commercial issues. Both sides agree and approve the 
agreement reached at the talks.
13. With the signing of this ‘Memorandum of Understanding on SIP’s 
Development’, both teams will jointly announce the outcome of the 
bilateral discussions in a manner that will boost investor confidence in SIP 
and avoid unnecessary speculation and negative interpretation. After the 
adjustment in the shareholding proportion of CSSD, the Chinese and 
Singapore sides will continue the cooperation and the commitments of 
SUM, SIP AC and CSSD to investors will remain unchanged. Both sides 
will make a public commitment on this.
14. Both sides will continue the friendly cooperation under the principle 
of ‘equality and mutual benefits and sincere cooperation’. The consensus 
documented above reflects the aspiration of both governments to build on 
their warm and close relationship, and the need to safeguard basic interests 
of both countries.
15. This Memorandum has been written in both Chinese and English 
languages. Both Chinese and English texts of the Memorandum shall have 
equal force.
16. This Memorandum is signed by both parties on 28 June 1999 in The 
Republic of Singapore.
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